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P R E F A C E 
Reinhold Niebuhr is widel y acknowledged, by religious and secular 
opinion alike, as the most in f luential Christian social ethicist of the 
twentieth century. For over fifty years he grappled with the issues which 
confronted his native America at a time when that nation was undergoing 
the most dramatic period of change in its history. During this time there 
was considerable debate about method in Christian ethics, but with little 
or no success. 
By contrast Niebuhr hardly seems to have a method, but perhaps behind 
his considerable success lies hidden a method which must be made explicit 
for the contemporary debate in Christian ethics. 
Since we have summarized our argument at the beginning of each 
chapter, it is necessary here only to indicate the main outline of this 
thesis. The contemporary debate in Christian ethics forms the subject 
of our first chapter, and states the problem with which this work is 
concerned. We then examine the formative context of Reinhold Niebuhr's 
life and work, before giving an exposition and critique of his Christian 
realism. The last two chapters seek to elucidate the theological method 
of Reinhold Niebuhr, and to offer an evaluation and critique. 
I stand in the William James 
tradition. He was both an 
empiricist and a religious man, 
and his faith was both the 
consequence and the presupposition 
of his pragmatism - REINHOLD NIEBUHR 
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C H A P T E R 0 N E 
ETHICS AND HISTORY: 
THE PROBLEM STATED 
This introductory chapter is intended to state the problem 
wh h provides the impetus for a study of ths themlogical method 
of Reinhold Niebuhr, and the relation between~past and contempora-
ry event in that method, It is not i.;ntended· th,en:efore to deal 
exhaustively with the question of the relstion be-tw1een ethics 
and history in this chapter, but to indicate the nature of the 
concern which a study of Niebuhr's theological method may help 
to illumine. 
(a) Criteria For Social.Choice 
The immediate concern which g~ves rise to this essay is 
expressed in the question: Can we deduce or derive courses of 
social action from the Faith? Given the almost~.l:imitless 
possibilities opening up for mankin~·in the latter part of the 
twentieth century, through .the ace umu,lation of technological 
developments, what criteria do we have for deciding in business, 
industry, politics, government, or international relations the 
courses of action to be taken? In every area·of modern life 
important and often novel moral issues are arising which make 
the need for criteria for social choice imperative. 
The field of medical research provi~es an example of the 
sort of novel moral issue facing men who fe'el "the care of t 
world" to be their responsibility. Anato1miclal transplantation 
is not ·new, but exciting and disturbing ·possib.Jil.li.ties are opening 
up with the increase of skills, sophis~icated equipment, and 
modern techniques in surgery. Problems arise~with the possibili-
ty of heart, or lung transplantations. The issue now is not 
whether methods can be perfected, but whether·tec~niques which 
have been tried should be used at all. Doctors are asking 
whether the concomitant changes in the psychosomatic make up of 
the recipient in a heart transplant, and the emotional and 
physical strain upon relatives, are really worth the ~xtra years 
of life which such a transplant may offer? Further~ where do you 
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draw the line in organ transplantation? Successful experiments 
have been carried out on animals so that it is now technically 
possible to transplant the head of a dog onto a recipient dog. 
The moral, psychological, and theological implications of such a 
possibility are not hard to imagine. 
A problem raised by transplant surgery relates to the deter-
mination of the 'moment of death' of the possible donor, and the 
related question of who takes responsibility for granting permi-
ssion for a donor's organ to be used in such surgery. On what 
basis is the decision made that such surgery should or should 
not be done? How do we decide the issues raised by anatomical 
transplantation? Whatever criteria are used they will not be 
medical only - the questions posed by the possibilities of organ 
transplantation involve our whole understanding of what man is. 
It is therefore the concern of the theologian. 
The need for criteria for social choice can also be seen in 
the field of industry. Decisions of great importance have to be 
made at different levels of management every day; decisions 
affecting not only the particular plant and the persons working 
there, but the environment in which the industry is situated. 
For exampler the decision to automate an industry which was 
previously labour-intensive because of the competition·being 
experienced, is a dec ion which has wide ramifications. It 
affects those who have worked in that particular industry and 
whose jobs will now be done by machines. Are they to be re-trained 
for other jobs? Who is responsible for such is-training? Can 
the labour market stand the injection of large numbers seeking 
othei job opportunities? The decision to automate affects the 
area in which the industry is situated. Local government, 
schooling, and families will all feel the effects of what might 
appear to be a purely economic decision made by management in the 
face of stiffer competition. Such a decision raises questions 
of which management is well aware, and which involve, ultimately, 
questions about man's function in the world: from the Christian 
point of view, theological questions. 
Questions of social ethics become more pressing and more 
complex as the processes of urbanization and industrialization 
proceed. The possibilities which science is uncovering and 
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technology is making possible raise the question of man's role 
in the wo his purpose and function in this increasingly complex 
world. 
Consider our understanding of work in the modern world, and 
the related quest n of the increase of leisure. Work has been 
understood to be a kind of punishment for sin, and men understood 
as born to be "hewers of wood and drawers of water 11 • Work, in 
this view, ~s an activ y of survival so that we may proceed to 
another and better world. In this understanding of work iw sheer 
hardship and toil is compensated for, and therefore borne, by 
the promise of better things to come. 
In our techonlogical society, however, work can be and is 
understood by many to be creative of a better world, and not 
preparation for another world. Work, in this view, seen to 
be part of the ere ive process which, through the responsible 
use of tech~ological resources of our time, cannot only le to 
the making of a better world, but the promise of a greater increase 
of leisure. Such a view calls for a quite different ethic of 
work, and of leisure, from any which may have been appropriate 
in the past. It raises the question of our understanding of 
'man in the world'. How we dec e the manner which we harnass 
the possibilities of a technological society will depend on our 
'model 1 of manis funct n in the wo Our criteria for social 
cho e will depend on how we understand man in the wo an 
ultimate question, and therefore a theological one. 
The urgent need for an adequate understanding of man as a 
basis for establishing criteria for social choice comes into 
sharp focus when we consider that various disc ines today 
operate with 1 models of man 1 which appear to be contradictory. 
One. writer highlights the problem in the following way: 
"The breakthrough in molecular biology (particular-
ly the breaking of the genetic code of DNA, the 
•secret of life 1 ), and the great advances in the 
'artificial ihtelligence' of computers, have 
reinforced the conviction of some interpreters 
that 'man is just a machine'. Against such 
reductionism, (it can be argued) ..• that the 
models of man as a biochemical organism and 
as a responsible self are not mutually exclusive. 
Let us acknowledge man's unity with nature and 
his biological basis (for whi~impressive evidence 
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(can) be cited from molecular biology, neuro-
physiology, evolutionary theory and ecology). 
But let us also recognize that organisms are 
multilevelled ~stems; events at higher levels 
of organization, especially in man, are without 
parallel at lower levels. Man, in short, can 
be viewed both as a biochemical mechanism and 
as a responsible self . 11 (1) 
The apparently conflicting 'models of man' highlighted in 
the passage just quoted reve 
by inter-disciplinary study. 
the need to achieve some consensus 
For we face an unprecedented 
situation where social choice involves us in questions about 
genetic alteration and control by means of cybernetic systems. 
They also r se the problem whether, in the face of such possibi-
lities, individualist values are adequate. Technological 
innovations have wide ramifications. It is a question whether 
the development of applied science can be lowed to depend on 
corporation profits. This in turn raises the controversial 
question of the degree and manner of control to be exercised by 
government. 
(b) Christian Ethics Today 
Given the issues which se ~n technological society, touched 
on in the preceeding paragraphs, the need for a re-appra al of 
the social ethical task and for criteria for soci choice 
becomes apparent. Can the Christian who is part of the complex 
technological society look for any h p from the tradition in 
which he stands? Wh there is little consensus among Christian 
ethicists, four different types of answer seem to emerge. 
There is vigorous debate among moral theologians about 
deciding how to decide in situations where ethical choice must be 
made. To enter fully into this debate would take us beyond the 
scope and intention of this chapter. It is necessary, however, 
to ind ate the various types of answer which are current in 
the debate, and to indicate some of the problems which they raise. 
To do so we will adopt Frederick Carney's suggestion that three 
basic positions can be identified in Christian ethics today: 
namely, the situationalist approach, the approach based on rules 
( 2) 
or directional norms, and the contextualist position. 





(i) Situation Ethics~ 
The position typified by Joseph fletcher and John Robinson 
appears to take the uncompromising view that it is not possible 
to deduce courses of action from the Faith, except in the sense 
that our understanding of love derives from it. fletcher 
summarizes his position in the following way~ 
"In capsule fashion, it seems to me that we can 
characterize the new morality as a shift away from 
moral law and prescriptive rules and ontologically 
grounded values to situational particularities 
and to a commitment to persons rather than princi-
ples. My own way of formul ing the essence of 
this is in two propositions~ (a) We are commanded 
to love people, not principles, so th the needs 
of human beings come before adherence to any rule 
- .~. and (b) We are to love people and use things, 
1 things' including abstractions such as moral 
principles as well as material objects, so that the 
clue to immorality lies in loving things and using 
people. 11 (3) 
11 Christianly speaking 11 , writes fletcher, 11 the norm or measure 
by which any thought or act n is to be judged a success or 
failure, i.~. right or wrong, is love", and the model of love 
which the Christian uses is the agape of Christ.'( 4 ) Another 
proponent of this view is Jahn Robinson, who has written that 
"love alone, because, as it were, it has a built-in moral compass, 
en ling it to 'home' intuitively upon the deepest need of the 
other, can allow itself to be directed completely by the situa~ 
t
'. II {5) 
~on. 
Both fletcher and Robinson would disclaim the label "existen-
tialist" for their position because a consistent ~xistentialist 
would deny that there are any rules, whereas they argue that there 
is only one 1 rule 1 - the pBapeic principle. Both would presumably 
avow that it net possible to deduce courses of social from the 
faith, except in the sense that the agapeic principle is derived from 
the Faith. They would argue that love must be present in every 
moral act, and that for many situations the best way to decide 
what to do is to examine the situation and apply the agapeic 
princiole directly to it. That is to say, it is only possible 
in the 1 giveness 1 of the moment to act in love. 
The situat nali t~s preach to Christian ethics, exemplifi 
in Fletcher and Robinson. is a controversial one and can be 
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criticized from a number of perspectives. Paul Ramsey~ for 
example~ has argued that it is 11 an ethic of pure act-agape" 
based on "two silent~ unexamined assumptions: (1) that Christian 
love has in itself no breadth to match its personal depth and 
therefore no rule-implying power~ and (2) that love 1 homes 1 in 
only upon the moment in the neighbour's reality~ for which it 
cares." {
6 ) For Ramsey~ therefore 9 the problem inherent in 
this approach is that it asks us to examine the facts of a given 
situation 9 and then to try to determine what is the most loving 
thing to do in that situation. In other words~ agape must be 
applied directly and separately in each situation. 
David Evans concludes his critical evaluation of Fletcher's 
11 love-monism 11 by pointing out that on Fletcher's analysis we 
cannot even be sure what love means 9 and that his account of 
love is a "muddle" in which at least four different. meanings of 
the word are used. For Fletcher~ love is an attitude of goodwill~ 
and the test of a moral action is whether it increases love in 
this sense. In another instance~ the test of a moral action is 
whether it expresses love, Then again 9 love is not an attitude 
but is ~hat an agent does~ and is tested by whether or not it 
produces good consequences. In another meaning~ love is not an 
action but a faculty whereby a moral agent discerns what he ought 
to do. ( 7 ) 
The critique of the situationalist approach does not lie 
merely in its act-agapeism or in the fact that its definition of 
love is "muddled"; it may be that the lack of clarity about love 
can be corrected. The problem with this approach is that the 
fact that we stand in the Hebrew-Christian tradition seems to 
make little difference to the way we arrive at ethical decisions. 
As such it offers little hope to modern man~ confronted as he is 
by a bewildering range of choices and seemingly limitless possi-
bilities. At best we are offered an ideal principle with which 
to work in a complex situation where the consequences of wrong 
choice are wide-ranging and serious. 
While it is true that we must always rema1n under the judge-
ment of the ideal of a~apeic love 9 it is a serious question 
whether the situationalistvs approach is really saying anything 
more than this. If this is so then this approach may be a 
counsel of despair to those who are grappling ~lith the problems 
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and possibilities of our time. 
The essence of NoH.G" Robinson's criticism of the situation-
alist1s approach is that it does not take the biblical-Christian 
tradition seriously. He writes: 
"Love needs to know how persons ought to be treated 9 
as Dr. J.A.T. Rcbinson in spite of himself was 
compelled to admit. Even Professor Fletcher 9 in 
distinguishing his situationalism from anti-
nomianism, allows himself to be 1 fully armed 
with the ethical maxims of his community and its 
heritage 1 and he treats them with res ct as 
illuminators of his problem 1 ; but if love is 
really the only absolute and if all other goods 
are completely relative to the person for whom 
they are goods 9 these maxims look extraordinarily 
like rabbits pulled out of the conjurer's hat • 
••• There is further in Robinson's ethical 
outlook an herent atomism •.• (a consequence 
of which is that) there is in Dr. Robinson's 
ethical teaching no sense of an ethic supple-
mented by a doctrine of history 9 no apparent 
concern for the fate of the moral in history at 
rge wh h is character tic of the Old Testament 
prophets at their best." (8) 
We will have occasion to examinethe method of the Hebrew 
prophet later in this chapter. In the context of the present dis-
cussion the significance of N.H.G. Robinson's reference to the 
Old .Testament prophets is that the Hebrew prophet brought to h 
contemporarysituationan understanding of the way God had dealt 
with His people in the past. In the interplay between the contem-
porary situation and the tradit n in which he stood 1 the prophet 
sought to discern what God was d ng, and therefore what His will 
for His people was. In this view there is a relation between 
ethics and history which is not apparent in the situationalist's 
approach. 
Our negative appraisal of 1 situation ethics' should not 
obscure the merits of this approach. It has rightly stressed the 
need for a serious evaluation of the situation in the process of 
ethical decision-making 1 and that th evaluation should use all 
the resources of rational calculation. fletcher describes what 
he means by "sit~ation" in these termsz it is "the priority in 
decision-making of the objective c umstances 11 • He therefore 
speaks of his ethical method as "an empii'ical, situational~ data-
centred~ fact-minded one - the rational view, in which it is supposed 
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that conscience. is the whole person critic ally examining the 
context of decision rationally, by the rules of discourse and 
logical analysis." (g) 
While this view of ethical decision-making is open to criti-
cism on the grounds of its pragmatism, in that it involves an 
analysis of the situation with little or no recourse to history, 
and little or no reference to moral values other than agapeic love, 
it nevertheless has me t in its stress on the need to evaluate 
the situ ~on. It is a question however whether ethical decision-
making can be as 11 fact-minded 11 , 11 data-centred 11 , and "rational" 
as Fletcher makes out, since most situations of ethical choice 
involve emotion and a conflict of values. It is doubtful, for 
example, whether it is possible for a relative to make a decision 
as rationally as fletcher suggests about giving permis n for the 
use of an organ in a transplant operation where the donor is 
someone he loves. · 
(ii) Normative Ethics~ 
A second answer to emerge from the current debate concerning 
the possibility of deducing courses of social act n from the Faith 
consists of what rney (lO) calls a "defence of d tional 
norms, or ... rules, in Christian eth s. 11 In th view "rules 
differ from principle in that they are concrete standards for 
particular types of situations". More often than not these rules 
"are understood to be expressions of principle, as a sexual rule 
may be thought to be an expression of love." Most supporters of 
this view believe that some (but not all) rules are absolute, in 
the sense that the conte:<t does not change the rule. Thus one 
of the proponents of this view has \ii!IiJcten of "generally valid 
rules of action that love itself imp s 11 , according to which some 
acts Hare as unconditionally wrong as love is unconditionally 
• ht 11 (11) 
r~g • 
Those whom Carney characterizes as defending "direction 
norms'' stand within the natural law or moral law tradition which 
asserts that there are some laws given by God for the guidance of 
our personal and collective life. Most Catholic moral theologians 
stand within this tradition though, as we will show, a serious 
reassessment of this tradition is being made i~ Catholic thought. 
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Within Protestant thought Paul Ramsey has argued that a serious 
examination of the relation between love and natural moral law is 
necessary since.~"there are a number of persons,more or less of the 
neo-orthodox persuasion, who appear resolved to swelter out the 
present moral crisis with their own personal decisions impaled 
on the point of the e}(istential moment or suspended wholly within 
a solution of justification by faith." (12) 
At one level the current debate concerning natural moral 
law centres on whether there can in fact be a 'natural law' at 
all. Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, argues that man's existence 
precedes his essence, and that man defines his essence himself. 
In principle, such a view represents a radical break with the 
natural law tradition in Western thought in both its theological 
and secular forms because it looks not to the structures of reality, 
or to God, or to history for clues to man's essence.; his essence 
and his values are what he creates. following Ramsey's analysis, 
the nature of the challenge to natural morality exemplified in 
Sartre becomes clear~ 
"Sartre quite rightly points out that according 
to traditional theism 'the individual man is the 
realization of a certain concept in the divine 
intellig~nce 1 • This was the import of the 
doctrine of creation, and the theory of natural 
law built upon it. By contrast Sartre may 
also help us to realize what has been insuffi-
ciently acknowledged: that some view of the 
essence of man is also exemplified in God's 
purpose for his creatures in their final 
redemption seen in Christ. Whether the stress 
be placed on creation or on redemption, man has 
in either case an essential nature. The 'essen-
tialist' tradition was only cowardly attentuated, 
according to Sartre, in all non-religious views 
of natural law or theories of a priori values. 
He breaks decisively with all this, and instead 
begins with bare e;dstence. 
Man only is •.• Opto ergo .§.illD.· 'Man is nothing 
else but \illhat he makes himself. 1 ••• For Sartre 
'there is no explaining things away (or, dropping 
out that last prejorative word, there is no 
explaining things ) by reference to a fixed and 
oiven human nature'. 1 Man makes himself. He 
isn't ready-made at the first. In choosing his 
ethics he makes himself, and force• of circum-
stances is such that he cannot abstain from 
choosing one. 1 ••• Man is a fr·ee, self-manufacturing 
being whose freedom 'in every concrete circum-
stance can have no othei' aim than to want itself. 1 " ( 13) 
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Sartre's challenge to natural morality is important because, 
among other things, it provides a clue to understanding what is 
at stake in the situationalist approach to ethics. For it seems 
that with one important reservation there is similarity between 
5artre's view and that of situationalists like Fletcher. Where-
as Sartre holds that there can be no rules or norms which govern 
ethical choice, Fletcher holds that the only norm is agape. This 
reservation granted, Sartre 1 s translator Hazel Brown points to 
the similarity between situation ethics and humanistic existen-
tialism when she writesg "The New Theologians are in complete 
harmony with human tic existentialism in declaring that there 
are no rules, codes, or commandments lll!hich may not be set aside." 
With reference to the challenge of Sartre, Paul Ramsey argues 
that in spite of his radical proposals there is nevertheless a 
'quantity' of natural law in Sartre's position. His position 
"shows that even a man who takes the most extreme measures to 
lighten the boat by emptying it of every concept that hampers 
free movement by legitimizing only some forms of conduct must 
still remain in the boat. To think at all about the nature of 
man Sartre must th k with essences, even if it be only the 
thought that man essentially consists of an ent ely dynamic and 
limitless freedom. However radically reshaped, here surely 
there is a modicum of the natural law." (lS) 
It is significant to note that there is in Protestant 
theology a serious attempt to work towards a doctrine of natural 
morality. Tnis is evidenced in the work of Paul Ramsey who 
argues that "whether the stress be placed on creation or redemp-
tion" man has 11 an essential nature". For this reason, and by 
virtue of the fact that even Sartre cannot avoid a "modicum of 
the natural law", it is the task of theology to work towards a 
doctrine of n ural morality. N.H.G. Robinson's The Groundwork 
of Christian Ethics is a recent example of the view that "it 
is impossible to resolve the dilemmas in the current discussion 
of the C ist n ethic unless one is prepared to affirm a doctrine 
of n :Jral morality, of which the traditional doctrine of natural 
lat,.; '"'as but one possible version. 11 {l6 ) 
In N.H.G. Robinson's view the traditional doctrine of natu-
ral law is "but one possible version" of the ''doctrine of natural 
(14) 
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morality". This distinction is important because it highlights 
the fact that there are difficulties inherent in the traditional 
view which account for the fa~t that within Catholic theology 
that tradition is presently being reassessed. Some of the 
difficulties of the traditional view illustrate not only the 
problernswithin that tradition» but indicate the problems with 
which any attempt at a doctrine of natural morality must contend. 
A major difficulty confronting those who would re-interpret 
traditional natural law ~s that the tradition has its roots in 
a static world-view. The classist methodology could work from 
universal» abstract norms which are applied to particular situa-
tions. A dynamic world-view understands the world of nature as 
having a history» and the whole created order and man 1 s place 
in it as not complete» but as evolving. In a dynamic world-
view a historically conscious methodology has difficulties with 
notions like 'fixed orders of creation 9 cradled in a static 
world-vie~·J. 
Catholic theologian eharles Curran writes that a transition 
from "a classist methodology to a more historically conscious 
methodology" is necessary. A classist methodology "tends to be 
abstract~ ~ priori» deductive» and a-historical. The classist 
world-view attempts to cut through the accidents of time and 
history to arrive at the eternal» universal» and unchanging. 
The Platonic notion of a pre-existing world of ideas well exem-
plifies such a methodCJlogy." (l7) A historically conscious metho-
dology must proceed in a different manner» in which "more attention 
is given to the historical~ the contingent» the personal» and 
the existential (without necessarily denying the other aspects of 
reality) . 11 Curran cites Bernard Lmnergan in this regard. 
Lonergan argues "for a methodology which 1 can apprehend mankind 
as a concrete aggragate developing over time where the locus of 
development andp so to speakp the synthetic bond is the emergencs~ 
expansion~ differentiation~ dialectic of meaning and meaningful 
performance 9 • For Lonergan» meaning is not something fixed» 
staticp and immutable; but shifting» developingp going astray, 
(18) 
and capable of redemption." 
The shift to a "historically conscious methodology" is exem-
(19) plified in Bernard H~ring 1 s notion of kairos. This recognizes 
that individuals and communities ''need a good number of detailed 
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1 rules 1 of conduct" which "tend to become absolute laws in pro-
portion to the immaturity of the leaders and the greater numbers 
of the members of the community," They tend to become absolute 
11 in proportion also to the ability or inability to distinguish 
the moral value from the approximate 1 rule 1 which protects it," 
The people cf Israel 9 for example, needed "protective and restric-
tive rules in order to guarantee internal unity and external 
protection against the alien r igious attitudes of the nations 
around them." According to H~ring, there is however ''an antago-
nism between, on the one hand, an all too 1 natural 1 tendency of 
the greater number, priests, rulers, and subjects, to cling to 
the bare external form of the rules, and on the otherp the 
prophetic spirit which stresses their deeper meaning and leads to 
a synthesis in true love of God and mercy to one's neighbour." 
In the New Testament, H~ring bel ves, the prophetic sp it 
reaches its high point where the Christian no longer faced 
with impersonal rules. but 11 with his master who showed the full 
extent of his love, and with his brother whom he can lovB with 
Christ." The morality of the d ciple is marked by ''spontaneity 
and generos y.n But spontaneity not arbitary, "it comes 
through in the biblical concept of kairos (the moment of favor, 
the moment of decision, the present opportunity), It is God who 
prepares the present opportu~ities within the framework of the 
exter11 8\Jents and even P days 1 which appear to be bad." 
H~ring's understanding of kairos is given in an essay entitled 
"Dynamism and Corrr~inui ty in a Personalistic Approach to Natural 
law. n It provides a.n example of the manner in which the divide 
between 1 nature 1 and 1 grace 1 , which has characterized much 
iiatur law morality, is being overcome in Catholic thought, 
this view, history is taken seriously whilst at the same time 
asser:t~rg that it may contain "moments" of kairos; that is to 
say~ rr:ome .ts in which the grace of God may be discerned, As 
In 
H ing says~ "The full understanding of the meaning of history 9 
of the 1 hour of favour•, and of vigilance for the coming of Christ 
in the2e event belongs to the realm of faith. However, after 
t. e di ~avery of ~ch a fundament attitude as vigilance for 
the prese~t opportunities, good human reasoning appreciates how 
importa~t it is for a fully developed moral life, for maturity 
ethics.n 
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In the world where history is taken seriously, .. and an 
evolutionary motif predominates, the problems and possibilities 
of o~r time call for what Ian Barbour describes as the ''ethics 
' (20) 
of novelty''· Since we now e ethical choices which have 
never arisen _in .human history, the import of Barbour's suggestion 
can be understood. But_an equate ethic for our time cannot 
reject out of hand the need to develop an approach to natural 
morality if it is to take history, including the h tory of 
nature~ seriously. ,By the same token it must be "vigilant" in 
H ing's sense, if it is to be open to what God is doing in the 
present, and open to the· future to which He calls us. .Such an 
ethic will no doubt be fraught with problems, but it cannot in 
principle be ruled out because our world-view is different from 
that in which traditional natural law had its roots. 
(iii) Contextual Ethics 
In the current debate in Christian ethics a third pas ion 
emerges concern~ng the problem of how we arrive at cr eria for 
soc 1 choice. This position is characterized by Paul Lehmann 
in his Ethics in a Christian Context. Lehmann takes the view 
that the context in which ethic decision is made important 9 
and so is the forming of th~ character of the agent who must 
k ~ h d . . ( 21) rna e ~ e ec~s~on. 
Lehmann concentrates his attention on the role of conscience 
in eth s. He speaks of a 11 theonomous 11 conscience operating 
within a th~eefold context: the Church (koinonia), the fa h, 
and th~ objective situation in which the Christian must make his 
dec ions. Thus for Lehmann the Christian br gs to the concrete 
situation a conscience formed in the context of h faith, within 
.the community of the Church. Such a conscience. will, in Leh~ 
mann 1 s view~ be "immediately sensitive" to the situEjtion and make 
a right decision in that situation. Regarding Lehmann's view 
of the· "theonomous" conscience, fletchel: has this criticism to 
make; it is on the "intuition-guidance wing' of the new morality" 
because it pretends 11 that the Spirit-led conscience can trust 
it is being 1 immediately sensitive• to the right action in the 
d . . 't . . li (22) ec~s~ve s~ ua~~on. 
Lehmann has argued that Christian ethics is 11 the d ciplined 
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reflection upon the question and its answer: What am I, as a 
believer in Jesus Chr t and as a member of his church, to 
do?" {23 ) He further argues that "Christian eth s is koinonia 
ethics 11 1 since it is from within the koinonia that the believer 
gets his answer to .the question about what he should do.( 24 ) 
N.H.G. Robinson has crit ized Lehmann in two related 
aspects of his method. In the first place Lehmann makes little 
positive use of natural morality. Although Lehmann does say 
"we cannot ignore 1 the common moral sense of mankind, the 
distilled ethical w dam of the ages'" the problem, according 
to Robinson 1 "is that if, when it comes to the reflective 
discipline of Ch stian ethics, we assign to natural morality no 
positive role we seem to be doing no better than ignoring it. 
It is difficult to believe that 'the common moral sense of mankind' 
is important in practice but not in theory." ( 25 ) 
The weight of Robinson's other crit ism of Lehmann is that 
his notion of koinonia ethics makes little of the i~peratives 
in the biblical-Christian tr ition. That is to say, the tradi-
tion makes no demands upon the Christian. On the contrary, 
Lehmann makes a distinction between imperative and indicative 1n 
his ethic. Following Robinson, "the fact that 'in the koinonia 
one is always fundamentally in an indicative rather than in an 
imperative situation''', leads us to the conclusion 11 that this 
indicative not a divine indicative but a human one, that while 
'the nought" tor cannot be ignored in ethical theory' - one 
would hope not - 'the primary eth al reality is the human ctor, 
the human indicative', in every situation involving the inter-
relationships and the decisions of men'"· 
{26) 
At the beginning of this chapter we suggested that our 
criteria for social choice will depend largely on our 'model' of 
man, a raised the question whether, in our quest for an adequate 
~model 1 of man we can look for criteria in the biblica~Christian 
Lr ition. This le s us to a criticism of hmann's assertion 
that the "primary ethical fteality is the hurr:an factor, the human 
indicatjve." If Lehmann ~F stressing the need to take account 
of all that the sciences can give us in our quest for an adequate 
model of man, his assertion is unexceptionable. But it appears 
that he is s ng more than this. 
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Are we to·depend for our criteria on.the texture of human 
"interralati8nships" te the exclusion of any imperatives there 
might be in the. Faith? Are there no preceptual claims to be made 
upon the texture of the human relationships in Christian ethics? 
Paul Ramsey has argued that the notions of 1 wholeness 1 and 'inter-
. related ness 1 ·, so important in Lehmann 1 s ethics, . draw their 
meanings from contempor~ry thought. .Ramsey writes~ 
"The truth is that in Lehmann 1 s. ethics. the develop-
ment of a.normative ethics of wholeness is. inhibited 
by the degree to which Christian categories prevail, 
and the development of a Christian ethi6s is 
1 frustrated by h readiness to turn elsewhere for 
the meaning ·of maturity. In order to see quite 
clearly 1 . however, . that Lehmann 1 s minimum: notion 
of wholeness is drawn from the philosophy of 
self-realization developed in the modern era~ 
with a li~eral dosage of Freudianism, Dne need 
only ask~ why· is it: more 1 mature 1 for a person 
•to develop organically in interp~rsonal relationships 
than for his maturity to be determined by wholly 
other. claims, commands, obligations, imperatives, 
and by what's right?~·· · 
The business ·of Christian ethics is: to exhibit 
and formulate the impli~ations of 'mature manhood' 
in the N~w ~estament understanding of it as these 
may bear on all .the concrete 'wholes' in the 
world in which men. are called into dis.cipleship. ~ ••. " (27) 
The force of Ramsey's criticism of Lehmann is not blunted if 
we assert that Ramsey's understanding of the ''business of Christian 
ethics", in the above passage 1 is limited by its emphasis .on the 
New Testament. Christian.ethics must surely not exclude the Old 
Testament and the post..;Ei~lical resources of the .Christian tr ition 
in its ".business". 
~!though Lehmann's Jcontextual ethics' is open to substantive 
criticism of the sort. we .have examined here, it does nevertheless 
represent a serious attempt to establish a~method whereby the 
resources ·of the Faith ,th13 role. of community,, and the concrete 
situation are taken into account .. As such it holds prQmise for 
those who search for a way of .making ethical decisions in the face 
of the responsibilities of our time. 
(iv) .An. Ethic of Hope 
There is emerging in the contemporary debate in Christian 
ethics a position which is in important respects different from 
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those which we have thus far examined. Based largely on the work 
of Jurgen Moltmann, this position is characterized by an eschata-
logical emphasis, and proceeds by a process of negation to build 
an ethic of hope. 
Moltmann deals with the problem of an ethic of hope in a 
chapter entitled "Understanding History ~n Christian Social Ethics" 
in his Hope ,and Planning. ( 2 B) What he calls 11 a historical 
ethic of hope" in this chapter presupposes the theological ground-
work of his major book Theology of Hope. ( 2 g) It is beyond our 
scope here to discuss Moltmann's theology as such~ but he does 
indicate the basis for bis eth al approach in a manner which may 
be summarized. 
"For a biblical~ Israelite Christian theology~ the 
reality of man is understood through an eschatalo-
. gical disclosure to be 1 history 1 • • • • Israel did 
not flee from the terrors of history into natural 
eternal laws ••• On the contrary~ she recognized 
and expected the coming of God with the inc culable 
events themselves •.•• the Israelite-Christian man 
stands in the 'apocalypse of that which is. coming'. 
He expects truth to come out of the future of 
God •.• 
·~· According to the biblical conception, man is 
identified and determined in and through that 
history in which he is incorporated by God's 
covenant and promise. His 1 essence 1 , and that 
means his identity continuity, is determined 
by the call of God, by his being called into a 
partnership in the covenant ••• (30) 
·With this understanding of eschatological "disclosure" of the 
"reality of man", Moltmann 1 s next step in building a basis for an 
ethic of hope is to assert the "profanity of human reality'': a 
"Christian theology sees the reality of man as a godless, worldly 
reality, disclosed by the revelation of God in the cross of 
Christ." ( 3l) The process of negat n to which we referred 
earlier is evident in the manner in which Moltmann treats the Cross. 
''If the whole of man's reality is accepted by God in the cross, 
then at the same time man's reality is revealed to him in the cross 
as a reality which is both directed and forsaken by God.'' (J 2 ) 
The conclusion which Moltmann draws from this interpretation of 
the Cross is that man ''finds himself in a godless world which is 
borne a taken up only in the cross of Christ. This is not the 
world on which man can depend. It is the world in which God has 
suffered; only the cross makes it possible to accept it in its 
18 
.total worldliness, through self-abandonment and sacrifice.'' ( 33 ) 
It what sense can Moltmann be searching for an ethic of hope 
if "this is not the world on which man can depend"? His answer 
is that anything which petrifies history. or aspects within history 1 
is challenged by God since history must be open to the future. 
"In the hidden faithfulness of the Spir , man is. directed ahead 
qf h~mself; he acquires future - not an automatic future but 
. rather a historical future - in the departure from the ever-tempting 
s~bterfuges of history into nature and its cyclical pattern or an 
artificial nature produced by technology and its rythms.''. {34 ) • 
Ao important feature of Moltmann 1 s thought is that he univer-
salizes the covenant community, understood in both its Old and New 
Testament senses. "In esch ological expectation and historical 
sacrifice, all nations and men are"included in the community of 
the covenant of God, in the demand of his commandment and the 
1 . ht f h. . ( 
3 5 } T h h t 1 . 1 · t · 1 1g o 1s prom1se.. e esc a o og1ca commun1 y, 1nc u-
ding "all men and nations", is given "direction" by 11 promise and 
commandment" which "destine. the community for an eschatological 
fellowship, i.e. for the assembly of those who live from the hope 
in that future which is determined by the historical event of 
Jesus Chr t." (J 6 } 
The significance for social ethics which Moltmann draws from 
the theologic 
as follows. 
basis summarized in the foregoing paragraphs is 
"{a) The people of God who travel in hope become a 
source of eschatological unrest within a society 
which attempts to save itself from history through 
a dream of technological perfection. The 
eschatological impatience (Claudel) of the community, 
however, basically corresponds to the mess nic 
charad:er of God's history in the world •••• (In) 
this community it can become clear that social 
institutions cannot overcome their temporality 
and relativity, their historicity. They cannot 
perpetuate themselves either mythically or ideal-
logically. 
{b) ••• the people of God ••• also pr!ilvide a 
directive for that society which, confronted with 
unavoidable inst~tutional diversity~ sinks into 
the trauma of resignation in the face of meaning-
less determinism ••.. Here social institutions can 
be made obsolete by being questioned about their 
final purpose and their eschatological justification. 
(c) ••• eschatological impatience and hope relate not 
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only to man in himself, but to the whole man~ to 
soul and body, to the individual in his social 
condition, ••. The eschatological salvation, the 
New Testament soteria, must therefore be interpreted 
more strongly than previously in terms of the Old 
Testament shalom and the concept of the Kingdom of 
God. In the expectation of the shalom, of the 
kingdom of God which comes to earth, of the new 
heaven and the new earth, one can find and give hope 
and courage for a life which is now, for the most 
part, determined only by functions." (37) 
The essay we have summarized was given by Moltmann to a study 
group on 'Sociology and Theology' at the Evangelische Akademie 
in Berlin. The 11 attemp't at a historical ethic of hope" seeks to 
"point in a definite direction", although it cannot present a 
complete picture. Moltmann believes that "the plan of a general 
ethical field theory of Christian hope would also be conceivable. 
Christian action and sufferin~ are the 'fruits of hope 1 • Good 
works do not build the kingdom of God, but hope in· the coming 
kingdom assumes ethical forms within history. Between optimistic 
chiliasm and apocalyptic lethargy Christian life stands in the 
dawn of hope (Rom. 13. ll-14) 11 ( 3 B) 
Moltmann 1 s theology represents an attempt to reinterpret 
Christian faith from an eschatological perspective, and draws 
upon Hegalian philosophy to do so. In the view of William 
Nicholls, Moltmann wishes to break the dominance of Kantian thought 
in moderf}·theology by opting a different view of reality "in 
which the opposition between subjectivity and objectification is 
overcome. •.. Such a project at once puts those who entertain it 
upon Hegalian ground" in that they wish to view history "as a 
process ha~ing inherent meaning and direction, perceived not 
i~serted by the human mind, 11 ( 3 9) 
The key eschatological symbol in Moltmann 1 s theology is the 
Resurrection of Jesus. ( 4 D) He believes that in the face of a 
11 pos~tivistic and mechanistic definition of the nature of history 
as a self-contained system of cause and effect 11 , ( 4 l) theology 
has the possibility of constructing its own concept of history and 
its own view of the tale of history on the basis of a theological 
and eschatological understanding of the resurrection." (
42
) 
It can do this by treating the resurrection as a "history-making" 
event 11 in the light of which all other history is illumined, 




It would be tempting to discuss Moltmann 1 s theology and the 
questions it raises. It is a real question, for example, whether 
the view of history as "a self-contained system of cause and 
effect" which Moltmann wishes to overcome is in fact seriously 
held today. We will have cause to show during-.the course of this 
study that scientists no longer hold a closed view of nature 9 and 
that the positivistic assumptions of an earlier time are seriously 
questioned in the disciplines of history and sociology. Neverthe-
less, the merit of Moltmann 1 s theology is th it represents a 
serious attempt to deal with the prob M of the Resurrection; 
the touchstone of modern theology. 
We have noted that the context of Moltmann 1 s "attempt" at an 
"ethic of hope 11 is a discussion between sociologists and theologians. 
A large part of his essay is taken up with the problems of our 
technological society. It is clear that he sees dangers in a 
technology which 1 clothes 1 itself in the guise of a saviour of 
contemporary society. From a biblical-Christian perspective any 
such view is open to charges of idolatry. We would suggest~ 
however~ that the problem is not that technology takes on such a 
guise, though some may see it as such. Tephnological advance 
does pose serious problems for our timep witness the ecological 
crisis in modern cities. Eut these problems call for criteria 
by which we can decide the manner and extent to which the techno-
log al possibilities of our time can be utiliz 
Paradoxically, Moltmann 1 s' 11 ethic of hope'' seems to offer 
little help to those who grapple with the problems of a technolo-
gical age. The direction he suggests would seem to negate the 
present in the hope of a ''new heaven and a new earth". Will the 
"new earth" be freed 'from technplogy? If so then ·it is r ically 
discontinuous with the present,; and we must presumably believe 
that the hand of God cannot be !seen in the technological society. 
1 
.! 
Those who wrestle with the problems of a technological soc ty 
·' 
can look for no criteria for spcial choice from the Faith except 
in the sense of standing under the ideal of some future "new 
earth". There are those who c~n agree with Moltmann that we 
stand in 11 the dawn of hope 11 , but who would want to see technolo-
gical society as part of that dawn, without believing that it 
represents the ideal society. Boes hope have to negate technology? 
Can we not believe, in Moltmann 1 s terms, that God's "promise and 
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commandment" call us to be responsible stewards of the possibili-
ties of technology? Do we have to agree withfuazillian Reubem 
Alves9 a student of Moltmann, that ''technology ere es a false 
man, a man who learns how to find happiness in what is given to 
him by the system. His soul is created in the image of what 
he can have. 11 (
44
) Alves' A Theology of Human Hope from which 
we have just quoted 9 and his recent Tomorrow's Child (
4 S) seem 
to proceed by negating all that is involved in the technological 
society in order to speak of a new tomorrow. We do not question 
~*H 
the note~which Moltmann and Alves have brought to contemporary 
theology, but we question whether it is necessary to negate tech-
nology as such in order to do this. An eschatological perspec-
tive may provide a vantage point from which to make a radical 
critique of Western society, but its effect in the theologians 
considered is revolutionary. It is a question whether an 
eschatological perspective needs to be revolutionary, in the sense 
of negating the technological society. Is it not possible to 
take an evolutionary view of the world without losing the critical 
vantage point which an esch ological perspective provides? 
(b) Ethics And History In 
The Prophetic Method 
In our discussion of some of the positions which have emerged 
in the contemporary debate about Christian ethics reference has 
been made to the Biblical tradition, as exemplified in the prophets. 
The prophets of Israel deduced courses of social action from 
history. Basic to this was the way in which Israel, as exempli-
fied in the prophetic tradition, understood history. In a key 
passage in his book The Old Testament Against Its Environment 
G.E. Wright sums up the Hebrew view of history: 
"Thus it came about that biblical sense of history 
was born. The contemporary polytheisms, having 
analyzed the problem of life over against nature, 
had little sense of or concern with the signifi-
cance of history. Nature with its changing 
seasons was cyclical, and human life, constantly 
integrating itself with nature in a cyclical 
manner. But Israel was little interests¢ in 
nature, except as God used it together with his 
historical acts to reveal himself and to accomplish 
his purpose. Yahweh was the God of history, the 
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living God unaffected by toe cycles of nature, who 
had set himself to accomplish a definite purpose 
in time. Consequently the religious literature 
of Israel was primarily concerned with the history 
of God's acts in and through his Chosen People. 
The great confessions of faith were primarily 
historical reviews of what God had done and what 
the people had done in response. Their purpose 
was to engender faith, praise, and repentence. 
The story of the past was a guide to the present 
and the key to the future. Both beginning and 
end, creation and~chatology, therefore, became 
an integral p~rt of the Israelite view of 
time." (46) 
The prophets clearly understood .Israel's history as the story 
of Yahweh's plan for His people, and concerned themselves with 
the obligations of such a view of history. History was moving 
toward a goal precisely because God had determined both the 
movement and the goal. Yet, as Wright points out, "Israel could 
not have arrived at this aw~rene~s of the meaning of time apart 
from her theology of election." ( 47 ) 
Not only did the prophets understand the 1 saving events' of 
Israel's history - the Exodus, and the Sinai Eovenant, for example -
in the manner just described. They also saw contemporary events 
in the light of God's activity in history. The prophets had "a 
keen and unprecendented awareness of the great historical move-
ments and changes of their own day and generation", says von 
( 48) 
Rad. 
Amos and Isaiah work in the shadow of Assyria's threat; 
Jeremiah sees impending disaster from the neo-Babylonians; 
Deutro-Isaiah is full of the emergence of the Persian Cyrus; and 
Haggai and Zechariah take account of the events that shook the 
Persian Empire in 521. ,The prophets took contemporary history 
seriously, and when they expounded upon God's new acts in history 
they did so with reference to Israal's 'saving history'. That 
is to say, they used the .1 clue' . derived more often than not from 
the Exodus-Sinai complex of events, by which they und~rstood God's 
workihg out of his purposes in history, to interpret contemporary 
events. Neither the prophet nor his hearers had any way of 
conceiving a dimension outside the saving acts of God in their 
canonical history. 
It should be noted that whilst the prophet sees God to be , 
using Assyria and Babylon as instruments of His will, they too 
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are under His judgement. God is the supreme and undisputed 
controller of history, including the history of Assyria and 
Babylon. "History lies in the hollow of his hand", is the way 
. ( 4 9) 
H.H. Rowley puts it. Assyria is Yahweh's "rod of anger" 
(Isa. 10:5), says the prophet, but "when the Lord performed his 
whole work upon MountZion 11 He will "punish the fruit of the 
stout heart of the king of Assyria" (Isa. 18:12) In this connec-
tion the prophets provide an example of the point we made when 
discussing eschatology in Moltmann~s ethic. For the prophet was 
able to se~ history as moving towards a goal without negating the 
historical realit s. Both Israel's and the destinies of Assyria 
and Babylon are "in the hollow of His hand", and Israel's enemies 
are.seen as working towards this goal. 
_The sense of movement of history towards a future goal, in 
which the promises of the past and the hopes of the present find 
their fulfillment, is a hallmark of the Israelite conception of 
history. It is also the source of our modern conception of 
history in the Western world~ As G.E. Wright points out: 
both.liberal idealism and Marxism have, of course, secularized the 
Biblical conception, but both owe their genesis ultimately to 
this completely unique and revolutionary doctrine." (SO) 
What we.have termed the •prophetic method 1 took past and 
contemporary history seriously in attempting to discern the will 
of God for His people. History, for this rea~on, was important 
in deducing courses of social action. Modern critics, however, 
would refute the contention of the ~rophetic method that it is 
possible to use history in our search for criteria in social 
ethics. 
noted. 
In this connection, the work of Karl Popper must be 
Popper's Critigue of Historicism 
Popper published a refutation of the Marxist theory of 
history called The Poverty of Historicism (1957), which he dedi-
cated to the 11 memory of the countless men and women of all creeds 
or nations or races who fell victims to the fascist and communist 
belief in Inexorable Laws of Historical Destiny." (Sl) 
His book is ~mportant for its critique of historicism as such, 
but from our point of view its importance lies in the fact that 
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Marxism is a secular ed version of the Biblic concept of 
history. Popper's critique, therefore 9 has a bearing on what 
we have said about the prophetic method. 
As Popper states it, the fundamental thesis of his bock 
"that the belief in historic destiny is sheer superstiticn 9 
and that there can be no prediction of the course of human history 
by sc ntific or any ather rational means •.. '' (S 2 ) 
Pepper argues that fer strictly logical reasons it is impossi-
ble to predict the future course of history. Any venture which 
proposes to do this he calls n hi star m". Papper's argument 
is as fallows. The course of human history is influenc by 
the growth of human knowledge. Since there can be no rational 
or scientific way of predicting the future growth of knowledge, 
we cannot predict the future course of human history. This 
means that we must reject the possibility of a scientific theory 
of historical development (he would argue that Marxist theory is 
such an attempt) as a bas far historical prediction. The 
fundamental aim of historicist methods is to develop a method 
which corresponds with theoretical science. Since this is im-
possible, the historicist method is misconceived and historicism 
(53) 
collapses. 
Basic to Popper's critique is his contention that there is 
no way of refuting c ims made by the historicist. They are 
therefore pseudo-scientific. To discuss Pepper's view in detail 
would take us beyond the scope of this essay, but it is important 
to note some of his arguments. Popper denies that scientific 
theories are constructed by inductive methods, from our obser-
vations about the world. In fact they are usually begun as 
bold "hunches" or intuitions out the world. What disting~ishes 
scientific theories from metaphysics or pseudo-science (and 
therefore historicism) is that scientific theory can be tested by 
empirical means. The method of testing is negative in the sense 
that "it must be possible for an empir al scientific system to 
be refuted by experience._" ( 54 ) The method of testing in science 
proceeds by means of the principle of falsifiability. 
The problem with pseudo-scientific theories is that "it 
easy to obtain conf mations or verifications for nearly every 
theory if we look for confirmations." ( 55 ) The principle of 
falsifiability 9 however, enables Popper to distinguish science 
from theories which look like science but are pseudo-science, and 
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which get verification because they interpret all events in 
accordance with their presuppositions, and do not recognize any 
event which may refute them. 
While not strictly speaking a positivist, Popper does favour 
scientific language. He says that the principle of falsifiability 
is not a criterion of meaning~ but a way of distinguishing science 
from pseudo-science. "It draws the line inside meaningful 
1 t d ;t." (
56 ) J ·h M · has shown how anguage, no aroun ~ o n acquarr~e 
Popper's principle of falsifiability has been used by linguistic 
philosophers to show the vacuous character of religious statements 
which seem "to suffer from the vice of irrefutability." { 57 ) 
Macquarrie cites an example: "a man enjoying health and prospe-
rity may say 'God cares for me'. He loses his prospe~ity 1 but 
he still says that God cares for him~ for he retains his·health. 
He falls ill 9 but now he points to the fact that his life is spared 
as evidence that God care~ for him. He eventually dies, but 
his friends claim that God still cares for him in a world beyond. 
Nothing is allowed to refute the assertion. . .• What would need 
to happen to falsify the belief that 'God cares for me'? And if 
nothing is counted as refuting this belief~ then how does it differ 
from the belief that 'God does not care for me'?'' ( 5 B) 
Any discus on of theology's relation to history will have 
to satisfy the requirements of validation. What do we make of 
the prophetic method of understanding historyg in the light of 
Popper? In what way, if any 1 can the statement 'God is at work 
in history' be refuted? Or to put the question another way: 
how can this typically prophetic statement about history be tested? 
We will have reason to deal with the problems posed by these 
questions more than once in the course of this essay. Neverthe-
less we will attempt now to deal with these questions brieflyg 
and in general terms. 
The Prophetic Method and the Question of Validation 
In our discussion of the prophetic method we said that the 
prophets 'came at 1 contemporary history with a historical perspec~ 
tive which had been developed and refined over a long period of 
time. Basic to this was the fact that God was actively working 
out his purposes in history 1 using Israel as His chosen instrument, 
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but using also other events and peoples. for this reason history 
revealed not only th~t God is at work.in the world 1 but so the 
character of God. Questions of man's responsibility before God 
were therefore of paramount importance. Looking at contemporary 
events with this perspective they were bound to ask what God was 
doing in the world 1 ,and what Israel's response should be. 
There is an important sense in which the prophetic method 
is not unlike what Popper calls the "method of hypothesis'' of 
sc nee, which he argues is deductive. A hypothesis is tested 
by empirical means in order to weed out false theories, to find 
the weak points of a theory and to reject it if it is falsified 
by the test. (Sg) It c~n be argued that the prophetic method 
is not unlike the "method of hypothesis 11 • The pr~phet's belief 
in Yahweh has been tested and refined through the course of 
history in terms of human experience, and continues to be tested 
and refined. The question of how this testing took place brings 
us to another important f or in prophecy. 
What the ~rophet said out Yahweh could of course only be 
understood by those who stood in the same tradition as he did. 
What the prophet said was true or false in terms of the tradition 
in which he and his hearers Stood. Truth exists in a tradition. 
There can be no presuppositionless history, as R.G. Collingwood 
has said. Every achievement of historical meaning. is the 
result of asking a specific question based on a "previou y held 
presupposition about reality." ( 6D) Thus the prophet operated 
in a tradition which had a fixed point- the. transc~ndent God who 
entere~ into a covenant relationship with his people Israel. 
The prophet and his hearers operated with the same presupposition 
about reality; namely, the transcendent God at work in history. 
It is for this reason that the prophet could allow nothing 
to refute his basic assertion that 1 d is at work in history', 
without stepping out of the tradition in which this assertion is 
made. But this ~s not to say that this assertion is not tested. 
It is tested on the anvil of experience in the history of Israel 
and is thereby validated or modified. 
A logical point about religious language is evident here. 
If you stand in a tr ition which asserts a Covenant God at work 
~n history, and believe therefore that
1
God enters i~to a 'personal' 
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relationship with His people Israel, then you cannot tell at a 
given moment what set of circumstances in the future will refute 
your belief. If a set of circumstances were to arise, as for 
example in Macquarrie's illustration, which caused you not to hold 
this belief any longer then you can be said to have 'converted 
out' of the belief and the tradition in which it is held. The 
language of personal relationships is the language in which most 
prophetic literature is couched. An example om the field of 
personal relat nships might elucidate the nature of religious 
language. I cannot predict at this point what set of ctors 
would convince me that my wife no longer loves me. Further, I 
would put the best construction on her actions, however unusual, 
explaining perh s that she is t d, or that she is doing this 
for my good, or th she is not well; but not that she does not 
love me. If however I d reach the conviction that she no 
longer loved me, I may well be able, in retrospect, to look at 
certain experiences, events, and circumstances which I could say 
influenced me to believe that she no longer loves me. 
The s nificance we draw from our discussion of the prophetic 
method is that it was in the interplay between presuppositions 
held by faith ('God is at work in history') and contemporary event 
that the prophet deduced courses of social action. History, in 
this view, is revelatory of God's will and therefore meaningful. 
The prophet would agree with Popper's contention th the course 
of history is influenced by human knowledge, but would affirm, 
however, that th knowledge includes an understanding of God. 
This le s him to believe that God is at work in history, and 
that under God history itself is moving toward a goal. Popper 
would call this view ''theistic historicism" which he would include 
in his attack on all forms of historicism which justify the 
''meaning of history" on the basis of presupposition or ideology. 
"History has·no meaning", contends Popper, because neither 
"nature nor history c~n tell us what we ought to do. Facts, 
whether those of nature sr those of history, cannot make decisions 
for. us, they cannot determine the ends· we are going to choose·~"· 
"If we think that history progresses, or that we are bound to 
progress then we commit the same mistake as those who believe 
that history has a meaning that can be discovered in it and. need 
not be given to it. For to progress is to move towards soma kind 
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of end, towards an end which exists for us as human beings. 
History cannot do that; only we, the human individuals can do 
it." (61,) 
To this we would reply that to believe that history is meaning-
ful, and that it is moving towards a goal, as the prophets did, 
is not to say that· we are 11 bound 11 to· progress or to claim divine 
sanction. for particular events in history. It is to affirm, as 
--Reinhold Niebuhr has reminded as , that 'God can make.even the 
wrath of men to please Him •. 1 Popper, it seems, fails to see 
the similarity between the scientist's 11 hunch 11 and the 1 clue 1 
or presupposition which the theist brings to his interpretation 
of history. 
On the logic of Popper's contention we are left only with the 
possibility of Jiliece-m~al social engineering by which we may 
co~rect.error here, and overcome pathology there, but with no 
vision of ends except those.which we create in a partic~lar moment 
of histoty. We believe that John Cumpsty 1 s rejoinder to Popper's 
contention is correct g 11 I think Popper is wrong. In the first 
place becauSe. I think that the alternative to a bad and fixed 
ideology is not the absence of an ideology but a good and self-
transforming one, and second that there is a logic to historicism 
for the theist, who believes that there is a fixed point of refe-
rence and guarantee, bath beyond the historical and discernibly 
. t • • t h • . • t II ( 6 2r) ac ~ve w~ ~n ~ • . 
(c) Summary 
The crucial question for Christian ethics is whether and in 
what manner the Christian .can look to the tradition in which he 
stands for help,in arriving at criteria for social choice in the 
face of the challenges, of our time. We have examined briefly 
some of the answers which emerge in the contemporary debate. 
A study of Reinhold Niebuhr's theological method reveals an 
interplay between the biblical-Christ n tradition and contempo-
rary experience wherein he was able to find criteria for social 
choice. As such it offers help to those who.today search for 
a way of making responsible ethical decisions. 
Niebuhr can be described as a situationalist only to the 
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extent that he took contemporary history seriously. He would 
argue, however, that to say that all we have to help us decide 
is an agapeic principle is too simplistic. 
He is critical of natural law morality. He nevertheless 
appreciates the valid~ty of this view. He would argue that change 
c~lls into question the relevancy of some norms of conduct. He 
would stress that the relation between love and n ural ~ is 
important for personal and social ethics. though revision of the 
tradition is necessary. 
In many respects Niebuhr is 1 contextual 1 in Lehmann 1 s sense, 
tho~gh his estimate of man derived from the biblical-Christian 
tradition to a greater extent than Lehmann 1 s appears to be. As 
such there is in Niebuhr's method a more explicit theological 
groundwork for Christian ethics. 
Niebuhr 1 s 'Christian realis~ 1 would make it difficult for him 
to adopt an eth of hope 1n Moltmann's sense. Niebuhr speaks 
of a 'provisional pessimism' and 'qualified optimism' as the 
proper attitude of the Christian. 
In his theological method Niebuhr reveals a close affinity 
to wh we have called the prophetic method. He derived his 
ethics from a re ing of past and contemporary history. Basic 
to that reading of history was his belief in the sovereignty of 
God over human history. In Popper 1 s terms, Niebuhr 1 s position 
may be described as 1 theistic.historicism 1 because he believed 
history to be both meaningful and revelatory of.God~ His manner 
of viewing history, however, is neither superstitious nor idola-
trous as Popper contends all theistic historicism is~ 
Chapter Two 
THE FORMATIVE CONTEXT 
The purpose of this chapter is to offer· a 
biographical account of Reinhold Niebuhr's life and 
thought, and to trace the 'torturous path' wh~ch led 
him to a Christian realist position. 
Niebuhr's early years considered in the context 
of the rapid economic and social changes in the United 
States. The influence of Niebuhr~s father; his 
academic training; the work of Harnack. 
The min~~try in Detroit: the influence .of the 
Social Gospel; Niabuhr's fight with Henry Ford; 
industrial expansion in Detroit. 
Niebuhr's first decade at Union Theological 
.Seminary, coinciding with the Depressipn of 1929 ~nd 
its aftermath, and the events leading up to the Second 
World War. Niebuhr's search for criteria for scicial 
choice: his move beyond pacificisrn, and ultimately 
beyond socialism. 
The importance of the Gifford.Lectures as a 
turning point in Niebuhr's thought. The in.fluence 
of Augustine, and of Pascal and Kierkegaard, in· 
Niebuhr's Christian Realism. Niebuhr's fight with 
Karl Eart\::1. 
C H A P T E R T W 0 
THE FORMATIVE CONTEXT: 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON REINHOLD NIEBUHR 
For over fifty years Reinhold Niebuhr was engaged in the 
theoretical and practical issues relating to his contemporary 
world. His involvement in social ethics began when he started 
his ministry in Detroit 1n 1915 9 and continued throughout his 
academic career as a teacher of Christian social ethics at the 
Union Theological Seminary from 1929 to his semi-retirement in 
1965. Until his death_in 1971 he remained a much sought after 
analyst of the contemporary social and political scene in the 
United States and oversea. 
In his search for criteria for soci choice Niebuhr was to 
undergo many changes in his thinking. What he described as his 
"simple Ch st n 'liberal' moralism 11 (l) of his early Detroit days 
changed 1n the e of t complexities of the problems in that 
rapidly growing city. Then for a period of time which caincided, 
to some extent, with the depression of the late twenties and early 
thirties Niebuhr attacked the ills of the capitalist society with 
socialist and Marxist critiques. Later, after nearly ten years 
at Union where he came into contact with the mainstream of thought 
in class al and biblical theology, he sought to subject both 
liberal idealism and Marxist theory to the biblical-Christian 
understanding of man's nature and destiny. 
Throughout his life, Niebuhr's thought and the events of 
contemporary history had a profound influence upon each other. 
The interplay between events and h own thinking about those 
events in the light of his faith, caused him to change his outlook 
many times. The ''torturous path" he travelled in his thinking, 
he described as adjusting "the original Protestant heritage of 
individualism and perf~ctionism through a world depression and 
two world wars to the present realities of a highly technical and 
collective culture, facing the perils of a nuclear age."(Z) 
If, as Niebuhr implies, it is possible to relate the 
Protestant heritage" to the complex problems of our technological 
society, exempli ed in the ever-present dangers of nuclear war, 
then it is importan~ to study his theological method. If Niebuhr 
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is successful~ then his method will assist us in answering the 
question w h which we began this essay: namely, is it posiible 
to deduce courses of social action from the ith, 
To understand the "torturous path" which Niebuhr travelled, 
and the interplay between his theology and what he called "present. 
realities", is the purpose of this chapter, To do this we will 
give a brief biographical outline of his life, and examine four 
discernible phases in that path. 
(1) A BIOGRAPHICAL OUTLINE 
Karl Paul Reinhold Niebuhr was born in Wright City, Missouri, 
in 1892, to the wife of a young pastor of the Evangelical Church, 
His father, Gustav Niebuhr, had arrived in the United States at 
the age of seventeen, largely in rebellion against his father and 
against having to spend several years in the rigid German military 
service. 
At school Niebuhr gave indications of the facility for words 
and sens ivity to their meanings which were to mark his adult 
life. He excelled in school debates, and also in writing; winning 
a local contest for short story writing whilst at school. 
From high school, Reinhold and his brother Richard, went to 
Elmhurst 1 a denominational college offering special scholarships 
for ministers 1 sons, ut having no recognised Bacheloi1a degree. 
After four years at Elmhurst 1 the two Niebuhr brothers went to 
Eden Theological Seminary, 
Whilst at Eden, Niebu 1 s father took ill suddenly and d d 
after a short illness. This was in April, 1913. Reinhold went 
on to Yale Divinity School to complete his graduate studies and 
gained a Master of Arts degree. Family needs, and his "boredom 
w h epistemology" prompted him to "forswear (further) graduate 
study and the academic career to which it pointed, and to accept 
a parish of my denomination in Detroit."l 3 ) 
Niebuhr spent the years 1915 to 1928 in his Detroit parish. 
During this time he became actively involved in social and 
political issues. He became a member of the Fellowship of Recon-
ciliation, a pacificist organization. He serVed on the Mayor's 
Committee for Racial Affairs, With the rise of the Ford Motor 
Company in Detroit, Niebuhr work with men like Walter Reuther 
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in the establishment of organized labour unions. Throughout his 
m1n try in Detroit he kept a "notebook'', extracts of which he 
published in 1929 under the title Leaves from the Notebook of a 
Tamed Cynic. In 1927 he published his first book: Does Civiliz-
ation Need Religion?''· As early as 1916 he began writing for 
national magazines, and published some forty articles during his 
stay in Detroit. 
gely as a result of the generosity of Sherwood Eddy, an 
influential figure in Y.M.C.A. 9 N buhr was able to spend time 
speaking to university groups 9 religious and secular 9 in the United 
States. Eddy contributed sufficient money to Niebuhr's Bethel 
congregation to pay for an assistant to enable him to take up 
such speaking engagements. 
When Henry Sloane Coffin became President of the Union Theo-
logical Seminary he invited Niebuhr to take up a teaching post 
there. In late 1928 9 Niebuhr took up the post at Union; the 
Chair of Christ n Ethics. This post he held for the rest of his 
active life. 
During the early years of his stay at Union, Niebuhr was 
instrumental in est lishing the Fellowship of Socialist Christ-
ians. He also became involved in the growing ecumenical movement, 
and attended the World Conference on "Church, Community, and State" 
in Oxfo in 1937. His e y years at Union were marked by a 
critical attitude to capitalist society, largely influenced by 
appropriated socialist and Marxist critiques. In 1932 Niebuhr 
published what he called his "first major work", entitled Moral 
Man and Immoral Society. This book, says Niebuhr, "was not un-
critically Marxist, but it does reveal a failure to recognize the 
ultimate similarities, despite immediate differences, between 
liberal and Marxist utopianism. 11 ( 4 ) 
In 1939, Niebuhr was invited to give the Gifford Lectures at 
Edinburgh University. "I chose", he said, 11 the only subject which 
I could have chosen, because the other fields of Christian thought 
were beyond my competence. I lectured on The Nature and Destiny 
of Man, comparing Biblical with classical and modern conceptions 
of human nature and destiny."(S) The Gifford Lectures, published 
in two volumes, might be called Niebuhr's magnum opus, although 
his biographer points out that Niebuhr did not think so, since he 
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always considered his 'next book' to be his magnum opus. 
Later when Niebuhr ~as invited to give the Lyman Beecher 
Lectures at Yale, the Warrack Lectures at the Scottish Universit-
ies, and to take up a lectureship at the Univers y of Uppsala in 
Sweden 9 he elaborated on the second part of his Gifford Lectures, 
and published a volume entitled Faith and History, in 1949. 
Reflecting on his Gifford Lectures and Faith and History 1n 
his Intellectual Autob graphy, Niebuhr says: 
"the reader would be fair in concluding that I have 
not, in years of theological study, proceeded very 
far from my original ethical and apologetic 
interest. 11 (6) 
The advent of his Gifford Lectures, on Niebuhr's own admission, 
marks a turning point in his work in social and political ethics. 
N buhr continued to publish books and articles. But he 11learned 
gradually to subject both viewpoints (that of classical and 
modern idealismF and Marxist theory) to a Christian criticism. 
I learned increasingly to value highly, rather than be apologetic 
for, the unique emphasis of Biblical faith. 11 ( 7 ) 
If the Gifford Lectures signified the turning point in his 
life, Niebuhr's subsequent writ gs indicate the way in which the 
"unique emphasis" of his biblical-Christian faith served as the 
basis for his profound and penetrating critique and analysis of 
contemporary history. In this sense the faith which he came to 
"value highly" did provide him with criteria for social choice. 
But his theologi~al method is seldom explicitly stated, and seems 
always subordinate to the apologetic and ethical tasks which were 
his primary concerns throughout his life. 
In 1952 he suffered a severe illness from 'which he never 
completely recovered. The last twenty years of his life were spent 
in constant pain. Many believed that his illness would mean a 
premature ,retir~ment. But Niebuhr used the convalescent period 
immediately after that illness to write his The Self in the Dramas 
of History. He retired from Union in 1960 at the age of 68. His 
last full-length book was published in 1965: Man's.Nature and 
His Communities. As far as we know he was still writing for 
journals as late as 1969. During the period 1964 ·~ 1968 he 
returned to Union to offer a seminar in social ethics, first at 
the Seminary, and then in his apartment on Rivers e Drive. 
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N buhr's death in June 1971 was marked by a full-page 
tribute in Time Magazine (June 14, 1971), The esteem in which 
he was held in the United States is indicated by the following 
words from that tribute: 
"For the past four decades, N buhr has been pre-
eminent in his field, the greatest Protestant theo-
logian born in America since Jonathan Edwards, 
Last week N buhr died at 78 in Stockbridge, Mass., 
the same town where Edwards once lived in exile -
banished for his too-demanding theology. The 
funeral was held in the church where Edwards had 
preached, 
Niebuhr left behind him not only a heritage of 
theological realism but a career of political 
involvement almost unique in his profession, .. 
(In the last twenty years of his life) a younger 
generation of Protestant berals was drifting 
away from Niebuhr's concept of constantly con-
tending self-interest to revolutionary third-world 
romanticism. He had decried 1 a too-simple social 
radicalism (th ) does not recognize how quickly 
the poor, the weak 9 the despised of yesterday may 
on gaining a soc 1 victory over their detractors, 
exhibit the same arrogance.' It was a comment 
typical of his hardheaded, pragmatic realism in 
human affairs, His successor as the ~eader of 
Protestant thought cannot avoid dealing with 
Niebuhr's forceful logic; he will have to abandon 
it deliberately or build on it,." 
The formative context of Niebuhr's theology a compound of 
the events of a turbulent period in modern history and his attempts 
to 'adjust" his theological heritage that it may be relevant to 
that history. In order to understand how Niebuhr came to what we 
will call his 'mature' position it is necessary that we now ex-
amine in some detail four distinguishable phases of his life and 
thought. 
(2) THE EARLY YEARS (1892-1914) 
Reinhold Niebuhr was born in the year that Charles and Frank 
Duryea created the first petrol-driven vehicle that actually ran. 
By the time he went to Detroit, motor cars were being mass-produced; 
revolutionizing the soci .and economic life in the United States. 
The advent of the motor car industry, which provide~. job opportun-
ities for the growing numbers of workers in the cities, is 
symbolic of the rapid social and economic changes experienced in 
the United States during the early twenties. 
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In his book The Responsibilities of Power 1900-1929 historian 
George H .. Knoyd'les out lines some of the main atures of. the econ-
. d . 1 h {8 ) A . 1 d . h d om~c an soc~a c ange. gr~cu ture ur~ng t e perio 1900 -
1920 enjoyed a "golden age" in which domestic and foreign markets 
expanded. farm produce in 1899 realized $4.7 billion, in 1920 
Zl9.3 billion. In 1900 60% of the population was rural; in 1920 
48.8%. In the field:· of industry the number.of wage earners 
doubled; wages increased five-fold; cand the value of output ~n 
product n increased six times. The United States enjoyed in-
creased wealth during the first twenty years of the twentieth 
century. .The national wealth in 1900 was $88 .. 5 billion; in 1917 
it was $351.7 billion. KnoWles attributes the increased wealth to 
the discovery of new sources of power, which led to advances in 
technology and a resultant increase in goods and services. 
Demographically, .the population increased by 30 million 
during the period 1900 to 19.20, with a large migration of Negroes 
to the Northern States and an influx of immigrants. In fact, .from 
1900 to 1915 the influx of foreign-born immigrants occurred at the 
rate of one million a year. .By 1910 much of the internal mobility 
in the Unit States was a direct result of growing job opportun-
ities in industry. 
The long term process of urbanization accelerated, during the 
period under review, in response to industrial and commercial 
expansion .. The urban population grew by nearly 40% during 1900 
1910~ and by nea~ly 30% in the following ten years. ~wo fifths 
of the new city dwellers were immigrants; one third came from 
rural areas. .The greatest concentrations of urban population 
occurred North of the Ohio and east of Mississi Cities were 
unprepared for the massive influx of po~ulation, and widespread 
slum areas developed. Of the influx of millions to the northern 
c ies, Knoy(les says: they brought with them "codes of morality 
.imbued in them by a still vigorous evangelical protestantism .• "(9) 
As early as 1897, President Woodrow Wilson had s that it 
was no longer easy to be hwman, for "the once simJ'l'le world" was 
being transformed. (lO) 
Wright City, in which N buhr was born, was populated largely 
by German immigrants. The city's population lt so remote from 
the rest of America that mary people did not bother to learn 
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English. They preferred the German of their own or their fore-
bears pre-immigrant status. 
Pastor Gustav Niebuhr was not unlike the people of Wright 
City. His ~ervices were conducted wholly in German. The Evangel-
ical church which Gustav Niebuhr served was bas ally Lutheran~·an 
offshoot of the Prussian Church Union, "transported to the U.S. 
Middle West as the result of an early nineteenth century immig-
ration from Germany."(ll) In 1934 it joined a lvinist group to 
become the Evangelical and Reformed Church and, in 1956, amalgam-
ated with the Congregational Christian Churches, to become The 
United Church of Christ. 
One of Gustav N buhr's younger colleagues recalls the early 
days of the Evangelical synod~ "(Ours) ... was a small and unknown 
group in the total picture of American church life .. , .All its 
congregations were German speaking or at best bilingua~. This 
German origin constituted a kind of voluntary and also involuntary 
social and religious segregation~"(lZ) 
Gustav Niebuhr trained for the ministry at his denomination's 
Eden Theological Seminary. Reinhold was deeply influenced by his 
father. "The first formative religious influence on my·life 11 , 
writes Niebuhr, 11 was my ther, who combined a vital personal 
piety with a complete freedomin his theological stud s. 11 (l 3 ) He 
combined erudition, piety, and a love for "American egalitarian-
ism and American freedom 11 , (l4 )read Greek or Hebrew every day from 
his Pol·vqlot Bible, and studied Macaulay because of his interest 
in history. 
Recalling the influence his father had on his thinking, 
Niebuhr writes: 
·"My father regarded the tyrannic ·father as a 
symbol of the whole German system and was rather 
more than most immigrants who arrived after 1848, 
ideologically oriented ... and gained a great 
interest in Lincoln .•. (which) lasted throughout 
his life. He was deeply religious and I inheri-
ted interest in religion or rather religious 
conviction.from him ... "(15} 
Niebuhr received encouragement and help from his father 
during his adolescence, when he had decided to enter the ministry. 
He gave his son Greek lessons every. Saturday morning, and encour-
aged him.to re widely. A student of Harnack himself, his father 
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"introduced his sons and daughter to the thought of Harnack. without 
fully shar g the liberal convictions of that theologian 11 , recalls 
N . b h .{16) ~e u r, 
After four years at Elmhurst, Reinhold went to Eden Theolog-
ical Seminary, One of his conte aries writes of that period 
at Eden: " our very inadequate a almost totally unrelated 
tra ing must be heavily discounted as an envirbnmental factor in 
Rein 's development."(l 7 ) Niebuhr 1 s own assessment of that 
training is: 
·"The seminary was in ue~tial in my li prima~ily 
because. of the creative ·effect upon me the 
li of a very remarkable man, Dr S.D.Press, who 
combined a childlike innocency with a gorous 
scholarship in Biblical and stematic subjects. 11 (l8) 
Niebuhr's biographer tells us that Dr Press, on the other 
hand .was so impressed in his turn with Reinhold that he started 
saving his letters from that time, and forty years later sh~red 
them for the compilation of data for Niebuhr's biography. 
Whi~st at Eden Niebuhr's ther died after a severe attack of 
diabetes. O~ly a short while later the discovery was made of the 
insulin that could have saved his life. The small, crucial time-
lag .between Gustav Niebuhr's death and the discovery of insulin, 
characteristic of the breathtaking changes that occurred during 
the early years of Reinhold's life. 
During his stay at Eden, the 1 unsinkable 1 Titanic, pr e of 
the seas, .went down with over a thousand people drowned. N buhr's 
reaction to this disaster was a sign of things to come .. One Df his 
fellow st ents writes of the different reaction to the disaster: 
"I was deeply moved by the sheer numbers of this 
awful tragedy. Rainie kept.commenting on the loss 
of some of the leaders in the realms of art and 
science .•. I ~retested that all men are equally 
precious i~ the sight of Gad. But he insisted 
with his passion for realism that the loss of men 
and women who are making a great contribution to 
the welfare of their .fellows infinitely gr er 
than the loss of the rank and file of the ~uma~ 
family. For me. democracy andre gious concern .•. 
were·equated with a kind of hazy.egalitarianism, 
but .Reinie 1 s keener insight recognized an aristoc-
racy thin the f=amework of democracy namely 
an ar tocracy of character and service to 
hL'ma . 11 (19) 
Niebuhr's denomination had a rule that upon g uation, 
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ministers were sent to any congregation which the synodical 
president might assign to them. However, with the blessing of 
his mother,. and after months of negotiation with his Church, 
Niebuhr took up a scholarship he had applied for at Yale Divin~ty 
School. He applied for a scholarship to Yale because, as he says, 
·"the standards of Union Theologic minary were too high ~or 
me ••• Yale, at that time, had different ones because the divinity 
school was building its up numerically ..• n( 2D) 
Niebuhr went to Yale conscious that he lacked an adequate 
education 1 . even after his years at Elmhurst and Eden. Writing to 
Professor ss at the· time, . he says: "I thought .once that I 
lacked only the B.A., but I have found .since that I lack the 
things that make up a B.A.: philosophy, ethics, sc nee and a 
real course in Engl h ..• I have bluffed my way through pretty 
well by industrious re ing, but I el all the time like a mongrel 
among thoroughbreds and that's what I am.11 ( 2 l) 
At Yale Niebuhr h his first taste of university life and 
good library facilities. He enrolled as a Bachelor of Divinity 
candidate, completed the course requirements, and wrote a thesis 
on 11 The Validity of Religious Experience and the Certainty of 
Religious Knowledge;ft The Dean·of Divinity accepted his applic-
ation to the gr uate school enrolling him as a "special student 11 , 
with the proviso that he maintained an A level average. This con-
cession was made because.his pre-Yale training had, by the standards 
of that institution, not been adequate, Niebuhr maintained the 
required level, and after two years, during which time he held a 
part-time job.in a small ne y church, he g uated with a Master 
of Arts degree. 
His years at Yale influenced Niebuhr a great deal. He found 
~himself part of a minority there. He was a Middle Westerner in 
the heart of the insular East; he was financially impoverished 
among the majority of wealthy students; he was a divinity student 
in what was largely a secular university; and he was of German 
d~scent in an area where German was almost unknown, and at a time 
when, because of the Kaiser and the first World War, .the word was· 
almost synonomous with enemy. 
In 1913 le Divinity School was making a serious attempt to 
relate theology to contemporary society. G.C.Keller, writing on 
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that period. at Yale, points out that Biblical studies were ex-
pected to be scient~fic, .and contemporary conditions were analysed 
in courses like: 'The Systematic Science of Society' and 'The 
Modern labour Movement'.(ZZ) 
In a letter to Prof~ssor Press, Niebuhr listed some of the 
books which he considered worth reading ~t the tim~(ZJ)and includes 








Hub a (sic) .: 
Outlines of a Phil. of Religi6n 
(the best of th-em all) 
Varieties of Religious Experience 
Will to believe 
The Meaning of God in Human Experience 
The Problem of Christianity 
Theism 
Types of Ethical Theories 
Psychological Study of Religion(very negative) 
Working mainly under the supervision of Douglas C Macintosh, 
Niebuhr .worked on his Master's thesis: nThe Contribution of 
Christianity to the. Doctrine of Immortality .. " He received the 
M.A. degree in l915,. and though ssed by Macintosh, decided 
not to pursue doctoral studies at Ya 
After completing his stud s at Yale, Niebuhr was posted to 
. a newly org~nized parish in the city of Detroit. He was, however, 
worried about the prospect of going there for two reasons. He had 
incurred debts during his years at Yale, and:did not know how.he 
was going to liVe on the .5900 per annum offered by the Bethel 
. Church. He felt he had. to do his share of assisting the family, 
and wanted his mother to accompany him. Bingham records that out 
of the .5900·. he h to pay $40 in rent .. "How could you eat?", a 
young minister asked years later. N buhr shrugged, "We couldn't, 
much. 11 (Z 4 ) 
But he was more worried about the attitude the Church would 
take to his liberal views: In a letter,. he writes: 
, 11 I am a good deal worried about my future. In the 
first place ... I have not gone for two years to 
Yale without absorbing a good deal of its liberal-
. ism ... I am a good de worried that my liberalism 
will not at all be liked in our church and will 
jeopardize any influence which I might in time 
have won in our church ... 11 (25) 
In his .Intellectual Autobiography, Niebuhr speaks of the two 
pro ssors at Yale who ihfluenced him most. One was Frank C. Porter, 
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his New Testament theologian, whose. 11 lucid and. comprehensive ex-
position of New Testament theology made a tremendous impression ... 
the notes J took in his classes are the only. school notes I still 
"26) 
preserve."\ 
Douglas C. Macintosh,. his professor of systematic theology, 
"opened the whole world of philosophic and theological learning 
to me .... (he) had written a most comprehensive survey of epistem-
ological theories .. I was thrilled at first with this encyclopedic 
knowledge; but, unfortunately, in time philosophical theor s 
bored me, though I was subsequently to discover that Macintosh's 
challenge, of the age-old alliance between the Christian faith and 
philosophical idealism ~r,~as important. 11 ( 27 ) 
Accompanied by his mother, Reinhold Niebuhr took up his first 
and only pastoral. charge, . at the- age. of twenty three. He describes 
his theological position on going to Detroit in his unpublished 
Later Leaves in this way~ 
"I ... had come to the pastorate with simple 
.Christian .'liberal' moralism. I regarded love 
as the answer to every moral problem. It is, 
indeed, ... But in the process of building 
communities every impulse of love must be trans-
formed into an impulse of justice. 11 (28) 
What were the sources of what Niebuhr calls his "simple 
Christian °liberal 1 moralis~? In part the answer 1 s in his 
upbringing within the conservative and somewhat isolated Evangel-
-ical church; and the influence of his father who combined religious 
conviction with an openness of mind. In part it lies in his ex-
posure at Yale to the prevailing liberal and pragmatic climate of 
the early twenties in the United States, which the historian 
George Kno~les characterizes as a "revolt .against formalism". ( 2 g) 
In part the answer lies in the influence of the Social Gospel 
movement on Nieb~hr, particularly in his early days in Detroit. 
We will examine the sense in which Niebuhr is heir to the Social 
Gospel movement when we discuss his Detroit period in more detail. 
Since the roots of t~at movement may be traced back to Harnack, it 
is important now to examine br fly his influence on American 
liberal theology. 
The effect of the theological position represented by Adolf 
von·Harnack on Continental and American theology ·is important to 
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note at this point because both Barth and Niebuhr reacted strongly 
against that position. Harnack (1851-1930), the German church 
historian and theolo~ian 9 was an outstanding Patristic scholar. 
His seven-volume ~istory of Dogma traced the history of Christian 
doctrine to the Reformation 9 with special attention given to the 
early period, Pre-eminently a church historian, this work never-
theless reflects his own theological position, which in turn owes 
much to the work of Albrecht Ritschl (1822 - 1889). Ritschl had 
argued that religious faith was not reducible to other forms of 
human experience, In a sc~entific age he hoped to show that 
religion has an empirical rather than a metaphysical base, By 
this we mean that Ritschl understood Christian faith not as the 
apprehension of a series of facts by rational means, nor as a 
metaphysical expression of the nature of God, His reaction against 
metaphysics and subjectivism was prompted by his belief that our· 
knowledge of God depends on His revelation of Himself in history, 
A key concept of his theology is his notion of Werturtheile or 
"value-judgements", Theological statements are judgements of value 
1n. the sense that a statement about redemption through the death 
of Jesus, for example, is more than an historical statement, It is 
"an expression of the 'Revelational-value' (Offenbarungswert) of 
Christ for the community which trusts in him as God, 11 ( 30) The so-
called "Ritschlian school' is characterized by its stress on ethics 
and on the Church as the immediate subject of God's revelation, 
and by its repudiation of metaphysics when understood as the pro-
ject for arguing the existence of God on rational grounds. According 
to H.R, Mackintosh~ "By insisting that the Christian mind must at 
every point of relig~ous belief be guided solely by the revelation 
of God in Christ, Ritschl did his utmost to expel any and every 
form of Speculative Rationalism; and it may well be that the future 
historian will reckon this to have been his best service to 
theology. 11 ( 31·) 
Harnack was a student of Ritschl, and has described him as the 
latest of the Church Fathers. Harnack regarded metaphysics as an 
alien intrusion in Christian theology from Greek sources; an 
intrusion he called ."Helenization." In 1900 he published What Is 
Christianity? in which he stressed the ethical teaching of 
Christianity to the exclusion of doctrinal formulations of the 
faith. In this book Harnack focusses attention on the message of 
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Jesus, and, inter alia, argues that the fact: 
"that the whole of Jesus's message may be reduced to 
these two heads - God as the Father, and the human 
soul so ennobled that it can and does unite with 
Him - shows us that the Gospel ... is, therefore, 
religion itself."(32) 
In keeping with the spirit of Neo-Protestantism, Harnack 
argues that the object of religious knowledge is not rational, and 
can only be expressed in symbolic form. The ultimate test of the 
truth of the Gospel is that those who believe, love God and love 
their neighbour as themselves. Says Harnack: 
'~hereal difficulties in the way of the religion 
of the Gospel remain the old ones. In the face 
of them we can 'prove' nothing,· for our proofs 
are only variations of our convictions~ But the 
course which history has taken has surely opened 
up a wide province, in which the Christian sense 
of brotherhood must give practical proof of 
itself ... I mean the social province."(33.) 
For Harnack the task of "scientific" theology is to master the 
object of its knowledge, which is the content of the message of the 
Gospel. On the question of the relation of the Gospel to what 
Harnack calls the ''social province", he reflects what he himself 
calls ''the rationalizing, subjective-religious line of Protestant-
ism."(J4) By this he appears to mean that line in Protestantism 
which emphasizes the need to give reasons for 'the hope that is 
within us 1 , whilst at the same time not attempting to "prove" the 
t r u.t h o f C h r i q t i a n fait h ; sin c e " o u r pro o f s are o n 1 y v a r i at i o n s of 
our convictions". The Gospel, says Harnack:, 
"makes its appeal to the inner man, who, ... always 
remains the same ... 1 ,My kingdom is not of this world'; 
it is no earthly kingdom that the Gospel establishes. 
Not only are these words inconsistent with such a 
political theocracy as the Pope aims at setting up 
and with all worldly dominion; they go much further, 
and forbid all direct formal interference of relig-
ion in worldly affairs. What the Gospel does say is 
this: ... There is only one relation and~ idea 
which you must not violate ... to be a child of God 
and a citizen of His kingdom, and to exercise love."(35) 
In the "social province" the Christian can expect no direct 
help from the Gospel - only the ideal of love for God and love for 
neighbour: 
"How you are to maintain yourself in this life on 
earth, and in what way you are to serve your 
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neighbour, is left to you and your own liberty 
of action •.. Then let us fight, let us struggle, 
let us get justice for the oppressed ... but do 
not let us expect the Gospel to afford us any 
direct help, .. 11 ( 36) 
{3) MINISTRY IN DETROIT: (1915 - 1928) 
When Niebuhr went to Detroit armed with a 11 simple Ch stian 
1 liberal 1 moralism" - not unlike that ennunciated by Harnack - he 
d covered that in the face of the challenges in that growing city 
such moral m was grossly inadequate. 
Part of the liberal teaching at Yale, about which N buhr had 
expressed the fear that his Church would not take kindly, was the 
American Social Gospel tr ition, associated with the name of 
Walter Rauschenbusch whose A Theology For The Social Gospel, based 
on ctures given at Yale, was published just prior to his death 
1n 1918. The roots of the Social Gospel tradition in America may 
be trac from Kant, Ritschl, Harnack, to Rauschenbusch. 
(a) The Social Gospel 
The editors of Christian Ethics, Waldo Beach and H. Richard 
Niebuhr retard the influence of the Social Gospel on Reinhold 
Niebuhr.: 
"Theologically trained in the American Social 
Gospel tradition, Niebuhr found his first parish 
in industrial Detroit in the l920 1 s. Here he 
discovered the confident message of the Social 
Gospel inadequate to the plight of the times, 
just as Rauschenbusch fifty years earlier h 
found pietism irrelevant to the needs of the 
New York slums ... (But) he has remained in part 
a child of the Social Gospel, though i eed a 
rebellious child, and heir to the prophetic and 
sociai passion of Rauschenbusch ... "{37) 
According to Beach and H.R.Niebuhr, the Social Gospel move-
ment, root as 
rise in America 
it was in Continental theology, began its definite 
"after the Civil War. This era of mechanization 
and industrialization, with the enormous upswing of ur~an populat-
ion swollen by immigration ... brought problems of social malad-
justment and poverty to which the t itional message of Protestant 
churches seemed remote and inept. 11 (
3 Bl Among the theological 
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assumptions of the movement were the assertion of the prophet 
understanding of the character of God; that God is at work within 
history for the building of His Kingdom. 
This Kingdom, however, comes by evolutionary growth in the 
view of the social gospel. The movement found an evolutionary 
theory of history "more plausible" than that of the tr itional 
creeds, because it was confident that history is progressing toward 
a better social order. 11 To the extent that men apply Christian 
ideals to their public and private lives, the Kingdom will come. 
This philosophy of history gives to the Social Gospel its great 
hope and impetus for moral endeavour,"(J 9 )is the way Beach and 
H.R.Niebuhr characterize its emphasis. 
Rauschenbusch sought to give a "social dimension" to the 
concepts of sin and salvation, as the following passage indicates: 
~The new thing in the social gospel is the clearness 
and .insistence with w·hich it sets forth the neces-
sity and th~ pass ility of redeeming the historical 
life of humanity from the social wrongs which now 
pervade it and which act as temptations and incite-
ments to evil and as forces of resistance to the 
powers of redemption. Its chief interest is con-
centrated on those manifestations of sin and re-
demption which lie beyond the individual soul. 11 (40) 
A key concept in the "redeeming (of) historic life" is the 
Kingdom of God. "This doctrine", says Rauschenbusch, "is itself 
the social Gospel 11 and theology must "give it a central place and 
revise all other doctrines so that they will articulate organically 
with it. 11 ( 4 l) The Kingdom of God ."is divine in its origin, progress 
and consummation"; it is "necessary to establish that organic union 
between ... theolmgy and ethics 11 ; and it "contains the teleology 
of the Christian religion. It tr~nsl~tes theology from the static 
to the dynamic. 11 The Kingdom is both present and future; it is 
"humanity organized according to the will of God''· And since 
"love is the supreme law of Christ 11 it "implies a progressive reign 
of love in human affairs." The Kingdom "is not confined within the 
limits of.the Church and its activities. It embraces the whole 
of human life. 11 ( 42 ) 
Niebuhr's years in Detro caused him to become increasingly 
critical of the prevailing sp it .of optimism which characterized 
the United States in the 1920's. "There was, as a matter of fact," 
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he says, "little difference between secular and Christian versions 
of the optimism of nineteenth-century ~ulture."{ 4 J) Niebuhr's 
critical attitude was influenced largely by his experiences in 
Detroit. 
During the thirteen years he was pastor of the Bethel Evangel-
ical Church Detroit city grew threefold; from half a million to 
a million and a half. The Bethel congregation grew tenfold; from 
65 to 656. Within four years of Niebuhr 1 s arrival the congregat-
ion was able to stand on its own feet financially and no longer 
needed missionary grants from the Central Church. One year later, 
in 1919, the congregation voted to discontinue the use of German 
in services, being the first 1n the Michigan district of the 
,Evangelical Synod to do so. 
Within seven years of Niebuh~ 1 s arrival in Detroit, the 
Bethel congregation had mOved from its $8,500 chapel to an imposing 
new building on the West Boulevard costing over !128,000. By the 
time Niebuhr left. the annual expenses of the congregation had 
grown from $957 to $18.397; and its benevolence from $75 to $3889. 
The growth of the congregation was in keeping not only with the 
growth of the city itself, but with growth in Church li in 
America. Historian W.W.Stree~. has shown that the ten years after 
the first World War saw a period of unprecedented growth in Church 
1 in the United States when more costly churches were built 
h t . t• (44) t an a any prev1ous 1me. 
Niebuhr's life-long involvement in social ethics. both practi-
cally and theoretically. can be traced to his early days in Detroit. 
For example. in an entry .in 1920, Niebuhr writes in leaves: 
"I am really beginning to like the ministry. J 
think nee I have stopped worrying so much about 
the intellectual problems of religi~n and have 
begun to e~plore some of its ethical problems 
there is more of a thrill in preaching. The real 
meaning of the gospel is in conflict with most of 
the customs and attitudes of our day at so many 
p es that there is adventure in the Christian 
message ... " { 4 5) 
The growth of the automobile industry. and particularly the 
Ford Motor Company, and its effects on the growing numbers of 
workers in that industry gave Niebuhr ample opportunity to ex ore 
ethical problems. What Bingham has called Niebuhr's ''fight with 
Ford 11 is characterist 
Detroit years. 
of his view of social ethics in his 
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(b) fight With ford 
When Niebuhr went to Detroit the automobile industry, in 
particular the Ford Motor Company, was just beginning the rapid 
expansion which was to make Detroit the motor capital of the 
country. The expansion of this industry affected the growth of the 
city which 9 as we have seen, grew from a half a million to a 
·million and a half in population. 
"The resulting facts 11 , writes Niebuhr, "determined my develop-
ment mare than any books which I may have read. For an the one 
hand my congregation grew ... and it numbered in the flock everything 
from auto workers to twa millionaires. On the ather hand, the 
social realities of a rapidly expanding industrial community, before 
the time of the organization of the workers ... farced me to recon-
sider the liberal and highly moralistic creed wh h I had accepted 
as tantamount to the Christian faith. 11 (46 ) 
"I cut my eyeteeth fighting Ford", says Niebuhr of his con-
flict with Henry Fa (47 ) His fight with Ford arose because as a 
minister Niebuhr was worried about the plight of the workers, many 
of whom were in his congregation. He was also concerned to "debunk" 
the mar pretensions of Henry Ford, whose five-dollar-a-day wage 
gave him a world-wide reputation for generosity. "I happened to 
know that same of his workers had an inadequate annual wage, 
whatever the pretensions of the daily wage may have been. Many of 
them lost their homes in the enforced vacations, which became 
longer and longer until the popular demand r the old Model T 
suddenly subsided. and forced a lay-off of almost a year for 
'retaoling 1 • 11 _( 4 B) 
According to Allan Nevins' Ford: The Times, The Man, The 
Company, Detroit was well known as "one of the open shop capitals 
of the land". There was hostility between its industrialists and 
unions, It had a large resource of immigrant labour. There was 
widespread use of adolescent workers. Scant attention was paid 
to safety; Nevins shows that the rate of industrial accidents was 
higher in the United States generally at that time than in Germany 
G t B •t . (49) or rea r1 a1n. 
Ford disapproved of the 'piece-work' prevalent at that time, 
and in its place developed the assembly line which has since been 
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adopted for mass production methods all over the world, In the 
interest of greater efficiency and faster production, 'efficiency 
experts' were hired. These Niebuhr called 11 a group of resourceful 
engineers who understood little out human relations, who analysed 
and directed workers as if they were machines, Prob ms of injury 
an.d age were the workers' problems not his, Ford maintained.(SO) 
It should be noted that the developments and the diffic~lties 
described here in.relat n to the motor industry took place years 
before the Wagner Act of 1935 guaranteed the right of collective 
bargaining by labour unions. These problems and difficulties also 
occurred before industrial unions took the place of craft unions 
in mass-production industries; be child labour was outlawed; 
before unemployment compensation was statutory; and before welfare 
payments saved unemployed workers m starving. 
Henry Ford;s aim was to get the price of motor cars down so 
that more people, including Ford workers, could buy them. To this 
end he increased not only production, but wages. When he needed 
capital for expansion, he cut dividends rather than wages. In 1914, 
Ford announced to the press 11 that the greatest and most successfui 
automobile company in the world" was inaugurating "the greatest 
revolution in the matter of rewards for workers ever known in the 
industrial world."(Sl) 
Much of the press comment on ford 1 s wage policy at the time 
was "ecstatic" as Nevins points ou_t. Later appraisal of his policy 
was also favourable. 
1959, as an example: 
Bingham quotes R.L. uckberger, writing in 
"I con der 1914 a momentous year in history ... 
the year in which Henry Ford, by ... more than 
doubling wages at one stroke, finally freed the 
worker from 1 proletarian 1 servitude and lifted 
him above the 'minimum subsistence' wage ... "{52) 
Ford also took other actions which, in the light of history, 
were forward looking. He hired White and Negro people to work 
together. He also employed handicapped persons, and people with 
gaol reco s. 
ford's 'Five Dollar A Day' wage was almost twice the average 
wage at ather automobile shops in Detroit. H innovation was, he 
believed, an example of 11 profi t sharing and efficiency engi.neer-
ing11. (SJ) He believed that this policy was motivated by two 
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basic aims. 
"The first was to increase the purchasing power 
and living standards of the worker by paying him 
higher wages well above the subsistence level~ 
on the principle that a mass production economy 
requires the dynamics of high consumption. 
The other and more immediate reason was to re-
duce labour turnover and improve worker discipline 
in his own plants at a time when production speed-
ups based on mass moving assembly were becoming 
more commonplace."(54) 
Reinhold Niebuhr vigorously attacked Ford on three grounds: 
his moral pretensions; his five-day-week policy; and his Five 
Dollar A Day wage programme. Writing in The Christian Century 
in December 1926~ Niebuhr asked "How Philanthropic is Henry Ford?" 
Is America justified in acclaiming Ford as a "hero" and a 
"humanitarian''? Ford argued that an adequate wage gives the worker 
security against unemployment and old age. An adequate wage 
obviates any necessity for philanthropy; for this reason Ford· 
refused to support any charitable agencies. 
Citing case histories to prove his point~ Niebuhr shows that 
high w~ges do not protect the worker through periods of unemploy-
ment. In fact "unemployed Ford Workers are the heaviest charge 
upon Detroit charities of any single class of citizens". Over fifty 
percent of the beneficiaries of some charities are Ford workers. 
If you employ a man at ~5 a day~ and then only employ him three 
days a week 9 his salary is below subsistence level~ and his family 
is dependent on charity. Apart from the few thousand highly 
skilled workers in Ford plants 9 "it is hardly possible to find a 
Ford worker who earned more than ~1500 during the past year (1926)", 
N . b h (55) says J.e u r. 
Niebuhr showed that the most important reason for the failure 
of the Ford five-dollar-a-day 9 five-day-week~ is that 85% of the 
men on production lines 11 are in the uniform predicament of having 
only four days work per week if they are fortunate". A five-dollar 
day wage in a shrinking working week means that total wages earned 
over a year are below a minimum subsistence wage. 
Niebuhr also attacked what he called "our incompetent social 
conscience" which can herald the automobile industry as a "model 
of human industrial strategy" in spite of its "distressing social 
consequences". Here, writes Niebuhr, "is a rather striking 
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personality, with more than inary industrial success, with 
humane impulses, now slightly corrupted, and w h a social philos-
ophy not advanced beyond the doctrinaire individualism of the 
nineteenth century; and yet the world imagines that he represents 
th • • • d t . 1 th" IH(S 6 ) some ~ng new ~n ~n us r~a e ~cs. 
An opportunity came in 1926 for Niebuhr to place himself 
publ ly on the side of the worker in Detroit. The Amer an 
Federation of Labour (AFL) arranged a convention in the city ~n 
the hope of attracting the industrial worker to its own craft unions. 
Churches were asked to invite labour speakers to their Sunday even-
ing services. But the Detroit Board of Commerce asked for the 
withdrawal of these invitations. "The fact is that all of the 
churches withdrew their invitations in a rather abject way. That 
e me a little s k about the obvious subservience of the churches 
to the business interest'', says Niebuhr. The only two churches 
that refused to withdraw were my little church and the Unitarian 
Ch h " (57) urc . 
The AFL effort was a vain one, however. A full decade was to 
pass before industrial workers were organised in industrial rather 
than craft un ns. The United Automobile Workers' Union was such a 
union. It is to N buhr's credit, and, an example of his foresight, 
that he recogn ed the need for such unions years before they 
became a reality. In 1927, he wrote: 
"For years the regular agencies of organized labour 
(like the AFL) despaired of organizing Ford workers. 
mposed of foreigners and country boys who had 
little appreciat n of the basic problems of in-
dustrial life, all efforts to organize them failed 
d mally. The time would now seem ripe for a real 
organiiing effort ... A new labour strategy will be 
necessary for this task ... (or) the !evolutionary 
radicals who are now the only spokesmen of the 
discontent of Ford workers will gain an influence 
out of all proportion to their qualities of 
leadership."{58) 
Walter Reuther who became one of the key leaders in the power-
ful United ~utomobile Workers' Union (UAW) and the Congress of 
Indus 1 Organizations (CIO), arrived in Detroit shortly before 
Niebuhr left. He later paid this tribute to Niebuhr: 
" ... I was much impressed and attracted to him as a 
person by his ability to relate religious, ethical 
and moral standards to practical, political and 
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social problems ... Reinie Niebuhr's high sense 
of social idealism as applied to the challenge-
ing problems of our times spoke the language 
that I understood during my formative years and 
the years when I was involved in the early be-
ginnings in the United Automobile Workers."(59) 
As we attempt to evaluate Niebuhr's 'fight' with Ford from 
the perspective of history, certain important learnings for 
Christian social ethics emerge. Ford's struggle to produce a 'car 
for the multitude', utilising technological advances and the 
technique of mass-production 1 and Niebuhr's struggle for labour 
reforms to ease the lot of the worker in the burgeoning automobile 
industry 1 can be described as a microcosm of what was happening 
in the ''progressive era" of American history. 
historians Morris and Greenleaf: 
In the words of 
"Americans in the progressive era witnessed not only 
a reformist assault upon the social evils of large-
scale industrialism, but new advances in the indus-
trialising process that raised levels of product-
ivity and the general standard of living to new 
heights."(60) 
Ford was ln the forefront of the mass-production revolution 
which ushered ln a new epoch in industrial technology. The Ford 
Motor Company pioneered the moving assembly line in the motor 
industry 1 and by 1914 accounted for forty-five percent of the 
total automobile output. The ungainly but durable Model T Ford, 
which incidentally Niebuhr enjoyed owning 1 had achieved global 
useo The phenomenal growth of the automobile industry was in a 
large measure responsible for the revolution in American consump-
tion; for it not only changed the pattern of living of Americans, 
it also gave birth to changes in the industrial field; as auxiliary 
industries grew up around the production of the automobile. 
Ford took other actions which 1 in the light of history, were 
foro111ard-looking 1 although at the time they were condemned by many 
of his fellow entrepeneurs. He hired Whites and Negroes to work 
together at a time when racial tension was rife. He employed 
handicapped persons. He did not turn a prospective employee away 
simply on the grounds of a gaol record. His wage policy 1 and his 
five day week were progressive for a time when the industry was 
in its infancy. 
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The advent of the motor car called into being a vast grouping 
of satellite industries "that eventually made one out of every 
seven jobs in the national economy directly or indirectly dependent 
upon the motorcar and its use". ( 6 l) "It is doubtful", wrote 
historian Harold Faulkner~ "if any mechanical invention in the 
history of the world has influence~ in the same length of time the 
~ (62) 
lives of so many people in an impci~tant way as the motor car." 
It.is to Henry Ford's credit that he was in the forefront of this 
technological revolution. 
Reinhpld Niebuhr shared many of the characteristics of the 
re rmist tradition of·the progressive era in American history. 
According to Morris and .Greenleaf~ this reformist tradition had a 
number of discernible characteristics. It was an urban middle-
class response to the abuses and evils that arose in the wake of 
uncontrol d indust alization and metropolitan expansion. As such 
it sought to improve the quality of li of an an-industrial 
society which had not heeded the social costs of rapid industrial-
ation. The re rmist was a pragmatist, confident that practical 
solutions could be devised; he was an activist, believing that 
sp ited individual and collective action could bring about reform; 
and he was a morali~t, hating injustice and be ving ·in the 
. ( 6 3 ) 
soundness of Amer1can democracy. 
In Detroit, Niebuhr used his considerable gifts to work for 
reforms in labour policies, and in the field of race relations . 
. To his great credit he was to identify and expose some of the 
.deep flaws in the life of that burgeoning city. In that process 
he came to see the inadequacies of his own "Christian 'liberal 1 
moralism 11 which believed.that love was the answer to every moral 
problem: 11 In the process of building communities every impulse 
of love must be transfoimed into an impulse of justice. 11 ( 64 ) 
Much has been written of Niebuhr as 'prophet' 9 and nowhere is 
this more evident than in his fight with Ford in Detroit. In the 
t ition of Amos he brought his gifts aa a speaker and wr~ter to 
bear on injustices that came in the wake of the rapidly growihg 
motor industry and worked .actively for much needed reforms . 
. Given the historical si tuat n 9 ,it is understandable that 
Niebuhr.should have given his energies to what might be termed 
the 'texture' of life in the Detroit of his day. One must question, 
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however, whether that texture did not blind him to the larger 
histor al events which occurred in that pe ad. As we saw in our 
first chapter, the prophetic tradition of the Old Testament took 
history seriously, and concerned itself with discerning God's 
activities and purposes .in history. In this prophet tradition, 
events of history-were judged in terms of how men understood the 
character of God in the 'light·of the Exodus-Sinai complex of events 
in their.past history. Given this basic clue tp God's will and 
person, .men sought to d ern what God was doing in the contempor-
ary situation that they might work with Him. 
One can understand how Niebuhr, who stood in the biblical-
.Christian tr ion, was motivated to work for justice in the social 
order in Detroit, and to denounce a system which caused so much 
human suffering. Eut how is it that Niebuhr could see no good in 
the advent of the motor industry which created new job-opportuni-
ties for a growing population; gave to the average American a new 
mobility; and provided much of the impetus needed to weld the 
automobile workers into a .self-confident, organized group? Is there 
nothing of the creative activity of God in this '.mass-production 
revolution 1 ? Did not the very suffering and injustice against 
which Niebuhr fought, provide the stimulus to change the status 
workers .;.com sed of "foreigners and country boys"- into a 
powerful organized group able to negotiate with the captains of 
industry from a posit n of strength? Is there not something of 
the creative activity of God, albeit through suffering, in this 
remarkable. tr~nsformation in the status of the worker? 
Niebuhr's pessimism about individual and collective man, and 
his sense of impending catastrophe, during his Detroit years and 
his early years at Union, cau him to condemn what Schleisin~er 
has called ''the most massive and brilliant period of political and 
economic experimentation in American history11 .( 6 S) Later Niebuhr was 
to reveal his-characteristic 'courage to change', but at this point 
in his life he was unable to credit the revolutionary changes taking 
place as good, let alone as reflecting G 's creating activity . 
. In .Detroit Niebuhr challenged Ford and worked for justice. 
From Detroit Niebuhr went to New York, and the Union Theological 
Seminary, where he was to devote the rest of his active life to 
the issues of social ethics. 
54 
{4) .FORMATIVE DECADE AT UNION: {1929 - 1939) 
Niebuhr 1 s life in New York was even more hectic than it had 
been in Detroit. It has been said that during his active life he 
worked a 17-hour day. His book-lined office ~n the seminary tower 
was always open to ~tudentsp .and was the scene 8f intense discussion 
with colleagues ~n those. formatiVe years at Union. R cting on 
his apptiintment to the newly-created Chair of Christian Ethics, 
Niebuhr indicates the sense in which his f st ten years were 
formative: 
"This was a hazardous venture,. since my reading in 
the parish had been rather und~sciplined and I had 
no scholarly competence in myfield, not to speak 
of the total field of Ch stian theology. My 
practical interests and the devoting .of every. week-
end to co ge preaching prevented any rapid 
acquisition of competence in my ostensible spec-
iality. It· was therefore a f1.ill decade before I 
could stand before a class and answer the searching 
questions of the students •.. without the ~ense of 
being a· fraud· lrJho. pretended to a ger and more 
comprehensive knowledge.than I possessed. Mean-
wh , the pressure of academic discipline and my 
companionship with the distinguished members of 
the Union faculty did serve to introduce me to 
the main outlines :of Elib cal. faith and to the 
clas al texts of Christian theology. 11 (66) 
(a) Decade Of Prospe;rity 
If N.iebuhr's life was hectic and his thought undergoing change, 
so was life .in New York City and every other major city in the 
United States during that .time. In the '20.' s wrote F .. Scott 
Fitzgerald, the country we:nt on "the· greatest, gaudiest spree in 
his>tory.n( 6 T) By the time Niebuhr went to Union, this "spree" was 
reaching a crescendo. What Fitzgerald called the "Jazz Age", was 
described,by hist ns as the·"Dec e of Prosperity". 
The national income grew from $70.2 billion in 1919 to $87.8 
billion in 1929. The impetus t~ prosperity.was provided by ~n-
- dus expansion •. Labour production climbed 35% between 1922 
and 1925, the value of manufactured goods rose from $60 to $68 
billion between 1925 and 1929. The reasons this expansion can 
be ascribed to the w~descale use of mass production technfques and 
the intensive use of the principles of lscientific management' 
• 
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introduced by Frederick Taylor. In 1929, about Z200 ·million was 
being spent on industrial research.( 6 B) 
Rapid industrial growth brought with it inevitable changes in 
American society. In the words of Morris and Greenleaf: 
"Many of the striking changes in American society 
during the '1 20 1 s were produc by a tidal·wave of 
urbanization that overwhelmed the cultural values 
of an dlder rur society •.. An urban g n of 
twenty-seven millibn re ents accounted for the 
overwhelming share of the nett inbrease of thirty-
one million in the national population between 1910 
and 1930 ... Rural America stood for tradition 
orthodoxy, conformism, and provi~cialism. Urban 
Arne a represented novelty, experimentation, 
plur sm 9 and diversity. . It was a time of contrast 
and .conflict."(69) 
These changes had the effect on the arts; .. on the mus of 
1 the roaring twent s 1 ; on leisure with the owth.of the cinema, 
theatre, .the radio; on the owth of the newspaper industry. New 
possibilities opened up for travel when in 1927 Lin~bergh accom-
plished his transatlantic Solo flight. 
Tremendous advances were made in the field of education. By 
1930, BL 3% ·bf the scho.ol. age population were in elementary and 
secondary schools, one .out .of seven of college age population 
attended institutions of higher learning, and 30$ bf the total 
national income was being s nt on schooling - almost half the 
t.G:tal world expenditure on education. 
In the·light of these advances, .one can understand the pride 
of accomplishment in the Inaugural of President Herbert Hoover·in 
1929:. "In no nation are .the fruits of accomplishment more 
secure.... I have no fears for the future of our country. 
bright with hope."(70) 
It is 
Yet there were gns of inequity and maladjustment below the 
surface of the boom. Of' the 27.5 million families in {_929, nearly 
lf (43$) had incomes of less than Zl500 per annum, and were 
therefore. low the· subsistence leve . Some industries never 
shar the boom, like the shipbuilding, coal mining, and textile 
industries. Throughout the 1 20 1 s the Mid-West experienced a 
farming depression. Unemp~oyment was a Country-wide and constant 
spectre .. In an average year during this dec e three million 
people were unemployed, .and at the height of the boom 1.5 million 
people were looking r work. 
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Niebuhr's biographer describes New York C y at the time he 
went there: 
·"The pre-aeats were staying up all night making 
whoopee, and the stock speculators were staying 
bDsy all day making .money. The fashionable 
businessman wore a small round gold ornament on 
his watch chain bearing the pre-Peale positive 
thinking of the bearded Dr Coue: 1 Every day in 
every way P m getting better and bet t,er 1 • From 
the point of view of the profits this was 
tl ght - 11 (71) exac y ~ 
(b) The Big Crash Of 1929 
Only eight. months after the confident Inaugural of President 
Hoover, the golden bubble of the 1 2Q's burst when the bottom fell 
out of the Wall.Street stock market in October, .1929. Two years 
before Niebuhr had criticizBd the evils of ·~tack manipulation, in 
his Leaves. But neither he nor most others could foresee· the ex-
tent and the duration of the depression that followed the crash, 
and which ,became a world..,.w e phenomenon o It was said of the Great 
Depression: "The U ted St es sneezes and the world catches cold~ 
The stock market crash itself 11 was the result of uncontrolled 
speculation in securit s fed by an easy money market and by a 
limitless optimism that a st turnover on stock purchases in a 
rising market was a sure and·easy path to wealth"~ according to 
Morris and Greenleaf.( 72 ) The market value of all listed securi-
ties rose from $27 billion in .1925 to $87 billion by October 1, 
.19 2 9 0 
The Great Depression was .the product of a number nf causes, 
domestic and foreign, One of the main domest causes was the 
unequal distributi'on of national income, a disproportionately 
large share of which was going to .the rich in the form of dividends 
and interest from industry·and finance, Increases in wages and 
salaries never matched the gains in.the national economy before 
1929, so that by that year it is estimated that one quarter of the 
national income was going to five per cent of the American taxpayers. 
The unequal distribution of the national income had an adverse 
effect Dpon consumer purchasing power. .By 1929, there were· s ns 
that mass buying power was inadequate, in spite of the wider use 
of hire purchase. S~les of motor cars, .radios, electric 
57 
appliances, and other durable g~ods were declining. By 1929, .at 
least one fifth of the-nations' manufacturing resources were not 
being put to use. 
If un r-consumption h its effects on industrial activity, 
gidity-during the 1 20 1 s. Retail p es remained 
·and 1929. In theory at least, technologiCal 
so did the price 
stable between 19 
advances and higher labour productivity should have enabled busi-
ness to cut prices, thereby enabling new buyers to enter the market. 
Yet this did not happen, and price rigid y became a major cause of 
mass unemployment. 
Banking mismanagement and loose credit practices were another 
major reason for the depression. In the decade up to 1930, no 
than two banks failed every day during the ten year ~eriod. 
In 1929 there were 25,330 banks in the United States, and many. of 
them joined in the easy optimism of the 1 20's. No fewer than 3,750 
banks f d.in the year following the depression, and the loss to 
thousands of depositors was a savage blow not only to them, but to 
;public confidenc~ in business leaders. 
The early thirties was a period of terrible and unrelieved 
poverty. and a .time of terrible contrast; contrast between w~at 
people used to have and be, and wha~ people now had and were . 
. Between 1929 and 1932 the national income was slashed by half, the 
flow of investment capital into the economy by ninety per cent; 
industrial production fell by fifty-one per cent; industrial 
Employment by 38% - so that at the peak of the rlepression between 
twelve and sixteen million people ~ere unemployed. Every part of 
the United Stat~s showed the signs of misery and poverty taking 
their toll of human lives. In New York City 30% of the employable 
population was jobless, and because relief resources were severely 
strained some. families were on a weekly relief of .$2.39. The 
picture was the same in other A~erican cities. Among the hardest 
hit were the already depressed farmers. Although their output 
dropped only six per cent between 1929 and 1932, the farm commodity 
prices dropped by a staggering 64%. Bitter poverty and sullen 
discontent replaced easy a confident optimism as the prevailing 
mood of the people. (12M 
The suffering and poverty moved many to a thorough-going 
criticism of the United States. For them the c sis was of such 
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proportions that only revolutionary changes could save the situation. 
They were convinced that the 'New Deal' policies of franklin 
Roosevelt were not sweeping enough. In the week before the Inaug-
ural of President Roosevelt the World Tomorrow (March, 1933) published 
the words of Reinhold Niebuhr that he has since publicly recanted: 
11 (73) 
0 "capitalism is dying and, .. it ought to d 
Murray Kempton, writing in 1955, recalled that Niebuhr's view 
was by no ~eans unusual~ 
"It already hard to remember that only a generation 
ago, there were a number of Americansr of significant 
character and talent, who believed that our society 
was not merely doomed but undeserving of survival ... 
its institutions seemed not just unworthy of preserv-
ation but crying out to be exterminated." (74) 
John Bennett, who worked closely with Niebuhr at Union recalled 
in 1953: 
11 the situation in which many of us ved twenty years 
ago ... was the period of the great depression and at 
the time labour was mostly unorganized and ... help-
less to defend itself against unemployment ... It was 
natural for Christians who were concerned about 
Social Action during that period to become convinced 
that nothing short of socialism was an adequate 
goal ... Often it was enough to say: "Young man go 
left. 11 A straight line to the left of the place 
where we were seemed a clear path of advance. 11 (75) 
Niebuhr was part of the discussions, and at times heated 
arguments, within academic and political groups, about the forms 
social change should take. Should the change be revolutionary, as 
the Communists and extreme Socialists argued? Dr should it be 
evolutionary, resorting not to violence and blood-shed, but to other 
forms of power struggle in the interests of justice and a more-
equal balance of power? And, when change had been achieved, how 
could the new society be prevented from developing other, perhaps 
equally unwanted, kinds of injustice? 
Those concerned with the plight of the United States during 
the depression could see little hope in the policies of Pres ent 
Hoover, or in the philosophy which informed those policies. Hoover 
came to office at a time when America glorified the self-made suc-
cessful businessman of humble origins. Hoover was a symbol of this 
American ideal. In his book American Individualism (1922), Hoover 
claimed that America had evolved a new concept of ''progressive 
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individua sm 11 which he defined as a moral deditation to equality 
of opportunity and the creed of service to the community. The 
dynamic force behind democrat progress was free enterprise; de-
pendent on voluntary effort and self-reliant individualism. 
Hoover nsaw government as an impartial umpire, intervening 
only when it was absolutely necessary to preserve equal opportunity, 
cto he off destructive class warfare, or to stimulate the broadest 
possible distribution of wealth by private means. 11 { 76 ) He saw 
government intervention as a last resort, and even when the de-
pression was at its worst, he never re-examin 
the light of the changing situation. 
his policies in 
In the eyes of Niebuhr and many others concerned to bring about 
real changes in the United States, the 'New Deal' po ies of 
Pres ent Franklin Roosevelt - inaugur ed in March, 1933 - offered 
little hope. Roosevelt came to office du ng the darkest days of 
the Great Depression. One out of every four workers in the United 
States was jobless; pay cuts .had reached such proportions that in 
some industries workers were .getting 5 to 10 cents an hour; and 
private we e agencies could no longer cope so that all relief 
payments were being made by publ treasuries. 
AfterRoosevelt was elected he told a reporter: "The Presidency 
not merely an ministrative office. That's the least of it ... 
It is pre-eminently a place of moral le ership. All our great 
Presidents were leaders of thought at times when historic ideas in 
the life of the nation h to be clarified.'' But Roosevelt was not 
doctrina , he was interested in results. The first phase of the 
New Deal (1933-35) involved measures of bold improvisation to deal 
with the emergency, aimed at stimulating the economy and providing 
federal relief for the impoverished unemployed. From the beginning 
the task of reform was never overlooked. The second phase of the 
New Deal (1935 - 1939) concentrated on the need for reform. The 
New Deal policies helped to pull the nation out of the depression, 
and pave the way forward. 
Greenleaf, the New Deal: 
In the words of historiansMorris and 
"clarified the role of corporate capitalism in a 
mass democracy, ushered in the beginnings of the 
modern 'welfare state' in America, and marked the 
emergence of the administrative state - that is, 
centra ed and positive government equipped with 
new tools of business regu tion and social 
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justice .... it reconciled the claims of private 
enterprise and the general welfare without des-
troying basic freedoms. Mare immediately, by 
raising the battered social morale of the 
American people from the depths of the Great 
Depression, the New Deal restored popular ith 
in the capacity of democratic government to act 
decisively •.. in meeting a fearful crisis.(77) 
It was net until the 40's that Niebuhr was able to give his 
support to the New Deal policies of Roosevelt. During the 30 1 s 
Niebuhr shared with ethers the belief that the decadent features of 
capitalism would lead straight towards total n facism. This 
sense of impending catastrophe is echoed in his Reflections en the 
End of an Era, published in 1934, in which he predicts that "the 
drift" toward scism "is inevitable". Of this pe ad in Niebuhr's 
thinkingi Arthur Schleisinger Jr, says: 
"rebounding m the liberal belief in the inevit-
ability of progress (Niebuhr) was all tee suscept-
ible to an equally extreme belief in the inevit-
ability of catastrophe. The recurrence of the 'end 
of an era' formula in his writings of the thirties 
suggests his shacked scination with the 
pos ility of some basic turn, some drastic 
judgement in history." (78} 
Con~irmation of this view of impending catastrophe came from 
N buhr 1 s contacts in Germany. Niebuhr had warned against Hitler.'s 
rise as early as 1933. His contacts with the German underground 
confirmed his worst rs. Here was a country in which the "drift" 
toward scism was actually taking place. He immediately set about 
helping same of the victims of the rising Third Reich. Paul 
Tillich was one of the many distinguished refugees from Germany 
whom Niebuhr helped to settle in the United St es. His chief 
contact with the Church in Germany was Dietrich nhceffer. 
Bonhoeffer had met Niebuhr at Union. When, in 1939, he decided 
to leave Germany for goad in protest against what was happening 
there, he met Niebuhr in England where he was staying prior to the 
Gifferd Lectures. On hearing of Bonhceffer's plans, Niebuhr 
immed tely cabled Union asking that a pest be found for him. An 
offer was made and Bonhoeffer went to New York, but later decided 
to return to Germany. "I made a mistake", he told Niebuhr the 
last time they saw each other. "The Christ ns in Germany will 
have to decide whether they wish to see the victory of Germany at 
the expense of civilization, or the victory of civilization at the 
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expense of Germany. I would be a coward if I didn't take part. 11 (79) 
Characteristically. Niebuhr's contacts with the German under-
ground were not only religious. His secu r contact was with Karl 
frank (alias Paul Hagen). Hagen was a non-Christian who held to-
gether an underground movement of several hundred members "of the 
noncommunist left" which ~succeeded in smuggling out of Germany 
many people who otherwise would have been tortured or killed. But 
its main emphasis was on staying put and surviving if possible ... 
After the war many of these survivors were in a position to be of 
crucial help in ~he re-establishment of democracy iQ Germany. 
Although they shared different bases for the hope that Germany 
would one day be restored 9 Niebuhr and Hagen worked closely 
together. Later Hagen paid tribute to Niebuhr: "Whatever you may 
think about his thinking, he has the greatest integrity I have 
ever seen •.. 11 ( 80 ) 
By D~cember, 1940 Niebuhr's worst fears about what was happen-
ing in Europe caused him to come out strongly in favour of American 
participation in the World War. Writing in The Chris~ian Century 
Niebuhr argued that, for politic and religious reasons, America, 
which had thus far sought to maintain a position of neutrality, 
should become involved: 
"my primary difficulty in recent months has been, 
not the fear of becoming involved in ~ar 1 but an 
uneasy conscience about living in security while 
other men are dying for principles in which I 
very much believe. The question whether or not 
we shouid declare war is therefore not primarily 
one of morals but of strategy in the sense that I 
be ve we ought to do whatever has to be done to 
prevent the triumph of this intolerable tyranny." (81) 
{c) Beyond Pacifism 
The point of view expressed by Niebuhr in the passage we have 
just cited marks a ical departure from the pacifist position he 
held when he came to Union, and illustrates the sweeping changes 
he underwent in his formative years there. 
When he came to New York he was a leading member of the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation, and for several years its chairman. 
The roots of his pacificism lay in his belief that war on a world 
scale was futile:. that of all conceivable circumstances war was 
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the greatest evil - a position he could defend before the emergence 
of aggressive totalitarianism. As we have seen, in the face of 
scism, Niebuhr vour.'ed war to prevent "intolerab tyranny". His 
pacificism also stemmed from his idealism. All forms of coersion 
therefore created serious problems for him. 
In 1932 Niebuhr broke with pacifism. He resigned from the 
Fel~wshipof Reconciliation, and helped found the Fellowship af 
Socialist Christians. The aim of this Fellowship was to explore, 
and express a form of Christian social action that was neither 
pacifist nor Marxist. Niebuhr's action in this regard arose out 
of his conclu on that there is no intrinsic moral !difference 
between violence and non-violence. In 1932 he wrote: 
"The differences are pragmatic rather than intrinsic. 
The soci consequences of the two methods are 
different, but the differences are in degree rather 
than in kind ... Once the principle of coercion and 
resistance has been accepted as necessary to the 
social struggle, and pure pacifism has thus been 
abandoned, the ~iffer~nces between violence and 
non-violence lose some of their significance though 
they remain important ... 11 (82) 
Niebuhr became one of the sharpest critics of pacifism in 
Church in America, especially during the rise of the Third Reich 
when religious and political pacifists exerted pressure to keep 
the United States out of the War. But at the same time he acknow-
ledged that the cons tent pacifist has an important ro in the 
Church as a judgement on those who are involved in the ambiguities 
of action and motive during a time of war. 
Allowing the need for coercion and violence in the strugg 
for justice, N buhr placed the strongest strictures on morally 
permissible violence. "If violence can be justified at all, its 
terror must have the tempo of a surgeon's skill and healing must 
follow quickly upon its wounds."( 8J) He also believed that non~ 
violent resistance, where this was possible, was morally superior 
because it '"offers the largest possibilities for harmon us relat-
ionship· with the moral and rational factors in social life. 11 ( 84 ) 
The Fellowship of Socialist Christians included a number of 
people who were influential on the American theological scene like 
Paul Tillich, H.Richard Niebuhr, Will Herberg and Liston Pope. 
The group frequently changed its name as its thinking changed in 
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relation to contemporary events. After the War it changed to 
Frontier Fellowship 9 and in 1951 merged with Christian Action. 
At the same time the Group's journal, which started out as Radical 
Religion ln 1935, changed to Christianity and Society in 1940, 
until it merged under the direction of Niebuhr with Christianity 
and Crisis in 1956. 
Tracing the history of the group John Hutchinson says that 
dropping the word 'Socialist' from its name, and 'Radical' from 
its journal, does not imply that its members were no longer radic-
ally critical of social institutions. It meant rather that the 
group had arrived at the conclusion "that Socialism in any precise 
sense of the word was no real cure for the ills of society.''(B 5 ) 
That Niebuhr reached this conclusion is evidence of another major 
transition through which he passed during those formative years 
at Union. 
(d) Beyond Socialism 
Niebuhr's experience in Detroit and during the years of the 
Depression, together with his fears about the threat of war in 
Europe, caused him to discard his "simple 'liberal', Christian 
moralism". In doing so he embarked on a search for more adequate 
criteria for social choice. Reflecting on that search, Niebuhr 
recalls his: 
"rather violent, and sometimes extravagant, reaction 
to what I defined as the 'utopianism', i.e. the 
illusory idealist and individualistic character, of 
a Protestant and bourgeois culture before the world 
depression and two world wars .... My reaction to 
bourgeois individualism prompted me to the error of 
using Marxist ideas to emphasize our new collective 
realities. I can only say in self-defence that, 
despite these absurd inconsistencies, I did succeed 
in escaping all the hallucinations of the left, who 
hailed the Russian Revolution as an emancipation 
for all mankind without noting that its annulment 
of freedom made the Stalinist despotism almost 
inevitable." (86) 
During the early thirties Niebuhr wrote two books which re-
flect his acceptance of much of the Marxist diagnosis of the 
contemporary historical situation and its prescription for the 
problems of a decaying Capitalism. In 1932 he published Moral Man 
and Immoral Society. The thesis Qf this book is that a sharp 
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distinction must be drawn between the moral and social behaviour of 
individuals, and the moral and social behaviour of groups; and that 
this distinction shows up the inadequacy of an individualistic ethic 
for social political problems, The book caused a great deal of 
controversy, both at home and abro In fact the first British 
edition appeared only in 1963, largely because theological publishers 
who might have been interested in it, maintained that it was not a 
Christian book,. Tb view was shared by religious and secular 
idealists in America in the 30's at whom the book was aimed. 
His other book, published in 1934 under the title Reflections 
on the End of an Era, expresses a sense of impending catastrophe 
largely informed by his re ing of Marxist theory, The files of 
Radical Religion for which he wrote most of the editorials reflect 
his use of Marxism as an instrument of criticism of liberal Christian-
ity, especially during the period 1935-1939. Th journal which 
started in 1935 carried an initi editorial in which Niebuhr out-
lined his view of Marxism, After criticising liberal Christianity 
and reviewing the class struggle, N buhr goes on ~o say: 
"We believe that a capitalistic society is destroying 
itself and yet that it must be destroyed, lest it 
reduce, in the delirium of its d integration, our 
whole civilization to barbarism, We believe that 
the social ownership of the means of production is 
the only basis of health and justice for a technic-
al a e, We believe that such a society can be 
est lished only through a social struggle and that 
in th struggle we ought to be on the side of the 
workingman, In these things we support socialism 
wholeheartedly," (87) 
The use of the terms Marxism and Socialism need to be explained 
relation to N buhr 1 s thinking, Niebuhrfs rejection of Capital-
ism and his advocacy of Socialism began earlier and outlasted the 
influence of Marxism on his thinking, His Socialism began in 1930 
when he left the Fellowship of Reconciliation and lasted until about 
1948 when he became aware of the problems of incentive and bureau-
cracy under Socialism during a visit to England. At the same time 
he came to accept the policies of the New Deal and Fair Deal in 
American politics as 11 the pattern of a creative revolution in 
America." By 1949 Niebuhr was saying: 11 Christian Socialism is no 
longer a viable compound. 11 ( 88 ) 
There was, however, a time during the 30's when Niebuhr's 
criticism of Capit m went far beyond the acceptance of Socialism 
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as an alternative social system. He accepted with few reservations 
the Marxist reading of history. and adopted what he called a 
Christ n Marxist position. (B 9 ) But, as we have seen, his reserva-
tions were important. By 1940 his reservations about Marxist 
'utopian m', and its den 1 of freedom, made Niebuhr one of 
America's sharpest critics of Marxism, Writing in 1956, John 
Bennett says: "today Communism has no opponent 1n this country 
who knows how to deal it a deadlier blow on the intellectual and 
spiritual level. 11 ( 9D) 
In the early 30's Niebuhr became practically involved in 
American political life. The Sociali Party, under the leadership 
of Norman Thomas, opposed the Republican and Democratic parties, 
and N buhr gave it his support. Thomas ran for President of the 
United States in 1932 and 1936 and Niebuhr supported him, In fact 
Niebuhr~ somewhat unwillingly, was the Socia st Party candidate 
for the upper west side of New York C y for the American Congress 
in 1930. He was an unwilling candidate because·his name was put 
forward whilst he was road, in Russia, and his declination ~rived 
too 1 e. He was, however, heavily defeated in the election and 
gained only a few thousand votes. 
Characteristically an activist, Niebuhr was involved in many 
programmes of social action - religious and secular - during the 
thirt s and forties. Press once drew a distinction between 
Reinhold and his brother Richard by saying that if an organization 
was doing ~ good thing Reinhold would join it and Richard would 
not. During this period there were many permanent and ad hoc 
organizations; Niebuhr gave his support to over one hundred of 
them. Toward the end of the thirties, however, Niebuhr resigned 
from the Socialist Party largely because he was disillusioned by 
the ineffectiveness and isolationism of the party, but also because 
he was undergoing major changes in his thinking. 
The invitation to give the Gifford Lectures led Niebuhr to do 
•some intense theological reflection in preparation for the writing 
of his The Nature and Destiny of Man, the subject of those lectures. 
This reflection, together with the cumulative effect of being 
exposed at Union to the mainstream of Biblical and theological 
thinking, brought Niebuhr to the 1 re t' position which he adopted 
during his mature years. 
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{5} NIEBUHR'S MATURE YEARS {1939 - 1971) 
The preparation and delivery of his Gifford Lectures could 
not have come at a more significant moment for Niebuhr. They mark 
perhaps the most important turning point of his life because they 
enabled him to analyse and evaluate the dramatic processes of change 
that had characterized his life and thought up to the late 1930's. 
The theological frame of reference that was to mark his subsequent 
work was given expression in those lectures. The lectures could 
not have come at a more difficult time. The war, which the world 
vainly hoped would not materialize, had broken out. It is said 
that bombs fell in Edinburgh, in 1939, when Niebuhr gave his 
lectures, and that he did not even look up. 
We describe the phase Niebuhr embarked upon with the delivery 
of the Gifford Lectures as his •mature years'. We use this p~~ase 
to denote the notable consistency of approach which characterized 
this period of his life. Niebuhr has himself indicated that his 
apologet and ethic interests did not change greatly ~n those 
years. In subsequent chapters we will examine the changes in 
emphasis discernible in his mature years, as he sought to grapple 
with contemporary problems. But these are changes in emphasis 
rather than fundamental changes of the sort that characterized 
his pre-Gifford years. 
Writing in the Living Library Volume*on Reinhold Niebuhr, 
John Bennett describes the way in which he came to his mature 
position in these words: 
"Reinhold Niebuhr's social ethics are close to the 
center of his thought. The center is doubtless to 
be found in his theology; but, more than with 
other theologians, his theology has developed in 
response to his reading of contemporary history and 
to his reflections upon his own social and polit-
ical responsibility in that history ..• His theology 
is in immediate control over his social ethics; but 
there is here no one-way deductive process, for in 
a large measure his theology has developed as he 
has sought answers to problems which first became 
acute to him as a teacher of ethics and as a parti-
cipant in public affairs. Both his theolo y and 
Racial ethics have deep roots in personal ith, 
in what he calls 'Biblical ith 1 ••• 11 (91) 
Niebuhr's "Biblical faith" enabled him to hold a "Christian 
Realist" position in regard to man 1 s individual and collective 
* Used throughout to refer to the Kegley & Bretall volume. 
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behaviour. It is given full expression in his Gifford Lectures. 
He describes the lectures in this way: 
"· .. the world depression and the rise of the Nazi 
terror swept away the last remnants of liberal 
utopianism. Having been invited to give the 
Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh on the very eve of 
the Second World War, I inevitably sought to give 
a theological frame to the now pervasive realism . 
.... The Nature and Destiny of Man, sought to 
describe the biblical-he~raic descr~ption of the 
human situation, particularly in the symbols of 
1 the image of God in man 1 and man as ·'sinner 1 • 11 ( 92) 
Later Niebuhr incorporated studies undertaken for the Lyman 
Beecher Lectures at Yale, the Warrack Lectures at the Scottish 
Universities, and a lectureshi~ at the University of Uppsala~ in 
a book called .Faith and History, published in 1949. These studies 
elaborated the second part.of his Gifford Lectures. The Nature 
and Destiny of Man and Faith and History are the two major works 
of Niebuhr's mature years, and reflect his theologi~al frame of 
reference fbr his social. ethics during those years. 
In this chapter we are concerned to describe the formative 
context in which Niebuhr's thought developed· in relation to his 
work in Christian social ethics. .Subsequent chapters will analyse 
h theological method, and give·a critical evaluation of it. 
Niebuhr's own reflections on the formative ihfluences by 
which he came to what we·have called his mature position are re-
corded in "Intellectual Autobiography", parts of ~hich we quot~: 
11 I am ..... surprised to note in retrospect how late I 
was in studying the thought of Augustihe carefully 
cause the thought of this theo.J,.og·ian was to 
answer so many of my unanswered questions and to 
·emancipate me finally. fr.om the notion that the 
Christian faith was in some way identical with the 
moral idealism of the past century . 
... Jt is difficult to know whether the crit ism 
of both liberal and Marxist views of human nature 
and history was prompted by a profounder under-
standing of the Biblical. faith; or whether this 
understanding was prompted by the 'refutation of 
the liberal and Marxist faith by the tragic facts 
of contemporary history.which included two world 
wars and the encounter ·of a liberal ~ulture with 
two idolatrous tyrannies, first Nazism and then 
.Communism, resting respectively upon. th~ foundat-
ions of moral cynicism and moral utopianism . 
. In these works (The Nature and Destiny of Man and 
Faith and History) I was concerned to prove that 
68 
modern versions of man's nature and fate w~re at 
once very different from,. and yet . very similar to, 
the interpretations found in classic idealism, and 
that the Biblical view of·man was supa or to both 
class and modern views. The intellectual 
pilgri~age which.these succeeding volumes reveal 
shows that I began to cr icize liberal viewpdints 
from a Marxist perspective in the first instance, 
and that I learned gradu to subject bo~view­
points to a Christian. crit i~m. I learn in-
.creasingly to value highly, rather than be 
apologetic for, the unique. emphasis of Biblical 
faith ... " (93) 
(a) The. Influence of St Augustine 
The extent of the influence of Augustine may be deduced m 
the many re encas to his works in the writings that came aut of 
Niebuhr's' mat,ure years .. Wh he is not uncritic of Augustine 1 
he has ac knowledged . that · he ·" awak
1
e ned 11 from his 11 socialist slumber 11 
·partly as the result of his study of Augustine's works.( 94 ) 
A considerable amount of Augus ne 1 s writing polemical 
because of his concern to.defend the F h against .the.doctrines 
. of Manichaeanism and his involvement in the Donatist and Pelagian 
controversies which were of contemporary importance to the Church. 
Augustine's treatise on ~he nature and,meaning 6f history, 
.stimulated by Alaric's sacking of Rome, ~is contained. in ,The City 
Of God~·· a book which Niebuhr called. 11 one. of the most important 
books of our iritual history .. " This tribute appears in an article 
Niebuhr wrote in 1942, .entitled "faith for History's Greatest 
sis", in which he describes the importance .of .. The City Of God . 
. ".In it Augustine affirmed that. the Christian religion 
contained an interpretation of life and history that 
made it possible to anticipate and to-discount the 
periodic catastrophes of history. -Every empire, 
every 'city of. this: world 1 , he dec.lared, would 
to break down ultimately because its 'peace was 
based on strjfe'. Which is .to say that such social 
•peace as is achieved in any civilization rests upon 
a precarious equil rium. of social forces. . This 
equilibrium may degenerate into anarchy if there is 
no strong organizing center in it. And it may 
~·g~nerate into .tyranny if the organi ng center 
destroys the vitality of the parts." (95) 
In Niebuhr's view Augustine was.nthe first great 'realist' in 
·western history". His picture of social reality ''gives an adequate 
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account of the social factions, .tensions, and compet ions which 
we know to be well-nigh universal. on every level of community; 
while the classical age conceived the order and justice of its 
polis to be a comparatively simple achievement," when "reason had 
brought all subrational forces under its:dominion:,,{g 6 ) 
Whilst Augustine was. influenced by cl~ssical philosophy,. his 
viewpoint is closer to the Biblical view of man's nature and destiny, 
according to Niebuhr. Augustine's view of man is a case in point. 
The self according to Augustine is an integral unity of mind and 
body, yet it·is something more than mihd and has the ability to 
transcend its functions .of mind, memory, and will. IIThese three 
things, memory, understanding and love are mine and not their own'', 
. wrote Augustine, "for they do. wh they do not for themselves but 
for me; or rather I do by them. For it is I who remember by 
memory and understand by understanding and love by love." 
(De Trinitate, 15.22) 
A corollary of Augustine's view of man is his understanding 
of moral evil. Niebuhr's thought reveals the influence of Augustine 
at this point in particular. Following Coplestone's commentary on 
Augustine, the cause of moral-evil "is not in the Creator but the 
created will .•.. Evil,then is 'that which falls away from the 
cease to 
and tends to non-being ••. It tends to make that which is 
be.'"(97) ., 
·essence 
The source of evil is not some residual natural .impulse which 
.the mind has not yet mastered, It is the excessive love of self, 
sometimes defined by Augustine as,pride or superbia, which causes 
man. to abandon God as his true e,h;~( .and makes . of himself an end - that 
is the source of evil. This understanding of moral evil enabled 
Augustine to refute classical theories of evil by asserting that 
"it is not the bad body which causes the good soul to sin but the 
bad soul which causes the good body to sin.~ (De Civ~Dei 15.5) A 
major part of N buhr 1 s Gifford Lectures is devoted to an analysis 
and critique of contemporary history by means of the concept.of 
sugerbia. 
Niebuhr believed that the "absurdity" of the Christian doctrine 
of sin, wh~reby man sins ''inevitably" but is nevertheless respons-
ible for his sin, .is made explicit. in Augustine. In justification 
of this view Niebuhr quotes Augustine: 
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."Man's nature was indeed at first created faultless 
and without sin; but nature as man now has it, into 
which ev~ry one is born from Adam, wants the 
Physician, being no longer in a healthy state. All 
good qualities which it still possesses ... it has 
from the most High God, its Creator and Maker. But 
the aw which darkens and weakens all these natural 
goods it has not contracted from its blameless 
Creator .•. but from that original sin which it 
committed of its own free will." (98) 
This .11 absurd" doctrine is essential.if our estim e of Man's 
nature is to be realistic .. Sin natural for man, according to 
Niebuhr, .in the sense that it is universal .but not in the sense it 
is necessary ... the whole crux of the doctrine of original sin 
lies in the seeming absurdity of the conception of freewill which 
underlies it. .The Pauline doctrine 9 as elaborated by Augustine 
and the Reforme~s. insists on the one hand that the will of man is 
enslaved to sin and is incapable of fulfilling God's law ... Yet 
on the other hand .... Augustine insists upon there ity of free-
will whenever he has cause to fear that the concept.of original 
sin might threaten the idea of.human responsibility: 'Only let no 
man dare to deny the freedom of the will as to desire to excuse 
sin'." ( 99 } 
In Niebuhr's v wit is Augustine's understanding .of sin, and 
the manner in which he elaborates it with reference to man's col-
lective life, that makes him the first great realist of Western 
history. 
In The City of God Augustine describes the social effect of 
human self-love. Following Coplestone, .he· "sees the history of 
the human race as the history of the dialectic of ... two principles, 
(love of God) the one forming the City of Jsrusalem, the other 
{self-love) the city of Babylon."{lOO) While the civitas terrena 
is inter-relat·ed with the civitas dei, it is dominated by self-love 
to the point of contempt for God. The civitas_ dei is actuated by 
love of God to the point of contempt for self, ~nd is thereby dis-
tinguished from the civitas terrena. 
For Augustine, the word 'city' does not denote the city-state 
of classical thought, as for example in Plato. It signifies man 
in community on the levels of the family, the commonwealth, and 
the world. The love of the city of God is the leaven for the city 
of this world: .9.!!!.2.!'. dei is the final norm by which all our actions 
must be judg Every "earthly peace", says Augustine, .is good 
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as far as it goes. HBut they will,not have it long for they used 
it not well while they had it.n That to sayr unless some larger 
love qualifies the.self-interest of groups, collective self-interest 
can le either to conflict between. compet g groups, or injustice 
by a dominant group which "when it is victorious ... will become 
vice, 1 s slave. 11 (l0l) 
Niebuhr's indebtedness to Augustine is clear, but it is also 
clear that he did not follow him unquestioningly. He criticizes 
Augustine's thought on several impQrtant issues. Niebuhr argues, 
for example, that Augustine 1 s distinction between the ''two loves" 
which characterize the "two cities" which "commingle" in this world 
is .over simple. Augustine does not recognize that this commingling 
is not due to the fact that there are two different kinds of people 
in the .world. It ~s because the conflict between love and self-
love ,exists in eve.r:y person. In the political sphere,. says Niebuhr, 
it is important to note that personal dedicat n is no guarantee 
against a person's involvement in the collectiVe egotism which so 
often characterizes.groups. Niebuhr's other main criticism of 
Augustine relates to his understanding of .§l!J.9.E.dei. ·He argues 
that here Augustine ~s influenced by clas al rather than b lical 
thought. The agape of the New Testament is not fully appreciated 
. by him, for two reasons .. The New Testament emphasites an equality 
of love of God and neighbour-love, whereas Augustine makes neigh-
bour-love subservient to love of God. The ot~er facet of agape 
which, according to Niebuhr, is obscured in Augustine's amor dei 
is the element of sacrificial love, This Niebuhr calls . 11 the surd 
principle of the Cross, the insistence that the self must sacrifice 
(102) itself for the other." 
In spite of the defects which .he detects in Augustine's 
thought, Niebuhr believed that his "politic . realism" is vastly 
superior to religious and secular thinkers who have preceded or 
come after him. The extent of Niebuhr's apprec tion is illus-
trated in the following passage: 
"A part of (his) superiority was due to his reliance 
upon biblical rather than idealistic or naturalist 
conceptions of selfhood. But. that could not have 
been the only cause, else Christian systems before 
and after him would not have been so inferior. Or 
were they:inferior because they subordinated the 
biblical•dramatic conception of human se~fhood too 
much to the rationalistic.scheme, as was the case 
with medieval Christianity culmihating in the thought 
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of Thomas. Aquinas? or· because they .did not under-
stand that the corruption of human freedom could 
not destroy the original dighity of man, as was 
the case with the Reformation with its doctrines 
of sin, bordering on· tot depravity and result-
ing in Luther's too pessimistic approach to 
political problems? 
As for secular thought, it has difficulty in 
approaching Augustihe's realism without falling 
.into· cynicism or in 'avoiding nihilism without 
falling into sent~m~ntality. Hobbes' realism 
was based on an insight which he shared with 
Augustine,. namely, , that· in all, historical en-
counters the mihd is the servant and not the 
master of the self. But he failed to recognize 
that the self which thus made .the mind its instru-
ment was a corrupted and not a 1 nor~al 1 self. 
:Modern 'realists' know the power of collective 
.self-ihterest as Augustine did; but they do not 
understand its blindness. Modern pragmatists 
understoQd the •irrelevance. of fixed and detailed 
norms; ;but they do. not understand that love must 
take the place ~s the final .norm f6r these inad-
·.equate norms. Modern liberal Christ ns. know that 
love the final norm for man; .. but, they fall 
into sentimentality ··because they f·ail ·to measure 
the power and .persistence of self-love. Thus 
Augustine,. whatever may be the• defects of his 
app~riach to politibal .reality ... nevertheless 
proves himself a more reliable. guide than any known 
thinker .. " (103) 
We include this .quotation from Niebuhr because it demonstrates 
more than just the extent of his indebtedness to Augustine. 1t also 
int;l~cates the manner in· which. he built. on those foundations a 
critique of cla~sical and modern thought that was uniquely his own. 
This· he did at. a ,time of, crisis in. :WeE;>tern, history .which he believed . . . 
was·at least equal to that which prompted Augustine's work. 
(b) The Influence of Pascal and Kierkegaard 
_Writing .on "The Historical Roots of Niebuhr's Thought", Richard 
KrQner says: "Niebuhr belongs to the illustrious group of those 
writers who called attentiQn to the alarming illusions of bourgeois 
society regarding the _moral progress of mankind and its potential 
capacities in overcoming 'original sin' 11 .(l04 ) In pursuit of that 
end Kroner believes that Niebuhr stood in the tradition of writers 
like Dostoevsky, ·Ibsen 1 . Zola, .Strindberg, and Unamuno. 
Among the theologic.al thinkers who influenced Niebuhr are the 
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Christian existentialists Pascal and Kierkegaard. If Niebuhr 
attributed his awakening from a ·"soc list slumber" to his reading 
of Augustine~ he has also acknowledged the part played by Pascal 
in that awakening.(lOS) Speaking of the influence of Kierkegaard, 
Kroner goes so far as to say that "Niebuhr can be called a Christian 
existentialist on better grounds than Jaspers or Marcel, for Jaspers 
explicitly rejects ... religious revelation as a source of truth, 
while Marcel, though a devout Catholic, makes little use of Scrip-
ture in his philosophy. Quite independently of continental 'crisis-
theology' Niebuhr developed his own scheme of an existentialist 
interpretation of Biblical revelation. 11 {l0 6 ) 
There can be no doubt of Niebuhr's indebtedness to Pascal and 
Kierkegaard, as well: as .. · to. M.artin .Bube.r the Jewish philosopher. 
However, the conclusion which Kroner draws from this is not entirely 
accurate. Without becoming involved in a semantic argument about 
the term ''existential', we believe that Niebuhr used existential 
modes of thought, particularly from the works of Pascal and 
Kierkegaard, w.ithout adopting a "scheme" of 11 ex tentialist inter-
pretation of Biblical revelation." 
I 
We believe Niebuhr would agree with Dav.id Roberts' opinion that 
"existentialism cannot serve as a self-sufficient philosophy. Its 
c hie f v u e is that o f a c or r.e c t i v e . 11 ( 1 07 ) N i e b u h r d p 1 a y s in his 
writings many of the characteristic features of existentialist 
thinking which Roberts identifies in his Existentialism and 
Religious Belief. These are, inter alia, a protest against all 
forms of rationalism which assume that reality can be grasped 
primarily by intellectual means; a protest against all forms of 
thinking which regard man as a 'thing' -.an assortment of functions 
and reactions; its clearcut distinction between subjective and 
objective truth'that stresses the distinction between knowing about 
the truth and being grasped by the truth in a personal manner. 
Existentialism, in all its .varieties, says Roberts, "regards man as 
fundamentally ambiguous. This is very closely linked to its pre-
. (108) ' 
dominant stress on freedom.n Existentialism views the human 
situation as filled with contradictions and ambiguities which 
cannot be resolved by such scientific information as may close the 
gaps .in our knowledge of man, or for that matter, by further philo-
sophical analysis. Ambiguity and contradiction belong to the very 
nature of the human situation. Man is free; yet he is conscious 
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of responsibility, of anxiety, of guilt. His freedom exists 
within a natural and social order which to a greater or lesser 
degree determines what he is. Man is finite; yet he has the cap-
acity of self-transcendence. He is bound by time; yet he can rise 
above the present and see its relation to the past and to the future. 
for Niebuhr the contribution made by Pasc and Kierkegaard 
to our understanding of human selfhood is of lasting importance. In 
seeking to prove his thesis that the Biblical view of man is super-
ior to both classical and modern views, Niebuhr finds support for 
his position in the work of these Christian existentialists. 
Speaking ~f the significance of Blaise Pascal's contribution, 
Niebuhr writes: "The whole realm of genuine selfhood, of sin and 
grace, is beyond the comprehension of various systems of philosophy. 
Neither Aristotle nor Kant succeeds in accounting for the concrete 
human self as free agent. This mystery of human freedom, including 
the concomitant mystery of historic evil, plus the previous incon-
gruity of man both as freespirit and as a creature of natuie, led 
Pascal to elaborate his Christian existialism in opposition to the 
Cartesian rationalism and Jesuit Thomism of his day .. Pascal delved 
'in mysteries without-which man remains a mystery to himself' .n(lD9) 
One: of the mysteries into. which Pascal delved· is what Niebuhr 
calls "the logical absurdity of the doctrine of original sin". 
This'doctrine which Niebuhr believed to be essential to a realist 
interpretation of man's nature, is frankly accepted by Pascal in 
words ~hich reveal a characteristic of existentialist thinkers: 
the holding in tension of the paradox of man's 'greatness' and his 
'wretchedness·' Niebuhr uses the.following quotation from Pascal 
in support of his own views on original sin and man's respons-
'b'l't. (llO) ~ ~ ~ y: 
11 In fact if man had never been corrupt, he would enjoy 
_in hi~ innocence both truth and hap~iness ..• and if 
man had always been.corrupt. he would have no idea of 
truth and bli~s. But wretched as we are, and more so 
if there were no greatness in our condition, we have 
an idea' of. happiness and can not reach it. . . for it is 
beyond doubt that there is nothing which more shocks 
our reason.than to say that the sin of the first man 
has rendered guilty those who, being so removed from 
its.source, seem incapable of participating in it ... 
Certainly nothing offends us more rudely than this 
doctrine, and yet without this mystery, the most in-
comprehensible of all, we are incomprehensible to 
ours~lves. (Pensees, 434)" 
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Pascal's emphasis on the paradox of man's grandeur and misery 
1s essential for an authentic understanding of man, in Niebuhr's 
view. He writes: "The Christian conception of the dignity of man 
and ·of the misery of man is all of one piece, as Pascal rightly 
apprehended. All Renaisance and modern emphasis upon the dignity 
of man to the exclusion of the Christian conception of the sin of 
man are lame efforts to reconstruct the Christ n doctrine of self-
hood without understanding the full implications of the Christian 
conception of the self's freedom."(lll} 
Niebuhr finds corroboration for his exposition of man's 
creatureliness in the work of Soren Kierkegaard. Writing in the 
Gifford Lectures, Niebuhr states that Kierkegaard 1 s understanding 
of "self-consciousness" expresses better than most theolo ans the . 
paradox of man's finitude and his capacity to transcend finiteness, 
The following passage indicates the measure of Niebuhr's indebtedness: 
11 
••• -it is important to recognize that Christianity 
1n its authentic and Biblical form is not subject 
to the charge of 'ide ism' so frequently levelled 
at it by materialists and naturalists. It knows 
of the finiteness of the self and of its involvement 
in all the relativities and contingencies of nature 
and history. The presuppositions of its faith make 
it possible to realize that the self in the highest 
reaches of its self-consciousness is still the 
mort and finite self. In this, as in other in-
stances, Kierkegaard has interpreted the true mean-
ing of human selfhood more accurately than any 
modern, and possibly than any previous, Christian 
theologian. He writes~ 'The determining factor in 
the self consciousness, i.e. self~consciousness .. , 
The self is the conscious synthesis of the limited 
and the unlimited ... Therefore development consists 
of this; that in the eternalization of the self 
one escapes the self endlessly and in the temporal-
ization of the self one endlessly returns to the 
self'." (112) 
In Niebuhr's view the perennial question for Christian apolo-
getics is whether,. and in what manner, the biblical-Christian view 
of man's nature and destiny can be related to the understanding of 
man which emerges in the secular disciplines. I n a n e s say "C o her e nc e, 
Incoherence, and Christ n Faith" 9 in which he comes closest to an 
exposition of his own theological methodology, Niebuhr discerns 
two traditions within the Christian faith regarding the perennial 
question for apologetics. From our description of the formative 
context of N buhr 1 s thought it is clear that he stands in the 
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first of these traditions. 
"On the one hand, there is a tradition of Christian 
theology which glories in the contradiction between 
the fool hness of God and the wisdom of men. It 
runs from Tertullian, through Augustine, Occam, 
Duns Scotus, to the Reformation, seal, Kierke-
gaard, and Earth. 
Luther speaks for this tradition in the words: 'We 
know that reason is the devil's harlot and can do 
nothing but slander all that God says and does. If 
outside of Christ you wish by your own thoughts to 
know your relation to God you will break your neck. 
- Therefore keep to revel ion and do not try to 
understand. 1 
The other tradition runs from Origen through Aquinas, 
the Christian Platonists, the Renaisance Humanists, 
to modern liberal Christianity. For this tradition 
Aquinas speaks: 'The natural dictates of reason must 
certainly be true. It is impossible to think of 
their being otherwise, nor again it possible to 
believe that the tenets of f h are false. Since 
falsehood alone is contrary to truth it is impos-
sible for the truths of faith to be contrary to the 
principles known by reason.! 
The inconclusive character of the debate .•. m~y be 
due to the tendency of one side to make the supra-
rational affirmations of faith too simply irrational 
... Christ n rationalists, on the other hand, 
equate meaning too simply with rationality and 
thereby inevitably obscure some of the profoundest 
inco~gruities, tragic antinomies, and depth of 
meaning on the edge of the mysteries in human life 
and history ... 11 ( 113) 
The concepts and intellectual tools which Niebuhr used in his 
own analysis of man's nature and destiny, reveal that he stands -
albeit critically - in the tradition which runs through Augustine, 
the Reformers, Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Earth. He uses the con-
cepts "tragedy" and 11 irony 11 to interpret history. He not afraid 
of paradox except when it offers an easy retreat into irrationality. 
His dialectic method is more closely akin to that of Kierkegaard 
than that of Hegel. Whereas Hegel's dialectical method was used 
in order to conceive the Absolute. Kierkegaard's was used to show 
that the Absolute cannot ultimately be conceived by human reason. 
As we have seen, Niebuhr does not shy away in alarm at the 11 absurd 11 
in the Christian's understanding of original sin. He uses it 
symbolically to describe human evil as an inevitable cond ion of 
man's finite nature. He believed, with Kierkegaard, that a 'leap 
of faith' necessary for a man who, in contrition, is reconciled 
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to God in Christ. 
Two major criticisms of the existentialism e it impossible 
for Niebuhr to accept existentialism as a self-sufficient philosophy, 
and negatively defined the areas in which he wished to work. Niebuhr 
argued that ''Kierkegaard's protest against Hegelianism betrays him 
into a position in which all enquiries into essences, universal 
forms, are discounted in order to emphasize the existing particu r." 
Kierkegaard can therefore have no sense of history, since the ex-
isting individual is the only part ular in history and can only 
have an internal history. Furthermore, Niebuhr argues, Kierkegaard 
... Exploits the inner contradiction within man as free spirit and 
contingent object too simply as the basis of faith ... {so that) 
by embracing this contr iction in passionate subjectivity, ..• 
(man) comes truly to himself." This leads Kierkegaard to the 
position in which passion e subjectivity becomes the only test of 
truth "in such a way that a disinterested worship of an idol is 
preferred to the wrong worship of the true Gad ... but it also lacks 
any standard by which the true God could be disinguished from a 
false God. In other words, a passionate Nazi could meet K rkegaards 
test. . . (surely a) hazardous subj ecti vi ty. 11 { 114 ) 
Since he wanted to take history more seriously than he believed 
Kierkegaard did, Niebuhr could not base his work on his existen-
tialism. On the other hand, Niebuhr believed that both Pascal and 
Kierkegaard had made important contributions to the Christian 
understanding of man. In his search for adequate criteria for 
social choice Niebuhr therefore drew heavily on their contributions. 
(c) Fight With Barth 
·Throughout Niebuhr's life polemic was part of his staple diet. 
6ne of the liveliest chapters in Niebuhr's polemical life was his 
debate with Karl Earth. It began in the late twenties, proceeded 
face to face at the meeting of the World Council of Churches in 
Amsterdam in 1948, and was brought to an end in the early sixties. 
It is a poignant debate because, in spite of the deep cleavages in 
their viewpoints, Niebuhr has pub ly acknowledged his indebted-
ness to Barth. It poignant because, according to Oscar Cullman, 
Earth "considered Niebuhr a worthy opponent". {llS) 
The debate is important because both Earth and Niebuhr reacted 
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strongly against nineteenth century liberal Protestant theology 
which, according to Earth, reached its peak and denouement with 
the publication of Harnack's What is Christianity? in 1900. (ll 6 } 
In spite of the fact that they were contemporaries, not only in 
years, but in the turbulent and torturous paths by which they came 
to their 'mature' positions, Barth and Niebuhr differed greatly in 
their responses to contemporary events. and in their theological 
methods. 
Barth has acknowledged his debt to Kierkegaard. He stands, 
in this sense, in the tradition with which Niebuhr identified him-
self, and which he described as including Paul, Augustine, the 
Reformers, Pascal and Kierkegaard. In the words of H.R.Mackintosch: 
11 In Kierkegaard, it is widely recognized, we have in 
some degree a precursor of Karl Barth. Barth's 
words are often quoted: 'If I have a system, it 
consists in this, that always as as possible I 
keep in mind what Kierkegaard spoke of as the 
infinite qualitative difference between time and 
eternity, alike in its negative and positive 
meaning. God is in heaven, you are on earth', 11 (117) 
In spite of his indebtedness to Kierkegaard, Barth came 
seriously to question and finally to discard existentialism as a 
philosophical basis for his work. Writing of the second edition . 
of h Dogmatic, Barth says: "To the best of my ability I have cut 
out of this second issue of the book everything th in the first 
issue might give the slightest appearance of giving theology a 
basis, support, or even a mere justification in the way of exist-
ential philosophy."(llB) In this view he has something in common 
with Niebuhr, although Niebuhr does not discard existential modes 
of thought where these assist him in his work. 
In our examination of Niebuhr's theological method, we will 
have occasion to refer to differences between Barth and Niebuhr. 
It is necessary here to indicate in a general way, therefore, the 
context in which these differences arose. 
Perhaps the major difference between Barth and Niebuhr lies 
in their respective understandings of the theological task. For 
Barth it is primarily a dogmatic one, whereas Niebuhr is primarily 
an ethicist and apologist. In consequence their approaches vary 
considerably. It is also clear that the contexts in which they 
worked were divergent. Whereas so-called "crisis-theology" in 
II 
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Europe sought to d engage Christian theology from its identific-
ation with an apparently collapsing culture 9 the crisis in America 
was of a different kind, and prompted Niebuhr to disengage theology 
from its identification with the "soft utopianism"of a liberal 
culture. 
The disparity between Niebuhr and Barth may emerge more 
cle y when viewed in the light of the manner in which Barth sought 
to verify the truth of God's revelation. Jurgen Moltmann has argued 
that Barth's theology must be seen as an attempt to establish "the 
proof of God from 'God'"· (ll 9 ) He writes: 
"If I see the situation correctly, a qu e inde-
pendent onto-theological thought has developed in 
Karl rth ... God's word is not founded in any 
other thing. In his word and his revelation, God 
is the sovereign subject and, for this reason, 
he enters into no correlation and into no circle 
of human consciousness. Therefore, he is not a 
point of relation to be inquired for in advance 
from an ~ priori of world and existence, which 
is already known in the form of the question. The 
sovereignty of God which is inaccessible to th~ 
world and existence validates itself in the act 
of revelation~ .. " (120) 
If this assessment of Barth is correct the d renee between his 
method and Niebuhr's becomes evident. Niebuhr is Barthian in the 
empha s he places on revelation ~n his theology. But he also 
insists on maintaining a commerce with the secular disciplines -
what we understand by Moltmann's 11 correlation 11 of "world and 
existence". 
In the course of this essay we will examine how Niebuhr 
validates the truth of Christian faith by showing its adequacy to 
illumine man's nature and destiny .. We will also examine how he 
allows experience to modify his theology .. There is, therefore, an 
important sense in which Niebuhr cannot be called Barthian. 
In 1928, when Niebuhr was still partly in the liberal 1 camp 1 , 
he reviewed the first of Barth's books to be translated into English 
and published in America. His review of Das Wort Gottes und die 
Theologie commends Barth, inter , for re-introducing "the note 
of tragedy in religion" as a "wholesome antidote to the superficial 
optimism of most current theology.n(lZl) The review, entitled 
Barth- Apostle of the Absolute'', asks, however, whether the "moral 
price" Barth pays for the 11 religious advantages of his theology" 
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is not too high.{l22) 
In reacting to the subjectivism and relativism of liberal 
theology, Barth's dogmatics "is a new kind of fundamentalism or an 
old kind of orthodoxy,." writes Niebuhr. It is 11 a revival of the 
theology of the Reformation, Calvinistic in its conception of God 
and Lutheran in its emphasis upon the experience of justification 
by faith.u( 123 ) It should be noted that during bis formative years 
at Union, Niebuhr himself came to a deeper apprec tion of 
Reformation theology. However, N buhr critisizes Barth: 
"In Grder to escape the relativism of a theolqgy 
which is based up8n and corrected by biology, 
psychology, social science, philosophy, and every 
other field of knowledge, we accept a theology 
which has no way of authenticating itself except 
by the ct that it meets human ne Th is a 
sorry victory. Relativism may be defeated but 
at the price of a new and more terrifying sub-
jectivism. How do we know that the human need 
which this kind of religion satisfies is not 
really a too-morbid conscience?" (124) 
These are strong words, but they highlight one major area of 
conflict between Barth and Niebuhr. On the one hand Barth believed 
the task of theology is a dogmatic one, dec ring that Ged is known 
in the history of H deeds and self-disclosure, and disavowing any 
commerce between faith and culture. On the other hand, Niebuhr 
believed that the revelation of God in Christ can and must be 
authent ated in the commerce between faith and culture. He writes: 
"We can escape relativity and uncertainty only by 
piling experience upon expe ence, checking hypo-
thesis against hypothesis, correcting errors by 
considering new perspectives, and finally by 
letting the ex rience of the race qualify the 
individual's experience of God .. " (125) 
When Barth and Niebuhr met face to face at the World Council 
of Churches meeting in 1948, another major area of difference 
became clear. Barth 1 s address· to the Amsterdam Assembly was en-
titled "No Christian Marshall Plan" in which he insisted that the 
Church has no system of economic and political principles to offer 
to the world. Niebuhr's reply to Barth's address was printed ln 
the Christian Century unde:r:· the title "We Are Men And Not God", 
in October 1948. In this article Niebuhr criticized Barth's 
11realized eschatology": 
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."The assurance, declared Earth, that 'Jesus Ch st 
has already robbed sin 9 death, the devil and hell 
of their power and has already vindicat divine 
and human justice in his person' ought to per-
suade us 'even on the first day of our deliber-
ations that the care of the church and the care 
of the world is nat our care. Burdened by this 
thought we could straighten nothing out.' For 
the final root of human disorder is precisely 
'this dreadful, godless, ridiculous opinion that 
man is the Atlas who is destined to bear the dome 
of heaven upon his shoulders.'" (126) 
No Christian, argued Niebuhr, can quarrel with the affirmation 
that the Church finds its authentic existence in the revelatory and 
redemptive power of the Christ-event. The questions which arose in 
Amsterdam were about the conclusions drawn from this art le of 
faith. "We are warned ... that the 'care of the world is nat our 
care'. We are to beware lest we seem to present a kind of 'Christ-
ian Marshall Plan' to the nations. This is a wholesome warning 
against the pet schemes of Christian moralists. But does it not 
annul the church's prophetic function to the natians? 11 , asks 
Niebuhr.( 127 ) Can the Barthian emphasis offer any help to the 
Christ n in the day-to-day decisions that are part and parcel of 
his existence? Elsewhere, Niebuhr argues that Barth's theology 
offers little help in the field of Christian ethics: 
11 Ethically Barth is as relativist as Westermarck 
and epistomalogically as much a positivist as 
Carnap .•.. In this world ]arth bids the Christian 
Church to witness to the resurrection; that is, 
to set up signs and symbols of redemption in the 
confusion of sin ... He bids the Church to wait 
until the issues are clear before it bears ... 
heroic witness, just as he himself waited in 
witnessing against Hitlerism until the manifest 
injustices of a tyrannical state revealed their 
clearly idolatrous religious character. This is 
a religion, as a Catholic critic rightly observes, 
which is fashioned for the catacombs and has 
little relation to the task of transfiguring the 
natural stuff of politics by the grace and wi om 
of the Gospel." (128) 
It is Earth's ethical relativism which caused Niebuhr to break 
finally any ties he might have had with him. Writing in 1949, 
Niebuhr says: 
"Earth seems inclined today to regard the differ-
ences between Communism and the sa-called 
democratic world as insignificant when viewed 
from the ultimate Christian standpoint. But we 
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are men and not God, and the destiny of civiliz-
ations depends upon our decisions in the 'nicely 
calculated less and more' of good and evil in 
political institutions, 11 ( 129) 
Following the putting down of the Hungarian uprising ~n October, 
1956, a bitter exchange ensued between Niebuhr and some of Barth's 
Students. Niebuhr wrote an article called "Why is Barth Silent on 
Hungary?"in which he criticizes Barth's complacency, and suggests 
that the reasons for his silence lie in a 11 defective" theological 
approach: 
"Karl Barth's theological framework is defective for 
wise political decisions for two reasons. The first 
is that he is too consistently 'eschatological' ... 
In his essay 'The Christian Community and Political 
Change 1 he declares: 'the goal toward which we are 
moving is the second coming of our Lord Jesus Christ . 
.The message of the church is a message of hope for 
everyone. Alternations in political systems must 
stand in the light of this great change, which is 
called Jesus Christ. It would be curious if the 
Church, which knows of this one great change, could 
not accept with a certain calm certain smaller changes.' 
... Not being a theologian, I can only observe that 
if oRe reaches a very high altitude, in either an 
eschatological or a real airplane, all distinctions 
which seem momentous on the 'earthly' level are 
dwarfed into insignificance ... 
The second defect in Barth's theological approach to 
political and moral problems is his extreme pragmat-
ism, which dis avows all moral principles. . . ( 130) 
Barth did not respond to Niebuhr's article, but some of his 
students did. Niebuhr's part of the exchange is contained in Essays 
In Applied Christianity .. (l 3l) This chapter in Niebuhr's polemical 
life was nearing an end, however. In 1960 Niebuhr concluded his 
exchanges with Barth when he wrote: 
. 11 ••• Barth has long since ceased to have any effect 
on my thought ... What seventeenth century Lutheran 
orthodoxy did to luther in a century, Barth has man-
aged to do to his own thought in a few decades ... (132) 
Summary. 
In this chapter we have traced what Niebuhr calls his"torturous" 
pilgrimage from a ''simple Christian 'Liberal' moralism" to the 
"Christian realism" of his mature years. In doing so we have des-
cribed some of the important factors which had a formative influence 
on him. We must now proceed to a detailed examination of Niebuhr's 
theological method. 
C.hapter • Three 
CHRISTIAN REALISM 
In order to set the scene for our subsequent 
study of Niebuhr's theological method~ this chapter 
offers a brief expositi,on and .critique of Christian 
Healism . 
. Some rootsof Niebuhr's real;i.smconsidered: 
the .philosophic::al basis for ethics; and the roots 
of Niebuhr's political realism~ The relation between 
Christian R~alism and nee-orthodoxy. 
An exposition and critique of ~iebuhr's most 
methodologic~lly explicit essay: "Coherence, 
Incoherence, and Christian Faith~" The question of 
validation. Niebuhr's 'uneasy dualism' considered. 
C H A P T E R THREE 
CHRISTIAN REALISM: 
AN EXPOSITION AND CRITIQUE 
N buhr does not often name his theological method. Neither 
does he give much help ~o the student of his thought by offe ng 
a systemat exposition of his theological methodology. However, 
Niebuhr has described his position as "Biblical", or "Christian" 
"Realism". And he has written an essay in which he sets out.in 
broad terms the main features of his Christian realist position. 
In order to set the scene, as it were, fQr our analysis of his 
theologic method we have chosen to concentrate 1n this chapter 
on the exposition of Christ n Realism contained in the essay 
"Coherence, Incoherence, and Christian faith"(l) published in his 
book Christian Realism and Political Problems {1953). This essay 
is described by John Bennett, Niebuhr's colleague Union, as intro-
ducing one 11 in a more technical way to his theological methodology''.f 2 ~ 
For the reason suggested by Bennett's evaluation it warrants care-
ful study. 
In our exposition and critique we will seek to place Christian 
Realism in its·historical context, and indicate some of the phil-
osophical and eth al considerations which gave rise to it. As we 
will show, his Christian Re sm as expounded in that essay, is 
the culmi~ ion of years of grappling with theological and moral 
problems. We will offer some criticisms of 11 Coherence, Incoherence, 
and Ch tian F th". These crticisms are also intended to set the 
scene for the analysis of his theological method which will occupy 
us in subsequent chapters of this study. 
(l) SOME ROOTS Of NIEBUHR 1 S REALISM 
The most important factors to influence Niebuhr during his 
formative years may also be said to prescribe hi~ abiding concern 
to clarify and elaborate a realist position. These factors were, 
1n his own wordsg "his boredom with epistemology", his "disillusion-
ment in nineteenth century religion", and his expe ence in Detroit 
which "determined (his) development more than any books (he) may 
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have read." We have already described his Detroit years, and will 
have occasion to refer to them frequently during the course of this 
st~dy. We should note, however, that his exposition of Christian 
Re~lism contained in the essay ''Coherence, Incoherence, and Chris-
tian Faith'' must be understood against the background of his 
Detroit experience. 
Liberal theology as it was taught at Yale made a profound 
impression on Niebuhr. He was concerned, therefore, that his Yale 
training would not be well received in an Evangelical parish. 
However, it was not his congregation as such that caused Niebuhr 
to react against the ''simple Christian 'liberal' moralism" which 
characterized American Liberal Protestantism. As we saw in Chap-
ter Two, it was the events in Detroit, symbolized in his fight 
with ford, which caused him to become disillusioned in "nineteenth 
century religion". Subsequent events in American and European 
history, plus his exposure at Union to biblical and classical 
theology, served to heighten that disillusionment, and to provide 
the impetus for his search for a more adequate alternative. 
Niebuhr's brother has epitomized Liberal Protestantism in Amer-
ica, as it appeared to those who, whilst influenced by it, came to 
react against it because it seemed unable to provide any adequate 
answers to the agonizing questions which contemporary events raised 
in such dramatic fashion. H. Richard Niebuhr 1 s epitomization is, 
we believe, a conci~e statement of the ihadequacies of ''nineteenth 
century religion'' which launched Reinhold on his torturous path 
towards Christian Realism. 
"The romantic conception of the kingdom of God involved 
no discontinuities, no crises, no tragedies, or sacri-
fices, no loss of all things, no cross, and resurrection. 
In ethics it reconciled the interests of the individual 
with those of society by means of a faith in a natural 
identity of interests or in the benevolent, altrui~tic 
character of man. In politics and economics it 
slurred over national and class divisions, seeing only 
the growth of unity and ignoring the increase of self-
assertion and exploitation. In religion it reconciled 
God and man by deifying the latter and humanizing the 
former •.. Christ the Redeemer became Jesus the· teacher 
or spiritual genius in whom the religious capacities 
of mankind were fully developed ..• Evolution, growth, 
development, the culture of the religious life, the 
nurture of kindly sentiments, the extension of human-
itarian ideals, and the progress of civilization took 
the place of the Christian revolution ... 
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A God wi t hout wra t h b r ought men without sin into a 
k i n gdom witho u t j udgement thro u gh the ministrations 
o f a Chris t wi th o ut a cross~"(3) 
Whe r ea s Nieb uhr's one-time "boredom with epistemology" prompte d 
him to forego an academic career for a pa s toral one, there is evi-
de nce t hat he wa s never able to escape epistemological problems. 
He ack no wledge s , for example, that if philosophical theories once 
b ored him , h~ came to rec og ni~e their importance if the ''age-old 
alliance be twee n t h e Chris tian f aith a n d p hilosophical idealism" 
wa s to be c hallenged. Th i s acknowledgemen t is important beca us e 
i t highlig h t s t h e f act t ha t Niebuhr's interest in epistemology 
wa s p romp t ed b y apologe t ic and ethical concerns. It also highlig hts 
t he tensio n between idealism and realism which constitutes a ba s ic 
f ea tu re of his t houg ht . ( 4 ) 
Robe r t Fi t c h doc u mented t h e many ."polarities" in Niebuhr' s 
wr i t i n gs - id eali s m/reali s m is o n e - and found over one hu n dred in 
h i s books. By mean s o f t h ese "polarities" Niebuhr explo r es t h e 
complex c harac t er of man'~ natu r e and his history. As such they 
"overlap a nd inte r sect o n e a nother i n t h e most complicated man ner . 
. Th i s c a n be seen", says Fitch, ."by taking o n e of Niebuhr's ba s ic 
ca t egorie s - idealism, perfec t ionism, utopianism - and examini n g 
th e a nt i th e s es, al t e rn a t ive s , a nd implica t io n s. Th u s we get: 
id eali sm - r eal ism; i deali s m - n a usea; hypocritical idealism -
irre s po ns i b le id eali s m; 11 ( 5 ) While Fi t ch describes idealis m a s 
a "b as ic ca t e g ory " o f Ni e bu hr' s t houg ht, h e does not develop it i n 
his e xp o s i ti o n o f Ni e b u hr' s p hilo s ophy of hi s tory. Such a develop-
ment is n e c e ss a ry , ho wever, in order to understand that 'philo s op hy '. 
Th e id e~li s m/r ealis m polari t y wa s import~nt for Niebuh r . 
Hi s Chris t ian ·realis t po s ition may be described as his manner o f 
h a nd l in g th e t e ns io n be tw ee n the ideal and the actual. I n orde r 
t o s how why this i s s o we will analyz e briefly the chapters o f t he 
tw o b oo ks , writt en s ome twe nt y si~< yea r s apart, which indicate h i s 
man n e r o f d eali n g with th is te nsion. The first appears i n hi s 
Doe s Civilizat io n Need Religio n ? (1927) entitled ''A Philosophy fo r 
an Ethi c a l Rel i gio n ''· Th e ot her i s hi s chapter on "A ugustine' s 
Politica l Reali sm ", c o nt ai ned in Ch r i s tian Rea l ism and Po l it ic a l 
Pr o bl e ms (19 5 3). I n t h e f ir s t h e ~xplores the metaphysical basi s 
f o r e th ic a l r eligio n . T he seco nd reveals his indebtedness to 
Au gu stin e for helping h im challe n ge the alliance be t ween nineteenth 
ce ntury ideali sm a nd Ch ris tian fait h . 
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(a) A Philosoph i cal Basis for Ethics 
It is more than conjec t ure to assert that Niebuhr's confessed 
boredom with epistemology wa s transformed into a vital interest by 
the issues wh ic h confronted him in Detroit. But his renewed inte-
rest in philosophy was prom pted by ethical considerations. He writes: 
"The e thical problem of religion may be more important 
than th e metaphysic a l one •.. but it cannot be solved 
without a reorientation of the present philosophical 
basis of religious co nviction." (6) 
Niebuhr's manner of re o rientating this philosophical basis is 
t o ho ld in t ension the idealism and realism which he believes are 
native to Christianity. This he does by suggesting that religions 
are caught on the horns of a dilemma which the "tentative dualism" 
o f Christianity may resolve: 
"By identifying God a nd the natural world (religions) 
either pe rsuad e men to resign themselves to the inad-
eq uacies of nature, under the illusion that divine 
sanctity has rendered them immutable, or they blind 
the eye to th e imperfections of nature and thus destroy 
th e moral sensitiveness of religion. The Orient has 
usually derived a morally enervating pessimism from 
its pantheism, while the Occident has chosen the other 
horn of th e monistic dilemma and fallen into a senti-
mental op timism . Both alternatives are as untrue 
to th e facts as th e y are inadequate to men's moral 
need s. " (7) 
For Niebuhr th e o nly f ruitful alternative to the above dilemma 
is a "dualism" which maint a ins some k i nd of distinction" between God 
and th e world , between the real and the ideal, and "does not lose 
the o n e in th e o t he r ." {B) Whilst dualistic interpretations exist 
in the hist o ry of much rel i gious thought, Niebuhr !inds a way for-
ward in th eir f o rmulation i n Hebrew and Christian thought. Such 
dua li sm may be metaphysica l ly 'untidy' but it is the source of 
e thic al strength. This i s one of its greatest assets, according 
t o Niebuhr. He j us tif ie s this claim in the following manner: 
"Early Hebrew r eligion was naive~y dualistic , and that 
is o n e r ea son why i~ has been s o potent in the history 
of r eligion. God wa~ indeed conceived of as omnipo-
t ent ; ... But th e idea of omnipotence was elaborated 
dramatically rather than philosophically ... 
I n the ea r ly Christ ia n church th e naive dualism of 
J es us was given dramatic and dynamic force through 
his deification, so that he became, in a sense, the 
God o f th e ideal, the symbol of the redemptive force 
in life which is in conflict with evil ... 
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(This is symb oli z e d in ) th e cross in which th e con-
flic t b e twe en goo d a nd evil is portrayed and th e possi-
bility a s we ll as th e difficulty of the triumph o f 
th e good over evi l . is dramatized ."(9) 
What we have de scrib e d as th e id ealism/realism polarf ty in Nie-
b uhr 9s th o ught ~ his first a nd most metaphys ical book de scrib e s a s 
" dua l ism". His philos op hical int e r e sts i n th a t boo k are pr ompt ed 
by ~ and s ubordina t e to ~ his e thical int er ests. He r ecognize d that 
"e thical r eligio n '' · may ne e d a philosophical basis , but his primary 
concern was that r eligion become a _source of s ocial renewal in 
th os e critical time s . Hi s Doe s Civiliz a ti on Need Religion? wa s 
writt en t o give e xpr ession t o th a t co nc ern . He was not interested, 
th e r e f o r e ~ i n b uilding a systematic me taphysic as a basis f or e thi c s. 
For the same r ea s ons he wa s not greatly concerned th a t du alism may 
be r a ti onally 1 untidy '. Nie buhr fi nds co nfirmation in Whitehead 
f or his mann e r of handling th e t e ns io n between th e ideal and the 
r eal ; th e co ns e qu e nc e o f wh i c h is a dualism wh ic h may be ratio nally 
uns atisfactory but tru e t o th e facts . Ni e buhr quotes Whitehead as 
saying: 
"C hr i stia nity has a l wa ys been a r eligio n seeking a 
me taphysic in contr ast t o Buddhi sm wh ich is a meta-
phys ic ge nerating a r el igion . . • The defect of a 
metap hysical s yst em is th e ve ry fact t hat it i s a 
nea t little syst em wh ic h th e r eb y o versimplif ie s it s 
e xpression of th e world . . . I n .r e spec t t o its tr ea t -
me nt of evil , Chr i stianity i s th e r e f or e less clea r 
i n its me t ap hys ical id ea but mor e i nclusive of th e 
f ac ts ."( l O) 
Nie buhr f inds add i tio nal war ra nt i n th e t hou ght of William 
J ame s f or th e t e ntati ve pr o pos al s outlin ed in hi s Does Civilization 
Need Relig i on? " Th e mora l and spiritual values in whic h religion i s 
intere sted have a basis in concre t e ac t uality. They are on the one 
ha nd not a mer e e f fervesc e nce on th e surf ace o f the co ncre t e, a nd 
on th e oth er ha nd th e y ar e not th e only basis of historical realities. 
Th e pl urali sm o f William James, which ha s been criticized as scien-
t ifica l l y i nacc urate a nd me t aph ys ically i nco nsistent, s eems to ha ve 
bo th s cie nt i f i c a nd me t ap hysical virt ues". {ll ) 
Th e t entative proposa l s wh ich Niebu hr o utlined i n 1926 were 
e lab ora t e d i n subs e que nt work s . Th e y may be summari z ed i n this sen-
t e nce fr om th e chap t e r " A ·Philosophy f or an Eth ical Religio n": 
·"T he r e i s goo d r ea s on t o ac cep t a t least a qualified dualism not 
only be ca us e it is morally more potent th a n tr adit ional monisms, but 
beca us e i t is metaphysically acceptable."{l2 ) 
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(b ) A Basis for Political Realism 
If dualism o f th e s ort we have d e scrib ed is metaphysically 
"acc e ptable" for an "e thic a l r eligio n ", th e tension between the 
id ea l and th e r e al is e ss e nti a l in polit ical th eory. In fact Nie-
b uh r disting uish e s b e tween id e a l ism and realism in metaphysics an d 
in pol itical th eo ry . He arg ue s that th e wo rds 'idealists ' and 
' r e a li sts ' den ote dispositions rath e r than d oc trines in political 
the ory , a n d are th e refore less e xac t than when us ed in metaphysics.(l 3 ) 
Writing in 1 953, h e defi n e d r e a l ism in pol itica l and moral theory 
a s that 
"disposition to take al l fact or s in a social · a n d 
political situation , which o ff e r r e sistanc e to 
e stablis h e d n o rms , into accou nt, particularly th e 
fact ors o f s e lf-int e r e st and pow e r . I n th e words 
of a no tori ou s ' r e alis t ' , Machia velli, th e purpose 
o f the r e a~ist is 1 to fo llow the truth o f th e 
ma tt e r r a th e r tha n th e imaginati o n of i t; for many 
ha ve pictures o f r epub lic s and principalities which 
ha ve n ever been seen'. This d e finiti on o f r ea lism 
implies that idealists a r e s ub ject to illusio ns 
about s ocia l r e aliti e s , which ind ee d th e y are. 
' I d e alism' i s , in th e e st eem o f its propon ents, 
charact e riz ed by loyal t y t o moral norms and ideals, 
rather tha n to self -in t e r es t , wh e th e r i nd ividual 
or coll e ctive . "{l4 ) 
We ha ve alr e ady indicat e d Ni e buhr's d e bt t o Augustin e, and we 
will ha ve c ause to do so again in subs e qu e nt chapters. At this 
po int it is suffici e nt to no t e that th e rea s o n why Niebuhr cannot 
acc e pt the r ealism of the s ort e laborat ed by Machiavelli is that it 
fails to hold the t e ns i on b e tw e e n th e id eal and th e actual. Augu s -
tin e is for Ni e buh:.: the 11 first gr e at ' r ealist' in western history" 
pr e cis e ly b e caus e h e s ucceeds in holdi n g this necessary tension. 
Aug ustin e is a r e alist b e ca u s e his d e scri p tio n of the civitas 
t e rr e na incl ud e s th e fact ors o f s e lf-int e r es t and power, and gives 
th e m a th eo l o gical basis in his n oti o n o f 'origina l sin'. Moreover, 
Aug ustine' s r e alism d oe s not o bs c ur e th e t e nsi o n bet ween the ideal 
and th e real , as his no tion of th e r e lation between . civitas terrena 
a nd civitas d e i signif ie s . 
I n Augustin e Nieb uhr f ou nd a theologian who enabled him to give 
e xpre ss ion to the r e alism late nt in his earli e r writings , and 
e nabl ed him t o elaborate the positio n which h e d e scrib ed as his own: 
namely, Christian Reali sm . Ni eb uh r's ind e bt e dn e ss t o Augustine 
wa s n o t u nq ualifie d . But h e b e l i eved him t o b e superior because 
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his analysis was closer t o th e biblical tradition than that of 
classical philosophers, and beca us e he succeed ed better than mos t 
to hold in tension the ide al and the real without losing th e o ne in 
the other. 
In the process of f ormulating his Christ ia n Realism Niebuhr' s 
intellectual . roots were imbedd e d in th e biblical tradition, in t he 
metaphysics of Whitehead, in the pragmatism of James, and .in th e 
theology of Augustine. 
We have indicated some roots of Niebuhr's manner of ·handling 
the tension between th e ideal and the real. It is in fact a r ecur-
ring problem in each phase of hi s thought. This is indicated in 
the latest assessment of Niebuhr t o come to hand; from a former 
student, Ronald Sto ne. He writes: 
"A .•. major thread of co ntinuity is hia handling of 
the relationship of th e ideal and the real ..• He has 
himself recognized that th e central problem of polit-
ical philosophy i s the relationship of man's imaginary 
communities to th e commu niti es in wh ich he lives. 
The problem appears as a moral and metaphysical 
issue in his first book .•• It is s een both in the 
opposition of communal interest . versus personal 
interests in a 1916 article, and in th e major essay 
of his 1965 book which disc us ses idealist and real-
ist political th eories. 11 (15) 
The latest book t o come from Niebuhr's pen, Man's Nature and 
His Communities (1965), .is d~scribed · as th e ''summary of my life-
work". In it he defines Christian r ealism in terms which may be 
taken, therefore, as a summary of his own position: 
"In principle, th e Christian f aith holds that human 
nature contains bot h self-regarding and s ocial im-
pulses and that the former are stro nger than th e 
latter. This assum ption is th e basis of Ch ristian 
realism. It must not be assumed that th e virtue 
inherent in this realistic analysis of the human 
condition guarantees th e validity of any Christian 
solution for two ve xi ng problems: the · e stablish-
ment of a tolerable harmony be twe e n self-regarding 
individuals within th e civil comm un ity, and th e 
relations of integral political communities with 
each other. The s e cond problem · is naturally 
more difficult th a n th e first beca use of the 
strength of collec t ive self-r egard in comparison : 1 . 
with the self-regard of individuals. 11 (16) 
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{2) CHRISTIAN REALISM AND NED-ORTHODOXY 
Reinhold Niebuhr. has rejected th e titl e theolog ian as descri~­
tive of his work. De Tocqueville's observation about the stro ng 
pragmatic emphasis of ,America n theology in comparison with Continen-
tal theology is valid in general terms even today; but it is cer-
tainly valid as far as Niebuhr's interests are concerned. He was 
a socia l ethicist and an a pologist. 
In spite of his disavowal of the titl e theologian, Niebuhr 's 
social ethics and apologetics o perated within a th eo logical fram e-
work which he called Biblical, or Christian r ealism. This frame-
work, he acknowledged, may justifiably be described as "nee-orthodox''· 
In this sense he has somet hing in common with Paul Tillich, Emil 
Brunner, Karl Barth, and Rudolf Bultmann. Tillich has in fact 
affirmed such a commonality, when writing in th e Living Library 
Volume on Brunner: 
"One day several ye a rs ago, Emil Brunner was sitting 
in my apartment in New York and agreed happily a nd 
gratefully when I said, 'It seems to me that in spite 
of the many divergences which e xist between you and 
Barth and Bultma nn and Niebuhr and mys elf, a kind of ,~ 
common ground in theology has developed in our gener-
ation.' Any comparison with th e preceding period 
which ended in Europe with the d ea th of Troeltsch 
and Harnack, and in Ame rica with th e approach of th e 
Second World War would provide additional confirm-
ation •.• 11 {17) 
The divergences between Niebuhr and his contemporaries Barth, 
Brunner, Bultmann, and 'Till ich are many. In some respects th e y are 
so great as to cause him to part company with them on matters of 
fundamental importance, as f or exampl e in Niebuhr's fight with Barth. 
No doubt these divergences arise because each of these s e minal 
thinkers pursued different interests in response to th e issues con-
fronting society. They also arise because of the differences in 
the European or Ame rican contexts in which th ey worked. 
We have already examined th e controversy between Barth and Nie-
buhr, and the points where Niebuhr to ok issue with Barth. Tillich 
and Niebuhr were colleague s at Union, and no doubt shared a common 
concern to communicate the Gospel in the modern world. However, 
Niebuhr's article in the Living Library Volume on Tillich, entitled 
"Biblical Thought and Ontological Speculation in Tillich's Th eo logy'', 






"Every systematic the ology", writes Niebuhr, 
"engages in more ont ological speculation than 
does Biblical thought. The Bible conceives 
life as a drama in which human and divine actions 
create the dramatic whole ~ There are ontological 
presuppositions for this drama, but they are not 
spelled out ... The Bible is concerned primarily 
with God's "mighty a c ts", that is, with those 
events in history through which and in which the 
ultimate power which bears history reveals its 
mystery. This mystery is revealed in specific 
historic events rath e r than in the structures of 
being ... If, in Tillich's language, God must be 
apprehended in terms both of ultimacy and of con-
creteness, the Bible assumes ultimacy and speaks 
of concreteness ..• . If Karl Earth is the Ter t ul-
lian of our day, abj uring ontological speculations 
for fear that they ma y obscure or blunt the 
kerygma of the Gospel, Tillich is the Origen of 
our period, seeking to relate the Gospel message 
to the disciplines of our culture and to the 
whole history of culture. 11 (18) 
the neo-orthodox the ologians, the thought of Niebuhr 
converge the most; e ach acknowledging a debt to the 
writes: "I may say that Brunner's whole theological 
is close to mine and that it is one to which I am more 
a nd 
o t her . 
e xpo-
i ndeb t e d 
than any other. I say this though in recent years our r espective 
treatment of the ethical pro blem has diverged rather widely, t hr ough 
his increasing adoption, and my increasing rejection, of the co ncept 
of 'Natural Law' _,(l 9 } 
Although there is little direct reference to Eultmann in Nie-
buhr's writing, points of divergence emerge whenever the concep t 
'myth' is under discussion. This is not surprising because this co n-
cept is important for both Niebuhr and Eultmann. We s hall have 
occasion later to examine Ni e buhr's understanding of myth. Niebu hr 
is aware that his understanding of myth can be construed as re ducin g 
Christianity to another philosophy of religion. He argues, how -
ever, that Eultmann did not take sufficient cognisance of the dis-
tinction between "pre-scient i fic" myth and "the myths of permanen t 
validity". Niebuhr, in fact, expressed regret at ever using the 
word 'myth', especially in the light of the dangers he saw in the 
"project for 'de - mythologizing' the Bible (which) has been under-
taken and bids fair to reduc e the Biblical revelation to etern ally 
valid truths without any existential encounters between God a nd 
man. 11 ( 2D) This is an obvious reference to Eultmann. 
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There are many points of divergence between the th eolog ians 
whom Tillich considered to have much in commo n, but this is not th e 
place for a detailed comparative analysi s of the work o f Niebuhr's 
contemporaries. Neither is it the place to enter into a discussi o n 
of the term "neo-orthodox" in relation to their work. But it is 
instructive for one's understandi ng o f th e work of Rei nh old Niebuhr 
to see what he shared with his contemporaries, and what his own 
particular contribution was. Our analysis o f his particular co ntribu-
tion will reveal that in some respects the neo-orthodox label does 
not fit him well . 
Like Niebuhr, th e o th er Pr o t e stant theologians who we r e d e stine d 
to play a prominent role in the first half of the tw e nti e th century, 
Earth, Brunner, Eultmann, a nd Tillic h were born before the turn o f 
the century. Th e y beg_ an their careers about th e time th e Firs t Wa r ld 
War broke out. Th e y bega~ in different way~ upon a path of th eolo g-
ical reconstruction after that war i n a world feeling th e impact o f 
th e growth o f technology and the urban-industrial proce ss which was 
putting tremendous strains on social a nd political structure s in 
Europe and Amenica. The pat h o f th eological reconstruction u pon 
which they embarked t ook th em away from the th oug ht of Schleiermacher, 
Ritchl, and Harnack who had dominated th e th eological sc e ne, e sp-
eciplly in Europe. 
In breaking with the liberal tradition in which th e y we r e train e d, 
they have all to some degree been called 11 neo-orthod ox". Wilhelm 
Pauck writes of how those wh o stood within th e tradition of liberal 
th eolog y viewed the process o f r econstructio n of t hese n eo -orthodox 
th eologians: 
"Harnack, the most represe ntative man of this gener-
ation of scholars (of the liberal tradition), pro-
fessed, with special r e sp ect t o th e th oug ht of Karl 
Ear t h •.• that he would never ha ve th oug ht it po ssibl e 
t ha t d uring his own l ife-time a way of thinking would 
emerge which he woul d b e unable t o r ece i ve and com-
prehend for lack of a n 'aerial' ."(?1) 
At no time during the l o ng proce ss of th eological r eco nstruction 
was ther e unanimity amo n g th e so-called neo-orthodox th eologians . 
Yet, as Pauck shows, there are at least fi ve major areas of commo n 
concern which have been the pre-occupation o f these th eologia ns 
over the years . ( 22 ) 
First, they are all con c erned to develop a th eo! og y o f r evelatio n 
in which knowledge of God is derived from God's s elf-dis clo sur e of 
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Himself in Christ. This concern represents a iadical departure 
from the emphasis in Schleiermacher's thought on the sui generis 
character of religious faith and the formulation of every aspect 
of doctrine as a particular determination of man's . religious con-
sciousness in its Christian form. 
Pauck, next, identifies the new under~tanding of biblical 
theology or what he calls "a new Biblicism 11 as a common concern of 
the nee-orthodox theologians. This "takes the books of the Bibl e 
as bearers of a kerygma, a message of salvation that must be 
believed ••• It is preoccupied with the concern; how to communicate 
the gospel." Niebuhr was not uncritical of "Biblicism", but th e r e 
is no doubt of the role the Bible played in his apologetics. 
The third emphasis common to the theologians under discussion 
Pauck describes as "the importance they attach t o historical work." 
Whilst they found it necessary to depart radically from the traditi o n 
of liberal theology, they nevertheless found the emphasis upon his-
torical research in that tradition to be invaluable. Niebuhr 's 
Gifford Lectures in which he makes an historical analysis o f th e 
Christian doctrine of man, Barth 's from fleuss~au · to Ritschl, -~ , 
and Bultmann 1 s mastery of th e historical met hod in his New Testa-
ment exegesis may be cited a s examples of the importance attached 
to historical research. 
Anoth-er J convergence . ·s Clfggested by Pauck is "t he indebtedness 
of contemporary theology to Reformation r esearc h ." Th e r enaissance 
brought about by research in t o the work of Lu th er ·an d Calvin has 
made an impact upon each of Niebuhr's contemporaries. Niebuhr's 
indebtedness to Luther has be an noted in the course o f our outline· 
of his development. Once again these men stand, as it were, on th e 
shoulders of those in the tradition of liberal theology wh ose re-
search into the Reformers has aroused new interest in the wor k o f 
Luther and Calvin within Protestant theology. 
Finally, Pauck draws attention to the ecumenical c haract e r of 
nee-orthodox theology. This fact has already been alluded to in 
our discussitin of Niebuhr's development. All these th eologia ns 
made major contributions to the crystalization of ecume nica l activity 
from the 1930's onward, albeit with reservations. Brunner voice s 
his reservations about organized ecumenical ac tivity by pointing 
to the differences between the American and European situations. 
"Our problem", he writes, "is not the variety of churche s in one 
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country, but rather the comp a rative irrelevance of the church as 
such. 11 ( 23 ) Niebuhr would sh a re that view, adding that th e real 
task of the Christian church t o day is t o promote "a dialogue between 
biblical faith and all the disciplines of modern culture in hopes 
that some day a creative synthesis may be reached. 11 ( 24 l 
(3) "COHERENCE, INCOHERENCE, AND CHRISTIAN 
FAITH": AN EXPOSITION 
Niebuhr's book Christian Realism and Political Problems (1953) 
is a contribution to the "dialog ue between biblical faith and all 
the disciplines of modern culture" which he believed to be th e press-
ing task of our times . It c o ntains a collection of essays written 
in an attempt 11 to establi sh the relevance of Christian faith to con-
temporary problems, particularly t o ethical and political ones. 11 (
25
) 
The final essay of the book, "Cohe r e nc e, Incoherence, and Christian 
Faith'' is, as Bennett suggests, his most theologically methodological 
one. Its thesis may be e xpr e ssed in the words of a letter he wrote 
in 1960, in which he says that th e coherencies of philosophy, like 
the methods of science, can be used as " the preliminary t e st of 
truth", but "the final arbiter .•• is the experience of incongruities 
in life and history which cannot be dig e sted in logically coherent 
systems.'1 ( 26 ) The relevance of Christian faith is its capacity to 
illumine what philosophy and science cannot; namely, the experience 
of "incongruities". In the dialogue between faith and th e discipline s 
of modern culture, Niebuhr ho pes that a creative synth e sis may 
emerge. In his essay he mak e s s ome proposals concerning th e apol-
ogetic task in this regard . 
Whilst the whole of reality is characterised by a "basic coh e r-
ence", Niebuhr argues that t here are f our r easons why coherence can-
not be used as a basic test o f truth. (a) There are historical 
characters and events whose uniqu enes s makes it impossible to fit 
them into any rational system. Th ere are, too , unique moral sit-
uations which cannot be fitt e d into a syst em of natural law. 
(b) "Realms of coherence ..• may stand in rational contradiction to 
each other. 11 ( 27 ) Thus, says Niebuhr, neither th e classical me ta-
physicists nor Hegel could embrace the emergence of novelty in his-
torical development. (c) Th e r e are "configurations and structure s 
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whic h stands at hw a rt eve ry rati o nally conceived system of mean-
. . "{28) Th . 
~ng... e pr~mary e xampl e f o r Ni e buhr, is man himself. 
{d) The mystery of human fr ee dom cannot be conceived · in any 
"natural o r rational scheme o f coherence •. • {This) led Pascal to 
elaborate his Christian e xis t e ntialism ..• (in which h e ) delved 'in 
mysteries without whi ch man r e mains a mystery t o hims elf' , 11 ( 2 9) 
I f coherence canno t b e a basic t e st of truth , in what way ar e 
the ''sup r aratio nal" affirmat i o ns of th e Christian faith related t o 
and valida t ed by their "capacity t o r e solve and clarify ·the anti-
nomies, th e aspects o f u niqu e ne ss and particularity, the ob scur e 
meani ngs and tangents o f meani n g in human lif e and h~story'',(JO) 
asks Nieb uhr . 
I n answering this qu e st io n , Niebuhr divid e s the world religions 
into two categori es: th e hi s torical religions are Christianity, 
Judaism, and . "possibly" Zo r oastr ianism and Mohammedanism. Culture 
religions is the term Niebuh r us e s t o d e scribe all other religions. 
These are characterised by a rigor o us attempt - more rigorous than 
science o r philosop hy - to pr e s e nt reality as a unified wh ole and 
to regard ''all discords and i ncongru~ti e s as pr o visi o nal or illus-
ory .•• {and) in which a universal principl e of meaning is sought 
eit her within the structures of th e world or within some universal 
subsistence above a nd beyond th e structure s ." (Jl ) Buddhism may be 
regarded as th e most con sist e nt form o f culture religion, which 
from the standpoin t o f pure mystici sm r egards th e temporal world, 
including the particular s elf, as essentially me aningl e ss . A modern 
versio n o f this form o f spirituality, f o r Ni e buhr, is th e work o f 
Ald ous Huxley. 
The emphasis of that Christia n faith which was Niebuhr's 
inheritance upon th e uniqu e, th e contradictory, the parad o xical, 
and unresolved mystery stands in striking contr~st t o the logic o f 
the culture religions. For ex ample, th e Christian doctrine o f 
creation ~ nihilo is world- affirming , whilst at the same time 
affirming th e suprarational c haract e r of th e myst e ry b e yond natural 
and rational ca usalities . This doc trin e , th e r e f o r e , indicates a 
realm o f fr eedom and myster y beyond r e ason's capacity to comprehend, 
wh ereby the fin al irrationality o f th e 11 giv e ne ss of things is frankly 
accepted, 11 (
32
) Biblical e schatolog y is anoth e r e xampl e of the 
paradoxical in Chris tian faith. I t affirms "th e culmination of time 
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in a transfigured time.:. t hat ou r partial simulta nei ty wil l not be 
annulled by God's totem simul, that th e c ulminati on means not th e 
annulment but the fulfillme nt of th e t e mp oral proce ss ." Th e s e con-
ceptions of the beginni ng a nd th e end "ar e rationally absurd, or at 
least paradoxical, but th ey guard th e Christian int e rpr e tation of 
life •.• from either a meani ngless time or a s elf-fulfilling 
t . "(33) ~me. 
The Christian interpretation of th e beginning and th e e nd 
provide the framework f or t he positive content of th e Christian 
Gospel "which has to do wit h man's fr ee dom and God's fre e d o m~ with 
man's sin and God's grace. 11 ( 34 ) Th e Christian answe r to th e human 
predicament is summarized by Niebuhr in th e foll owing passag e : 
"a divine mercy t oward man , revealed in Christ, . which 
is at o nce a power e nabling th e s el f to r eali z e 
itself t ruly beyo nd itself in love, and th e f orgive-
ness of God toward th e s elf which even at its best 
remains in partial c ontradiction to th e divin e 
will •.. In the Christian faith th e s el f in its 
final fr eedom doe s not find its no rm in th e struc-
tures ei th er of natur e or of r ea son . Nor is e ith e r 
able to bind the s elf's fr ee dom or guarant ee its 
virtue, as the proponents of 'natural law' would 
have it. The principle of rationality • .• does not 
secure the virt ue of th e s e lf as in th e thought 
of Kant. For th e s elf can mak e use of logic for 
its ends .•• Nor is evil in th e self th e provi-
sional con f usion and cross-purpos e s of natural 
passion be f ore ord e r e d by mind as in Aristo t le."(35) 
The Christi an concept o f th e dig ni ty and mis e ry of man as 
being of one piece, as Pascal as s ert ed , . is clo s e r to truth abo ut 
man than Re naissa nce and modern conceptions o f man which assert 
man's dignity to th e e xclusion of man's capacity for sin. 
Niebuhr uses the t e rm ''drama" to de scrib e th e Christian under-
standing of the engageme nt between God and individual and coll ec t ive 
man, because neither th e life of the individual nor of man kind ca n 
"be conceived in stric tly rati onal t e rms of c o her e nce. 11 ( 36 ) In 
the drama of engagemen t between man and God , th e only c e rtainty 
from t he Christian viewpoi nt is: 
"that evil canno t rise t o the point of de feating 
God; that every f orm of e gotism , s elf-idolatry, 
and defiance stand s under divin e j udg e ment; that 
this judgement is partially executed in act ua l 
history ••• that hi story r emains morally ambig uou s 
to the end; and that a divin e r ede mpti ve l ove is 
always initiating a r ec onciliation be twee n God and 
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man. According to this answer, a suffering 
divine love is the final coherence of life ... 
"(This) Christian ans wer, adequate for a full 
understanding of both the good and the evil 
possibilities of human freedom, involves a def-
inition of God which stands beyond the limits of 
rationality. God is defined as both just and 
merciful ••• He is defined i n trini t arian terms. 
The Almighty creator, wh o transcends hist ory, and 
the redeemer whn suffers in history are two and 
yet one. The Holy Spirit, who is the f inal 
bond of unity in the comm u nity o f t he redeemed, 
represents •.• the ultima t e harmony, which includes 
both the power o f th e c r eator and the love of th e 
redeemer. 11 {27 ) 
The doctrines of the Atonemen t and the Trinity can no t s ucce ss-
fully be explained ~n rational t e rms , in spite of attempts in Chris-
tian theology to do so. Justice degenerates into legalism, and 
love into sentimentality without th e doctrine of ato nemen t , says 
Niebuhr. 
The ultrarational ''pi nnacles o f Christian truth" which e mbrac e 
paradox and contradiction, Niebuhr believes can only be made plaus-
ible when they are understood as '' th e keys which make the drama of 
human life and history com prehe nsibl e and without which it i s eith e r 
given a too-simple meaning or falls into meaningle ss . 11 ( 3 B) Thus 
Niebuhr believes that, in sp ite of his critici s ms of it, existe ntial-
ism is a revolt against th e nai ve ty o f traditional rationalism, and 
logical positivism expresses a scepticism obscured by idealism. 
Niebuhr argues that his assertion that th e Christian apologetic 
validates the ultrarational a ffirmati ons o f th e faith by sh o wing 
them to be the key to unde r standin g t he dra ma of i ndividual a nd 
collective life, is suppo r t ed by the Old and New Testaments. He 
cites as an example the un d ers t a nding o f a suffering God~ 
"It is in searching for the ultimate meaning o f .th e 
morally intolerable suffering of right eou s and com-
paratively innocent Israel that Chapter 53 o f I s aiah 
first establishes th e relation between a moral ob-
scurity in his t ory with wh a t becomes in th e New Test-
ament the final clari fi cation of the moral obscurity 
of history, a suffering God. Paul rejoices in th e 
fact that ..• the me ssage o f th e Cross, becomes in th e 
eyes of faith the key whic h u nloc ks the mysteries o f 
life and makes sen s e out o f it. 11 (39) 
. ,uN iebuhr . now turns his attention to the "unremitting problem" 
of the I elationship betwee n t he validi ty o f Ch ristian trut h and th e 
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cultural disciplines which search for coherence in nature, li f e a n d 
history. As we have seen, Niebuhr detects two main traditions whic h 
have emerged in response to thi s problem. ( 40) On the one hand t he r e 
is the tradition character i sed by Luther which emphasises, to a 
greater or lesser extent, t he i r rational character of Chris t ian 
truth. On the other hand t here is the tradition, charac t erised by 
Aquinas, which seeks to ex press Chris t ian truth in ra t ional terms, 
thereby obscuring the deep incongruities in human life and hi st ory. 
Neither the content o f Christian faith nor the character of 
human life and history mak e it po s sible for u s t o rely upon a n 
interpretation of life based o n cohe r ence and rationalit y . Bu t , 
Niebuhr argues, there are s eriou s perils in the opposite app r oach 
of Christian existentialism. I n the previou s chapter we exami ned 
his criticisms of Kierkega ard and Bar t h which highlight these peri l s . 
What, then, is the way fo rward? Niebuhr is commit t ed to f i nd-
ing a way of relating Chri s tian t ru th and the cultural discipli n e s . 
This can be seen in the following quotation: 
"There is, in short, no possibility of fully val-
idating the truth i n the f oolishness of the Gos-
p-~1 - ~ i f every '''c'ti"rtural discipline is not taken ser-
iously up to the point where it becomes conscious 
of its own limits and the point where the insights 
of the various dis c iplines sta n d in contradiction to 
each other, signifying that the t otal of reali t y is 
more complex than any scheme of rational meaning 
which may be invented to comprehend it."{41) 
The way forward, for Niebuhr, lies in a position which he 
defines as biblical realism, which escapes t he difficulties i nh e r e n t 
in the thought of Barth and Kierkegaard, and yet may justifiably 
be described by the term "neo-orthodoxy": 
"··· criticisms of the two best-known forms of 
Christian existentialism imply a third position 
which would distinguish itself from both by 
taking the coherences a n d causalities of life 
and history more seriously than Kierkegaard. 
On the other hand, it re j ec t s the biblical 
. literalism into which Barth is betrayed and his 
attitude toward the disciplines of philosophy 
and the sciences. We might well define this 
position as biblical realism."(42) 
By taking accumulated evidence o f the natural sciences se r ious-
ly in his biblical realism, Niebuhr differs in one important poin t 
from the biblical world-view. On the evidence of the natural 
sciences he is convinced "that the realm of natural causation is 
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more closed, and less subject to divine intervention, than the 
Biblical world view assumes . 11 ( 4 J) This conclusion has cer t ain 
important consequences. As he puts it, it ca us es him t o discard 
"one kind of miracle, and mi racle is the dearest c hi ld o f faith . 11 ( 44 ) 
Not all miracles are d i scarded in Nieb~Hr•s biblical r ealism. 
The healing miracles of Jesus, f or e xam ple, a r e credible because they 
take into account that man i s more than the sum t otal o f his physical 
and psychological needs; that he has a spiritual dimensi o n. Th e 
evidence o f psychosomatic medicine, he believes, corro b orates · such a 
view. 
"Bu t ", says Niebuhr, " we do not b elie ve in th e virgin birth, 
and we have difficulty with th e ~hysical resurrection of Christ . 
We do not believe, in other words, that th e r e vela t o ry eve nts validat e 
themselves by a divine brea k-t hroug h in th e n a tural o rd e r. 11 ( 4 S) 
By adopting th is a ttit ude, Niebuhr argue s that a s i gnificant 
gain has bee n made. A gain in keeping with Christis own r e j ec tion 
o f signs as authen ticat ions o f his messianic missio n . Revelatory 
truths must be apprehended b y r epe nt ance and faith , "and cannot 
merely be accepted as a hist orical fact , validated by th e miraculous 
charac t er of th e fact. Th e deeper truth must b e apprehended by 
becoming th e key whi ch unlock s th e myst ery o f wh a t man is and should 
be and of wh a t God is in relations with man. 11 ( 46 ) 
On th e oth er hand, biblical realism is e ntirely in agreement 
with the Old and New Tes taments wh e n it inter pr e ts " the drama of 
human history as an engageme nt betwee.n man and Go d ", and "ca n r eco g-
nise in the course o f history particular eve nts which hav e a spec ial 




Niebuhr acknowledges the perils o f th e kind of int erp r e tati o n 
embodied in his biblical realism. It can b e said that Christianity, 
on this view, has been red uced t o yet another philo s o phy . For t o 
say, as Niebuhr does ·, that ''hi st o rical f ac ts ( must b e tak e n) s e rio us -
ly bu t not literally .•• may be on th e way o f no t taking them as 
historical facts at all. 11 ( 4 B) 
However, Niebuhr beli e ves that th e gains mad e by adopting a 
biblical realism approach a re significant. For e xample , he is abl e 
to interpret t he fall o f man as myth, and not as historical fact, 
thereby re j ecting. notions of biologically inh e rit e d corruption, 
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whilst at the same time insisting that evil is an inevitable condition 
of man's finiteness, But he r ecog nizes that this interpretation of 
evil stands "on the edge of Pla tonism." The same principle applies 
in his rejection of the end of the world as a literal event. He is 
aware, however, that this reje c tion can "easily obscure the eternity 
at the end of time and have only an eternity over time left, again 
a movement toward Platonism. 11 ( 4 9 ) 
There is no simple solutio n to the problems of which Niebuhr 
is conscious in the biblical realism he proposes. He makes the point, 
howe ver? that the great Christ ia n existentialists Pascal, Luther, and 
Kierkegaard t ho u ght in a world in which modern science had not yet 
radically altered the conception of Nature. On the other hand, 
Earthians dis r egard the evidences of modern science: This approach 
is untenable, in Niebuhr's view. 
If a way forward is to be found for the apologetic task, Nie-
buhr believes that it must incorporate the evidences of modern science. 
He therefore makes two proposa l s: 
"1) A radical distinction between the natural world 
and the world of human history must be made, how-
e ver much his t ory may have a natural base. The just-
ification for this dis ti nction lies in the unique 
charac t er of h uman fre e dom. Almost all misrepresen-
tations of huma n selfh oo d ... are derived from the 
effort t o r educe human e xis t ence t o the coherence of 
n a ture. 2 ) Huma n history must be understood as con-
t aining wit h i n i t the e ncounters between man and God 
i n wh ich God int ervenes t o reconstruct the rational 
concepts o f mea n ing which men and cultures construct ... "(50) 
Niebu hr does no t e n large upon t he " t wo primary propositions" he 
makes r egardin g t he wa y forward f or apologetics. He does, however, 
indica t e t h e manner i n wh ich Go d i s encountered in human history. 
I n a t igh t ly- kn i t arg ument whi c h follows upon his propositions, he 
writes: 
" The t rue God i s encou ntered in (a) creativities which 
introduce elemen t s int o the historic situation which 
could not have been anticipated , .. In history this 
crea t ivity appea r s a s grace, as a form of election for 
which no rea s on can be given, as in God's covenant 
wi t h I srael .... (b) Go d is encountered in judgement 
whe n e v e r human ideals, values, and historical achieve-
me nts are disco vered t o be in contradiction to the ,, 
di v ine ... Incl uded in such historical events are the 
prop hetic testimonie s which fathom the contradiction 
be tw ee n the h u man and the divine , God speaks to the 
belie v er .. , t hrough the testimony of the prophets ... 
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No reason for these prophetic insights can be given. 
Th ey are not antic ipated in the highest culture, but 
they . . can by faith be incorporated into a new inter-
pretation of th e meaning of history. (c) Events in 
which the divin e j~dg ements lead to a reconstitution 
o f life. These are re velations of redeeming grace 
in which the old s elf, including the collective self 
o f f al s e c ultures is destroyed, but the destruction 
leads to new . life. The Bible rightly represents the 
wh ole drama of Ch r ist as the final point in the 
Heilgeschichte, f o r here every form of human good-
ness is revealed in its problematic character. But 
a recognition of that fact makes a new form of good-
ness possible ..• 
These events come to the believer as given. They can 
therefore not be a nt icipated by any philosophy of 
co h e r ence . •• "(51) 
The historic e vents which are central to the Christian faith, 
can not by their very nature be anticipated by rational philosophy. 
It is, for Nieb uhr , o n e of the presuppositions of the Christian 
f ait h that there is an ''existential incoherence" between the human 
and divine will. for this reason the historic events or revelation 
can only be appropriated by faith; that is, . ~xistentially rather 
than rationally. Recognition of their truth requires an attitude 
of repentance towards false attempts at coherence. 
"Furthermore", writ es Niebuhr, these historic events "assert a 
relevance b e twe e n a divine freedom a nd a human freedom, across the 
chasm o f th e inflexibilities o f nature which have no other message 
but d ea th, to this cu rious animal, man, who is more than an ani -
1 .. (52) rna • 
Th e r e n eed b e n o gr e at . gulf fixed between the historic events 
affirmed by th e Christian faith, and the cultural disciplines. They 
ca n b e related spec ulatively t o these disciplines, and make sense 
ou t o f them. Reason can thus follow after faith. But it can also 
precede it in th e sense that reason can point to the limits of 
rational .. systems o f co he r e nce in und erstanding reality in general, 
and in particular man' s place within that reality. If, as Niebuhr 
argues, it .is granted that the full dimension of the human spirit 
cann o t be co ntain e d with i n any rational system of coherence, then 
it cannot be und e rst ood a t all '' without presupposing a dimension of 
divin e fr ee d om abo ve th e co here nces of nature and mind as its 
e n viro nment; which in i t s e nd less self-transcendence knows that 
all j udgement s passed up o n it by history are subject to a more ult-
10 3 
imate jud geme nt .. • ; a nd , finally , which is aborti vely invol ved in 
o v e rcoming th e incongruity o f i ts e x istence as free spirit and a s 
ob j ec t in nature, eit h e r by denying its fr eedom (sensuality) or by 
d e nying its f i nit ene ss (h y bri s ) ••• The final answer to this inco-
here nce be tw ee n th e h uma n and th e divine will is the divine suff e ring 
me r cy; a nd for this n o r e aso n can be given. 11 ( 5 J) 
Having d elin ea t e d the mai n f ea tur e s of his biblical realism, 
Nieb uhr co nclude s his e s say by examining briefly the gains made by 
adopti n g su c h a po s ition . He argu e s that many " s ophisticated 
moder ns " find the " s mooth picture s o f man and history" apparent in 
modern cul ture grossly inadequat e. Thi s may be viewed as a " negative" 
proo f o f th e a ffir mation s o f the Christian faith. By this he mean s 
that th e Ch r istian u n d e rstanding of man and history is acknowledged 
t o be mo r e ad e quat e than mode rn alternatives, and cites a n historia n 
in support o f this co nt e ntion: 
"It can n o t be denied that Christian analyses o f 
h uma n co n d uct a nd o f huma n history are truer to the 
f ac ts o f e x perience than alternative analyses. 
(B ut h e a dds ) wh e t her the truth o f these analyses 
ca n be d e r iv e d o nl y from th e presuppositions of 
th e Christ ian fai t h r ema ins t o be determined."(54) 
On the o th e r h a nd , and mo r e positively: 
" we ar e wh e r e we always have been. Faith is not 
r ea s o n ..• The sit ua tion for f aith is only slightly 
altered by th e n e w pict ur e o f a quasi-autonomous 
nat ure, cr ea t e d by God, n o t mai nt ained by His fiat 
fr o m moment t o mome nt . No s ig n can be give n b ut 
tha t o f th e pr o ph e t J o nah, by wh ic h Jesus meant the 
sign of d ea th and r e surrection . This is t o say, 
wh e neve r th e v i cissit ud e s f rom wh ich th e self, either 
individ uall y o r collectively, suffers are appropriated 
by fait h as divi n e j udgeme nts and not as meaningless 
caprice, th ey r e su l t in th e love, j oy, and peace of 
a n e w life •.. A th eolog y wh ich bo th holds fast to 
the mystery a nd me aning b eyo nd ..• co h e r ences and also 
has a dece nt r e s pec t f o r th e c rd e r and mean ing o f the 
n a tural wo r l d ca n no t be th e qu ee n o f the scie nces, nor 
s ho uld sh e be th e d e spis ed and neglected handmaiden 
o f her present e s tat e."( 55 ) 
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(4) CHR IST I AN REA LISM AND THE 
PR OBLE M OF VALIDATIQN 
; .. t 
Niebuhr's essay "Coherence, Incoherence, and Christian Faith'' 
i s his most methodological statement of position. It must therefore 
be seen as a microcosm of his theological method. For this reason 
subsequent chapters of this analysis of Niebuhr will elabora t e the 
themes delineated in that essay. 
Even his most theological l y methodological statement does not 
make e xplicit the method implic it in his thought . It is rath er a 
statement of position aver agai~st those he believed to be inad-
equate. For example, he is critical of the Christian existentialists, 
and wishes to move beyond them. But it is only from his criticisms 
of Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Barth that one may deduce the manner in 
which .he wishes to do this . In . other wards, his position is negative-
ly -defined rather than positivel y stated. Another example is the 
fact that his proposition~ regarding the way forward for apologetics 
came at the end of the essay, where they are stated but not elab-
orated. 
Implicit thro u ghout his essay is Niebuhr's use of 'adequacy' 
as a test of the truth of Christian faith . For example, he - argues 
that the ~'suprarational" affirmations of Christian faith are valid -
~ ated by t heir abilit y to provid e th e keys with which to co mprehend 
the drama of life and history as meaningful. Niebuhr makes use of 
the criterion of 'adequacy' rather than 'coherence' in his method. 
He is on record as saying that he is in complete agreement with the 
Lo ndon "Times Literary Supplement" that the Christian doctrine of 
original sin is the best attested of the Christian doctrines. In 
spite of the irrational character of that doctr~ne, it is more 
adequate to describe the human situation than thos e schemes which 
use the criterion of 'coherence' when attempting to do so . 
Niebuhr does nat elaborate on what we have described as the 
use of adequacy implicit in his validation of the ·affirmations of 
Christian faith. His whole essay is a search for a way . forward for 
Christian apologetics and social ethics. In this search he rej ec ts 
rationalism and extreme forms ~f .Christian existentialism on the 
grounds that they cannot do jus~ice to (are nat adequate to describe) 
human life and history as we experience them . In the commerce 
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, betwee n · faith and th e warld 9 th e truth o f Christian f aith is 
affirmed - nat by appeal to same ultimate authority, whether it be 
Gad, th e Bibl e , or personal experie nce - sut by its ad eq uacy to 
'make s e nse o f ' the reality o f h uma n e xperience and history. The 
traditional sources of a uthori t y far th e Christian may be accepted 
as authoritativ e , he argues im plicitly through o ut the essay, only 
because they meet the criterio n o f adequacy. 
Th e r e ~s, we belie ve , in t his essay a methodology which Niebuhr 
n e ver e xplicitly elabo rat e s. He · us e s the criterion o f 'adequacy' to 
judg e bath rationalism a nd e xt r eme farms of Christian e xist en tialism, 
and by that same criterion to postulate what h e calls "biblical 
r eali sm ". He argues that bibl i cal r ea lism is mare adequate than 
ather positions, and that it p r ovides the k e y to und ers tanding the 
relationship betwee n the fai t h and the world. Rational syst em s of 
coherence fail in that they . ca nn a t adequately account f ar the ambig-
uiti e s, f a r novel ty, f ar partic ularity as th e y undoubt edly appear 
in human histo r y. Ex treme ex~stentiali s m fails because it cannot 
tak e t~e . findings o f th e cultu~al disciplin es seriously. Biblical 
realism, whilst nat without probl e ms, can in Niebuhr's vi ew cl~rif~ 
the drama of human e xis t ence a nd h uman history . I t is th erefore mare 
adequate, and pro vides a way f o rward far Christian apologetics. 
We t u r l no w to Nieb uh r 's e x position of biblical realism to 
e xamine same paint s i n hi s stateme nt which tend t o obscure rath e r 
than to clarify i t . 
{a) Tr ut h Withi n Th e Tradition 
At a later pain t we will shaw that f ar Niebuhr Christian Real-
ism deno t es ba th a th eolog i cal me t hod and a Christian tradition. 
As a me th o d it us e s th e pr i ncip l e o f a d e qu acy to te s t the truth of 
Chr i s tia n fa i th . As a Chr i sti a n tradition, i t i s that which, inter-
pre t e d a nd modi f ied by Ni e buhr, runs thr o u g h th e Old Testament 
prop h e ts, th e Ne w Testame nt, and Au g ust i ne, to t he Re formers, Pascal, 
a nd Ki e rk egaard. 
Ni eb uhr's e xp ositio n o f biblical r ealism con t ained i n his 
e ss a y wo u l d be str e ngth e n e d if h e we r e to d r ~w a distinction bet wee n 
th a t wh ic h i s tru e wi th i n a tradi tio n , a nd h ow t he tradition i t s elf 
i s verifie d i n h i st o ry and i n hum a n e x peri e nce . 
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From his essay, and from his writings in general, it would 
appear that Niebuhr does no t consider the gains made by linguistic 
analysis in clarifying what we have called the 'truth within th e 
tradition'. 
Linguistic analysis, in the words of Alisdair Macintyre, is 
concerned "to show how an e x pression is used so that it has point 
and purpose. So the philosopher's approach to language is both 
empirical and normative ..• (Thus, for example, the statement "God 
loves us") can only be unde r stood correctly in the whole context o f 
religious discourse."(S 6 ) 
There are several cruc i al points in Niebuhr's analysis of bib-
lical realism which the therapeutic t ool of linguistic · analysis 
would greatly elucidate. At points in his argument, Niebuhr uses 
phrases like "No reason but God .'s mysterious grace · can be given for 
the covenant"(S 7 ); 11 a form of election .for which no reason · can b e 
given, . as in God's · covenant with Israel"{SB); "no reason for . these 
prophetic insights can be g i ven. They are not anticipated by th e 
highest culture ..• "(Sg); and "The final answer to this incohere nce 
between the human and the d i vine will is the divine suffering mercy; 
and for this no reason can be given. 11 ( 6D) 
Niebuhr's use of the word " r easo n '' in these contexts is puzzling. 
Does he mean by it that which · is not subject to empirical verifica-
tion? Does he mean that the One who establis hes the Covena nt is a 
transcendent God and cannot therefore b e the object of empirical 
means of verification? If his use of the word "reason" is intended 
to make the point that the t ranscendent God cannot be comprehended 
merely by rational means, then of course Niebuhr is right. But the 
question with which he is wr estling in his essay is: How do we 
know that the Aultrarational pinnacles" of Christian faith are true ? 
He is concerned, therefore, to give reasons for the truth o f Chris-
tian faith. We believe tha t the criterion or test of the truth of 
Christian faith, for Niebuh r , is what we have called the 'principle 
of adequacy' - this is implicit in his method. 
To say no r e ason can be given for election, or covenant, or the 
doctrine of a divine suffering mercy, is to obscure the argument 
Niebuhr is making. The rea s on for obscuri ty would seem to lie in 
his failure to distinguish between what ~ e have called ' truth wit h i n 
the tradition', and how the tradition itself is tested and modified 
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in relation to the totality of human experience. 
Within the language g a me of the Hebrew-Christian tradition it 
is possible to give reason s for the election, the covenant , a nd th e 
idea of a divine suffering mercy. These belong, in the first plac e 
to the tradition's understanding of the character of God, and al s o 
to the tradition's understanding of revelation as God's unfoldin g 
disclosures of Himself in history. That is to say, within th e trad-
ition election, covenant and the prophetic role are understood t o 
be inextricably bound to i ts un derstanding o f the c har ac t e r o f Go d . 
You cannot speak of cove na n t or election without speaking o f Go d, 
and provided you do not us e the crit eria of verifica t ion fr om ano th e r 
language game, such as scie nce, it is possible to give rea s o ns f o r 
a particular affirmation wi thin the tradition - such as cove n a nt -
within the context of the t radition itself. 
In our discussion of th e prophetic method in th e first chap t e r 
we noted that the prophet could be und erstood only by those wh o 
shared the same tradition as he did. In this sense truth e xist s 
within a tradition. What t he prophet said was understood t o be tru e 
or false in the context in which he an d his hearers st ood. 
It was surely clear t o Nieb u hr that it is possible t o give 
reasons for concepts of electio n , covenant, and th e prophet ' s r o le. 
But because he does not ut i lize the distinction between 'truth 
within the tradition' and 'testing th e tradition', th e f orce o f his 
argument in his essay is s ome wh at blu nted. 
Having said this, it must be added that the traditi o n i ts el f 
cannot be said to be true, simply because it holds t oge th er , a nd 
because reasons can be gi ve n f or the affirmation o f faith wi t hin 
the tradition itself. If this were s o, it would be possible t o have 
a coherent 'system' which is in n o way relevant o r applicable t o th e 
totality of human experienc e. As Niebuhr rightly says, o n e o f th e 
crucial tasks facing Christian apologetics t oday is how t o relate 
the affirmations of the faith to what he call s the "wi s dom of th e 
world". 
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(b) Testing The Tradition 
Throughout his essay Niebuhr is searching for a way of testing 
the truth of his tradition - which he expresses in a form he calls 
Biblical Realism - against the totality of human experience .. As we 
have seen, he argues that the doctrine of creation ~ nihilo is 
true because it is world-affirming (as opposed to Buddhism whic h 
regards the temporal world as · essentially meaningless). But i t is 
also true because it affirms that the world is more t h an the sum 
total of its natural and rational causality: it points t o a " s up r a-
rational ..• mystery" beyond this causality. The doctrine of c r ea-
tion, which in the Hebrew-Christian tradition .is arri ved a t as a 
result of its understanding of the character of the transcendent 
God, is true because it provides the key to understanding the wo r ld. 
A key which our understanding of natural causation, and the limi t s 
of reason, . cannot give. 
What Niebuhr seems to be saying here is that the Buddhist 
cannot . be right, because t he world of reality does have mean i ng. 
Tested against the totalit y of human experience pure mystici s m 
cannot be right because th e temporal world is not only r eal , b ut 
also meaningful. On the o t her hand, the world is more than the sum 
total of our understanding s of natural and rational causation. 
Naturalism and ration a lism may provide us with invaluable da t a 
about man, but they cannot in the final analysis provide us with 
an adequate key to underst a nding man and the world. Niebuhr, in 
fact, spent a great deal of his life fighting those f orms of na t ural-
ism and rationalism which boasted ultimate truth about man and the 
world. The criterion which he used in this fight, whilst never 
explicitly elaborated, was the criterion of· adequacy. For example , 
he argues that ,Pascal's un d erstanding of the grandeur and misery o f 
man is closer to the truth than the .Renaissance and modern under-
standings which emphasise man's dignity to the exclusion of his 
capacity to sin. 
We have said that 'ad e quacy' is the means of testing the t rad-
itibn implicit in Niebuhr's essay. In his Intellectual Autobio-
graphy Niebuhr discusses hi s approach .to the question of testing the 
truth of Christian faith. He begins by pointing to the interplay 
between the presuppositions of faith and the facts of experience , 
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and describes it in this wa y: 
"It is difficult t o kn o w wh e th er th e criticism of 
both liberal and Ma rxist view s o f human natur e and 
history was prompt e d by a profo und e r und e rstanding 
of the Biblical faith; o r wh e th er this under-
standing was prompted by th e refutation o f the 
liberal a nd Marxist faith by th e tragic eve nts o f 
contemporary h istory whi c h included two wo rld wars 
and the e nco unt er o f a liberal culture with two 
idolatrous tyranni e s, first Nazism and th e n Co mmunism 9 
resting respectively upon th e f o und a tio ns - o f moral 
cynicism and moral utopia nism . Abo ut th e circ ular 
relation betwee n th e presuppositions o f faith and 
the facts o f experience I must say more pr e s e ntly ."{61} 
Niebuhr expa nds a nd d e fe nds his und e rstanding o f th e "c ircular 
relation be t ween f aith a nd ex p e rienc e" in an sw e ring c ritics o f th e 
Barthian school. They had argued that th ere is no way o f compelling 
faith rationally, a nd sinc e f ai th govern s th e conclusion s o ne 
arrive s a t , there i s no wa y o f using e xp erience t o d e t e rmin e f ai th. 
In a key passage, Niebu hr d e f e nds his und e rstanding: 
"Since a guiding pr e suppo sitio n, held by faith, act s 
as a kind o f filt er f o r th e evid e nc e adduced by 
experience, it would seem th a t th e th eolo gians a r e 
right and th a t the modern scien tist is wr o ng in 
making ! e xperi e nc e' a final arbiter o f truth. But 
th e matter is more compl e x . Guiding presuppositions 
do indeed colo r th e evide nc e accumulated by e xp e r-
ience; but th ey do not fully control e xp e ri e nce . 
Pre suppositio ns ·ar e like spec tacles worn by a near-
sighted or myopic man. He cannot s ee with o ut the 
spectacles. But if evide nce ot her th a n that gath ere d 
b y his sight persu a des him that his spectacle s ar e 
inadequate t o help him see wh a t h e ou ght t o s ee , h e 
will cha n ge his spectacles."{62) 
Thus Nieb uhr concedes wh at s omeone o f strict Barth ian persuasion 
-
cannot concede. Experie nc e ca n modi fy th e " s pectacles" o n e wears, 
and it can even cause th e wea r e r t o discard th em alt o ge th e r . The 
process of modificatio n of presuppositions, a nd eve n th e discarding 
of presuppositions is illustrated in Niebuhr's v iew of mod e rn 
secularism: 
"Modern sec ularism r e sults from th e disavowal o f 
traditional Jewish a nd Chr i stian - faith s on what 
s eems to be th e incontrovertibl e evidence o f 
e xperience. These faiths as su med a myst e ry of 
a person and a wil l behind th e ob s ervable phenom-
ena of the world. Science proved th e s e · ph e nome n a 
to be related to each othe r in s e qu e nces o f e ffic-
ient ca us a tion ••• Th erefore va rio us typ es o f 
'secularism' which regarded th e wh ole o f r eal ity 
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as self-explanatory and s elf-fulfilling , and which 
interpreted man in t e rms of his relation either t o th e 
realm of rea s o n or t o th e r ealm of nature, s eeme d t o 
have compelling evide nc e in their fa vour. Tradit -
ional and historic r eligio ns s eeme d passe. I t is 
therefore necessary t o r eco unt the e xp e rie nc e s o f 
mo dern man which are most obviou sly at va rianc e with 
this modern picture o f th e human e nt e rpris e ••• that 
there was something wrong with th e spec tacles throug h 
which mo dern man l o o ke d at hims elf an ~ his world ."( 63 ) 
Niebuhr believed that t h e apologetic task comprises of an anal-
ysis and critique of th e pre s u pposi tio ns o f modern c ulture, and an 
exposition o f the manner in which Christian f aith may provid e a ke y 
to understand contemporary . e xp e ri e nc e b eyo nd the limits of r e ason and 
natural ca usat ion. 
Man's capacity to tran s cend no t o nly th e process e s o f nature 
but also the opera t ion s of his own r ea s o n; t o st a nd as it were 
above "the structures and c oh e r e nce s o f th e world ", points to that 
dimension of human e xist e nc e whi ch makes rationalistic and natu r al-
istic interpretation s o f exist e nce inad e quat e. 
Modern attempts to embrace this dimension o f th e human spirit 
elaborate a form o f mysticism. Niebuhr cites Be rtrand Russell's 
Mysticism and Logic a nd Aldo us Hu xle y's The Pere nn ial Philo sophy a s 
e xamples of an attempt " t o delve into th e realm of pur e myst e ry 
{about which nothing can be said but that it is at th e same time the 
fulln ess of being and the abse nce o f being )."( 64 ) This form of 
mysticism seriously ,misunderstands man. In asserting that only th e 
d ivine is good a nd th at all t em poral and i ndividual particularity is 
evil, mysticism has n o means o f und.erstanding man ' s e x i stenc e a s an 
historical creature. "Chris tianity (o n th e contrary) is in e xtricably 
bound up with the idea of the historical character of man.'1 ( 6S) 
Niebuhr's ma j or critic ism o f th e philo s o phie s which e mphasis e 
ontological categories, wh e th er naturalistic, idealistic, o r mystical 
is that they canno t do justice to man as an hist orical creature. 
Th e Christian faith makes t wo fund ame ntal assertions upon which it 
must stand or fall: 
"The Chris t ian faith asserts about God that He is a 
person and that He has tak e n hist orical action t o ove r -
come the varia nce b e tw ee n man and God •.• Both pr o posi-
tions are absurd f r om a strictly on t ological stand-
point."(66) 
Ontology has difficulty with th e concept o f God's personalit y , 
because the co ncept o f per s o nality is full of cohnotations of finit e -
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ness and cannot ther.efore b e ascrib~d to God. . Ye t , ha s Bradl e y not 
shown, that if God is absolute then H~ ca nnot be perso n? And s o 
t his philosophy is involved in "an absurdity in t he e ff or t t o e scap e 
an absurdity"; it assigns t o God 'absolutes' of diff e r e nt ki nd, but 
it denies its God the simple freedom which man himsel f und o ubt edly 
en j oys. Its difficulty lies in the fact that the conce pt of pe rson -
ality cannot be contained in a rational system, accordin g t o Ni e buhr. 
It is regretable that Ni ebuhr does not elaborate upon th e 
Christian affirmation of God as person. He simply as s er t s that wh e r e-
as an ontological standpoint has great difficult y wit h th e co nce pt of 
God's personality, the Christian faith asserts abo ut God th a t He ~s 
person. At the time of writing his Intellectual Autobiogra phy, 
Niebuhr believed that Christian apologeti~s must explo r e th e 
di~ensions of personality a nd history: 
~We must .~~ke it cle ar that the concepts of bo th 
personality and his tory are ·a ntologically ambigo us . 
Personality, whether God's - or man'si is , de f i ne d onl y 
in a dramatic and historic encounter. Tho ugh the s e 
dramatic and historical media of personali ty . a r e no t 
inherently 'irrational', they are not s ub j ect t o the 
ordinary 'scientific ' tests of ratio nal in t elli gi bility. 
Nothing in history follows as it does in nature or 
reason, . 'in a necessary manner'. The personal± ty i s 
bound by historical destiny rather t han by na tur a l or 
on t ological necessity." {67) 
Because of what he describes as the "o nt ologic a l ambiguity " of 
both personality and history, Niebuhr makes th e point that it is 
s~gnificant that artists, dramatists, noveli sts , a nd poe ts hav e 
found it easier to understand the faith, · while philoso ph e rs and 
scientists have found it difficult to respect i t i nt el l ec tua l ly. 
This, he believes, is because the concepts of pe r so nali t y and hist ory 
lend themselves to dramatic interpretation to a grea t e r de gree than 
they do to causal and rational interpretation. 
Nieb uhr is on record as saying that t he bibl i cal t e xt whic h , for 
him, expresses the crux of the faith is: "God wa s in Christ 
reconciling the world unto Himself", {2 Cor 5:19). This affirmati o n 
may not be reducible to an ontological principle, or a pro posit i onal 
statement, but it is adequate in that it provide s a bas ic ke y to 
understanding the drama of the self and th e drama of hist ory, and 
because the concepts of ,personality and history th e ms e lve s transcend 
causality and rationality. 
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As far as Niebuhr is concerned, the only ultimate validation 
of the affirmations of the Christian faith lies in the quality of 
life which ensues when a person accepts them, by faith. He writes 
in his Intellectual Autobiography: 
"There is no way of validating such a proposition (that 
God is person, and has taken historical action to heal 
the breach between man and God) philosophically, or of 
proving that in the ultimate personal encounter between 
man and God th ere can be forgiveness ..• The only val-
idation of such a proposition is the repentance and 
the new life which must obviously result from genuine 
repentance."(68) 
His essay "Co herence, I ncohere nc e, and Christian faith" uses 
much the same reasoning on the question of ultimate validation of 
the Christian faith. He adds an important rider, however; namely, 
that the affirmations about God's action in history come to the 
believer "as given". They can be appropriated only by faith; "that 
is, existentially rather than speculatively, because the recognition 
of thei~ truth requires a repentant attitude toward false completions 
of life from the human standpoint."( 6g) For the "sin" of dependence 
upon false completio ns of life there is a cure. When acknowledged, 
the cure is "a humble and a charitable life. That testimony can 
enter into history as a proof of the Christian faith (presumably in 
the life of the Church), which th e unbelievers may see. But if it 
should be true that even the most righteous life remains in some 
degree of contradiction to the divine, it is hazardous either for 
individual Christians or the Church to point to their goodness as 
proofs of th e truth of their faith. 11 { 7D) 
(5} THE "GOD OF THE GAPS": 
NIEBUHR'S UNEASY DUALISM 
In our discussion of some of the roots of Niebuhr's realism at 
the beginning of this chapter we saw that Niebuhr's manner of handling 
the tension between th e ideal and the actual involved him in a form 
of "dualism". Whils t this dualism f which he believed to be nat'ive 
to the Hebrew-Christian tradition, is metaphysically 'untidy' it 
nevertheless enable s him to hold to his "faith in God without either 
identifying him with or losing him in the concrete world." 
On the evide nce of the e ssay which has been the subject of our 
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study i n this chapter, dual i sm r emai ns a problem f or Niebuhr. We 
have already drawn attention t o Niebuhr's suggestion th at the way 
forward f or apologe tics li e s in a radical distincti on between the 
natural wor ld and the world o f human hist or y . Th e justification 
for this distinctio n , in Niebuhr ' s view, is tw o f old. Firstly, he 
accepts the evidence of th e n a tu ral scie nces t hat natur al causation 
is "more closed" a nd " l e ss subj ec t to divin e intervention " than the 
biblical world vie w presupposes . Seco ndly , Niebuhr justifies th e 
distinction on the basis o f hi s understanding of th e unique and 
radical natur e o f human fr ee d o m. Man, writ es Niebuhr , "is both a 
creature and a cre ator .•• wh o d oe s not fit · easily into any system 
o f ratio nal or natural coherence. 11 ( 7l) According to th e Christian 
view, " th e human s el f aris e s a s an independent and self-determining 
force in the ver y social proce s s .. . in which it is also a creature. 
I ts fr eedom is a radical one •. • "'
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The radical distin c tio n between natural and human history which 
Niebuhr makes enable s him to int e rpr e t human history as th e sta~e on 
which man e ncounters Go d , and o n which God 'intervenes' tci cre~te, 
to judge, and to reconstitut e. He belie v e d th at his proposal brought 
him certain gains. Th e ' un easy dualism' evident in Niebuhr's essay 
is the price he pays f o r attempting t o tak e the e vidence of the 
natural sciences s e riou s ly , wh i lst at th e sam e t ime holding to his 
faith in th e " s ove r e ignty of a divin e c r ea tor , jud ge, and redeemer." 
By accepting a s ci e ntific und e rstanding of the natural world, 
and attemp t i ng t o ingraft the biblical understanding of a transcen-
d e nt God active in his t ory, Niebuhr ha s , in e ff ect, preclud ed the 
natural world as a realm of Go d.' s activity. I n this aspect of his 
thinking Niebu hr is open t o the criticism which Langdon Gilkey makes 
of n eo-o rthodoxy in ge neral. Gilkey writes that its attempt at a 
synthesis between th e mod e rn, s cientific world view, and that of th e 
Bible • 
" was at best only an uneasy dualism , with a natural -
istically interpr eted world and a Biblically under-
sto o d God who b y hi s activity in that world gives 
to it mea ning a nd co h e r ence •• • 
..• th e acc e pta nce o f th e causal o rder governing finite 
event s meant that ob s e r v abl e mi r acl e s and special divine 
interve nti o n s we r e n o t a possible part of the neD-
ortho d o x fram e wo rk . 
Biblical th eolog ians s h udd e r ed as much as did th e 
liberal s o r t h e s ec ularists wh e n Cecil B. De Milles' 
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camera showed the Israelites walking through the 
Red Sea between walls of water and staring at the 
fish! No, said they, ~ ad acts in history, but not 
that way! He is n o mi r aculou s cause an t he sur-
face of history wh e r e natural and historical causes 
are e xclusively at work as f a r as 'e xp lanations' 
are concerned. 11 ( 73) 
Niebuh r 's accept anc e o f a s cie ntific understanding of the 
natural world may itself be ba s ed on a mechanistic model which mad-
ern science no longer us es. T h e conce pts of unbreakable law and 
rigid causality operating thro u ghout nature are being replaced with 
a concept, which goes back to Hume, o f st atistical regularity. The 
present day scientist is more li kely to speak of a high degree of 
probability of one even t f ollo wing upon another, than of one event 
causing another. Even grantin g that Ni ebuhr operated with a tao-
mechanistic scientific model, Gilkey's criticis~ is valid. for 
the effect of Niebuhr's radical distinction between natural and 
human history is an "uneasy du a lism" which precludes any notion of 
God's activit y within th e natural world, e xc ept in the general way 
evidenced by his tr ea t me nt of th e doctrine o f creatio ~ nihilo. 
A corollary o f Niebu hr 's uneasy dualism is that, in effect, it 
tends toward a "God o f the gE\ps" argume nt . If we accept Niebuhr 1 s 
argument that scientific processes are less open to God's activity 
th an the biblical wo r ld view pre supp o s e s then God becomes the Deus 
~ Machina remi nisc e n t of Di e trich Bonhaeffer's "working hypothesi s " 
for t he "solving o f in soluble problems" o f human e xist ence. <74 ) It 
is but a shor t st e p t o argu e, a s Ba nh oe f f e r does, that "as in th e 
scientific fi el d , so i n hum an affairs generally what we call 'God' 
is being more and mo r e edged ou t of life, losing more and more 
ground ••• Even th ou gh th e r e has been s ur r en d er on all secular prob-
lems {it is arg ued, howe ve r , that ) th ere still remain the so-called 
ultimate q uestio ns - de a th, guilt - on which only 'God' can furnish 
an answer, a nd whi c h a r e th e r ea s o n why God and th e Church and the 
pastor are neede d .•• Bu t wh at if one day th ey no longer exist, if 
they t oo are answered witho u t 'God'?"( 7S) 
On th e reasoning o f Nieb u hr ' s e ssay "Coherence, Incoherence, 
and Christian faith" i t i s hard na t to conclude that his is a "God 
of the gaps" argument, a l th o u g h we believe this is nat his intention. 
He has severely limi t e d t h e s e ns e in whi c h we may speak of God in 
relation to the na tu r al world . He ha s argu ed that in the face of 
th e "inc o ngruiti e s " a nd "i nc o h e r e nc e s " o f human experience Christian 
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faith may provide a key by which they can be seen as · meaningful. 
Paradoxically, the e ffect of Ni ebuhr's argument concerning man's 
"radical freedom" is t o make the field of human history less open 
to "divine intervention" than the biblical-Christian tradition 
presupposes, althoug h we do no t believe this is his intention. We 
shall return to the problems raised by Niebuhr's ''propositions" 
concernin g the apologetic task in our final chapter. 
At this point it should be noted that it is one of Niebuhr's 
major contribution s , in keepin g with th e biblical tradition, that 
he insists on maintaining a di vine reference-point from which every 
attempt on the part of man t o c r eate structures of meaning must be 
judged. Niebuhr's own pilgrimage, and the events of contemporary 
history, convinced him that every attempt to create structures of 
meaning, and to develop syst em s of collective life from within 
history itself contained withi n them a thr eat to both life and his-
tory • He he 1 d , t here fore·, t h a t faith in t h e 11 so v ere i g n t y of a 
divine creator, judge, and redeemer" is essential. "The final test 
of -any religion", writes Niebu hr , "mu st be its ability to prompt 
ethical action upon the basis of reverence for personality."( 76 ) 
We question, however, whether the radical dichotomy between natural 
and human history is e ssen tial , and ask whether it is in fact not 
destructive of his goal s . 
Perhaps it is Niebuhr 's revolt agains~ all those forms of 
thought which emp hasise 'coherence', and his polemic against "soft 
u to pi ani s m 11 with it s c redo of t h e 11 in e vi t a b i 1 it y of pro g res s , '~ t h at 
accounts for his failure to ma ke use of the insights of process 
philosophy. It is 
North Whitehead in 
significant that the only reference to Alfred 
his Gifford Lectures is in th e chapter entitled 
"The Optimism of Idealism" wherein he criticizes Whitehead 1 s . "quasi-
idealistic theory" whi ch regards evil as a "cultural lag", and which 
hopes for "a society which will ul timat ely be governed purely by 
rational suasion rather than by force. 11 ( 77 ) 
Niebuhr does, how e ver, agre e with Whitehead's definition of 
religion. 
Whitehead: 
In his Christianity and Power Politics, Niebuhr quotes 
"Religio n is a vision of somethin g which stands 
beyond, behind, and within, th e passing flux of 
immediate things, som e thing which is real, and 
yet waiting to be reali sed; something which is 
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a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present 
facts; something which gives meaning to all that 
passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose 
possession is the fina l good, and yet is beyond all 
reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and 
the hopeless quest."(78) 
Niebuhr agrees with this definition because it captures the para-
doxes and ambiguities which re l igion seeks to comprehend, and which 
he himself is insistent o n emphasising. Niebuhr therefore finds 
support for his vi e w that religion issues in a "qualified · optimism" 
in Whitehead's definition, of whi ch he writ es; 
"The paradoxes are in th e spirit of great religion. 
The mystery of life is comprehended in meaning, 
though no human stateme nt of the meaning can fully 
resolve the mystery. The tragedy of life is recognised, 
but freedom preven ts t r agedy from being pure tragedy. 
Perplexity remains, bu t there is no perplexity unto 
despair. Evil is not accepted as inevitable nor re-
garded as a proof of the meaninglessness of life. 
Gratitude and contriti o n are mingled which means 
that life is both appr e ciated and challenged."(79) 
Whitehead's ability to en c ompass the ambiguities and paradoxes 
that belong to religion is what Niebuhr appreciates. Yet Whitehead's 
definition also makes us e of what may be called 'process language', 
and is e xpressed in dynamic terms of which th ere is little evidence 
in Niebuhr's work. Per haps it is Niebuhr's t oo-static view of rev-
elatio n in which he r e pres e nts the " whol e drama of Christ as the 
final point in the Heilgeschic h t e", which comes "to the believer as 
given", (BO) plus his too-mecha nistic model of science, that accounts 
for the scant attention he gi v e s t o process philosophy. In this 
regard it is illuminating to read William Nicholls~ assessment of 
White head' s significance: 
"Whitehead ••• made a br e ach with classical metaphysics 
analogous to that which Newton made with medieval and 
ancient science wh en he conceived of motion instead of 
rest as the fundamental state of matter ..• The meta-
physics of the ancient world, on which the classical 
philosophy of Christianity was founded, assumed that 
rest was more fundam ental than motion, and that motion 
co uld onl y be explained by an unmoved mover. For 
post-Newtonian physics, · motion requires no e xplanation; 
rest does ... there is a fundamental change here which 
must e ff ec t any post-Newt o nian metaphysics. Whitehead 
mak es this cha n ge when he takes process instead of 
substance as the way he conceives the fundam ental 
metaphysical reality. For Whitehead, becoming includes 
being, instead of the ot h er way r ou nd . Thus the time 
dimension is incorporated into the concept of being 
for the first time, and metaphysics becomes a history 
of nature."(Bl) 
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from this perspective nature itself has a history, and history 
is for Niebuhr the fundamental vehicle of revelation. From this 
perspective Niebuhr's too-mechanistic model of natural science need 
no longer preclude revelation, since nature itself is in process 
and can be interpreted as being revelatory. 
In this regard, the work of .Teilhard de Chardin, .whom Ian 
.Barbour has suggested can be interpreted as a process philosopher 
in the tradition of Whitehe ad(B 2 ), can act as a corrective to Niebuhr' s 
uneasy dualism. For Teilhard criticized static views of nature and 
cyclic views of history, and insi~ted ·on an evolutionary interpreta-
tion of the world, which would allow natural history and human his-
ory to be revelatory. 
Teilhard's insistence on an evolutionary motif led him into 
difficulties with his · ecclesiastical superiors; and one of the main 
reasons was that any such motif tends to give the impression of 
under-estimating the gravit y of sin and evil. We have already seen 
how Niebuhr ·reacted to Whitehead by insisting that his mode of think-
ing was unrealistic and erroneous when it came to the question of 
evil. Niebuhr nowhere refe r s to .Teilhard's work in his writings; a 
fact which is not altogethe r surprising since most of Teilhard's 
works were -translated into English from 1960 onwards. However, if 
Niebuhr's reaction to White h ead .is any guide, then no doubt he would 
have had similar problems with Teilhard's evolutionary motif with 
regard to the question of sin and evil. 
We have said that Nieb uhr embraced a scientific world view, 
although his was a too-mechanistic model of the scientific process. 
Teilhard also embraced a modern scientific world view. Yet, unlike 
Nieb0hr, he believed natural history to be revelatory of God. For 
Teilhard an evolutionary perspective is not an option that is open 
to modern man, it is a fundamental truth about the -reality of the 
world. In his Phenomenon of Man Teilhard writes: 
''Evolution, is a light illuminating all facts, a curve 
that all lines must follow .•. What makes and classifies 
a 'modern man' (and a whole host of our contemporaries 
is not yet 'modern' in this sense) is having become 
capable of seeing in terms not of space and time alone, 
but also of duration, or - and it comes to the same 
thing - of biological space-time; and above all 
having become incapable of seeing anything otherwise -
anything - not eve n himself."(83) 
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The significance of th e word 'biological' when added to 'space-
time' is that it implies a direction. The notion of direction has 
led Teilhard into controver s y with biologists who argue that he is 
smuggling into his evolutio nary scheme . a sense of "purpose''· . The 
controversy is sharpened bec ause Teilhard uses the · word "orthogenesi s '' 
to describe his view; a word which in the past has been frequently 
used by philosophers and theologians as a means of introducing some 
" notion of divine purpose into the natural process of evolution. For 
Teilhard the concept of evolution is not conceived of as an entirely 
random process • . As Bernard Towers has pointed out there is a pro-
found pessimism lurking in all purely mechanistic theories of the 
universe, based on what he terms a "billiard-ball" concept of 
matter, which view . biological evolution as the chance product of 
random events; the human mind itself being the product of such a 
chance process. In such a view, as Towers shows, no meaning can be 
attached to anything in · the world, for the . world itself is a product 
of random chance. "Ultimately the theory is self-defeating because 
there is no meaning to be attached to 'meaning'! The Christian 
reacts either by . ignoring the problem, or by retreating into a 
fundamentalism that is wholly · anti-intellectual, or by putting his 
trust in an 'existential' encounter with God. The agnostic or 
atheistic existentialist has nothing but himself and other 'absurd-
ities• · in an absurd world to fall ' back on . . If he 1s honest, 'he finds 
himself, as Sartre ·did, with the 'Nausea' ."< 84 ) 
Teilhard uses the term ·••orthogenesis" to point to the . fact that 
there is direction in the evolutionary pr~cess, partly because he 
argues that nature itself h as a history, , and partly because he argues 
that man himself has a han d in the process of evolution. Philip 
Hefner explains Teilhard's theory in this way: 
"(1) Evolution is no t, . at all levels, entirely random; 
there are anti.chance factors built ·into the process .•• 
Thus, Teilhard's u s e of the term ''orthogenesis" to 
refer to the ''drift" ·of development that results • from 
each generation buildi~g upon previous forms. In this 
sense, . evolution ''gropes" its way, but is ·influenced 
by the gropings o f its predecessor stages and by its 
environment .•• it ·i s clear that he believed that the 
"directio~'' or "dr i ft" of evolution could be documented 
without recourse to divine revelation or special 
insight. 
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(2) The role .of chance in evolution is nat th e same 
after man's appearanc e as before ..• man himself has 
taken a hand in his e volution. _ The rise of the naa-
sphere (Teilhard 1 s t e rm far the advent o f thinking 
man) is a sign that e volution has became conscious 
of ·itself, inasmuch a s species self-awareness is 
awareness of the aim s of e volution (i.e., toward 
increased camplexific atian - collectivization plus 
personalization) and is self-conscious action toward 
the accomplishment o f those aims. 11 (85) 
Thus, far Teilhard, nature ,itself has a hist o ry which · is in 
dynamic process, with an int r insic "direc tion "; and man hims el f has 
a responsible role to play in the evolutionary process. It is oft e n 
emphasised by scholars of Teilhard 1 s work that he was no naive op ti-
mist with a nineteenth-centu r y view ·of th e · 'inevitability of progress ' . 
He knew what it was to suffe r personally, and he lived through a 
period of history which saw t h e ravages of twa World Wars and th e 
rise of the same totalitarian syst ems which , as we have seen, cause d 
Niebuhr to modify his awn thinking. Yet, . as Martin Jarrett-Kerr 
paints aut, Teilhard began Phenomenon o f Man before nuclear fission 
was thought possible and conc luded it after Hiroshima; and h e did 
sa · without altering one ward of this work. (B 6) He was able to do 
this because he held a view o f progress which refers t o the increase 
of consciousness, and particularly o f s elf-awar eness. Prog r e ss , far 
Teilhard, is movement along the line o f camplexificati6n, and that 
movement is slaw in the same way that all organic processes are slaw. 
Teilhard did nat believe that the process o f e voluti on was 
autonomous; he knew that ma n could d e cid e to work again~t the 
processes of his awn develop me nt, and has dane many times in his t ory. 
Pain and sin are nat preclud e d from Teilhard's view of progress . 
Georges Crespy paraphrases a n essay by Teilhard (written in 194 7 , 
but never published) which d e als with the problem of evil. Creatio n 
is seen by Teilhard as a process o f uniting, . and evil eme rg e s as soan 
as the process begins becaus e that process is: 
"impregnated with pains and errors. It is statistic-
ally inevitable that in th e course of the journ e y s ame 
local disorders will appear, and consequently there 
· will result collective disordered conditions with pain 
in the midst of the li vi ng and sin in the midst of man."(B7} 
Evil is thus to be found within the creative process, but sub-
ordinate to the creative activity of Gad. The myth of the Fall is 
nat interpreted as a dateable even t in history, but rather as th e 
intrinsic capacity within the natural order .and the human condition 
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t o obstruct the destiny toward which God is mQving his creation. 
Crespy comme nt s upon Teilhard's view o f evil in this way: 
"Teilhard ... affirms t hat evil is such o nly evolu tively , 
that .is, only relative ly t o futur e good. Evi l is evil 
only as a consequence o f a passion f o r th e best. I n 
o th er words, once aga i n th e r e is evil o nly if th e world 
is going somewhere, if it has meaning and direction. 
And then evil is the nondirection of this direction 
and the nonmeaning of this meaning."(BB) 
For Teilhard, it is one thing t o locate the f o r ce s o f e vil within 
th e creative processes, it _is quite a n o th e r to conclude that th ese 
forces . will finall y prevail. I t is an act o f faith on Teilhard's 
part, . based on th e phenomena which h e observes in th e proc e ss o f 
evolution, that the process o f comple xificati o n will ultimat el y prevail. 
Such an act of faith is f o r Teilhard more true t o th e o bservable facts 
than the opposite 'random' or 'c hanc e' und erstandings o f evolution. 
Teilhard's very act of faith itself is in keeping with a tru t h within 
t he scientific tradition, whi c h goes back t o Mill, that th e inductive 
sciences depend o n the presupposition that natur e is uniform - a 
presupposition which cannot be e stablished by th e methods of inductive 
science. 
The philosopher, Brian Fos t e r, in a s e ries o f articles published 
in th e earl y Thirti e s , argues that th e Christian d oct r in e of Creation 
which implies " that th e material is r ea l . .9..!d.§. material" is at the base 
(albeit unac kn owledged) o f th e scientific r e volution . . Foster e xt e nd s 
Mill's thesis: "Every science o f natur e must d e p e nd up on pre suppo-
sitions about nature which can not be e stablish ed by the me thods of 
science itself."(Bg) For Teilhard, a genuine understanding of th e 
evol utionary process, and a r eco gnitio n of th e limits · of scientific 
me th od, leads him t o discern a "pre s e nc e of Christ '' within nature. 
This Teilhard does in much th e same way as Ni eb uhr, on the basis of 
historical evide nce, discern s a " pr e senc e of Ch rist" in h uman history . 
Th us f or Teilhard scie ntific " r e s ea rch is adoration''· Th e 
process of creation is an on - going and dynamic one, in which God is 
at work . Suc h a view is a synth esis o f a biblical understanding of 
God and the cumulative evid e nce o f scie ntific o bservation of the 
· e volutionary process. Nieb uhr , in s ee king to tak e s e riously th e 
cumulative evidence of the n a tural sciences whilst at the s ame time 
holding to a biblical unders t a nding o f r evelation, arrives at a diff e r -
e nt position. In Niebuhr's v iew a radical dichotomy b e twee n the 
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world of nature and the world of human history is the only way 
forward for Christian apologet i cs. We have argued that Niebuhr 
was led to this concl usio n par t ly a s a result of his too-static view 
of revelation, and pa r tly as a result of his too-mechanistic view 
of the scientific proce s s. 
leads him into dif f iculties. 
The uneasy dualism in Niebuhr's method 
He has great difficulty with the 
notion of the physical resurrection of Christ, and is forced into 
a highly symbolic interpr etation of that "historical event". Such 
an interpretation, he admits, l ays itself open to the serious 
question as to whether in fact he is any longer speaking of history 
at all; whether he i s no t in f act postulating another Christian 
philosophy. 
At this point we ask whe t her, ~n the light of a Teilhardian-
type synthesis, Nieb u hr' s radical dichotomy need be an integral 
part of his method. Can it no t be modified without destroying his 
intention, which is to take se r iously the scientific world-view' 
We believe it can. 
We have alrea d y said t hat a Teilhardian-type synthesis requires 
an act of faith, an d that an act of faith is intrinsic in the 
scientific method itself. The r e can be no presuppositionless 
science. One of the recent po s itions which opposes that of Teil-
hard i s the wo r k of e x i s tentialist Albert Camus. It is significant 
that the figure o f Sisyph us is used by both Teilhard and Camus. 
For Teil h a r d, Si s yp h us is a n a n ti-typical figure who stands for the 
hopeless, ant-li k e slave who can see no hope in t he process of 
evol u tion a nd the movement of h uma n history. For Camus, Sisyphus 
is a proto-t y pical f igure whose fate i t i s to roll the stone up the 
mountain, alway s to ha ve it roll do wn again. For Camus, this is the 
way things are. He th e r e f ore formulates a category of the Absurd, 
a s a fu ndamen t al mea n s o f i nt e r preting the world: 
"The ir r a t ion a l , th e human nostalgia, and the absurd 
tha t i s bo rn o f t heir encou nter - these are the three 
characters i n t he dr ama t h a t must necessarily end with 
all t he logic o f which an e x i st e nce is capable."(90) 
For Camus ab surdit y i s the occa s io n for suicide; and suicide 
is the o nly s erio us ph ilo s ophical ques t ion. Camus himself decides 
against su icide, a nd fo r an ethical life for the sake of his fellow 
men. This po s i t ion i s , f or Teilhard, ut t erly untenable. Philip 
Hefner summa r i z e s th e s e tw o po s it i ons in this way: 
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"The two positions are clear - both held by fr e nch-
men near the end of th e first half of our century: 
Th e one holds that man st·ands in congruity with 
e vol ut io n and world hist ory, a congruity based o n 
th e personalizing character of the world, r e sonating 
to his own esse ntia l personhood; he is e nabl e d th e r e-
f ore to give himself to the process e s of evol ution, 
co nfid e nt of con summation; th e other holds to an 
intrinsic incongruity be tw ee n man and r eali ty "o ut 
there", since th e world is sile nt to man's cries for 
meaning, and e ve n th o ugh man must give himself to th e 
struggle for human e xist e nc e - in the fac e of all 
od ds - he is fighting agai nst creation, and he has no 
hope of vict ory or e ve n intelligibility in his struggle; 
th e struggle is an e nd in itsel f . 11.(91) 
Both in t er pr e tatio ns are bas e d o n presuppositions which are 
"ac ts of faith". Teilhard argues that o ur world view must be con-
gruous with our understanding of the ess e nce of our s el f-hood; 
that man thinks by analogy a bout the world, about God, ·and about 
the future; and th e analogy he us e s is a personal o ne, bas e d on 
what he unders t a nds to be th e essence of personhood. Camus, on the 
other hand, argues that th ere is a basic inc ongruity between man 
and th e world; that man is ·fat e d to fight against an irrational, 
aimless world. 
Teilhard a rgu e s that th e r e liability of the proc e ss of evol-
ution is crucial to man; th a t this "act of faith" is the premise 
upon which scientific and t ec hn olo gical adva~ce is based; and that 
the reasonableness of an y "G od-argument '' must be l oc ated at this 
point. Hefne~ commen ts upon this aspect of Teilhard's position: 
"If th e proce ss of evol ution is ultimately trustworthy , then th e 
qu es tion arises as to the cause and order of that trustworthin e ss, 
to which the concept ·of God is a reasonable, if not the most reason-
able, ans wer. 11 ( 92 } 
It is significant that f or both Teilhard and Niebuhr the 
category of "perso nh ood" is · ba sic . " To make r oo m for thought ~n 
th e world", write s Teilhard, "I ha ve need e d to 'int e riorise' matt e r~ 
to provide evolutio n with a dir ection, a lin e of advance and 
critical points; and finally to mak e all things double back upon 
someone ..• The only univ e rs e capable of ··containing the human person 
. . .b l I 1 .. I • "' 93 ) N. b h th ~s an ~rrevers~ y persona ~s~ng un~v e rse. ~e u r us e s e 
category of the sel f to int erpret the drama of God's e ncount e r with 
man in human history; Teil hard by means of analogy us e s the cate-
gory of the personal t o interpret th e unive rse as 'at -least - personal'. 
I t is ~is extension which a Teilhardian-type method is abl e to 
make which can free Niebuhr's th ought of its uneasy dualism and its 
tendency to a ."Gbd -'of ;· th e g aps 1~ - typ e . argument • . 
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(6} SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined Niebuhr's most methodological essay, 
and made some criticisms of it. The essay "Coherence, Incoherence, and 
Christian Faith" is viewed as a microcosm of Niebuhr's theological method. 
The themes contained in it, and the issues which it raises concerning 
his method, will be the sub j ect of our subsequent chapters. In these 
we will elaborate these themes, and make some proposals concerning the 
problems which have been discus s ed in relation to it. Our intention 
i n this chapte r has been, therefore, to provide a framework for the 
a nalysis of Nieb uhr's theologic a l method which will occupy us in the 
remaining chapters of this study. 
Chapter Four 
FAITH AND HISTORY 
This chapter offers a detail~d examination of 
the relation between past and .coritemporary event in 
Niebuhr's. theological method, based largely on his 
Gifford Lectures and his Faith and History. 
A preliminary di~cussion . of 'doubt' as a dynamic 
process. Niebuhr's pilgrimage re-visited - his 
'courage to change' presuppositions in the light of 
experience. The interplay between faith ·and 
experience. 
Faith and hist6ry - the pr6blem of definition 
discussed in · relation to William Dray's analysis. 
Historicism and: neo-o~thodoxy: Troeltsch's challenge. 
Niebuhr's view of history 1 Three contending 
views of history: the Greek classical view, the 
bib~;cal-Christian view, and the modern view. A full 
exposition of Niebuhr's understanding of the biblical-
Christian view of history. 
Niebuhr~s - appro ach to contemporary history. A 
detailed exposition of his 'handles to history' · -
revelatory events; myth and symbol; 'tragedy' and 
'irony' in the 'drama ' of history. 
C H A P T E R F 0 U R 
FAI TH AND HI STO R Y ~ NIE BUHR ' S 
THEO LOGICA L METH OD 
Th e d i ffi c ultie s di s c e r ne d in Ni e buhr's e ssa y~ "C o he r e nc e p 
I nco h e r e nce a nd th e Chr ist i a n Faith " P wh ic h we e x amin e d in th e 
last c ha pt er 9 ca n be i nt e r pre t e d t o b e o f su c h a s e rio us nature 
a s t o di s co unt hi s co nt r i b ut i o n a s b e i n g wo r thwhile f o r th o s e 
wh o are searc hin g f o r a wa y f o rw a r d . Fo r e xampl e , Lang d o n 
Gil ke y i s c ri t i cal o f t he d uali sm he di s c e rns i n ne o - orth o d o xy ; 
• 
a d uali sm we have po in t ed t o i n Nieb uhr's t ho u ght. Gilk e y wr i t e sg 
" Neo-o rth o d o xy wa s p th e r e f o r e 9 o n tw o c o unts i n tun e 
wi th th e co nt e mp o rary ' s e c ul a r' mi n d~ (1 ) i t agre e d 
th a t Go d wa s not r e veal e d i n o rd i n a ry s e c u la r li f e 9 
a nd (2 ) it ac ce p t e d th e n a turalist ic s y s t e m o f s pa c e -
time e ve nt s . 
I t att e mpt e d t o acc e p t th e s e c ular wor l d s ec ula r ly 9 
but t o re t ain t he Biblical a nd o rt h o d o x world s £ -
ligious l y . As we s hall s ee p th i s d ual posture , while 
th e s o urce o f i ts ve r y c o ns i d e r able powe r 9 pro ve d 
its und o in g in t he e nd . " (1 ) 
I 
Ru be m Alve s, o n the o t he r han d , c r i t ici z e s Ni e b uhr f o r h i s 
t oo st a tic und e r s t a ndi n g o f th e re ve l a t o ry truth o f th e Cros s 
c aus e 
givi n g 
it t e nd s t o po in t u p th e ambig uit i e s o f hist o ry with o ut 
a ny impuls e t o a t he olog y o f hop e . He writ e s~ 
"I t s ee ms t o me t hat h e r e is o n e o f th e reas o ns why 
Nieb uhr ' s t heo logy , o th e rw i s e s o r ic h in c rit ical 
re s o urc e s , has t e nd e d t o t a ke mo r e co ns e rva t i v e 
posit i ons. His t he o log y s ee s th e c r o ss no t primar -
ily a s a radical ne ga t io n th a t t he pr e s e nc e o f Go d 
in hist ory a ddr e ss e s t o th e pow e rs t ha t ar e 9 in a 
co n c r e t e situat io n th a t i s t o l e ad t o a moveme nt 
t o wa rd the futur e , b ut ra th e r a s th e t o t al r e la t -
i vizat io n o f e veryt hi n g in hi st o ry, whic h r e s ul ts 
i n th e e limina t io n o f th e s e ns e o f d ir e c t io n t o-
wa rd th e fu tu r e . I t i s tr ue th a t everythin g i s 
r e lative . But i f t he c r o ss pro vid e s n o t a d irec t i o n 
b ut a r e lati viza t io n o f a ll d ir e c t i o ns , ho w i s i t 
po ssible t o b e have in o rd e r t o b r ing abo ut a n e w 
t o morr ow? . " (2) 
b e -
Gilk e y's c ritic i s m c o ncer n i n g du alis m, a nd Alves ' c r i t icis m 
o f Nieb uhr ' s t e nd e n c y t o. t h e " t o t al re l a t i v i z a t i o n o f e ve ryt hing 
in hi sto ry " , a r e s e ri o us cha r g e s u po n Ni e b u hr's me th o d o l o gy . But 
th e y are ch ar ge s a g a in s t a ma n who hims e l f wa s t r y i n g t o f i nd a 
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way forward; a man trying to relate the insights of the faith 
to the problems and possibilities of contemporary history, 
Th e difficulties inherent in Niebuhr's Christian realism 
can be interpreted as the con sequences of a courageous man's 
search for criteria for social choice, Courageous; because the 
difficulties are admitted a nd the consequences squarely faced, 
Niebuhr's aver-riding · concern is to find adequate criteria for 
social choice. He is unab l e to accept either Christian or sec-
ular rationalism or naturalism. He has difficulty with Christian 
existentialism in its Kierkegaardi~n or Barthi~n forms , Why? 
Because in none of these does he find an adequate way of dealing 
with the ambiguities and incaherencies of contemporary history 
on the one hand; and on the ather hand, neither can he find in 
them adequate criteria for social choice. Here is a man who 
lived through a turbulent a nd exciting period of history; whose 
fi eld of operation is Chri s tian social ethics; and whose concern 
is to find a way of interpr eting contemporary history that is 
theologically adequate and socially relevant. 
In spite of his disclaimers · about being a theologian in the 
narrow sense, Niebuhr is vi tally interested in finding a way of 
interpreting history theologically, whilst at the same time en-
suring that he remains in conversa tion with, and relevant to the 
physical and social scient i sts whose researches are . throwing up 
all-important ethical ques t ions. Upon th e answers to these ques -
tions depends the future o f man. Therefor e , methodol~gical prob-
lems may trip him up, but t hey do not cause him to giVe up his 
task. They will certainly cause him to sharpen his methodolog-
ical tools, but if necessa r y he i~ prepared to work with admit-
tedly inadequate tools. The task will not wait whilst he refines 
his tools or invents new ones, Others will have to do this. 
Christian Realism is the t ·t aol •· he uses; and contemporary history 
is his workshop. It is no ~ alw~ys an adequate tool, but in 
Niebuhr's view it is more adequat e than most. 
The process by which he came to his Christian Realism, and 
the significance of this method is impartant. Important because 
th e question which Niebuhr basically is asking, albeit never ex-
plicitly, is the question with which this essay began. Can we 
deduce from the faith criteria far social choice? It is the 
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question which surely is basic to anyone working i n the field of 
Christian social ethics. 
(1) DOUBT AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS: 
Niebuhr's Pilgrimage Re-visited 
June Bingham entitled her biographieal introduction to the 
life and thought of Reinhold Niebuhr "Courage to Change", there-
by providing us with a key to understanding his theological 
method. That Niebuhr changed and modified his position many 
times as he wrestled with the larger issues of contemporary his-
tory ~s beyond dispute . But he is no'feather blown about in the 
winds of change'. 
To re-visit the scene of Niebuhr's pilgrimage ~s to discern 
the theological significance of doubt as a dynamic process. The 
verb doubt, in the sense i n which we are using it here, is de-
fined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary in these terms: "feel un-
certai~ about ..• be undecid ed about ... call in question." In 
the vi~w of Daniel Jenkins, author of one of the earliest books 
on the controversy sparked off in theological circles by Bon-
hoeffer's notion of "religionless christianity", the "discipline 
of doubt" is one of the ne w tasks for theology today. He writes: 
"It is of the greatest importance for the Church to-
day that the theologians should accept fully the 
discipline of doub t as part of their task. They do 
not need . to do this chiefly for apologetic purposes -
if they do, their d oubt will qu~ckly become dishon-
est - but in order that they themsel ves may find 
true f.aith and discover the will of God . " (3) 
The process of calling into question previously-held theo-
logical and ethical points of view; the dynamic process of doubt, 
can bs discerned throughout wh~t Niebuhr calls his "torturous" 
I 
pilg~im~ge. Niebuh~ h~~se l f desc~ibes what we have c~lled hi~ 
formative years - the pe~iod from 19~ 9 to 1939, his first decade 
at Union - as the 11 Ten Yea r s That' Shook My World" when writing 
for The Christian Cantury' s se~ies "How My Mind Has Changed In 
This Decade" (April 26, 19 3 9) . 
In his latest book, Man's Nature and His Communities pub-
lished in 1966 when Niebuhr was 74, his introductory chapter is 
entitled "Changing Perspectives". Here he summarizes the pro-
cess of change which he ha s undergone: 
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"The systematic essays are intended to 'revise' pre-
viously held opinio ns only in the sense that they 
seek to give a systematic account of the revisions 
which have taken place in the author's mind in a 
whole lifetime of study and of writing books too 
frequently. These r evisions are of two .kinds. On 
the one . hand, they gradually change from a purely 
Protestant viewpoi nt to an increasing sympathy for 
the two other great traditions of Western culture, 
Jewish and Cathol~c. They .also embody increasingly 
the insights of th e secular disciplines and reflect 
the author's increasing enthusiasm for the virtues 
of an open society which .allows freedom to all re-
ligious traditions and also freedom to analyse and 
criticise all thes e traditions through the discip-
lines of an empiri c al and historical culture. 
On the other hand th ey give an historical (not, I 
hope, too autobiographical) account of the tortur-
ous path of the author's mind in adjusting the 
original Protestant heritage of individualism and 
perfectionism through a world depression and two 
world wars to the pr esent realities of a highly 
technical and colle ctive culture, facing the perils 
of .a nuclear age." (4) 
The Editors of The Christi an Century, ~n 1964, invited a 
group of mid-career sch~lars~ many of whom are heirs to the work 
of the Barth-Bultmann-Tillich-Niebuhr generation, to write for 
a new series entitled: "Ho w I Am Making Up My Mind.'' In his con-
tribution to that series Ha rvey Cox~ without using the precise 
terms, outlines the d~namic process of doubt: 
"The issue of how we should make up our minds theo-
logically is itself a . theological issue. It concerns 
the place and the p urpose of theologizing . It in-
cludes such considerations . as what a theological 
issue is and how .and why . theological issues arise. 
What we thin.k is d e termined far more than we real-
ize by where we thi~k (our Sitz im Denken) and ~ 
we think (the aim o f theological enquiry). I ·would 
argue that the pur po se of theology is to serve the 
prophetic communit y . For this reason the place of 
theology is that jagged edge where the faithful 
company grapple wi t h the swiftest currents of the 
age." ( 5) 
The Christian Realism of Niebuhr's ''mature years" was hammer-
ed out in the crucible of eve nts which included the burgeoning i n -
dustrialization in the cit y of Detroit, precipi t ated by the advent . ' ~ ~ 
of the mass-produced motor car, and its concomitant political, 
social,and economic problems and opportunities. During his"form-
ative years" at Union, the United States was nearing the end of 
. a decade of prosperity, wh i ch was followed by the Big Crash of 
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1929. During these years he became increasingly concerned about 
the rise of the Third Reich which ultimately plunged the world 
into World War Two. 
By disposition ~nd a~~de~ic interest, Niebuhr was intimately 
involved in these epoch-making events. He would therefore be in 
substantial agreement with Cox's view that what theologians think 
is determined very largely by where they think. In Chapter Two 
we showed that it is impossible to separate Niebuhr's thought 
from his life and the events of contemporary American and world 
history. 
It is this capacity to allow contemporary historical events 
to impinge upon and modify his theological presuppositions, there-
by sharpening the theological tools which he uses in his wide-
ranging and critical analysis of those same historical events, 
which made Niebuhr a figure to be reckoned with inside and out-
side of the Church. To state this in other words, Niebuhr's theo-
logical method incorporates doubt as a dynamic process. He does 
not bring to contemporary events a rigid ·and inflexible theolog-
ical "system". If theology be defined as the process of creating 
a theological system, in which the emphasis is on the systematic 
creation of a theological 11 etiificeit, then Niebuhr would disavow 
the title 'theologian'. If, however, theology is defined in 
Cox's terms as having as its purpose ~to serve the prophetic com-
munity" at that "jagged edge where the faithful company grapple 
with the swiftest currents of the age" then Niebuhr is a theolog -
ian. In terms of our concerns in this essay, it is this dynamic 
process of doubt which is important for understanding Niebuhr's 
theological methodology. 
What, then, is Niebuhr's theological method? Or, to put the 
question in another form, how did Niebuhr do theology? On this 
question, Niebuhr himself gives us very little help. We have 
already examined, in some detail, the one essay in which he out-
lines the basic features of his thought. This we did in the last · 
chapter. But that essay compresses his thought into a somewhat 
formalized statement and fails to account for the changes he under-
went. It is therefore inadequate to describe his theological 
method. 
It is our contention that one of the fundamental character-
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istics of Niebuhr's method· is what we have called the dynamic 
process of doubt. Evidence for this contention is given in 
Niebuhr's notion of "the circular relation between the pre-
suppositions of faith and t h e facts of experience". The notion 
of the circular relation between faith and the facts of experience 
is another way of expressing what we have called the dynamic pro-
cess of doubt. For Niebuhr argues that the presuppositions of 
faith act as a 'filter' by which we adduce, or draw to a common 
centre, the data of experie nce. The presuppositions of faith are 
like 'spectacles' without which we cannot see. If, however, 
evidence other than that gathered by the use of these spectacles, 
leads a man to believe that they are inadequate for proper per-
ception~ he will of necessity change his spectacles. 
Another way of expressing this is to say that a man of faith 
has certain basic presuppositions by which he seeks to understand 
the facts of contemporary experience. If on the evidence of his 
experiences he begins to doubt whether all or some of his pre-
suppositions are adequate to enable him to 'see' or 'make sense 
of' those experiences, he is forced to re-examine, and perhaps 
even modify, the presuppositions themselves. A close reading of 
Niebuhr's biography, and of his own statements about his pilgrim-
age, are evidence of the process we have just described: the 
.. . dynamic prcices s of doubt. 
Niebuhr's so-called "fight with ford", which we described in 
Chapter Two,' provides us with a vivid example of the dynamic pro-
cess of doubt. His experience in his first and only parish in 
Detroit is important for understanding his theo~ogical method, 
because as he says it determined his development "more . than any 
. ( 6) 
books which {he) may have read." 
The ''simple Christian 1 liberal 1 moralism'• which regarded 
love as the answer to every moral problem was one of the basic 
presuppositions with which Niebuhr was armed when he went to 
Detroit. The basic ingredients for the make-up of the 'spectacles' 
he wore comprised in the main of an upbringing within a conserv-
ative and somewhat isolated Evangelical church; an exposure at 
Yale to the prevailing liberal and pragmatic milieu of the early 
Twenties; and the important influence of the Social Gospel move-
ment. Whatever content he gave to key concepts of his Pro~estant 
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th eolo gy wa s large ly d e t e rmin e d b y th e bac k gro un d we have d e s -
c rib e d h e r e . 
Th e r e aliti e s o f th e yeers h e sp e nt i n De tro it f orce d · Nieb uh r 
t o r e-e xamin e , and s o me time s ra dically modify his theolo g ical ·pr e-
sup po s i tions . Be st d o cu me nte d , a nd a lread y d e s cribe d i n some 
d e t ail 9 is th e r a dical mo d i f icatio n o f h i s libe r al · an d hig h l y 
moral istic c r ee d which he accep t e d a s t an t amo u nt t o th e Ch r i st ia n 
f a ith; n a mely, " an o ptimistic f a ith " . I t wa s no t th e o ut brea k o f 
th e First Wo rld Wa r s o mu c h a s th e s ocial real it ies i n De t roi t 
wh i ch und e rmin e d his youthful op t i mism , a nd f o r ced h i m t o r eco n-
. sid e r h i s pr e supp ositio ns. 
On e o f th e b a sic diffe r e nce s be tw ee n th e co nt em po r a r ie s Barth 
a nd Ni e buhr lie s pr e cis e ly i n th e ir respecti ve Sit z 1 m Den ken o f 
th o s e cru c ial y e ars . Barth 1 s r e volutio n a ry '~l e tt e r t o th e Roma ns " 
I 
wa s bo rn o ut o f a n a go nizing e ffo ~t t o e xtr ica t e a nd re- f o rmu la t e 
th e Chr i sti a n f a ith in th e f ace of wh a t appeare d t o be th e 
imman e nt c o llaps e o f Europ e an "C hristia n " c ulture . Nieb uhr' s Sit z 
im De nk e n in th o s e ea rly y ea rs was of q u i t e a d i ff e r e nt kind. I t 
wa s n o t th e -imman e nt co llaps e ~f a c u l tur e th a t ca use d h i m t o 
d o ubt his theo l o gical pre suppo sit io ns. On t he co ntrary , Nieb uhr 
wa s f aced o n th e o n e hand by a bu o yant o ptimis m in th e Unit e d 
St a t e s which s ee med t o b e b o rn e o ut by th e r ap id growth o f th e 
mo t o r industry in De tr oit: th e g i a nt n a t io n wa s b e g i nn i n g t o fl e x 
its mus c l e s. On th e oth e r h a nd Ni e buhr witn essed th e i nab ility 
o f th e n a tio n t o shap e , with a nything lik e th e s ame spee d or e n-
thusiasm, a just socia l o rd e r. 
I t ma y b e argu e d th a t th e wh ere o f Barth ' s theolog y i n e vit-
a bly l e d him t o what may b e called a reco n s t r uc t io n o f a s trict l y 
th eo l o gi c al kind 9 in th e f ace crf th e cris i s i n Europe: h i s th eo -
l o gy h a s bee n d e scribe d a s c risis th eo l o gy . Th e wh e r e o f Nie-
buhr 1 s th eolo gy 'in e vitab l y l ed him t o co n ce ntr a t e o n Chr i st ia n 
s oc ial e th ic s . Wh a t was b e i n g cal l e d i nt o qu e stio n {d o u bt ed ) 
wh e r e Ni e buhr was, was prec i s e ly th e o ptimi sm , id eal ism, ind i vid -
ualism, and '' simple Christia n 'lib e r a l ' mo r al ism " · wh ic h we r e p a rt 
of his h e ritag e . Can a simpl isti c l o v e e thic d eal wi th t he rea l--iti e s o f a situatio n in whi c h t ec hn olog i cal a dv a nce s p a wns 
e n o r mo us s oc ial probl e ms? Nieb uhr b e gan s e rio us l y t o q u e stio n 
wh e th e r th e h e rit a ge t o which h e wa s a n h e ir , h a d wi th i n it th e 
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capacity f o r dealing with what h e came t o ~ ee as a major issue: 
th e inabil ity t o devel~p political and social structures adequate 
for th e kind of s ociety which t ech nological p fe>g ress makes pos-
sible. Que stions such as th e s e ~ immediately plunged him int o th e 
issues o f s ocial e thics , a nd caused him to doubt wh et h e r th e 
heritage to which he wao heir, h eld th e answers. In his s ea rch 
f o r answers~ or f o r more adequate c rit e ria f or social action , h e 
launched o ut upon a "torturous path" o f r e-app r ai s al i n which h e 
of t e n over-re act e d and was o ft e n invGlved in radical co ntradict-
ions in his attitudes. These h e admits : 
"For instance, my s ocial-gospel background made my 
first reac tion t o th e Versailles peace a r eac tio n 
of pac ifist perfectio~ism. And my reac tion t o 
bourge~is indi vidu al ism prompted me t o th e e rro r of 
using Marxist ideas t o emp hasi z e o ur n e w collective 
realiti e s. " {7) 
H o wever ~ we ha ve already described how Niebuhr moved paci-
fism, and bey8nd s oc ialis~, t o a ' r ealist ' position given theo-
log ical fr ame by an application of his interpretation o f th e 
Hewbrew-Christian und e rst a ndi n g of man's natur e and destiny. 
Niebuhr's Gifford Le cture s, given on the eve o f th e Second 
World War~ and his fai th and H ist ory ~ published just a ft e r that 
war, s o ught to d e scribe th e human situ a tio n in t erms o f th e Bib-
lical vie w of man~ r elying h eavily' u·po h th e Siblical symb ols o f 
'th e imag e of Go d in man' ~ and man a s ' sinn e r'. Th e p e rsp ec tiv e 
which he de s cribes in th e s e volumes, arrived at during hi s 
mature years ~ has, o n his ~wn admis s ion ~ not changed grea tly 
during subs eq u e nt years. What c han g ed in s ub s eq ue nt years was 
th e way in which h e u s ed the dominant symbols o f this perspect-
ive: th e p e rsp ective h ~ calls C hris~iah Realism . He describes 
th e change in his use o f t he s e symmol s in this way: 
"I mad e a r a th e r u n pa rd o nab le pedagogical err o r in 
The Natur e and De stiny o f Man ... My th eological 
pr e~cc upatio n prompted me t o de fin e th e persi s t e nc e 
and universality of man's self-regard as ' original 
sin'. This was historically a nd symbolically co r -
r ec t. Bu t my pedag o gical e rror consisted in seeking 
t o challenge mode rn op timism with th e th eological 
d oc trine which was anath ema t o modern culture. I 
was in fact proud and heedless because I had tak en 
pains t o deny th e historicy of th e primitive myth 
of the fall o f Adam in the garden, ... and I also 
disa vowed Aug ustin e 's horrendous concep tio n that 
sin is tr a nsmitt ed f ro m generation to ge neration 
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th ro u gh l us t in t he ac t o f pro c r e a t io n. 
But t h e s e lab o ur s o f mo d e rn i n t e rp r e ta t ion o f 
traditional r e lig iou s s ymb~ls prove d vai n. Th e 
r e actio n t o my 'real ism ' tau g ht me muc h ab ou t th e 
us e o f traditio nal s ymbols . Th e r em n a nts o f s oci a l 
op t imis m picture d me as a re gr e ssive a u t horita r ia n 9 
caugh t in th e t o ils o f an an c i e n t lege nd . But it 
wa s e ve n mor e imp o rt a nt tha t th e ' r e alist s 1 9 i n -
cludi ng man y , i f no t most 9 p o l it ical p hilo s o p h e rs 
wh o we r e in sub s t a ntial a gre eme n t wi t h po sit i o ns 
t a k e n in my Gi f f o r d Le ct u~ e s 9 we r e c a r e f u l t o 
s ta t e th a t t h e i r agr ee me nt did n o t e xt e n d t o my 
1 th eo l o gi cal pr e su p po si t io ns. 11 ( 8) 
It i s cle a r f rom th e a b ove q uo t a t io n t ha t a n imp ort a nt f ea-
tu r e o f th e t h eo lo gic~l p e r s pe ct i ve o f Ni e buhr's Chris t ia n 
. I 
Re a l i sm i s hi s int e r p r e t a t i o n a nd u s e of, Bib l ical myt h a n d sym-
b a l . An o th e r i mp ort ant f e at ur e o f i t i s his c o n vi c t i o n t ha t 
t hi s p e rs p e ct i ve sh o uld s e r ve n o t o n l y th e n e ga t i ve fun ctio n o f 
pr ovid ing th e c r i t e r i a f o r a c r itiqu e o f cla s sical a n d mod e rn 
vi e ws o f ma n. Th e p o sitive f un c t i o n o f this p e r sp e c t i v e is t ha t 
i t s ho u l d b e th e s e r v a nt o f just i ce i n co nt e mp o r ary s oc i e ty ; 
pro vidi ng t h e c ri t e~ia by wh i c h ' s Uch jus tic e ca n b e ac hi eve d . 
This h e d e s crib e s a s the '' g u i di n g principle " o f his ma ture yea rs : 
" . . . my stro n g c o n v i c t io n ( is ) t ha t a r e alist c o n -
c e p t io n o f huma n n a tur e sh o ul d b e mad e th e s e r va nt 
o f an e t hic o f prog r e s s i ve ju s t ic e a n d sh o uld n o t 
b e mad e i nt o a ba s tion o f c o ns e r va t i sm, pa r t ic u -
larly a c o n s e r v a t ism wh ic h d e f e n d s unjust 
pri vil e ge s . 
I mig ht d e f i n e th i s co n vi c t io n a s th e g u i d i n g 
princip l e th r o ug ho ut my matur e l if e o f t h e r e -
la t io n o f r e l i gious r e s po nsibility t o p oli t ical 
a ff a irs . . . th e fut ur e o f d e moc r ac y d oe s n o t d e p e nd 
up o n mi ld illus io ns ab o ut h uma n v i rt u e s a nd mo r al 
capacit ies . " (9 ) 
I t sh o uld b e no t e d tha t it is pr ecis e l y a t this p o i nt t h a t 
Alve s, i n th e qu o t a t i o n at t h e b e ginnin g o f th is c hapt e r , c r i -
t ici s e s Ni e buhr. Fo r Alve s a r gu e s th a t Ni e b uhr' s i n t e rp r e t ation 
o f t he Cr o ss - a f oc al s ymb o l i n his Biblical Re alism - pro vid e s 
n o imp ul s e f o r th e b r ingin g ab o ut o f a 'n e w t o mor r ow ' . This 
po i nt will h a ve t o b e tak e n up agai n a t a la t e r s t ag e . 
Th e r e is ampl e da t a in Ni e b u hr ' s p i lg r imag e f o r wh a t we ha v e 
calle d th e d yn amic pr oce s s o f d o ub t. Th e da t a we h av e us e d is 
dra wn f ro m his e arly y e a rs be ca us e t h e s e ye a r s a r e , o n his own 
a dmi ssio n, s o i mp orta n t t o him . I nt e r e s t i n g warran t f o r thi s 
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process comes fr om th e psychology of r eligio n . H.C . Rumk e, ~n his 
book The Psychology of Unbelief arg ue s th a t doubt has an import-
ant function in the development o f religious e xp e rie nce: 
"doub t in itsel f is not a f ac t or in the origin of 
unbelief . On th e co ntrary, it is a ferment which 
helps t o deliver th e o nce invested structure . We 
always s ee doubt arise in th e gr ea t crises of life-
doub t abo ut everything, about ou rs elves and about 
o ur f ellow beings. But eve ry kind o f growth has 
been preceded by doubt . " ( 10) 
I n d e s cribing th e development of belie f fr om a psychological 
viewpoint, Rumk e s peak s o f "two o utstanding ways leading t o r eal 
belief e xperie nces: o ne along th e direct cosmic- r eligio us e x-
perience; the o ~h e r along 'th e shapes behind th e words' " · (ll) 
Rumke argu e s that, in th e cou rs e of o ur development , we acquir e 
wa rds like "God" , " H eaven 1~- , " Hell" , and "C r oss"; a nd we acquire 
th e s e wa rds wh e th e r we gr ow up in a r eligio us e nvironme nt o r not . 
I n th e course of development su c h wa rds t a ke on a symb ol ic char-
acter, and are laden with various meanings . Be hind th e wo rds 
aris e th e sh apes which give co nt e nt t o th e wa rds we tak e with 
us into ' puberty . 
When what Rum ke call s 't he shapes behind the word s' a r e t es t e d in 
r elatio n t o th e world as we e xperi e nc e it, th e y eith e r pro ve 
adequate in help ing us t o mak e s e ns e o f th e world we e xperience, 
or th e y undergo modificati on wh e n f o und t o be i nadequate . Our 
r eligio us vocabula ry comes from th e tr aditio n in which we st a nd . 
Th e 'sh ape s behind th e wor ds' o ~ th a t vocab ulary develop as a 
r e su l t o f th e many diffe r e nt influences up o n us . Experience in 
th e world t e sts and modifi e s 't he sh ape s be hin d th e wa rds'. In 
turn, th e language of faith enable s us t o mak e s e ns e o f th e 
world as we e xp e ri e nce ·it . This is a dynamic process . During 
his De troi t years and in his formative years at U-ni o n, one dis -
cern s a dynamic interplay between th e traditio n in which Niebuh r 
stood and t~he wor l d as he e xp e rienced it . I n that interplay he 
a rrive d at the position he d e s cribe s as Christian Realism, and 
us e d this position t o make s e ns e of his Sit z im Leben. I n this 
s e ns e we sp ea k of d oubt as a dynamic process ~n Niebuhr: a 
process implicitly built int o his theological method . 
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(~)_ FAI TH AND HISTOR Y 
Thro ugh o ut this e ss a y we have sh own that Niebuhr wish e d to 
t a ke hist ory s e rio usly ; th a t he ga ve co nsid e rabl e we ight t o both 
pas t and co nt e mp orary hist ory in hi s work. We must now e stab-
l ish wh a t he mea nt by ' hi s to ry ' , how he us e d it in his work, a nd 
why he be lie ve d hist ory t o be im po rtant. 
(a) ~Th e Pr oble m o f De f i ni tio n 
One of th e proble ms wi th th e word hist ory is its ambi gui ty. 
I t is , in fa c t, us e d in a vari e ty o f wa ys t o mea n diff e r e nt 
things. Th e word c a n be us e d t o d e not e fa c tua l ity in th e s e ns e 
in whi c h th e critical hist ori a n us e s it wh e n he s ee ks t o e stab -
lish wh at hap pe ne d, t o d e t ermine~ it happ e ne d, and t o de ve l o p 
s ome un de rst a nding of th e e f fec t of what happ e ne d on th e pe ri od 
he i s studying. I n this s e Hs e th e hist orian mak e s it his busi-
ne ss t o study a particular c ou rs e of eve nts, using th e critical 
t oo ls which have bee n c r e a t e d f o r this sp ecific purp os e . 
Th e sp ecul ati ve histor ian , by c ontr a st, s ee ks t o d i s c over i~ 
' hi s t ory a patt e rn of mea ning whic h is in fa c t be yond th e purvie w 
of th e critica l hist orian. -Th e fi e ld o f study is th e same for 
both th e critical and th e s pec ulative historians, but th e ir 
obj ec ti ve s ar e diff e r e nt . A sp eculative hist oria n will s e arch 
f or 'me aning' or 'signific a nc e ' in hist oric a l e ve nts , going be -
yond th e purpos e s of th e c ritic a l hist orian, and he wi l l d o s o in 
t e rms o f his philos ophic a l pr e supp ositions . Exampl e s of su c h 
sp ec ulative hist orie s a r e th e work of th e Ge rman philos oph e r 
He ge l ; th e English hist orian Arn old Toynb ee; a nd in Am eric a th e 
th eo l o gic al int e rpr etation of hi s tory by Re inh old Ni e buhr. 1 t i s 
th e s e thr ee hist ori a ns th a t Willi am Dr a y c hoo s e s a s e xa mple s of 
s pec ul a tive syst e ms . 
In dis c ussing sp ec ul a tive ·phi l os oph ie s o f hist ory, Wi l li a m 
Dray draws att e nt io n t o s ome of th e wa ys in whic h su c h syst e ms 
may be cl assifie d . .Such c l assific atio n ma y, f o r e xa mpl e ,-b e mad e by : 
." r e f e r e nc e t o th e 'so urce of auth ority ' or final 
basis of argument th e y r eco gnis e . Th e, syst em s of 
He ge l, Toynb ee , a nd Nie buhr diff e r mark edly in 
this re gard; th e y are (o r at l e ast claim t o be ), 
.re sp ec tively , _me taphysic ally , empiric al ly, · and 
r e ligiously ba s ed. Thus th e mea ning He ge l · finds 
136 
in th e co urs e o f h i story ca n o n l y fu lly be e xp o und e d 
by metaphysical n o t io ns like ' Wo rld Spirit ', which 
ar e deri v e d fr o m h i s general p hi losophical position. 
And th e ac cep tabil i ty o f his acco unt d e pe nd s, in th e 
e nd , up o n th e accep t ability o f th a t positio n as a 
wh ole . To ynb ee ' s v i e w o f hist o ry 9 by co ntrast, is r e-
prese nt ed as a concl us io n f orce d up o n him by an e m-
pirical survey . And at least part of it, th e assert-
ion o f ce rt ain his t o ric al laws, cla ims a st a tus 
a n alo go us t o that o f an emp irically valida t e d 
sci e ntific hyp o th e s is. Niebuhr is s o much a t o dds 
with bot h o f th e s e approaches that at times h e d e-
n ies th a t h e o ff e r s , in a ny comparable s en s e, a 
~ h ilosophy 9 o f his t ory ai; all . . He claims o n ly t o 
sh o w ho w Christia n f ai th, whi c h trans ce nds ratio n al 
argum en t, can give a mea ning t o o th e rwis e meaning-
less occ ur a n ces. He neverth eless app ear s t o be 
th o r o u ghly invol ved in th e issu e s rais e d by th e 
o th e r tw o approac h e s, Fo r h e d e ni e s that me t aphys-
ical o r e mpiric a l in v e stig a tio n can mak e a ny s e n se 
o f hist o ry a t all . 
A more usual way o f cla ssifying phi losophies o f 
hist o ry is by th e type :of patt e rn th e y claim t o 
find in past e vent s . At th e mo st ge n e r al le vel o f 
an a lysis , . th e r e ar e , o f co urs e , o nly three possibi~ 
itie s ope n . Eith e r hist o ry will be f o und t o hav e a 
linear pattern · - it will b e 'g oing s omewhe r e'; o r 
it will b e ~yclical, r epea ting its elf e nd lessly in 
succ eed ing peoples a nd p e riods; ;o r it will appea r 
c ha o t ic, e xh ibit in g . L. o n ly 'th e play o f th e co n -
ting e n t a nd th e unf o r e s ee n! " . (12) 
Co n cedin g that a combin atio n o f th e s e ba s ic pos s ibilities 
ap pea rs t o s o me e xt e nt in th e wo rk o f Hegel , T o yn bee, and Nieb uhr , 
-Dray a rgu e s th a t th e lin ear patt e r n is ·d o minant in Hegel; th e 
c y clical pa tt e rn i n To ynb ee; a nd th e chaotic patt ern in Ni eb uhr. 
Of Nieb uhr 1 s phi lo s oph y, ·Dray ma k e s thi s point in r e gard t o 
d o minant p a tt e rns : 
. ''E v e n Nie buhr , wh o finds n o si gnif ica nt ove r -all 
pattern , a nd wh o ·is s e l ec t e d h e r e in part beca us e 
h e come s s o clo s e t o being a - ' c h aos' th eo rist , ad-
mits that o n e ca n dra w lin e s o f progress through 
th e past : th e lin e o f t e chn o logical ad va nc e , f o r e x -
ample . But h e . ca ~n o t s ee th a t any o f th ese pick 
o ut d e velop me nts o f much imp ortan ce fr o m th e 
sta~dp o int o f Christian fa i th . " (13) 
Whilst in substantial agreemen t with Dray 1 s clas sification 
of Nieb uhr a s a sp ec ulati ve historian, we wo uld q u e stion _his 
assertio n th a t Ni e buhr d e n ies th e p ossibility o f "empirical 
inv e stigation " making "a n y s e ns e of hist ory a t all . " Niebuhr, 
as we have s ee n, c o nsist e ntly arg u e s that th e c ritical discip-
lines must be t a k e n s e rio usly: be th e y psychology, s ociolog y, 
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or critical history. But he also argues, consistently, th at it 
is necessary to go beyond th e limits of these disciplines in 
order to make any 
sweep of history . 
that Niebuhr must 
sense of th e ambiguities evident in the broad 
It is precisely because he wants to do this 
be said t o offer a speculative vi e w of history: 
though he may disavow the word 'system' · in describing his con-
tribution. 
It is not o ur intention here to offer a detailed acco unt of 
the many problems which r e l ate t o the problem of definition in 
the ·philosophy of history. It is enough for our purposes to use 
the wid ely accep t ed division of this field into two main parts: 
critical and sp ec ulative hi story. In s eeking to und ers tand 
Niebuhr's vi e w .of history, which is the purpose of this chapter, 
we - accept that we are dealing with a speculative view of history. 
There is, however, on e problem of definition to which we 
must give atte ntion because it r elates specifically to the 
emergence of th e 'dialecti c ' or 'nee-orthodox ' group of theolog-
ians with which Niebuhr is associated. The problem concerns the 
evolution of modern critical historical enquiry and the presup-
positions on which it rests, on the one hand, and the response 
of so-called dialectical or nee-orthodox theology, on the other. 
Th e iss~e may be e xpressed in the form of a question: to wh at 
degree do th e presuppositions of th e ·hist oria n determine th e 
conclusion s he r eache s in any ·particular , historical research? 
And a furth er question: do th e s e presuppositions not, .by · their 
ve ry nature, raise insu~mountable problems f or Christian faith? 
Er~st Troeltsch, , who was intimately associated with th e 
e volution of critical historical e nquiry , addressed hims elf to 
this issue. He argued that critical historical enquiry rests on 
thr ee inter-related principles. And these principles, he argued, 
are founded upon th e accepta nc e of wh at can be desc~ibed as a 
'scientific-world-view'. 
I n his book The Historian and the Believer, Van Harvey 
summarizes Troeltsch 1 s principles: 
:"(l) the principle of c riticism, by which he meant 
that our judgements about th e past cannot simply 
be classified as tru e or false but must be seen as . 
claiming only a greater .or a . lesser degree . of prob-
ability and as always open to re~ision; (2) the 
principle o f anal ogy, by which he meant that we are 
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able to make judgements of probability only if we 
presuppose that our own present experience is not 
radically dissimilar . to the experience of the past 
persons; - and (3) the principle , of correlation. by 
which he meant that . the phenomena of man's histor-
ical life are so related ' and interdependent that 
no radical change can take place at any one point 
in the historical · nexus without effecting a change 
in all that. immedia tely . surrounds it. Historical 
explanation, . therefore, . necessarily takes the · form 
of understanding a n event in terms of its anteced-
ents and consequences, and no event can be isolated 
from its historically conditioned time and space. 11 (14) 
Troeltsch believed th a t these principles are incompatible 
with traditional Christian belief because anyone· who based his 
historical enqUiries upon t hem would necessarily ·be in conflict 
with orthodox Christian belief. The force of his arguement is 
seen if we . apply his princ i ple of analogy to the Christian claims 
of uniqueness and divinity for Jesus Christ, and in particular 
belief in the Resurrection . We have no analogy for resurrection, 
Troe~schsays, and therefore we have · no way of assessing the pro-
bability of such an 'event ' . Can we speak, then, of resurrection 
as historical event? Orthodox assertions about the 'mi~acle' of 
the Resurrection, for Troe lt~~h, are incompatible with the prin-
ciple of analogy precisely because it is impossible to assess 
the degree of probability of such an assertion. 
What are for orthodox Christian belief revelatory events, 
such as the Incarnation an d the Resurrection, . are in terms of 
Troeltsth's principles, precluded from the . field of critical 
histor~ ~ i g By defin i tion, any event which is not analogous 
to other events in history, and which have a transcendan t (or 
supranatural) quality · about them are precluded from critical 
historical enquiry. 
Van Harvey summarizes the difficulties inherent 1n Troel-
tsch's position: 
"Many theologians agree with Troeltsch that the 
principle of analogy is incompatible with Christian 
belief . if one interprets it as he does. But_ they 
conclude . from this not that Christian . belief is 
untenable but that Troeltsch simply reflected the 
anti-supernaturalistic and positivist bias of the 
nineteenth century . . Troeltsch's criticisms, they · 
claim, are but a version of a naturali~tic meta-
physics in which the occurrence of genuinely unique 
events is precluded from the outset . " (15) 
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The problem lies not in the principle of analogy as such, 
but in the presuppositions which give rise to Troeltsch's three 
principles of historical enquiry, and thus with the nature of 
historical thinking itself. The naturalistic assumptian·s which 
underlie Troeltsch's work have , in the view of Harvey, dominated 
New Testament criticism from D.F.Strauss to Rudolph Bultmann. 
"It is clear, for e xample, that Strauss' concept of 
myth is predicted on the view that 'all things are 
linked together by a chain of causes and effects, 
which suffers no interruption', just as Bultmann 
admits that 'the historical method includes the 
presupposition that history is a unity in the sense 
of a closed continuum of effects in which individ-
ual events are connected by the succession of cause 
and effect', a con t inuum that 'cannot be rent . by 
the interference of supernatural, transcendent 
powe~s ... '" (16) 
The question which Richard R. Niebuhr asks in his book 
Resurrection and Historical Reason(l7 )is ,whether the metaphys-
ical presuppositions of Strauss and Bultmann (and by implication 
Troeltsch) do not in fact d estroy historical thinking. Historical 
thinking, argues Rich~rd R . Niebuhr, requires openness to the 
unique and the novel in past events, and no historian can a priori 
· rule out the possibility o f such events. If, far · example, the 
resurrection is a unique e vent, then it challenges the principle 
of analogy and cannot be conformed to it. In this sense, of 
course, the resurrection represents the problem of all historical 
thinking: namely, how to understand the genuinely unique. 
There are ·striking similarities between the theoretical 
assumptions of nineteenth century historicism and nineteenth 
century sociology. For ex ampl e, the positivistic element in 
Troeltsch's principle of , correlation creates a model of history 
as a nexus of cause and ef f ect; a continuum of causality; an 
organic whole. This model has its counterpart in the history of 
sociological theory. Emile Durkheim and A.R.Radcliffe-Brown for 
example, propounded a functionalist view of society based on the 
analogy of a physical orga nism. In this view, the study of a 
particular aspect of a society, such as kinship, had to be under-
· t~ken in · the belief that t h e institution of kinship ·cannot be 
understood in isolation from other aspects of that society. Every 
aspect of society is part o f the whole, and each aspect of 
society is interdependent. 
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Functionalism in sociological theory has undergone a great 
deal of modific~tion, as h a ve the underlying positivistic assumpt-
ions of the model. Major d ifficulties with the model in its early 
form are numerous. Becaus e of the similarities between histor-
icism and sociological theory, some of the difficulties in the 
latter are of a similar nature to those that can be discerned in 
the former. 
One of the major problems relating to what we may term the 
'organic model' is that it is a typical example of what Whitehead 
called the 'fallacy of mis placed concreteness'; the error of 
supposing that conceptual entities are 'real' in the sense that 
a physical organism is 're a l'. When a sociologist or anthropol-
ogist is describing the structure and function of a society, he 
is not describing an entit y called 'society' but is, on the basis 
of his theoretical assumptions, abstracting from his observations 
about the relationships be t ween t he individuals in the society in 
order to describe what hap pens as well as how or why it happens. 
Troeltsc~'s principle of correlation, by which it is asserted 
that the phenomena of historical life are interdep~ndent, and 
that no change can take place at one point in the historical nexus 
without effecting change i n all that immediately surrounds it, ~s an 
example of the ''fallacy of mispl~ced concreteness". It assumes 
that history is an 'entity ' , whereas . the process of description 
and explanation of events by a particular historian of a given 
period of history is a pro c ess of abstraction · which the historian 
does on the basis of his theoretical assumptions. 
The principle of correlation which Troeltsch enunciated, is 
strikingly similar to Emil e Durkheim's principle of concomi t ant 
0ariation which reflects the influence · of nineteenth · century 
positivism on his sociolog i cal theo~y. A statement of Durkheim's 
principle of concomitant variation, when applied to his classic 
study on suicide, would be : if a change in one variable (rate of 
suicide) is accompanied by change in another (religious affil-
iation) the two changes are probably casually related; either 
directly, or through a thi r d variable.· It should be noted that 
Durkheim's principle rests on two- presuppositions: that there is 
a correlation of variables in a society; and that societies are 
not made up of - random 'items', but of items which hang together 
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~n a meaningful nexus. 
The functionalist mod e l in sociological theory and the prin -
ciple of correlation in critical historicism lean heavily upon 
the organic analogy which is drawn from the biological sciences. 
they also reveal the perva s ive influence of nineteenth-century 
positivism with ·its mechanistic view of the world. William 
Nicholls in his Systematic and Ph il osophical Theology character-
ises nineteenth-century science and the problems it presents for 
theology in this way: 
"Nineteenth-century tended to see the world on the 
model of a vast machine, . and ih this model, scien-
tific laws were unbreakable. The regularity of the 
universe could not be infringed without destroying 
the basis of science, and rendering it once again 
unintelligible to the human mind. But since the 
regularity of nature was constantly being verified 
with every fresh experiment, and no new evidence of 
a convincing kind came in to support the occurrence 
of miracles, the scientists became extremely sure 
of their principle." ( 18) 
Today the organic mod e l i~ seriously questioned by sociolog-
ical theorists although positivism still has a pervasive influence 
in the social sciences even th ough some of its extreme implicat-
ions may hav e been abandon e d. Evidence of this question i ng is 
set out in John Rex's Key Problems of Sociological Theory. (lg) 
. 
Present-day science a l so operates with a model which is 
less mechanistic. Nicholls writes: 
"The concept of unb r eakable law, with its implicat-
ions for a rigid causality operating throughout 
nature, is being repla6~d, if only to account for 
observations at the sub-atomic level, - with a notion, , 
going back to Hume in its origins, of statistical 
regularity. Thus, t he present-day scientist is more 
likely to speak of a high degree of probability of 
one event following upon another, than of the first 
causing the second ... 
Whether a more con t emporary understanding of scient-
ific law makes miracle easier to incorporate into 
a scientifically-g r ounded picture of the world 
may ... be doubted. At any rate, there is no agree-
ment among the most influential of contemporary 
:theologians that it does." (20) 
Criticisms may be lev e lled at Troeltsch'sprinciples of his-
toricriticism, or against the functionalist model in sociolog-
ical theory, in terms of t he presuppositions which inform them. 
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. But an important factor emerges which is in keeping with the 
modern critical spirit. This is the factor of autonomy. It is 
the insistence, · for example of, sociological theorists from 
Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown to the present, that sociological 
explanation is not reducible. That is to say, sociological ex-
planation must be given in terms of sociological criteria, and 
cannot be given on the basis of psychological or historical or 
any other. This is not to say that the sociologist deliberate-
ly ignores insights from the disciplines of psychology or history. 
It is to insist, however, that sociological data must be inter-
preted sociologically. 
The spirit of autonomy which drives sociological theorists 
constantly to refine and perfect their tools of research, is a 
characteristic of the scientific spirit. This jealously guarded 
spirit of autonomy is equally cherished in the other sciences of 
man, including critical history. This spirit of autonomy is 
based on the conviction, in critical history for example, that 
the truth of a particular historical judgement must be validated 
in terms of the critical tools of that particular discipline, 
and not by appeal to transcendent or suprarational authority. 
~ 
Thus, the truth or falsity of historical judgements, must be 
decided on the basis of the principles operative within the dis-
cipline of critical history itself, and not by reference to some 
external authority. 
For our purposes, the important point to note is that the 
evolution of a critical historical method has important implic-
ations for theology. On the one hand, Niebuhr and so-called neo -
orthodox theologies genera l ly, respected the autonomy and critical 
nature of this discipline, and took its findings seriously. But 
the very act of doing this raised serious problems for Christian 
faith as we have seen in relation to Troelt sch's principle of 
analogy. 
The force of langdon Gilkey's criticism of neo-orthodoxy, 
with which we began this chapter, is evident at this point: "It 
attempted to accept the secular world secularly, but to retain 
the Biblical and orthodox worlds religiously." This dualistic 
posture, it must be noted, was to some extent a response to the 
evolving critical historical method . . It is to that response 
we now turn. 
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(b) Neo-orthodoxy and Historical Criticism 
Troeltsch's principles of 'historical judgement raised serious 
problems for Protestant theology. If it is true that the his-
torian must assume the principle of analogy: that the way we ex-
perience the present is not radically dissimilar to the experience 
of past persons, what do we make of the Resurrection or the 
Incarnation which are fundamental to Christian faith? If the 
historian does not assume the principle of analogy, can he talk 
at all about the probability and improbability? 
Consider Troeltsch's first principle: that our judgements 
about the past can be seen as having only a degree of probability, 
and as always open to revision; a principle which is surely 
essential to historical en quiry, but raises serious questions for 
Christian faith. Van Harv ey argues that the emergence of the so-
called neo-orthodox or dialectical school of theology was, in 
fact, a response to the problems raised by Troelts~. 
"Barth, Brunner, Bultmann and Tillich argued, as 
Martin Kahler and Soren Kierkegaard had done before 
them, that faith is a passion which becomes comic 
and distorted if it tries to rest on the ~pproxim­
ation process' of historical inquiry. Faith has, 
they claimed, its ow n certitude, and it is a 
falsification of both faith and historical inquiry 
if the former is based on the latter: a falsific-
~tion of faith because faith cannot change with 
every new consensu s of New Testament criticism or · 
hold its breath lest some discovery in the Dead 
Sea area c asts· a s hadow of doubt over this or that 
particular belief; falsification of hi~tory because 
it is intolerable t o honest inquiry if the New 
Testament critic o r believer decides in favour of 
one historical judgement rather than another 
because. it is more compatible with his religious 
beliefs. Consequen tly , . the dialectical theologians 
argued . that the ob j ect of faith is not the Jesus 
reconstructed by the historian but the Christ pro-
claimed in the ker ygma, the one who was crucified 
and revealed to be the Word of God.'' (21) 
Of course, it can be argu ed that historical inquiry can never 
prove that Jesus -is the Ch r ist, the Son of God. But, in principle 
at least, it can cast doub t on it. For what if historical in-
quiry proved beyond reasonable do4bt that, for example, the actual 
words of Jesus were signif i cantly different in content and mean-
ing from those upheld by the Church? 
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The attempt by dialectical theology to separate faith from 
historical criticism, is i t self liable to serious criticism. It 
is possible to claim as dialectical theology does in principle, 
that Christian faith rests on an interpretation of a concrete 
historical event, and at the same time to argue that no histor-
ical judgement can falsify that interpretation? A critic of 
dialectical theology can rightly argue that you cannot have 
historicity .without encountering risk, 
On the question of the relationship between faith and 
history, Van Harvey argues that the issue ce ntres on "the col-
lision of two moralities o f knowledge, the one characteristic of 
the scholarly world since t he Enlightenment, the other character-
istic of traditional Chris tian belief." ( 22 )The issue, for 
Harv e y, "is not merely a pr oblem of two logics or two methodolog-
ies. It is a problem ... o f two ethics of judgement." ( 23 ) In 
fact, he goes so far as to say that from "liberal Protestantism 
to th e new hermeneutic, Protestant theology may be regarded as 
a series of salvage operations, attempts to show how one can 
still believe in J es us Chr ist and not violate an ideal of in-
tellectual integrity." ( 24 ) 
These are serious cha r ges upon the method of dialectical 
theology. Yet there is some warrant for them when one considers 
how some of these theologians sought to cope with the problems 
raised for them by historical inquiry . At this point it is im-
portant to stress that while the single term "dialectical theo-
logy" or "nee-orthodox th e ology" is used to describe a certai1111 
group of theologians, there are, of course, significant differ-
ences b'etween, say, Barth and •:Su.l tmann, or Tillich and Niebuhr. 
There is, as we have alrea d y shown in this essay, much that is 
common to all, and therefore justifies the use of a single des-
criptive term for them. 
One such common feature is the insistence of dialectical 
theology that faith is something deeper than belief in a set of 
commonly held propositions. It is the theologians task, among 
others, to explo.re not only what we believe, but how we believe 
' 
what we believe. And for those who were more attracted to 
existentialism, the important focus was on the authenticity of 
th e belie ver in response to the Word of God. 
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To return to the charges made by Harvey against dialectical 
theology, it is necessary to look at the ways in which the prob-
lem of faith and hist ory is highlighted in the work of specific 
theologians of this 'school'. We do this because it will help us 
to understand some of the probl ems which relate to Reinhold 
Niebuhr's understanding history. In doing this we r e ly on Harvey's 
analysis to point up the dilemmas. 
Rudolf Bultmann's attempt to wrestle with the relationship 
of faith and history is e quivocal. It is a major affirmation of 
th e Christian faith, for Bultmann , that man can only realize his 
awn tru e nature through the prior initiative of God. The act of 
God wh e r e by man is e nabled to live authentically, occurs in 
Jesus Christ and in th e proclamation of this Word to man. However, 
this proclamation is not historical report which may or may not 
be verified by critical means; rather it proclaims 
" that in what happened then, however it might have 
bee n (es m6ge gewesen sein wie es woll e ), God has 
acted, and that through this act o f Gad the Word of 
divine judg eme nt and forgiv e ness which now confronts 
him is authenticated. The meaning of that act of God 
is nothing ather than the establishment of this Word 
the proclamation of this Word itself. No historical 
science can control or confirm or reject this 
a ffirmation. Far that this Ward and this proclam-
a tion are Gad's act stands an the other side of 
historical observation." (25) 
Thus, Bultmann argues that faith ~s a universal possibility 
for man, and al so th a t · faith is dependent upon an act of God in 
hist ory about which little can be known. As Harvey paints out, 
what is so pe rpl e xing about Bultmann's position is that it tends 
to suppor t th e contention that there is no relationship between 
faith and history. This contention can be stated this way: If 
faith can be translated into existentialist terms ( as Bultmann 
insists it can), th en it can be argued that reference to Jesus 
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If, on the other hand, reference to Jesus Christ is necessary 
(as Bultmann insists it is), th e n how can faith be independent 
of historical inquir~? 
We now turn to the manner in which Paul Tillich wrestled 
with the issue of faith and history. Essentially, Tillich wishes 
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to interpret the Protestant Reformer's understanding of justific-
' 
ation by faith. Like Barth and Bultmann, he believes that this 
understanding of faith must be seen as the experience of grace and 
judgement ''that brings assurance by depriving us of all security". 
( 26 ) The Protestant message, furthermore, gives ''witness to the 
'New Being' through which alone it is able to say its word in 
power ... without making this witness again the basis of a wrong 
"t ·n< 27 ) Th · th" rad;cal · f f "th · bl secur~ y. us, ~n ~s • v~ew o a~ , man ~s a e 
to accept the ambiguities of his existence, without resorting to 
false bastions · of security which may take the form of a world-
view or an absolute claim to truth. 
In his Courage To Be Tillich speaks of an "absolute faith" 
which "transcends theism"; ·it is ·"the accepting of the acceptance 
without somebody or something that ac~epts"( 2 B)it is the courage 
to be. In what way, then, is this "absolute faith" related to the 
Christ-event? In principle there is no essential connection, 
although Tillich believes i t found perfect expression in Jesus 
Christ. The absolute faith of which Tillich speaks is, as Harvey 
puts it, "a possibility ava i lable to man as man, even a man who 
has never heard of Jesus of Nazareth. Indeed, if faith is not 
such a universal possibility, Tillich's thesis ~n Courage To Be 
is meaningless, since his basic point is to demonstrate how faith 
can appear when all traditional Christian belief and symbolism 
are rendered unintelligible . It is this radicalization of faith 
that constitutes Tillich's power as an apologetic theologian in 
our times, but it depends on his cutting any essential tie to 
Christian revelation." ( 29 ) 
But Tillich does want to assert that Jesus is the Christ, 
and that assertion has to · do with historical fact, and an inter-
pretation of that fact. The historical fact '~f Jesus may be ex-
pressed symbolically, but if this "factual element in the Christian 
event were denied, the foundstion of Christi~hity would be de-
nied." (JO) He also wants to assert that the picture of Jesus 
which the New Testament provides is the basic image or parable of 
faith, although he does not argue that revelation occurs only in 
Jesus. That revelation is final in the sense that it occurred 
perfectly in Jesus, but it presupposes ~'p're.l,iminary"· and 
''adumbrated" revelations which occur elsewhere in human experience. 
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Once more, as Harvey shows, we are faced with ambiguities 
in the relationship between faith and history: 
II it still remains a question how this historical 
revelation may be affirmed as essential to faith 
without prejudice to the universal possibility of 
faith on the one hand or without colliding with the 
morality of historical knowledge on the other. 
How is it possible to affirm that Jesus is the de-
cisive event for faith while insisting that 'his-
torical research can neither give 6r take away the 
foundation of the Christian faith'?" (31) 
The difficulties which Harvey discerns in Tillich's stand-
point he also explores in r elation to the work of Karl Barth~ 32 ) 
We shall have occasion to deal with them when we explore Rein-
hold Niebuhr's understanding of the relationship between faith 
and history. 
At this point it should be noted that so-called neo-orthodox 
theology's response to crit ical history was an endeavour to 
separate faith and the dis c ipline of historical criticism. In 
doing so it accepted the pr inciples of autonomy and responsibil-
ity of that discipline . . I t also asked that the same respect be 
accorded to it in its exploration of the nature and structure of 
faith; its legitimate field of inquiry. Furthermore, as Harvey 
shows, some dialectical theologians - Gogarten and H. Richard 
Niebuhr in particular - argue that there is a structural affinity 
between their understanding of the faith and the scientific spirit. 
11 Gogarten, for example, insisted that .the autonomy 
and responsibility of the sciences, including histor~ 
were made possible ·by the Protestant concept of 
justification. H. Richard Niebuhr, on the other hand, 
was more cautious and was content to point out that 
the Protestant theologian will recognise that there 
is something like r adical faith in the work of the 
secular communities of learning influenced by the 
enlightenment. 
Although it can be questioned whe-ther Protestantism 
stands on a casual relationship to the autonomy ex-
emplified by the modern scienti fie spirit, ,Gogarten 's 
thesis is ... . that · i t was t_he unique contribution of 
the Protestant Reformation to shatter the Weltansch-
auung of . the medieval world and, hence, to free the 
self for God, on the one hand, and for the ·world on 
the other. By this Gogarten means that the medieval 
vision of reality was bound to the static categories 
·of -classical Greek metaphysics. The ·actual world, 
according to this understanding, consists not so 
much in change, wh i ch is to say in history, but in 
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certain unalterable and eternal structures. The will 
of Gad is that men conform to these eternal patte~ns; 
hence, history is thought to be fulfilled just to the 
degree that man takes his place within an already ex-
isting and eternal framework... · 
.Luther's message s hattered this understanding, 
Gogarten argues. By means of his doctrine of the two 
kingdoms, Luther r e pudiated the medieval church's 
claims to sovereignty over the world and granted ~ 
new autonomy to ma n . L~fe in the world was entrusted 
to reason and to go vernment; the salvation of the 
soul was a matter for God ... the upshot of this dis-
tinction between the two realms was to grant complete 
independence to the sciences. In the name of faith, 
sa to speak, science was free to do its own wark. 11 {33) 
Whether in fact there is a casual relationship between Reform-
ation thought and the scie ntifi c spirit, as Gogarten suggests, is 
an open question. If, how e ver, Gogarten is right in his thesis 
that the Protestant era re placed the static categories of medi-
eval thought . with ' more dyn ami c ones, then this is a tremendous 
gain. But it is a gain that is not without ironical dimensions, 
in the sense in which Reinhold Niebuhr uses the notion of irony. 
For Niebuhr, an ironic situation pertains when virtue becomes 
vice through same hidden d e fect in the · virtue, and the person in-
valved in it bears same re sponsibility far that situation. If 
Gagarten's thesis is right, then there is obvious virtue in the 
autonomy achieved far the sc iences when "in the riame of faith, 
sa to speak, science was f ree to do its awn work". The hidden 
defect in the virtue is that in . the name of that same faith, sa 
to speak, a wedge is driven between faith and the sciences -
including historical science. Then faith becomes a matter for 
the theologians, and science far the scientists, and the .dualism 
which is inherent in dialectical theology becomes apparent. Or 
to put the matter another way, . the secular world is accepted as 
secular at the same time a s the Biblical world is accepted 
religiously. 
The issues which have been raised in our discussion ~n this 
section, of the relationsh i p between theology and history farm the 
backdrop for an examination of Niebuhr's view of history. In 
same instances they came sharply into focus in such examination. 
To this we now turn. 
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(3) NIEBUHR ' S VIEW OF HISTORY 
(a) Introduction 
_Anyone who sets out to analyse Niebuhr's understanding of 
history is immediately con fr onted with two problems. The first 
is the sheer volume of his writing. What might be called his 
systematic treatment of history is contained in seven books. 
These are: Reflections on th e End of an Era (1934), Beyond 
Tragedy (1937), The Nature and Destiny of Man (1943), Discerning 
the Signs of the Times (1946), Faith and History '(1949), The 
Irony of American History (1952), and The Self in the Dramas of 
History (1955). But most of his writing, whether in books, or 
published in journals, hav e a bearing on the issue. 
The second problem relating to an analysis of Nieb~hr's 
understanding of history a r ises out of the first. -It is a 
problem of methodology: ho w to marshall all the relevant data 
in order to give it fair treatment, whilst at the same time keep-
ing it within manageable proportions. 
The procedure we will adoptis to begin with a 'statement of 
purpose' which seeks to describe Niebuhr's intention in wrestling 
with the problems of faith and history. We shall then examine 
his description of the 'th r ee contending views of history' which 
are predominant ~n Western culture: namely the Greek, . the Biblical-
Christian, . and the modern view. The remairider of the chapter will 
discuss Niebuhr's view of past ·and co n temporary history. Our ex -
position of history as past event will be based largely on _Faith 
. and History. History as co n temporary event will expound his under-
standing of 'revelatory events 1 , 'myth and symbol' and 1 tragedy 
and irony in the drama of history'. Throughout we will attemp to 
be both descriptive and critical of Niebuhr's view of history. 
(i) A STATEMENT Of PU RPOSE 
In order to give some focus to this section on Niebuhr's view 
of history, and accepting that a theologian's task is determined 
as much by his Sitz im leben as by his Sitz im Denken, we might 
· formulate a statement of his purpose in the following way. 
Niebuhr saw it as his task to give depth to the 
critique of the philosophical and theological 
assumptions of the prevailing optimism of his day. 
But before he coul d do this, he had to distil a 
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tradition from the romantic, Enlightenment, and 
nineteenth-century views with which earlier Christian 
tradition had been admixed. Thus he arrived at a 
moral traditi6n in which Hebrew prophetic and New 
Testament insights, Augustine, and the Reformers 
came to the fore. This tradition he called Christian 
Realism. 
This process of di s tillation, which not only made 
him the centre of c ontroversy but was painful to 
Niebuhr himself, wa s undertaken to bring fresh 
impetus to social ethics and political decision-
making in a period of history turbulent with new 
problems. 
The purpose which we h ave set out above is itself a distil-
lation from his writings: nowhere does Niebuhr state his purpose 
in these terms. However h e may have stated his task, he certainly 
saw it against the backdro p of the contemporary crisis in Western 
civilization. His 5itz i m Leben was a determining factor in his 
5itz im Denken. A_ quick l o ok at the titles of his amazing output 
of books and articles from 1916 onwards is sufficient confirm-
ation of this (34) 
Writing of the contem porary crisis as he saw it in 1949, 
Niebuhr gives further conf i rmation of the above view . "Our civ-
ilization has been engulfe d in obvious and widespread political 
and social confusion since the second decade of this century. One 
world war has followed another; · and the second conflagration has 
left the world in even dee per distress and less assurance for the 
future than the first. While Western civilization has been the 
centre and source of the world's disorders, the social confusion 
and political tumult have spread from this centre into the whole 
world." The most immediat e cause of our distress, he continues, 
."could be defined as the i nability and unwillingness of modern 
men and nations to re-estab lish community, or to reconstruct 
justice, under conditions which a technical civilization has 
created." ~ 35 ) 
Philosopher and historian, William Dray has shown that it is 
possible to bring considerable criticism to bear on Niebuhr's 
formal writing on faith and history.( 36 ) However, this task is 
made a lot easier for Dray becau~e he at no point takes into account 
the issues with which Niebuhi was grappling when he wrote those 
books. In retrospect, and with the aid of critical literary and 
philosophical tools, Dray is able to reveal many weaknesses in 
what he describes as Niebuhr's "attempt to 'interpret' history 
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f rom th e standpoint of rel i gio us f aith . " Dr a y ackn o wl edge s th a t 
Nieb uh r's co nce rn is s ocia l e thics ; " th e wo rk i n g o ut o f a Chris t -
ian vi e w o f history i s clo s e ly a ssoc iat e d wi th th e t ask o f showing 
th e r e l e va nce o f r e ligio uB f ai th t o th e problems of s ec ular lif e -
especially poli t ical o n e s ; a nd h e is probably as well kn o wn ~n 
Ame rica f o r his d o ur a nd . r a dical comm e nt on political a ff ai rs as 
f o r h is th eolo gical s c holars hi p . " (J 7 ) But wh e n it comes t o his 
analysi s a nd c r i ticism o f Ni e buhr 1 s work 9 h e in f ac t trea t s i t a s 
th o ugh it b o r e no r ela t io n t o th a t s ec ula r life; as a n e xample o f 
sp e c ula tive hist o ry in th e worst s e ns e . Critici s m Nieb uhr did 
and ca n b e ar 9 but wh at he cannot b e ar is t o b e t r ea t e d as th o u g h 
h e we r e wo rking in a v ac uu m. 
This c r i t ici sm o f Dray ' s app roach to Ni e buhr is mad e t o 
highli ght a proble m f a c e d by a nyon e who wants t o d o ju s ti ce t o 
Nieb uhr'~ th o ught. Th a t problem is how t o a nal y se his wo rk 9 
whi ls t at th e s ame time gi vi n g eq ual weight t o his situatio n and 
t o this th o ught . 
(ii) TH REE CON TENDING VIE WS OF HIST OR Y 
I n his Faith and His t o ry Ni e b uhr a rgu e s that three con t e nd -
ing vi e ws o f histo ry dominat e We s t e rn c ultur e 9 a nd th a t th e 
pr e vaili ng mod e rn und e rstandin g o f hist o~y is bo th simila~ t o , 
and diffe r e nt fr om th e vi e w f o und in classic al id ealism . He also 
s ee ks t o sh ow that th e Biblical v i e w of hist o ry is su pe rio r t o 
bo th th e classica l and mod e r n in t erp r e tations . 
"We st e rn c ultur e e mb od i e s thr ee approache s t o wa rd th e 
ve xing pr o bl e m o f th e n a tur e o f human histo ry : (1) 
Th e app r oac h o f Gr e e k c lassicism wh ich e quated his -
t o ry with th e world o f n a tur e a nd s o u ght ema ncipatio n 
o f ma n's c hang e l e ss r e aso n f r o m this world o f cha n ge; 
(2) th e Biblical-Christia n appr oac h wh ich f o und ma n's 
hist oric e xist e nc e bo th mea ningfu l and myst e r io us and 
which r e gard ed th e fr ee d om o f ma n, wh ic h distinguish e d 
h i st o ry fr om n a tur e 9 a s th e s o urc e o f evil · a s well a s 
good; (3). a nd th e mode rn app r o ach wh ich r ega rd e d th e 
hist orical d eve l o pme nt o f ma n's pow e r a n d fr ee d om as 
th e s o lution f or e ve ry hum a n p e rpl e xity a n d a s th e 
way o f ema ncipatio n fr o m e ve ry hum a n e vil . " (3 8) 
I n o rd e r t o un de r s t a nd th e pre d icame nt o f mode rn c u l ture, 
Nieb uhr a r gu e s th a t it is n ece ss ary to e xamine th e r elatio nship 
bet wee n th e s e co nt e nding v iews o f hist o ry . "For th e dyn amism o f 
we st e rn c u l tur e was ma d e pos sibl e by th e trium p h of th e Bibl ical-
Christi a n s e ns e of hist o ry a s a r ea lm of mea nin g o v e r th e 
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ffiistorical culture of clas s icism. Th e un an ticipa t ed disaster 
which followed up o n this d yn amism is, o n th e other hand, related 
t o th e triumph o f th e modern vi ew o f history o ver th e Biblical-
Christian . For th e Chris tia n vi e w of life and histor y recognised 
the peril, as well as the c reativi ty, o f human fr eedom while th e 
I 
modern vi e w h ad a n uncritical confidence in the e n largement o f 
human fr eedom." (p .l6) 
Niebuhr argues, much a s Gogarten does, that the classical 
Gree k vi e w o f th e world fo und chiefly in the works o f Plato, 
Aristotle a nd the Stoics, was rejected b~cause o f its stati~ and 
cyclic und e rst a nding o f h istory . This view is a " weste rn a nd in-
tellectual version o f th e un i versal ty pe o f ahis t orical spirit-
ualit y ", o f which "Bra hmin a nd Budhisti c mysticism are orien t al 
and non-rational versions." (p.l7) He d oes n ot , however, 
a ttribut e th e fact th a t this vie w is superceded t o th e work o f the 
Re f orme rs 9 as Gogarten d oes . Rather, h e s ugg es ts that it ~s 
sup e rc eded because o f its ahistoric al nature 9 and because of th e 
al t e rnative o ff e r ed by th e Biblical-Christi an v i e w o f hist o ry. 
At th e o th e r e nd o f th e scale is the modern vie w of history 
" dist i ngu i sh ed by its co nfid ence, both in th e growing power o f 
r ea s o n and in its capacity, when rightly disciplined, t o assure 
th e development o f e v ery hum a n po wer and . virtu e . " (pJ) Th e 
dominant n o t e in this vie w is a '' faith in history"; the noti o n 
o f 11a redemptive hist o ry. " Evid e nce o f this und erstanding , Niebuhr 
r 
finds 9 abo unds in a diverse group of thinkers including Leibnitz, 
Herder, Kant, He gel , an d J.S.Mill. (p.3) 
This linear, developme nt al view o f hist ory is a post-
Renaissance phenomenon, a rising a t a time wh e n Wes t ern man was 
regaining a sense o f co nfid e nc e in his ·c r ea ti ve powers. This vi e w 
o f hist o ry ac tua lly trace s i ts ance stry back t o th e insights of 
th e Hewbrew prophetic traditioh 9 though Ni eb uhr arg u es th a t it 
s ec ula riz e s th e m. And ·in d o ing so it misunderstands th em . In 
esse nc e, th e modern vi e w is th a t hist ory, which in classical Greek 
th o ug~was r ega rd e d as cycl e s o f growth and d ecay , is s ee n as th e 
"realm of indeterminate growth" (p· 77 ) In conse qu ence of this v iew, 
"e xtr a vag e nt es timat es o f freedom" in which th e possibilities, 
f o r e x a mpl e, o f increasing c o ntrol ove r n a ture, increasing 
physical well-being, th e d e moc r a tiz atio n o f s ocie ty, the crea t ion 
o f a uni ve rsal community, a nd o th e r legitimat e goals wil l follow 
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i nevita blyo 
Such a view of hist ory, Niebuhr a rgu es, is a va st improve-
men t up on th e cl assical vie w beca us e it finds mea ning in ma n ' s 
hi st orica l e xist e nce o But it also in vol ves a disasterous nai ve t e o 
It s e ri o usly ove r e stima t e s e xt e nt of fr ee dom in hist ory , a nd 
pla ys d own built-in limits to th a t freedom o 
"This modern c r eed has distilled a great illusion 
fr om a n imp ortant trutho Th e truth is that both 
na tur e a nd hist oric institutio ns a r e subject t o 
development in timeo ooo Modern c ultur e o oo is uniqu e 
in its reco gnitions o f th e full significance of 
hist oric develo pme nto 
Th e illu s i o n which i t derived from this truth wa s 
th e belie f th a t gr owth fulfi lled th e mea ning of 
li f e 9 a nd r edeemed i t from its ills a nd e rrors o11 ( p o7 B) 
Th e ove r e stimatio n of freedom, and th e t e nd e nc y to identify 
fr ee dom with virtu e , a r e th e basis of this illusion o Niebuhr 
believe s that th e Christi a n view is protected a g ain~th e nai ve 
as sumpti ons o f a progressive view of hist ory in th a t i t has a 
mo r e r ealistic und e r s t a nding of human natur e o This und erst a nd -
ing derive s fr om th e vi e w that e vil is no accide nt al or pa ssing 
thing ; it is loca t e d in th e warp a nd wo of of life o f which the 
not io ns "o rigin al sin " a nd t he "Fall" a r e symbols o 
Th e o ut sta nd ing ac hi e ve ment of th e modern view of hist ory is 
its " r ec ognit ion o f th e fu l l si gnificance o f hist oric development 11 o 
Th i s is du e part l y t o its an t ece d e nts in th e Hewbrew pr op he tic 
traditi on , but al so beca us e hist ory h a s been th e s cene of t ec h-
nical advances which ha ve c hanged th e way we view th e world o 
Howeve r, Nie buhr poses a problem in regard to th e contribut-
ion of th e Heb r ew- Christian ·tradition · t o a dyn amic un derst andi ng of 
hist oryo "Th e truth abo ut t e mp or al d e velopme nt in natur e was not 
kno wn at all in c la s sic al t ho ught; a nd th e idea of hi s t oric de vel-
op me nt wa s not fully a pprecia t e do I t was recognized only 
obliq ue ly in Christian th oug ht , eve ~ th o ugh Biblical-Hebraic 
th o ught co nce i ve d of t ime a s moving on a line r ath er th an a 
c ycl e on (po78) For this r ea son th e mode rn view of hist ory is a 
uni que ac hi eve me nt 9 in his view. 
Pe rhaps th e r ea s on why this dy namic, or developmental vi e w 
was r ecog nis ed only obliq uel y in Christ·i a n th ough t lies in th e 
fact th at, i n spit e o f th e thoroughgoing process o f distillation 
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whi c h Ni e buhr e mbark e d upo n , h e did not go far e no ugh . Standi n g 
as it we r e ''o n th e sh o uld e rs " o f Nie buhr, Harv e y Cox b e li e v e s 
that th e pro c e ss whi ch Ni e buhr b e gan must b e c o ntinu e d, He wri t e s : 
" If Ni e buhr's accomp~ishme nt was to e xtricat e and sh o w 
th e r e l e vanc e o f th e Juda eo -Christian vi e w o f man for 
p olitics 9 o ur chall e ng e is t o e xtricat e th e charact e r-
istically He br e w dimension o f this traditio n and t o 
sh o w ho w it info rms an o p e n and r e sp o nsibl e v i e w o f 
th e futur e ... 
f o r th e He brews ... th e world its elf~ history. God's 
word to man, his dabar 9 was a pr o mis e th a t dir ec t e d 
man t oward a futu re in which thi s pro mis e wo uld b e 
fulfill e d 
..• e arly Chri stianity wa s also ext r e me ly future 
ori e nted. · But this o p e n and e xp e ctan t a t titud e t o -
ward th e futur e in e arly Christianity was t e mp e r e d 
by tw o influ e nc e s. One was dualistic ap oc a lypt ic ism; 
th e o th e r wa s Gree k t e leology. " (39) 
Co x b e lie v e s, th e r e f o r e , that th e proce s s must b e c o ntinu e d 
o f r e fining and purifying a traditio n th a t has b e c o me e mb e llishe d 
with th e se additions, in ord e r th at th e pr o ph e tic insights o f 
He br e w tradition can b e b r o ught t o b e ar o n o ur p r e s e nt p o litical 
q u andri e s. He b e li e v e s this 9 b e ca us e ap ocalypticism and t eleo l og y, 
with their inh e r e nt un d e rstandings of man and hist o ry, off e r litt le 
h e lp t o us at this time . 
To r e turn t o Ni e buhr 1 s a nalysis of th e mod e rn v i e w o f his-
t o ry9 he arg ues that th e r e is p e rh aps n o limit which can b e s e t 
t o th e p o t e nti al e xt e nt o f t e chn o l o gical advanc e , and that co n-
t e mp o r ary history is e vid e nc e o f that advanc e . .But th e r e is als o 
mo u nt ing e vide nc e " th at t he growth o f h u man fre e dom and p o we r 
. e nlarg e s th e scop e of human pro bl e ms. Th e probl e ms in th e ir 
larger scop e ar e n o t insolubl e . 
may b e found f or them in time. " 
his vi e w, li e s at a noth e r point; 
Proximat e solutions, at l e as t, 
(p.llO) Re al p ower in hist o ry, 
a p o int at wh ich th e Christian 
und e rstanding o f man has a c o ntribution t o mak e . It is wh e th e r 
in 
man can master his own "e goistic d e sire s and impuls e s. " F o r with 
e very advanc e man mak e s i n hist o ry, th e r e i s a wid e r rang e of 
possibilitie s bo th f o r g oo d and e vil, a s h e not e s in this passag e g 
" Ev e ry ne w fr e edom r e pr e s e nt e d a n e w p e ri l as we ll 
as a n e w promis e . Mod e rn industrial s oc i e ty diss o lv e d 
ancient f orms o f political auth oritarianism; but th e 
tyranni e s which gr e w on its s o il pro v e d mor e brutal 
and ve x a t io us than t h e old o n e s. Th e in e qualiti e s 
r oo t e d in l~nd e d pr o perty, we r e l e ve ll e d. But th e 
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more dynamic ineq~alities of a technical society 
became more perilous to the community than the more 
static forms of uneven power. The achievement of 
individual liberty was one of the genuine advances 
of bourgeois society. But this society also created 
atomic individuals who~ freed from the disciplines 
of t~ o~er organic communities, were lost in the 
mass and became the prey of demagogues and charla-
tans who transmuted their individual anxieties and 
resentments into collective political power of 
demonic fury." (pp.7,8) 
The possibility that increasing "freedom o ver natural limit-
ations might result in giving egoistic desires and impulses a 
wider range than they had under more primitive conditions seems 
ne ver seriously to disturb the modern mind . " (p . 17) It is the 
more realistic view of man in the Biblical-Christian tradition, 
symbolized in the concept of ''original sin", that Niebuhr believes 
is essential to off-set the naive optimism of the modern view. 
Against the stream of prevailing optimism, Niebuhr sought to 
re-interpret the doctrine of "original sin" that it might fit the 
role he saw to be so necessary in the conte~porary situation . In 
Chapter Two we explored in some detail his understanding of this 
doctrine . Essentially it a~serts "the obvious fact that all men 
are persistently inclined t o regard themselves more highly and are 
more assiduously concerned with their own interests than any 
'objective' v iew of their i mportance would warrant", and that this 
is true of indiv iduals as it is df communities ( 40) Built in to 
the human condition is man's tendency to make of himself a ''false 
centre of meaning"; to ascribe to himself the role of ''creator" 
rather than "creature"; to b e guilty of "idolatry" which in essence 
is 11 man 1 s unwillingness to acknowledge his finiteness"(p.l33) And 
Niebuhr during his life-time , used all his considerable polemical 
skills to make this point as forcefully as he could. For he be-
lieved that the consequences of a modern view of man and history, 
without the correcti ves of Biblical Realism, were sadly in evidence 
all around him . In "soft utopianism~ with its creed of sal vation 
through progress; and in ''hard utopianism" with its secular faith 
in sal vation through revolution, he saw with prophetic insight 
and passion the dangers of a disasterous naivete. 
What then does Niebuhr assert is the Biblical-Christian 
understanding of history? I ndirectly, of course, we have already 
examined some of its assertions by contrast to classical and 
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modern vi e ws o f history, and in doing s o have e xp lo r e d s ome o f 
th e issues with which he grappled during his life-time . We mus t 
n ow turn t o an e x a minatio n o f th e assertions h e makes for the 
Biblical-Christian view o f hist o ry. 
Th e r e is no "C hristian 'phil osop hy ' which co ul d be set 
aga inst a modern o r a cla ssical o n e in such a wa y as to prove its 
superior profundity throug h rational comparison." (p . ll4) This i s 
so because by its n a tur e Christi anity does not o ff e r a rational 
philosophical system, a nd c a nn~t do so because o f its dependence 
on revelatory eve nts whi ch must be apprehe nd ed b y faith. It may 
be possible , th o ugh, t o d emo nstr a t e its relevance: to "pro v e its 
r eleva nc e r a tionally '~(p . ll4)as h e puts it. 
What th e n does Bibli c a l-Christian faith asser t about history? 
In e ss e nce it as s e rts th e s o v e r eig nty o f God o ver th e whole of it. 
Whilst it is tru e th at th e id ea o f a divine sovereignty o ver his-
' 
t o ry is no t unique t o Biblical thought, "yet th e Biblical concept 
of a divin e sovereignty o ve r indi vidual and collec tive historical 
d e stiny has a uniqu e quality. " This quality is given by th e f ac t 
that " th e God wh o is ope rativ e in hist orical destiny is not con-
ceive d as a projection o r e xt e nsi o n o f the nation's or individ-
ual' s ideals and purposes, nor as a power co-e xt e nsive with , or 
suppl eme nt a ry t o, th e n a t i o n's power; n o r as a f orce o f reason 
id e ntical with th e Logos whi c h th e human min d incarnates . n(p . ll5) 
God c hoo s e s Israel. Israel d oe s not choose God; and initiative 
i s His . 
Belief in a transcend e nt , sovereign God is int egral to the 
Biblical tr aditio n . Thi s f a ith in a transcendent God " wh o is at 
once th e c r ea t o r o f thewor l d ( i. e . source o f its meani n g ) a nd 
judg e o f th e world (i. e . go al o f its perfection)"( 4 l)serves two 
important functions. Hist o ry has a unity und e r th e sovereignty 
o f God: this article o f f ai th is a safeguard against over simple 
systems for und e rst and ing history. Also , th e inclination of e very 
human col l ec tivity t o make itself th e ce ntr e of hist ory is over-
co me in principle by this e mphasis up o n divin e, sovereign trans-
cende nce . 
Th e Heb r e w is able to mak e th ese assertions abou t God because 
of his und e rstanding o f r e velation . Th e ''radically new dimension" 
in the sto ry o f th e Hebrew people, as Nieb uhr sees it, lies in th e 
f ac t that th e Go d o f this people is co ncei v ed not as their God, 
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but th e God who singled th em o ut f o r a special d estiny. 
" Th e 1 fact' o f history by which th ey give meaning 
to their hist o ry is God 1 s 'co v e nant ' with I srael ? 
in which, by a special act o f divin e grace, this 
people is single d ou t f o r a special mission . Th e 
particular eve nt which becomes the cen tr e o f his -
t orical int erpre t a t ion, from whi ch history is 
finally interpreted backward t o creation and for -
ward t o th e Messianic r eig n, is th e Sinaitic 
co v e nant. " (p . 27) 
Th e id ea that a unive rsal hist o ry sh ould hav e emerged fr om 
th e "co r e" o f this particu l ar eve nt is wh a t Niebuhr calls the 
"scandal o f particularity"?( P . 119) and is e ss en tial t o th e Biblical 
tradition . I t is "~ 5ca ndal f o r all rationalistic int e rpr e tat -
i o ns o f history " b e cause 9 according to th ese int e rpr e tation s , 
" univ e rsally valid concepts o f meaning must be f o und in r ecur-
rences and forms t o which all hist oric al phenomena conform . " (p .ll8) 
Th e 'scandal o f particularity" f or Ghristian faith lies in 
th e significanc e it finds i n th e Christ-event as r e velatio n . 
Thus, Niebuhr writ e s : 
" Th e Christi a n faith begins with, a nd is founded up on, 
th e affirmation that the life ~ death, and r esu rrect-
i o n o f Christ r e pr e s e nts an eve nt in history, in and 
thro ugh whi c h a di s clos ur e o f th e wh ole meaning o f 
hist o ry occ urs . .. Th e interpretation o f history in 
th e light o f this e v e nt crea t es a structure o f 
meaning in whi c h t h e history o f a particular nation, 
as the centre o f th e whol e o f hist o ry , is un eq ui -
vocally tr a ns c e nd e d . This 'second co v enan t' between 
God a nd Hi s peo pl e is n o t be tw e en Go d and a ny pa r -
ticular people but with all those o f any nation who 
ar e 'calle d ' , that is, wh o are able t o apprehend by 
faith, that this person 1 dr ama a nd e v e nt of hist or y, 
disclo s e s th e power a n d th e l o ve whi c h is th e source 
and th e . e nd of th e whol e hist o rica l drama. I n so far 
as this is an e v e nt , the r e vela t o ry depth and height 
o f which must be app r e h e nded b y faith, it is not th e 
ba s is o f a 'philosophy o f history' at which one 
might arri v e by an a ly sing the s eq uence s and recur-
r e nc e s 9 th e struct u r e s a nd patterns of hist o ry . But 
in s o far as hist o ry becomes meaningful by being 
o ri e nt e d t o ward th e r evela tion o f this eve nt, the 
e ve nt is th e s o urc e o f ' wisd o m' a nd of ' truth ' . 
(pp . 29 930 ) 
In th e above pass age, which is c ru cial t o his view o f history, 
Ni eb u hr mak e s it clear th a t th e Christ- e ve nt is the re velatory 
e ve nt which pro vid e s th e b a sic clue f o r interpreting history . . " Th e 
New Te stament make s th e st a rtling claim that in Ch rist, hi s t ory 
has a c hi e v e d both its e nd a nd a new beginning . " (p . lS7) Here h e 
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ma ke s a distinction b e twe e n th e " f o rm " and "co nt e nt " o f this r e v-
e l a t o ry e v e nt.(p.lS B) Th e f o r m is that o f a s to ry p a n e v e nt in 
hi s t o ry whichp by th e a ppre h e nsi o n o f f a ith p b eco me s mor e than a 
me r e st o ry ; it become s th e e v e nt through whi c h me aning is giv e n 
t o th e wh o l e o f hist o ry a nd th e sp ec ific n a ture o f divin e s o ver-
eig nty ove r h i st o ry is r e vea l e d a s " suff e rin g lo ve . As su c h i t i s 
a c hall e ng e t o ma n's r ea s o n . Th e co nt en t o f this r e velat o ry e v e nt , 
th e c rucifixio n o f th e Me ssi a h, is a c h a lle n ge t o man's virtue. 
Th i s is s o b e c a u s e th e ag e nts of th e c ru c ifixio n we r e th e tw o 
high e st a c hi e v e me nts o f human c ultu re a t th e time - Ro man law 
a nd J e wish r e ligio n. Th e suff e ring o f th e " guilt le ss o ne'' beco me s 
f o r Christian f a ith a " rev e l a tion o f God's o wn suffe ring 11 9 a nd a s 
su c h it br i n gs a uniqu e answ e r t o b ear o n th e p e rp le x i n g proble m 
o f suffe ring i ts e lf. For, a s Nie buhr puts it " t o mak e suffering 
l o ve r a th e r th a n p o we r th e fin a l e xpr e ssio n o f s o verei gnty wa s t o 
e mb o dy th e p e rp le xity o f hi s t o ry int o the soluti o n . " (p . l 61) 
This r e v e l a t o ry Christ -e v e nt h a s, in Ni e buhr ' s und e rst a nding 
of hist o ry, b o th a po sitive a nd a n egative functi o n. Follo wi ng 
Ro b e rt Fit c h's analysis o f Nieb uhr, C4 2) th e Christ-e ve nt h a s a 
po s i tiv e fun ctio n as a r e v elatio n o f Go d's wisd o m a nd truth , His 
gra ce a nd pow e r. But wh a t is pe rf ec tly r eve a led c a n o nly be ~m-
p e rfec tly a ppre h e nd e d by m~n beca us e o f s~n . I n co n se qu e nce o f 
this, th e justic e we achi e v e ca n o nly b e partial 9 t e ntativ e justic e 
in hist o ry ; th e truth we ap pr e h e n·d ~s alw a ys o bl i qu e ly kn o wn. Man 
~s th e r e f o r e an a mbigu o us crea ture in th e p o sitio n o f simu l t a n eo us -
ly 'having and n o t having t he truth ' . 
Th e nega t i v e fun c t io n o f th e Christ- e v e nt a s r e velatio n is 
that this e ve nt always stands in judg e ment up o n all th e id olatro us 
ce ntr e s o f meaning b e f o r e wh i c h we worship. Th e s e ma y b e s ec ular : 
f e ud a l, b o urg eo is , o r Marxist~ Th e y may b e Chri s ti a n : Luth e ran , 
Ca th o lic, Calvinist, or Pi e ti s t. I n e ith e r ca s e th e y r e f lec t 
man's p e r e nnial disp o s i t io n t o ~rea t e f o r hims e lf fals e ce ntr e s of 
me aning and th e r e by sh o w th e ir n eed f o r th a t ironic int e rpr e tat io n 
o f e vil in hist o ry, wh ic h Nie buhr b e li e v e s t o be no rmativ e f o r 
Christian faith. S uc h a vi e w is bas e d o n th e b e li e f 
" that th e wh o l e dr am a o f human hist o ry i s und e r th e 
s c rutiny o f a di v i n e jud ge wh o l a ughs at human pre-
t e nsions with o ut bei n g hos tile t o human aspir a ti o ns. 
Th e laught e r at th e pr e t e nsio ns is th e divin e 
judg e me nt. Th e jud g e me nt is tr a nsmut e d int o me rcy 
159 
if it resul ts in abating the pretensions and in 
prompting me n to a contrite recognition of the 
vanity of their imagination." (43) 
How can we know that the Christ -even t is not itself another 
idolatrous ce ntre of meaning? Here Nieb uhr calls o ur attention 
to what he d e scribes as "the history of expectation" . In the 
New Testament, the Christ-event is presented as the last in a 
series of God's mighty acts; the fulfillment of the promise of a 
Messiah . Thus Niehuhr argues 
"No Christ could validate himself as the disclosure 
of a hidd e n divin e sovereignty over history or as a 
vindication of the meaningfulness of history, if a 
Christ were not ex p ected .•. Any Chris t must be 
'foolishness t o th e Greeks' , both ancient and 
modern . Christ may also be a 'stumblingblock to the 
Jews'; but he is n o t 'foolishness' to them." (44) 
Christ is"fooli shn ess" to th e Greeks precisely because they h ad 
no expectatio n o f a Me ssia h : he is "stumbli ng blockn to the Jews 
because, in spite of th e ir history of expectation , he prov e s to 
be not the Messiah th ey ex pected . 
This a rgum en t from th e history of exp e ctation raises some 
serious questions about th e adequacy of Niebuhr's validation of 
the re v e latory e ve nt. Standing within the Biblical tradition, he 
ca n argue that the Christ-e ven t is the "last in a series of God's 
mighty acts'' · But he is singularly unwilling to deal with the 
continuity o f history that follows rather than precedes this Act. 
Is h e a rguing th a t God does not , in fact, reveal h imself in the 
eve nts that f ollo w? I n terms of his formal theory it would appear 
so. For he a rgu e s that the final clue to understanding the mys-
t ery o f divine power is t o be found in the Christ-event, and that 
once this is apprehended by f aith, all history can be interpreted 
in th e light of this even t and become the impetus to ''renewal". 
Thus it would s eem, Niebuhr is saying that the Christ-e v ent, 
which occ urred at a particular time in history, must be apprehend-
ed by f aith in order that we might make sense of the present and 
the future in the light of that "clue". 
"T hat the final cl u e to the mystery of the divine 
po wer is found in the suffering love of a man on 
the Cross is not a proposition which follows log-
ically from the obser vable facts of history. But 
there are no observable facts of history which 
. ca nnot be interpreted in its light . When so in-
terpreted the con fusions a nd catastrophies of 
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history may become the source of the renewal of 
life." (p.l55) 
If the Christ-event is seen as the last in a series of God's 
mighty acts, in what sense can we speak of God's action in con-
t emporary history? Mus t we interpret "last" to mean final? Dr 
is N i e b u h r 1 s u s e o f t h e ph r i3 s e " a s erie s •~ to be t a k e n to me a n 
that history is still open to more acts of God? These are serious 
questions regarding Niebuh r 's methodology . However, in keeping 
with what he has said about the Christ-event, we belie ve that by 
'final' he means final in depth. This seems to be borne o ut by 
his use of the phrase "last in~ series of God's mighty acts''. 
When raising similar questions about how Niebuhr sees divine 
provid e nce in operation in history, William Dray discerns some 
likeness between Niebuhr, Joynbee, and Hegel : 
"The account Niebuhr elaborate(s) of the ac tual 
operatio n of divin e providence in . history is 
(like Toynb ee 's th eo ry) in some ways reminiscent 
of the Hegalian dialectic. For Niebuhr's providence 
does not intervene miraculously; like Hegel's 
'reason' it is immanent in the historical process 
itself . It is part of the providential 'structure 
of exist ence' that 'forms of life which make them-
selves into their o wn end' acc6mplish th ereby 
their own ' ultimat e self-destruction'(p.27) By a 
kind of divine nemesis, pride not o nly goes " before 
a fall; it brings it about. Th e r e is thus a vagu ely 
cyclic pattern in history af t er all: men and nati ons 
are constantly o verreac hing themselves and being 
brought low . Unlike the . Hegalia n dialectic, howe ver, 
Niebuhr's t ension between providence a nd a corr upt 
human freedom has . no dynamic quality ; th e r e ·is no 
progress from synthesis to synthesis. The limiting 
power of providence explains not the direction 
history takes, but why history ne ver gets an ywh ere 
at all."(45 ) 
Niebuhr, of course , has argu e d th at the Hebrew-Christian 
tradition ca nn ot offer a systematic philosophy of history because 
of its dependence on revelation, an~ because its understanding of 
di vine s o vereig nty, history has unity but no overall structure 
that can be elabo rat ed by reason . It is therefore not a spec-
ulative history in the sense that He gel's or Toy nbee's works are . 
.furth e rmore, Niebuhr would argue in response to Dray's 
analysis that hist ory cannot be r e demptive; it cannot be its own 
Christ . Th e Biblical affirmation of the ultimate charac t e r of 
sin in hist ory asserts tha t hist ory has no inbuilt order of 
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progress that must eve ntu ally squeeze out sin. By th e same 
t oke n man ca nn ot be his own Christ; can not e ve r become master of 
hist oric al destiny . To den y man's sin a nd finitude~ which such 
a ffirmati o n asserts, is to open th e way for the s ort of man - made 
soteriologies which have generated some of th e most t e rrible 
f a naticisms hist ory has kn own , e xemplifi e d in Nazism and Commun-
ism in o ur century (Ch V-Vl). This, f or Niebuhr, is th e danger 
of any notion of a " progress fr om synthesis t o synth esis. " 
Eve n granting th e impact a nd implications of Ni eb uhr's 
a rgument that history ca nn ot be its own Christ 9 is Dray not co r -
r ec t in discerning a lack of dynamic quality in which ''history 
ne ver gets anywh e r e at all"? For Niebuhr does claim th ai whilst 
history provides "disclo s ures•• of mea ni ng, it can not provide 
fulfillment of me~ning. This claim~ as fitch says, ha s merit in 
th a t it n~~diates between cla ssical philosophies, which deny all 
meaning t o th e t e mp ora l a nd s eek escape t o the e t e rn al ~ and mod-
e rn philosop hi e s, which e xpect t ot al fulfillment in ·hist ory . In 
one of Niebuhr's f avouri t e me t apha rs, Man is a ' Moses who has 
glimpsed th e promised lan d from afar 9 and 'wh o has made some 
progress tow a rd it on this earth~ but wh o will not e nt e r into it 
in hist ory. Th e e nd of hi s life is a finis, an abrupt termina-
tion of his career in this world 9 but it is not th e t elos, or 
tru e e nd, · which t a kes. him beyond hist ory . 11 ( 46) 
I 
I n di s tinguishing be t ween "d isclo sure" a pd "fulfill men t '', 
f ini s a nd telos, Nieb uhr i s seeking t~ hold the i~portant truth 
th at history, as s ufh 9 ca nn ot be its own saviour. Dne may ask · 
however: does fulfillment - telos ~ h ave to be other-worldly? · Is 
this a tru e interpretation · of the · Biblical vi ew t a ke n as a wh ole ? 
I f fulfill men t is seen as a " this-worldlyfl possibility~ th at is , 
hist oric al, does thi s nec essarily make it secular? For Niebuhr 
seems t o imply th a t th~ notion of this -worldly fulfillment pre-
clud e s th e a ffirmati on of divine s overeig nty. Per hap s the lack 
of dynamic quality in Nie buhr, which we have more th a n once high-
lighted i n this es s ay, co uld be overcome i f he we r e t o gran t th e 
possibility - und er God - of fulfillment in history rather th a n 
beyond it. Pe rhaps we have an instance here of what Harv ey Cox 
disc e rn e d in Ni eb uhr: that whilst he went a long way toward dis-
tilling th e Biblical tr ad ition fr om its admixtures , at this point 
I • 
he did not go far enough ~ Had ·Niebuhr reli'~d more on th e 
162 
esc ha t ological insights of the Hebrew prophets th an on the 
t eleology of Greek philos ophy, the position may ha ve been 
different. 
Of co urse, Niebuhr is not so credulous as to follow implic-
i t l y the Greek und erstandin g in his interpre tat ion o f the Biblical-
Christia n vi e w of the · e nd of history . Wha t we f i nd is an amalgam 
of Hebrew esc hatological a nd Greek teleological insights in his 
view . He sees 7 f or example, no necessa ry con tradictio n betwee n 
Biblical a nd modern . vi e ws of hist ory: 
"I t is necessary t o subj ec t Christian interpretation 
of life ~nd hist ory to co nstant r e-e xamin atio n 7 in 
ord e r to detect th e err ors whi c h become compo und ed 
with its truth in vari ous ·stages of hist or y. In o ur 
own day .. . it is nece ssary to incorporate wh a t is 
tru e in th e modern discovery of a mo ving time and a 
development in hist ory into th e fin al truth of th e 
Christi a n Gospel . There is nothing incompatible be-
twee n a Biblica l conception of a dynamic history 
and th e modern vi e w of hist orical development if the 
modern errors of r egardi ng historical development as 
self~explanatory and of eq uatin g it with r edemption 
are avoided . 11 . ( pp. 223,224) 
I n f ac t 7 Niebuhr goes on to a r gue th at if the a ff inities between 
th e s e two views are fu lly e xplor ed s ome of the errors of tr adit ~ 
ional stat eme nts of th e Chr i stian position ca n be corr ected. 
How e ve r 9 Ni eb uhr emp hasiz e s th a t th e "New Testame nt en vi s age s 
a c ulmination of history whic h is hot, literally speaking, wit hin 
time- hist ory . I t looks f orw a rd t o a fin al jud geme nt and a general 
resurrection which are a t once both th e fulfi llme nt and th e end 
of hist ory. Th e y imply an e nd in th e s e ns es of finis; but the 
e nd in th e sense of telos, that is as th e moral and spiritual 
c ulminati on of th e mea ning is not within hist ory itself'' . (P· 267 ) 
Th e int erpre t ation of " judgement" and · "ge ne ral r es urrection" is 
highly symbolic but nece ssary f o r Chris ti an faith if false 
ce ntr e s of mea ning are to be a void ed . 
" Th e s e e sch a t ological e xp ec tati ons in New Tes tam e nt 
faith, howe ve r e mb a r r a s ing wh e n taken literally, 
a r e nece s sary for a Christia n interpretation of 
hist ory . I f th ey are sacr~ficed 9 th e meaning o f 
hist ory is confused by the introd uc tion of fp lse 
ce ntres of meani ng , t ake n f rom the contin gen t 
stuff of th e historic al process ... "(p . 243) 
Dray's co nt e nt io n is th a t, on analysis, Nieb uhr 's view of 
hist ory wo uld s eem to imply th at " history ne ver ge ts an ywh e r e a t 
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all " " Niebuhr's notion of a fi n is in h istory 9 and a t elos beyo nd 
hist o ry wo uld seem -t o s u p port this vi e w" This may well be du e to 
th e fa c t th a t he appea r s t o r ely more on a n admixture o f th e 
apocalyptic and t eleological strains in the Biblical-Christian 
tr aditio n th an h e does on th e e scatologic~l " I f Niebuhr had, in 
f ac t, e xplored th e a ffiniti es h e discerns in ·th e Biblical co n -
ceptio n o f a dynamic histo ry and the moder n vi e w o f historical 
d e velop me nt h e may h ave found it necessary t o modify his posi-
ti o n a t this point " For a s Harvey Co x notes, we inherit fr om 
Christi a nity thr ee different , e v e n contradic t ory , wa ys o f per -
ceiving th e futur e: 
" Th e apocalyptic, d e riving fr om ancie nt nea r Eas t e rn 
dualism , f orsees i mmanent ca t as trophe, produces - a 
nega tive e val uat i o n of . this world 9 and o ft e n believes 
in a n elit e whi c h wi ll be sn a tph e d fr om th e infer n o 
when e verything else dissolves. "Teleology deri ved 
mainly from th e Gre e ks but adapted b y Lhristia nity , 
s ee s the futur e as the unwinding o f a purpose in-
he r e nt in .th e univ e r se itself Dr in ' its primal 
stuff , th e develo pm e nt o f the world toward a fix e d 
e nd " Th e prophetic i s th ~ characteris tic ally Hebrew 
no tio n o f th e futur e as th e open field o f human 
hope a nd r e s ponsibi l ity ". Th e .Israeli t e prophets " .. 
r ecalled Ya hw e h 1 s p r omise as a way o f calli ng th e 
I sraelite.s into mor a l ac tion in th e present . "(4 7) 
Be f ore concl uding this section we must r e turn t o another 
pr ob l e m r ai s e d .by Ni eb uhr's conce pt of th e · '' hist o ry o f e xp ec ta-
tio n " " In what s e ns e ca n Ch ristia ns spea k o f Christ .as un i v e rsal , 
if th e Christ -eve nt ca n o n l y be ap pr e h e nd ed from within a tradit -
ion in wh ich a Christ is e xp e cted ? Where does this leave th e 
" Ge ntil e s " f or wh om Christ i s " f ooli shn e ss " precisely because 
th e y hav e no such history of e xpectation o f a Christ? Th e 
probl em o f th e val id a tion o f th e r e vela t ory e v e nt is, as we ha v e 
s ee n thro ugh o ut this e ss a y , o n e th at h a unts Niebuh r ; as it d oe s 
con t e mp o rary th eology i n gen e ral . Niebuhr's answer appears t o 
b e g th e q u e st io n. For h e ar gu e s, o n the o n e hand , that th e truth 
o f th e Go spel is n o t pro v ed by rational analysis but is apprehend-
ed by f aith; th o ugh it may be possible to prove its rele v a nce 
r a t io n ally . More recently 9 as Fitch sh ows , Niebuhr has developed 
th e doct r i n e th a t th e r eal proof of th e truth o f th e Gospel lies 
in t h e wi tn e ss o f a Ch risti a n life whi c h shows th e fruits of th e 
Spirit o For a t this point we a r e dealing with "a truth of f aith ; 
a nd i t i s valid a t ed by a witn e ss of . lives wh ic h have been obvio usly 
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remade by the power of God's judgement and fo~giveness."(4B)One 
may ask, however, in whose eyes are men obviously remade by God? 
Is this not an instance o f reverting to a form of mysticism in 
the face of a hard question? 
' On the other hand, Niebuhr argues that history itself val-
idates the viewpoint which must be apprehended by faith. For 
example, he argues that if a historic institution prospers this 
is evidence of God's grace in the creativities of history: if 
it fails this is evidence of God's judgement upon it: 
"the world's many cultures and civilizations ... die 
in the end; but they also live. Their life is a tes-
timony of the crea t ivity of history, even as their 
death is a proof o f the sin in history. The vast 
variety of historic organisms, the richness of their 
elaboratiohs of human potentialities, the wealth of 
their :many cultural .forms and social configurations, 
are as certainly a testimony to the divine provi-
dence under which they have grown, as . their destruct-
ion is a vindication of the eternal judgement, which 
they are unable to defy with impunity."(49) 
But, the critic · may ask, . has not Niebuhr placed himself in an in-
vulnerable position by his ;form of argument? Built into his 
understanding of providence is a defence against its overthrow. 
If you paint to good in his t ory, this is seen as validating his 
concept of providence; if you point· to evil in history, this is 
also a .vindication of that s ame provid~nce. As William Dray says, . 
"such a theory may still ... tell us the truth about history. But 
it is hard to see how it ~an claim to be validated by the facts of 
history to which it appeals.n(50) 
The question at issue here has to do with th e logical nature 
of religibus language, as Dray recognizes. He is asking whether 
Niebuhr would allow the possibility of anything refuting his 
basic assertion about providence; Niebuhr himself does not answer 
this, except in the manner already stated. However, when discuss-
ing the prophetic 'method ' ih r egard to history in Chapter · One, we 
made the point that the Hebre w prophet operated within a tradition, 
as Niebuhr does, which had a fixed point - the transcendant God 
who entered Covenant with Is r ael. Thus the prophet and his 
hearers operated within the s ame tradition. How else could they 
be heard except this were so ? For this reason the prophet could 
allow nothing to refute his basic assertion that God is at work 
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in history without stepping out of the tradition in which this 
assertion is made. This i s not to say, however, that his pre-
supposition is not tested; it is tested on the anvil of experience 
in the history of Israel which validates or modifies it. 
The questions we have raised in relation to Niebuhr's under-
standing of the "history of expectation" would seem to suggest 
that some modifications to Niebuhr's approach are required, if as 
we believe, an exposition of theology's relation to history must 
satisfy the requirement of validation. We will return to this 
question in .the next chapter. 
We have sought here to give a critical exposition of what 
might be called Niebuhr's formal approach to the problem of faith 
and history. We turn now to a discussion of his understanding 
of history as 'past event'. 
(b) History as "Past Event" 
\ ,, t , , •• . 
For the purpose of clarity we make a distinction · between 
history as "past event" and history as "contemporary event''. 
Obviously, in general usage the word history denotes past event. 
The distinction, with reference to Niebuhr's understanding of 
history, is made in order that ·we might examine how he saw Bib-
lical history (past) before we examine how he operated in history 
(contemporary). We do this for the purpose of discussion, al-
though in practise there is a relationship between the two. We 
have some justification for this view if we interpret his Christian 
Realism thus: ttChristian" meaning an understanding of the Hebrew-
Christian tradition; and "Realism". meaning the reality of present 
experience. For it is clear that he wants to assert a dynamic 
relationship between these two parts of our tota~ experience: 
even if he does not .always succeerl in doing so. 
The two dominant motifs of the Biblical tradition, for 
Niebuhr; are the Exodus-event and the Christ-event.(p.27,29,30) 
Their significance lies in the fact that they are the pre-eminent 
revelatory events; that from the core of these particular events 
in history meaning is given to all history, and the specific 
nature of divine sovereignty i s disclosed. In the Hebrew-Biblical 
tradition the Exodus-event si gnifies God's. 'covenant nature' in 
that, by an act of grace, a p a rticular people are chosen for a 
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special mission. This fo cal event becomes the disclosure of God's 
nature and activity from wh ich all history is interpreted "back-
ward to creation and forward to the Messianic reign." This 
ttscandal of particularity" ( einmaligheid) is· a necessary part 
of revelation; 
"The mysterious divine power, which explains the 
beginning, the present order and the final end of 
history, represents a depth of mystery and meaning 
which is not fully disclosed by the obvious coher-
ences of nature an d sequences of history. Yet 
Biblical faith is not identical with agnosticism. 
It believes that Go d does disclose his purposes. 
The disclosure tak e s place in significant events 
of history. The revelatory power of these events 
must be apprehende d by faith. So apprehended ... 
they are 'mighty acts' of God in which the meaning 
of the whole drama of human life is made clear. 
This clarification is always an act of redemption 
as well as revelation."(p.ll9) 
The Exodus-event as it is perceived ~n the Hebrew-Biblical 
tradition represents "the radical break of Biblical faith with 
the idolatrous tendencies in all human culture."(p.ll6) This is 
so because "God is not made in any human image" as is evidenced 
in the rigorous strictures placed on the making of images in the 
decalogue. Thus the mystery of God as Deus Absconditus is pre-
served: God and his purpose in history cannot be reduced too 
simply to "rational intelligibility ... and thereby ... given a 
false centre of meaning in a relative or contingent historical 
force or end." God is not th e £Q!J.Ception of a human mind or 
culture: he remains "myster y ". But because of this understanding 
of the Exodus-event some meaning is given to this "mystery": God 
is ~ceived in that event. We use the word 'perceived' in its 
strict meaning here. The Exodus-event was an event located in a 
particular time and place; in the experience of a particular 
people. The significance of that event, in the Hebrew-Biblical 
tradition, lies in its revelatory character. In fact Niebuhr 
argues that the idea of God c hoosing Israel as an act of grace 
"represents a radical break in the history of culture. · It is, 
in a genuine sense, the b~ginning of revelation.n(p.ll7) 
It is a bold claim to make for the Exodus-event that it was 
the beginning of revelation~. Niebuhr's argument is 
"··· here a nation ap prehends and is apprehended 
by the true God and not by a divine creature of 
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its own contrivance. The proof of the genuineness 
of His majesty and t he truth of His Divinity is 
attested by the fac t that He confronts the nation 
and the individual a s the limit, and not the ex-
tension, of its own power and purpose. He is the 
enemy and the judge of every human pretension 
which transgresses th e limits of human finiteness." 
(p.ll7) 
We have some difficulties with Niebuhr's argument at this 
point. The first relates to his use of the word "beginning". 
he using this word in a highly symbolic way to mean "most impor-
tant" or "most profound" in the sense that the Exodus-even t was, 
I s 
for the Hebrew, basic to his understanding of God? Th ere is some 
evidence that he is using it 1n this sense because h e emphasize s 
that the prophetic role, of t he Second Isaiah and Amos in parti-
cular, was to "interpret and reinterpret" the significance o f the 
Sinaitic covenant. Every " profound prophetic interpretation o f 
God's covenant with Israel l e ads to an indictment that Israel has 
broken the covenant and that it must turn from its evil ways if 
it would live. The dialectical fact that the special destiny of 
a nation exposes it to a special peril of pride and that capitula-
tion to this temptation subjects Israel t o a uniquely s eve r e 
divine condemnation ... (is a) logic normative for the whole 
Biblical interpretation of history." (pp. llg,lZO) Thus Niebuhr 
does argue that th e Exodus-ev e nt is th e central motif o f the 
Hebrew-Biblical tradition. 
If, on the other hand, .Ni eb uhr 1s u sing the word "beginni ng" 
in its usual sense of 'to start' or 'to commence', then surely 
the Exodus-event cannot be th e beginning o f revelation. For with-
out the prior assumption that God re veals himself in history, 
there would be no Exodus-event. The revelatory significance 
ascribed to the historical events of the Exodus, by Moses and by 
the prophets later, is possible o nly if that assumption is granted. 
Niebuhr argues that the prophets did not "invent " the idea of a 
covenant God; neither did those who were involved in the dramatic 
events of the Exodus itself. Before Moses and the prophets, was 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob - all of whom stood in th e same tradi -
tion; a tradition whose presupposition (albeit tentative) was 
that God reveals himself in th e events of history and in th e e x-
periences of meri. Of the dep t h and significance o f th e Exodus-
event as revelation for the Hebrew-Biblical tradition th ere can 
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be no doubt. I.t represen t s, as Niebuhr says, a radical break in 
the history of culture. For it ~s on the basis of this event, 
and the theology of elect i on implicit in it, that the Hebrew 
understanding of the meaningfulness of history is deduced. The 
outstanding achievement o f this "completely unique and revolut-
ionary doctrine" is, as G. Ernest Wright has ·argued, that : it is 
the source of our modern conception of history in the Western 
World.(Sl) Liberal ideali~m and Marxism are secularized versions 
of the Biblical conception of history, and as such owe their 
genesis to this view. 
As Wright says, the effect of Israel's theology of election 
is our modern conception o f history. This is the conclusion 
which Niebuhr draws from hi s analysis: 
"Two ideas, basic to a Biblical interpretation of 
history are implic i t in this radical conception of 
the relation of Go d to historical destiny. One is 
the idea of a unive rsal history. The other is that 
history is filled with man's proud and pretentious 
efforts to defy the divine sovereignty, to estab-
lish himself as god by his pGwer or virtue, his 
wisdom or 'foresight." ( p .118) 
He also contends that when this biblical interpret~tion of 
history is secularized, as for e~ample in liberal idealism and in 
Marxism, it lends itself to the d~ngers inherent in "soft" or 
.. uhard·" utopianism. 
The Exodut-event is, Ni ebuhr argues, focal to the Biblical 
interpretation of history for the reasons a~ready given. But to 
speak of it as the ••beginning of revelation" is misleading . because 
the revelatory significance of the events of the Exodus could only 
have been discerned on the prior assumption that God reveals him-
self in this way. This rai s es questions about Niebuhr's under-
standing of revelation and t he validation of revelatory events. 
To return to a passage already used, he argues that the Sinaitic 
covenant is the beginning of revelation: for here a nation 
apprehends and is apprehended by the true God and not by a god of 
its own contrivance. The proof of the "genuineness" of His 
Majesty and the truth of His Divinity is attested by the fact 
that He confronts · the nation and the individual as the limit, and 
not the extension, of its ow n pow~r and purpose.n(p.ll7) We have 
difficulty with his use of words like "proof" and "attested" in 
this regard. What Niebuhr appears to be doing is to use a 
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quality of transcendence t o validate transcendence. He is saying 
transcendence (Majesty and Divinity) is attested by a quality of 
transcendence (He is not the extension of the nation's power). 
By definition the transcendent God cannot be the extension of a 
nation's power; one cannot therefore argue that the fact that God 
is not such an "extension" is proof of His transcendence. This 
surely is what is meant by. the word 'transcendent'. And it is 
precisely this conception o f transcendence, deduced from the 
Exodus-event in particular, that is the outstanding achievement of 
the Hebrew-Biblical tradition. One may argue that the insights 
gained from such an understanding of history are relevant to the 
human situation~ as Niebuhr does with convincing force. We shall 
have occasion to return to the question of how revelatory events 
are validated. 
Niebuhr acknowledges h i s indebtedness to his brother Richard 
for his understanding of re ve lation. According to June Bingham, 
"Niebuhr tells his classes h e prefers his brother Richard's defin-
ition to any of his own. Richard Niebuhr has written in The 
Meaning of Revelation: 
By revelation in our history, then, we mean that 
~pecial occasion ~hic h provides us with an image 
by means of which all the occasions of personal 
and common life become intelligible."(52) 
That this is how he understands revelation is clear from his ex-
position of the Sinaitic covenant. For Niebuhr, however, the 
"special Occasion"· which is the revelatory event is the Christ-
event. This is not to say that it is the only event of revelatory 
significance, but that it is his leitmotif: 
"In so far as these various confrontations between 
God and His people ha ve a history, there is also a 
history of revelation. But this is not a history 
of a broadening relig i ous consciousness or of a 
more and more success f ul yearning or searching 
after God. For every step in the story requires 
that divine judgement be accepted in repentance ... ; 
and that the divine me rcy which prompts and quali-
fies the judgement be apprehended by faith. 
The climax of the crucifixion and resurrection 
thus becomes not merely the culmination of the 
whole series of revelations but the pattern of all 
subsequent confrontations between God and man. 
They must contain the c rucifixion of self-abandon-
ment and the resurrect io n of self-recovery."(p.l68) 
170 
In reply to Paul Lehmann's article on his Christology in the 
Living Library Volume, Ni e buhr tells why Christology became central 
for him: 
"The situation is that I have come gradually to 
realize that it .is possible to look at the human 
situation without illusion and without despair only 
from the standpoint of the Christ-revelation . It 
has come to be mor e and more the ultimate truth . . • 
Thus the Christological center of my thought has 
become more explic i t and more important. But, as 
Professor Lehmann declares, I have never pretended 
to be a theologian , and so I have elaborated the 
Christological theme only in the context of in-
quiries about human nature and human destiny."(53) 
It is in .his volume faith and History that Niebuhr gives 
his most explicit statement of his Christology. It is instruct-
1ve for an understanding of his methodology to note his movement 
of thought in his treatment of the Christ-revelation. for, in 
that volume, his thought moves creatively from an analysis of the 
cultural, social, and political relevance of the Incarnation and 
the Atonement to an exposition and demo~stratio n of the truth 
embodied in these 'doctrine s ' of Christian faith. Whilst insist-
ing that the truth of Christian faith, cannot ultimately be 
demonstrated rationally, and must be apprehended by faith, this 
relationship between releva n ce and ~ruth is intrinsic ±a his 
method. This, on his own a d mission, is the purpose of his Christ-
ology. for Niebuhr is on re~ord as saying that his theology is 
intended to be nothing more than the analysis of the truth about 
Christus pro nobis and Christus in nobis in its significance for 
man. (54) This fact, unearthed by Lehmann, provides him with the 
key for his analysis of Nieb uhr's Christology; and enables him to 
say of it - "Niebuhr's accou n t of Jesus Christ is the presuppos-
ition of his anthropology.tt( 5 5) This statement from Lehmann is not 
a very good one because if one takes a developmental view of 
Niebuhr's thought it is · clear that there is an interplay between 
anthropology and christology in his thought. Lehmann's own 
analysis of Niebuhr's Christ o logy makes this clear. 
We have already noted t he weight Niebuhr gives to the Christ -
event as that event in history which for the Christian faith 
"represents ... a disclosure of the whole meaning of history''(p. 2 9) 
His analysis of the human situa~ion (what Lehmann calls his 
anthropology) is an attempt t o show the relevance of this 
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u nd e rst a nding o f th e Christ -e ve nt , a nd the r eb y t o indica t e th e 
truth o f this a f firm a tio n . We l ist he r e s o me o f th e co ncl us io ns 
he dr a ws , f o r th e c o nt e mp o r a ry situ a t io n, fr o m his und e rst a ndin g 
o f th e Cr oss : s o c e ntral i n his vi e w. 
(l) Th e c ru c ifixio n r e pre s e nts a c hal l e ng e t o man ' s 
virtue: virtu e h e r e mea ns ma n' s ca pac ity t o ma ke 
o f his fin e st a c hi e veme nts " f a ls e a bs o lut e s " . 
Th e Cr o s s ch a lle ng e s this beca us e th e ag e nts o f 
th e c ru c ifixio n we r e th e two fin e st ac hi e v e me nts 
o f cult ur e at t hat time : Ro ma n law a nd J e wish 
r e ligio n . 
(2) T he Cr oss symbol is e s th e f act that hist ory is 
morally ambigu o us t o th e e nd . Thi s is s o be caus e 
th e " p e rf ec t l o ve which His lif e and d e ath e x-
e mplify is d e f ea t e d , rath e r than triumphant , in 
th e a c tu al co urs e o f hist ory " . Th e pe rf e ct l o ve 
o f Christ " is bo t h th e ultimat e po ssibi l i t y o f 
all hist ori c vir t ue s and . a co ntr a dictio n t o th em . " 
(p . l53) Pr o xima t e j ustic e is all we can ho pe f o r 
in hist or y sinc e p e rf ec t justice is o nly po s si b l e 
when it c ulminat e s in s e lf-giving l o ve si g nifie d 
i n th e Cross . I n r ea lity (hist ory) this is no t 
po ssible b e ca us e e ve ry striving t o wa rd justice 
has within it eleme nts which co ntr adic t su c h 
s e lf - gi ving ; a f ac t which th e Cr oss att e sts . 
(3) Th e suff e ri ng o f th e " guiltl e ss o ne'' o n th e Cr o ss 
is a r e ve latio n o f " Go d ' s own suffe rin g"; a s su c h 
th e f i n al c lu e t o th e myst e ry o f di vin e po we r is 
giv e n . Th e r e f o r e, th e Christia n f a ith d oe s no t 
pro mis e t o o ve rc o me th e fragm e nt a ry n a ture o f 
man's e xist e nc e; it d oe s c l aim th a t this r e ve l -
atio n o f di vin e _ suff e ~ing "bears and o ve r come s 
th e sins o f th e world" . Divin e po we r a nd me r c y 
" ul t ima t e ly r e s o l ve( s) life 's ambiguiti e s a nd 
p ur ge ( s) me n o f th e e v i l i nt o which th e y fa ll 
be ca us e t he y s ee k s o d e sp e r at e ly t o o ve r co me 
th e m . ~ ( pp . l61 , 154) 
(4) Th e Cr o ss, th e ref o r e , r e pr e s e nts th e ne gati o n o f 
man 's a tt e mpts a t s a l va tio n by hi s own wisd o m, 
powe r, a nd virtue; whi l st at th e s a me time r e -
pr e s e nting th e pr omis e o f sa l vatio n. " Ne w l ife 
i s po s sible by dying t o s e lf ... th e Chr i stian 
f aith promis e s ind e t e rminat e r e ne wals o f life in 
hist ory . But o n t h e o th e r hand th e t o tal hist o r-
i ca l e nt e rpris e is n o t progr e ssi ve ly ema ncip a t e d 
fr o m e vil . (p . l54) Nieb uhr 's c riticism o f " s oft " 
and " h a r d " ut o pi a nism is mad e o n th e basis o f 
thi s vi e w. 
(5 ) The tr a ns c e nd e nt a gape symb oliz e d in th e Cr oss 
ha s a thr ee f o ld .r e l a tio n t o th e e thic al r eal itie s 
o f hist o ry (56) ( a ) I t "co mpl e t e s th e in co m-
pl e t e ne ss o f mu t u a l l o ve ( e ros) ". This i s s o 
b e cau s e pr ud e nce will di c t a t e th a t th e r e l a tio n -
sh ip o f o n e pe rs o n t o a noth e r h a s within it a 
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meas ure of s e lf-int e r es t : a nd thus " in e vi t ably 
arr est th e impulse t owards, and co nce rn f or, 
th e life of th e oth e r. " Th e r e are no limits i n 
hi st ory f or th e achie veme nt of mo r e perfec t 
mutu al r e lations ; in f ac t agape ha s bee n th e 
impuls e f or e ve ry signi fic a nt adva nce in this 
regard. But ultimat ely agape as sacrificial 
lo ve is imp ossible o f achievemen t in hist ory. 
For e Yample, " t he r e is no limit t o th e possibl e 
admi xture o f f orgiving love i n crimi nal ju s t ice, 
e xcep t o f co ur s e th e absol ut e limi t th at no 
s oc i e ty will ev e r deal with crimi nal s i n t e rms 
o f pur e f or givene ss or ac hi e ve a per f ec t r e-
lation be twee n just ice a nd f orgive ness. " · 
(b) Th e Cr oss r e pr e s e nts a " tr a nsc e nd e nt pe r -
f ec ti on whi c h clarifi e s th e obs c uriti e s o f 
hist ory " a nd " de fin e s th e limits of wh a t i s 
po ssib le i n histori ca l d e velopme nt. " This 
bec aus e eve ry eff ort t o tr a nslat e this nor m 
int o r eality f all s int o th e err or of making it 
a t oo "s imple pos s ibili ty " . It is .not po ssible 
t o blur th e distinction betwee n mutual ldve 
(~) and disint e r e st e d, s ac rificing lo ve 
(aga pe ) in hist ory . . Att e mpts t o do this, for 
e xample, by pinning hope on th e c umul a tive 
e ff e c t of universal e ducation (as i n s ec ular 
libe r alism) or by r e volutio na ry r eo rganization 
of soc i e ty · (as i n Mar xism), att e st thi s f act. 
(c ) I n e th ical t e rms th e Cr oss st a nds in con-
tradi c ti on t o all e ff orts t o achie ve a f i nal 
goodne s s in hist ory ; f or at be st this go odn e ss 
is a c omp o und of s elf -assertion .and ~ - in 
th e s e ns e of mutu al lo ve . This is s d Beca us e 
e ve ry c omm un ity must be or ga niz e d fr om a ce ntr e 
of powe r ; and that cen tr e of powe r is both im -
partial in its c once rn for th e inte r est s o f 
oth ers wh ilst at th e s a me ti me bei ng it s el f a 
partial s oc i al f o r ce. Writing a t th e e nd of th e 
.Second World War ~ Ni e buhr at t e sts th ls f ac t by 
pr edicting th at this ·" tragic aspec t of hist ory 
will be illumin e d a ne w wh e n th e wo rld po we rs 
which ha ve d e f ea t e d tyr a nny s ee k t o orga nize · 
th e c o mmu nity of natio ns .. ~ Recog nitio n of this 
as pec t of hist ory ha s th e distinction of be ing 
a uniqu e Christ ian insight " . 
Th e we ight whi ch Ni e buhr give s to th e Cr oss in his i nt e rpre-
t a t i on o f th e Christ e vent ~ and th e profound insights which he 
dra ws fr om his unde r sta nd ing o f th e Cr oss i n r elati on t o th e co n-
t e mporary situation 9 a r e commo nly ack now-l e dg e d to l:: e amo ng his 
grea t est ac hi e ve me nts . I n an a rt icle e nt i t led " Th eolo gy and th e 
Transform a ti o n of Societ y 11 9 Richa rd Sha ul l o f Pr i nce t o n Th eologi-
-c al Semi nar y ackn owl e dg e s th e in deb t e dness of America n th eolo gy 
t o Ni e buhr: 
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"By th e d e p th and brilliance o f his work .. . Ni e b uh r 
mad e an o utst andi n g c o ntribution t o th e d e v e l o pm e nt 
o f th e ology i n this c o untry, a nd th o s e o f us wh o 
ar e c o nce rn e d a b o ut t he ch urch ' s wi t n e ss in s oc i e ty 
a r e ind e bt e d t o him f o r this , a nd will always r e -
ma i n in his d e bt. But we hav e n o w r ea ch e d a p o in t 
wh e r e s omething mor e is d e mand e d o f us than a 
c o nt i nu e d r ec ognition o f thi.s ind e bt e d ne ss and 
fu r th e r work alo ng th e l in e s h e has s e t d own. Th e 
pr es e nt s t at e o f n e a r st e rility in Christian s ocial 
th o u g ht may b e a sign th a t this e ff o r t at s o me 
poin t we nt wr o n g th eo l o gically. " (57) 
Shaull go e s o n t o sugg e st th a t t he e rro r lie s ~n Nie buhr' s 
e mplo ym e nt o f "metap hysical cat e g o r i e s o f transc e nd e nc e" which 
d e scrib e God a s o ne wh o stands o v e r ag a i n s t hist o ry, whilst no t 
b e i n g d e t ac h e d fr o m i t; and h i s " r e duction o f th e biblical st o r y 
t o a th e ol o gical anthropolo gy " wh ich vie ws man as c r e a t e d i n th e 
imag e o f Go d a n d a sinn e r. S uc h cat e gori e s, Sh a ull arg u e s, hav e 
litt l e meani n g for th os e a ff e c t e d by th e ad v ancing proc e s s o f 
s e c ula r iza t i o n. Th e " f un da me ntal th e olo gical shift " which Shaull 
o ff e rs as an alt e rnativ e is " a th eolo gy o f messianism " and th e 
'' su bs tituti o n o f hist o r ical- e schat o l o gical" ca t eg o r i e s o f trans-
c e n d e nc e f or th e " me t aphysic a l- o nt o l o gi c al imag e ry us e d by 
Ni e buh r . " ( 5 B) To th is criticism, t wo r e j o ind e rs may b e gi ve n. 
I f th e p r oblem is o n e o f c o mm u n i ca ting wi th th o s e i n v o l v e d . in th e 
p r oce ss o f s e c ularizatio n , is t h e proble m go ing t o b e s o l v e d by 
r e pla c ing on e s e t o f transce nd e nt cat e gories wi th an o th e r: e v e n 
gran tin g his ca t e goriza t i o n o f Ni e b u hr ' s t h o ug ht? Th e o th e r 
r e j o i nd e r is th a t , gi v e n th e sit uatio n i n wh ic h Ni e buhr wo rk e d and 
his conce rn t o make th e truth o f th e f ait h r e l e vant t o that situa-
tio n, it is und e rst andable that th e dominan t motifs o f his an thr o -
pology sho uld b e th e "imag e o f God i n man " and '' man as sinn e r , " as 
Shaull himself is s a yin g. 
Th e r e a l issu e l i e s h owe v e r no t s o much in th e use o f trans-
ce nd e nt cat e gorie s, b ut a t an o t h e r p o i nt. Ass u mi n g th e ga i n s 
mad e by Nieb uhr's c o ntribut i o n t o o ur un d e r standing o f man 's 
natu r e and d e stiny: th at i t i s p ossibl e f o r Sha ull and o t h e rs t o 
st and , a s i t we r e , o n his sh o ul d e rs. And ass uming th e qu e stio ns 
with wh ic h this e ss a y b e gin s ~ which ask wh ether we can d e duc e 
fr om th e f aith c o ur s e s o f social actio n by which we may act r e-
s po nsibly in th e f ac e o f th e s e e mingly un limit e d possibilitie s o f 
th e s e last decad e s o f the tw e ntie th- ce nt ury . Thes e ass u mp t i o n s 
gr a nt e d, we may we ll want t o mo dify th e weight which Ni e bu hr 
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gives to the Cross , and the somewhat pessimistic conclusion he 
draws from it that history is morally ambiguous to the e~d . . This 
is the problem which Alves discerns in Niebuhr's understanding of 
the Cross. At the beginning of this chapter we noted Al ves's 
question as to wh ether Niebuhr's view does not lead to the .. 
absolutization or justification of suffering, or the . announcement 
of the fin al triumph of th e ambiguities of history . .. . (and asks) 
if the cross provides not a direction .but a relativization of all 
directions, how is it possible to behave in order to bring about 
a new tomorrow? 
Given Niebuhr.'s Sitz i m Leben and the issues with wh ich he 
grappled, his interpretatio n of the Cross nevertheless does 
invite criticism of the sort Alve s makes. Perhaps the problem 
lies in the discernible imbalance in his treatment of the Cross 
and of the Resurrection . For if his interpretation of th e Cross 
is long and penetrating, his analysis of the Resurrection is short 
and hedg ed about with problems. 
Niebuhr deals with the Resurrection "event" in two pages o f 
his Faith and History, although references to the significance . 
o f the Resurrection are to b e found in the . final .chapter of the 
book: " Th e Church and the End of History". Because of the prob-
lems .which arise in the manner of . his dealing with the Res urrection 
"even t ", we will quote exte nsively from the two pages referred to. 
He writes: 
"While ·all Gospel na r ratives -are written in the con-
sciousn e ss of the ' r e velatory significance of the 
story th e y tell, the sense of the dimen sion of the 
story influences the telling of the narrative par-
ticularly in the accounts of the resurrection of 
Christ . It seems fairly certain that the earlier 
narratives r eported an e xp erience of communion by 
th e disciples with the resurrected Lord in Galilee 
(1 Corinthia ns 15:1-8) ? while later narratives not 
onl y fixed this e ve nt at Jerusalem but sought to 
validate it by fact ual details of which the empty 
tomb was the most significant . . The story of this 
triumph o ver death is thus shrouded in a mystery 
which places it in a different order of history 
than the story of the cr ucifixion . Yet the ch ur ch 
as a fellowship of believers was ob vio usly founded 
up o n the con vict ion of the .fact of the resurrection . 
This ' f act ' contained an alteration in the story 
through faith~ apprehension of the significance of 
the st ory . To recognize that the Cros s was some-
thing more than a noble tragedy and its victim 
something else than a good man who died for his 
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ideals; to behold rather that this suff e ring was indi-
cative o f God's triumph o ver evil .. . ; t o s ee in other 
words the whole myst e ry -o f God's mercy disclosed is 
to know that the cr ucified Lord had triumphed o v e r 
death ... It is th e revelatory depth o f th e fact 
which is th e primary concern of f aith. 
Th e ef f or t t o certif y this triumph through sp ecific 
historical details may well be regarded as an e xpres sio n 
of a scepticism which runs through th e whol e hist o ry of 
Christianit y . The account o f Christ's virgin birth 
serves th e same purpose. Christ ca nn o t be known as 
the revelation of God e xcept by faith and r e pentanc& ; 
but a faith, not q uite sure o f its el f always hop e s to 
suppress its sc epticism by e stablishing th e r e vel a-
tory depth of a fact through its miracul o us character. 
This type of miracl e is in opposition to tru e faith. 
On the ot h e r han d th e belief in th e resurrection is 
itself a miracle of a diffe r e nt ord e r, and a miracl e 
with ou t which th e church could not hav e come int o 
e xist ence or could no t continue to e xist. It is 
the miracle of r ecog nizing th e triumph of God's 
sovereignty in what s eems to be very ambiguous facts 
of history." (pp. 166, 167) 
We confess some difficulty in understanding Niebuhr's argument. 
Wha t he appears to be saying is this. Th e crucifi xio n is an 
event in history. (p.lSB) Pr es umably this means that it can be 
attested by c ritical historical meth ods. The interpretation of 
that even t by th e earl y chu rch is d epe ndent up o n presuppositions 
about th e revelatory significance o f the story they are telling. 
Th ose presuppositions, presu mab ly, incl ud e th e ir understanding 
of revelation based upon th e Exodus-event, and in what Niebuhr 
calls th e "his t ory of e xpec tation ". That is, th e rev e latory 
significance of th e Cross d epe nds o n th e pr e suppositio ns about 
r e velatory eve nts held by th e Gospel writers. Thus th e event 
becomes more than a mere eve nt. I t is interpreted as that e vent 
through which meaning is given t o th e wh ole o f history and th e 
specific nature o f divine sovereignty ove r history is r e v e al e d as 
(p.29) 
"suffering love". 
The Resurrection is in a "different order of hist o ry th a n th e 
story of the crucifixio n. " Th e historical fact (in th e sam e s e ns e 
th at the cr ucifixion is hist o r ical fact) is ,th e "experience o f 
communion •.. with the resurr e c t e d Lord in Galilee" and r e p ort ed in 
th e Gospel narratives. Repl y ing t o a critic, in the Livi ng 
Library Volume, Niebuhr con firms this view: 
"My impression wa s th at historical scholarship s ee med to 
indicate that the story of th e empty t o mb was an after-
th ough t and that the really attested hist orical fact was 
the e xp erie nce o f the r isen Christ among his vario us dis-
ciples. I accept that fact together with th e certainty 
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that the Church was founded upon the assurance that 
Christ was indeed risen." {59) 
Through faith's apprehension of the revelatory significance of 
the .story being told, the actual writing of the story is influenc-
ed and the narrative altere d to include the empty tomb. 
Thus Niebuhr's argume nt ·seems to be that revelatory signi-
-ficance is ascribed to the crucifixion: an event in history, an 
the basis of faith's presuppositions. This is in keeping with 
Niebuhr's understanding of revelation, to which we have referred 
in this chapter. No 'mirac le' is needed to certify this under-
standing of the crucifixio n . In the resurrection narrative, 
however, faith's presuppositions nat only ascribe such revelatory 
significance {i.e. the experience of communion wi t h the risen 
Lard) but require that the narrative be changed to accord with 
the revelatary . significance. This he · describes · as "the effort to 
certify this triumph (the resurrection) through specific : histar-
ical 'details" by . a faith which, because it is unsure of itself, 
. seeks to "suppress its scepticism by establishing the revelatory 
depth of a fact through its miraculous character". 
Niebuhr is nat saying of the resurrection - the story of 
this triumph aver death "sh r ouded in a mystery" - that nothing 
happened. Something did happen, in the sense in which we -normally 
use the ward 'happen', as · the experience of the disciples testi-
fies. What did nat happen, . in this sense, is the 'event' of the 
empty tomb. What Niebuhr speaks af ·as "factual details" and 
"specific historical detail s " like the empty tomb, are to him 
nothing of the -sort. They a re the inventions of· a ''faith nat sure 
·of · itsel f 11 designed to esta blish the "revelatory depthtt-. of whatever 
did happen. The real miracle - "miracle of a differe.nt order" -
is precisely the recognitio n of the , revelatary , depth of whatever 
did happen; · i.e . . the experience of communion. 
It is difficult to avoid the con~lusion that Niebuhr, in his 
discussion of the resurrection, is involved in a torturous logic 
which is out of keeping with the rest of his book. He appears to 
be embroiled in the same difficulties which we discussed in our 
section of "Neo-orthodoxy · an d Historical Criticism'', which call 
. forth from him. concessions t o a scientific · world view. 
One may ask: -haw does hi starical ·scholarship conclude that 
the empty tomb is an .11 afterthought"? There is no independent 
evidence -ta · carraborate thes e : sa-called -11 alteratians 11 to the 
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-narrative. All the evidence we have is in these same narratives. 
Niebuhr argues that the Gospel writers made these embellishments 
to the ~ory because they discerned the revelatory significance 
of the story . they were writing. But they do not say this; 
Niebuhr does. The answer surely is that historical _scholarship, 
with which Niebuhr concurs, can conclude cthat the empty tomb is 
an afterthought on the basis of . its presupposition that such an 
event · could not possibly happe n. Th at is, because its . principle 
of. analogy of past with present argues that we can only make . 
judgements about .the probability that ·something happened only . if 
we presuppose that our .own present . experience is not radically 
dissimilar to the experience of · past persons. But we have no 
analogy, ·.so the argument runs, for a bodily resurrection and the 
empty tomb. Therefore the probability of such an 'event' must 
be doubted. "We have difficulty with the physical resurrection 
of Christ", writes Niebuhr, because *~e do not . believe .. . . that 
· revelatory events validate themselves by a divine. breakthrough 
in the natural order; ·" ·· "we have given up on.e kind of miracle, 
and miracle is the dearest child of faith.~(60) This he does on 
the basis .of his presupposition of a "quasi-autonomous nature, . 
created by God, not maintained by His fiat from moment to moment.~: 
(61) We shall have occasion to return to the problems raised 
here ~n our next chapter . 
. To .return to Niebuhr's exposition of the Resurrection - Why, 
we may askr does he dispense with . the Virgin Birth which he says 
doe~ not validate the revelatory truth of the Christ-event, and . 
yet retain the Resurrection: albeit embellished with . non-object-
ive "detail"7 If .as he argues . a . faith . unsure of itself certifi es 
'events' by miraculous means, . why not retain both? Or, why not 
be consistent and dispense .with . the Resurrection as well? What 
criteria is he using for deciding to retain the Resurrection? 
Is it . because he is conVinced that . the only hard fact in the 
resurrection -narratives is the ~experience of communion~ with 
the Risen . Lord reported there? .. If this is the· .case, .. on . what .. basis 
does he . accept the . trustworthiness of the narrative . at one . point 
(the . uexperience · of . communio~~) : and at . another point rej~bt . the 
trustworthiness of the narratives . (, .. details"· about the empty . 
-tomb)? But . the question is even deepEIT, .as .Ronald Hepburn shows:· 
"Putting it generously, Niebuhr : has yet · to ·show · us 
that we are justified in believing that the New 
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Testament writers interpreted whatever events there 
were along sound lines, and did not distort or warp 
them. This trustworthiness is . assumed and not 
argued for ... 11 ( 62) 
Does the answer to these qu estions not . lie . in tha~ fact that 
Niebuhr is bringing to the reswrrection narratives his own pre-
suppositions, which i~clude thB rejection of 'miracle' .in the 
sense of ' divine intervention in the natural order? For he appears 
to interpret the resurrection on the basis · of this presupposition. 
Is he not, then, .doing precisely what he suggests the Gospel 
writers did? For he suggests that on the basis of their presup~ 
positions, . which include t he possibility of 'miracle' in the sense 
of divine intervention in t he natural order, these writers altered 
the factual details. If this is so, then the issue is one of 
conflicting (or different) sets of presuppositions . 
On the basis of his presuppositions, Niebuhr dismisses the . 
historicity of the specific details of the resurrection narrative: 
the . 11 ~ost significant of .which is the empty. tomb . . But he wants 
to . maintain that the Resurrection is not merely a . good idea . with 
important ethical implications . . The Resurrection, without .which 
the .church .could not have .. come into existence, is true . because . it 
is a . "different order of history" alld a .-*'mi;racle of a different 
order"·. But it ~s still history . . lts truth is not to be search-
ed for in objective historyr but in the revelatory depth of 
this 'event'. 
The difficulty .with this · form of argument is the . one we 
discussed earli·er in our section on 11 Neo-.-orthodoxy and .. Historical 
Criticism..-': · If ·we claim that the ·. revelatory .depth of an event is 
the .primary concern of . faith 7 . we must already be sure that there 
is . an event (objective-hist orical) which -has such revelatory . 
depth. The Exodus . and . the Crucifixion present no problems . in . 
this -regard . . But it appears .. for Niebuhr that the .Resurrection 
does. .He . therefore creates a .11 history of a . different order" to . 
' overcome this problem. But as Hepburn points out . the traditional 
Christian defence of the . Resurrection lies precisely in the 
historical details of the narratives . 
. " ... ' if you are confronted with a human form, ' 
h~m~n ·facial e~~r~s~ion~. ~ci~tures, - ~ Vciic~ re~ 
~pons.iYe · in toriverstaion · (Enid the ·'detailed 1 · 
res~rrectio~-narrative8 '' pi6vide all these with 
respect to the risen Christ), then t~e 
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possibilities of illusion, hallucination, and the 
rest are enormously diminished. They are reduced 
to vanishing-point when sJ1 the features present 
in a normal meeting wi~h a persoh are present also 
in the case ~n question."(63) 
But the historicity · of the ·"details" of the resurrection narrative 
are denied and only the existential encounter with Christ, re-
ported in the narratives, -is retained. What is retained, argues 
Hepburn, seem 
"at least as fallible as any documentary account 
about the rolling away of a stone or angels at the 
tomb ... · If we still say that the resurrection, 
though not . accessible to o~jective--historical re-
search, belongs nevertheless to 'a different order 
of history', are we saying any more than that some 
people, past and present, have a sense as of · the 
presence of Christ ? ... (can we any · longer) bring 
forward the object i ve historicity of Christ's 
resurrection as the justification of the otherwise 
rash assertion that all these senses of presence 
have been and are o f the same person, identical 
with Jesus of Nazareth. And that appeal to 
objectivity here ha s undoubtedly been the supreme 
traditional defence .against possibilities of 
imaginative illu~ion."(64) 
Niebuhr is well awara of the difficulties which arise in 
consequence of his interpretation of the Resurrection. Insisting 
that revelatory truth must be apprehended by faith, which is to 
say existentially, and cannot "merely be accepted as historical 
fact, validated by the -miraculous character of the fact''(65) is 
perilous. As Niebuhr himself says the peril lies in the 
"tendency to reduce Christianity to · yet another 
philosophy, profounder than other philosophies . .. 
We say we take hist orical facts seriously but not 
literally; but that may be on the way of not 
taking them as .hist orical facts at all . 11 ( 66) 
He believes, however, that the gain of this manner of interpre-
tation is worth the price. For in this manner revelatory truth 
is not validated by 'miracle '; it must be apprehended by "repent-
ance and faithtt. 
To say this, however, does not absol ve Niebuhr from the 
problems involved . in assert i ng the historical nature -of that 
revelatory truth. Even granting the important assertion which 
he makes concerning the nee d for such revelatory truth to be 
apprehended by faith, the problem of the empty tomb is not solved 
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by the torturous logic which he employs to do so. That logic, as 
we have tried to show, involves him in still more problems. 
· Is it necessary to dismiss the historical . details of the re~ 
surrection narratives? Does the empty tomb have to be an embell-
ishment? John Cumpsty, for one does not believe so. (67) He 
quotes Ihmels as saying, "We may say without exaggeration, -at the 
tomb in Jerusalem the ultimate choice will be made between two 
totally different world - views." It is the failure to perceive 
this fact that leads Niebuhr into difficulties with the empty 
tomb. For, as Cumpsty sho ws, it is imperative to distinguish 
between the Greek and Hebr e w world-views if we are to understand 
the significance to the di s ciples of the empty tomb. 
Cumpsty argues as follows. The Hebrew had a unitive view of 
man; that is to say there is, in general, no - body-soul dichotomy 
in Hebrew thought as there is ~n the Greek. Writing of the 
Semitic "totality concept" M.E.Dahl says: "When it comes to the 
human personality, we should not be surprised to find that man, 
too, is a totality, which e mbraces all that a man is and ever 
shall be. The Old Testament has no word for 'body' because 
this totality concept makes it unnecessary.n(68) On the basis of 
this 'totality concept' Cumpsty argues that although later Hebrew 
thought was influenced by the Greek, and although body-soul lang-
uage is used in the New Tes t ament, it is not native to it. -In 
theHebrew view, therefore, "death means the destruction of the 
whole pe~son ~nd any future life means resurrection of the whole 
person." It is inconceivable that the early disciples made up the 
story of the empty tomb to prove that Jesus had risen. Why? 
Because as Hebrews the lack of an empty tomb, in the face of ex-
perience of communion with the risen Lord, would have denied the 
unitive view of man which they held. This unitive assumption is 
written into the narratives themselves; for when they heard from 
the women that they had seen .Jesus, they ran to the tomb. If the 
body had been there "then. he was not risen for there was only one 
unitive person." On the other hand, if the body had been there, 
then the "good news" of the resurrection would not have been news 
at all, at least to the Gentile world, for as ~umpsty says in a 
sermon on the resurrection: 
"Among the Gentiles t here had been belief in immortal 
sould from time immemorial. They didn't need a few 
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He bre ws who had r eg ard e d ma n a s a un i ty~ dust o f 
th e grou nd caused t o li v e, t o t ell th em that ma n 
h ad a n immort al s o u l . " 
Re surr.ectio n o f th e whol e p e rson was both th e good n e ws and 
th e s ca nd al t o th e Ge ntil e world. Pa ul a nd J o hn wh o do much t o 
make th e gospel pl a usible ·to th ei r Ge nti le heare rs r e fuse t o sub -
stitut e th e stumbling block o f the resurrection of th e wh ole 
perso n f o r th e much mo r e readily accep t able doctrine of immortal 
s o ul. Fo r i t i s o n th~ s th a t th e good ne ws o f t he gospel, with 
all i ts co s mic s ignific a nce, h ang s. 
Ni eb uhr a rgu e s th a t th e res urrec tion n a rr a tiv e s were alte red 
-to i ncl ude t h e e mpty t o mb · ~+de tails i n. o rd e r that th e r evela t o ry 
tr uth o f th e r e surrectio n ma y b e valida t e d . And he does s o 
becaus e his s cie ntific world view makes it impo ss ible f o r him t o 
accep t ' miracle' ( e mpty t omb ) a s divin e in t e r ve ntio n i n th e 
n a tural o rd e r. 
Cump sty, o n th e o ther h a nd, a r g ue s th at th e empty tomb is 
a n e ss e nt ial _par t o f th e r es urr ec tion n arrati ve beca us e o f th e 
Heb r aic vie w o f men -as-unitive. Such a vi e w indeed has much i n 
commo n with mode rn s cie nc e . wh ich s ee ms t o be pointing in th e s ame 
directio n with its n o tion o f th e phys ico-ch e mical basis o f 
p e rs o na lity. 
Al th o u gh th e pr ob l e m o f th e Re s urrection is a t o uc h-s t o n e o f 
mode rn th eo l og y a nd we are t e mpt e d t o co nt i nu e o ur e xami n a ti o n o f 
Ni e b uhr's con tri bu t ion t o th e debate , o ur pre s e nt co ncer n to this 
point h a s b ee n with . his th e-ological me th od . 
I t r e mains n o w t o ask h o w Nieb uhr u s e s th e Re surr ec tion t o 
illuminat e th e human situatio n? Fo r it is his primary concer n , 
a s we h ave s ee n , t o sh ow th e r ele vanc e o f C hri ~t ia n t ruth f o r th e 
human s i tu a t i o n. I n th e f i n al c h ap t e r o f his Faith and Hi~ t ory 
e ntitl e d " Th e Chur c h a nd Th e End o f Hist ory " h e argues th a t th e 
Biblical symb o ls "Re su rre c tion" a n d "Last Judg emen t•• sh o uld be 
t a ke n s e rio us ly: b e c a us e '' wi th o ut th em th e Biblical f ai th dege n e r -
a t e s e ithe r into Plat o n i s m o r ut opia nism.n(p .2 69) Th e e n d o f 
hist o ry i s n o t f i n i s . Against the de s pair whi c h finds mea ning 
o nly i n hist ory, a n d s ee s th e e nd o f his t o ry o n l y a s fini s , th e 
Chr i sti a n f a ith " ho pe s f o r a n e t e rnity whic h tr a ns fig ures, b ut 
d oe s n o t a nnul th e t e mporal proce ss " by th e symb ol o f th e 
r e surr e ctio n{p.26 9) Th e s ymb ol o f th e last jud gement, o n th e 
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oth e r hand, "emphasiz e s th e mor a l ambiguity o f hist ory t o th e 
e nd . It ne gat e s ut o pi a n illusio ns in progr essive int erpre tations 
of hist ory . . . « (p . 269) . 
Thus th e Re s urre ction is one o f Ni e buhr ' s " myths o f pe rman e nt 
validity '' with out whi c h it is no t possible t o de s c rib e th e . ultim-
at e r e aliti e s of th e t e mp or a l world . And with o ut which f a ls e 
ho pe s ab o ut fulfilme nt i n hist ory , or d e spair ab o ut hist ory's 
significanc e are in e vita bl e . I n th e Re surr ection we hav e a symb o l 
whi c h pe rmits us t o a nticip a t e a fulfillm e nt be yond all hist ory . 
Hist ory c ontinu e s its own ambigu ous way : its meaning is fulfill e d 
in a noth e r r e alm " be yond hist ory " . Th e affirm ation of th e Re sur-
r e ctio n as an e ve nt o f a " diffe r e nt ord e r of history '' is symb olic 
of this · me ani ng. 
To kn ow what Ni e buhr me ans by fulfillm e nt of and be yond 
histury r e mains a probl e m. Hi s account o f th e origins of th e 
symb ol o f Re surre ction s ee ms t o indicat e his satisfactio n with an 
'individual survival' int erpre t ation o f Re surrection . His applic-
at i on o f th e symb ol, howe ver, s e ems t o sugg e st s omething mor e in 
t e rms of th e wh ol e " t emp oral proc e ss " . 
(c) Hist ory as " Co nt e mpo rary Event" 
I f th e re is o ne thing that this e ssay has mad e cl e ar th us 
far , it is t hat Niebuhr is no 'armchair th eologian ' whos e chi e f 
in t er e s t is t o d e vi s e a th eologi c al syst e m 'un earth ed' , as it 
wer e , in th e sit ua t i on in whic h he f ound hims e lf . I n fa c t his 
primary c onc ern , a s his life and work t estifi e s , was th e dynamic 
relationship betwee n faith a nd c ont e mp orary e ven t s. Whe th e r or no t 
we agree with Davi s and Goo d that Ni e buhr is "for e most a political 
and moral philosop he r " , we must ~gr ee with th e m wh e n th e y say 
" ·· . he has always bee n vitally e ngag e d with th e 
pr a ctical affairs o f o ur tro ubl e d times . .. he has 
us e d e xp e ri e nce powerfully a s an e mpirical t e st 
o f th e ad e quacy of his own pe rsupp ositions . Any o ne 
familiar with t he .d e ve l opment of his th o ught kn ows 
how painful was th e pro ce ss by which he moved from one frame 
o f r e f e r e nc e to an ot he r as e ach in t urn pr o ve d t o 
be an inad e quat e guid e t o th e c ompl e xiti e s of th e 
human situation. He has mad e perf ectly e xpli c it 
th e fram e of r e f e r e nc e which he finally f ound 
s uffici e nt : his und e rstanding of th e cl assical 
and Biblical ve rsi on o f th e Christi a n faith. " (69) 
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Th e f ac t th a t Davi s a nd Good, tw o po~itical s cie nt ists have com-
piled a large volume ·of Niebuhr 1 s writings on his political 
philo s op hy a nd its applicati on to th e contemporary s i tu a ti o n r --i s 
pe rhaps sufficie nt e vid e nc e t o sh ow how succes s fu l Nieb uhr wa s 
i n his primary co ncern , But th e ir vol ume is e vidence of s ome thing 
els e: . s omething of primary co nc e rn t o us in this s ecti on of our 
discussi on of Ni e buhr , 
I n co mpili ng th e ir vo l ume Da vis a nd Good . drew up o n ma t erial 
fr om no le ss th a n s ixt ee n of Nieb uhr ' s books and s ome one hundr e d 
a nd s eve nty of his article s , . besides seve ral unpu bli sh ed s elec t -
io ns, To disti l fr om hi s ma ssive a nd unsyst ema tic output s ome 
und e r standing of how Nie buhr f un ctio ned i n his co nt em porary 
situ a ti on is our pur pose i n this ~ e ctio n, I n ord e r t o do this 
we will e xamine · th e · ma j or categories- wh at Robe rt Fitch calls 
" handl e s t o hist ory " - with wh ic h Nieb uhr opera t ed , But, i3S 
Fitch · poi nts out 9 a ny attempt to di s ting ui sh be twe e n his "philo-
s o phy " of hi s tory a nd hi s " fun c tioning " in .a nd up on hist ory "is 
probably in e qual pa rt s r ea l a nd artificial. Bu t it may help t o 
illumin a t e th e te ns ion be twee n th e philosopher and th e pr op he t 
i n Re inh old Niebu hr, 11 (70) Wo r ds · like ' e xam ine' and 'analys e' 
whic h a r e impos sible t o avoid in a n e s say of this na tur e .e xpose 
us, however , to th e da nge r s of art i f iciality o f anoth e r sor t wh e n 
writin g of Ni e buhr, For he would disa vow th e label " philoso ph e r " 
as muc h a s he did th e label " th eo l o gia n 11 , He d e s cribe s hims e l f 
a s a t ea c he r of Ch r istian s oc ial e th ics a nd apologe t ics ; as a 
~irc uit r ide r " acti vely involv ed iri th e d e f e nce a nd ju stif ica t io n 
of Christi a n f ai th in a s ec ula r age , 
To th e qu e s tio n with whic h this e ssay bega n, Ni eb uh r's 
a nsw e r would be a ff irmative , Ye s , we can deduce co urs e s of soc-
i al action fr om th e f aith , Th e real que st ion is wh e th e r we do s o , 
an d how we do s o , As f a r back as 1925 , in th e early yea r s of hi s 
mini stry in De troit, Ni e b..uh r wr o t e 
"W he n I s i t thr ough a c hurch co nfe r e nce I begi n t o 
s ee a litt le mo r e cl e arly wh y r eligion is o n th e 
wh ole s o im po t e nt e t hically , wh y th e achie veme nts 
of th e church ar e s o mea gre c ompar e d wi th i t s 
mo r a l pr e t e nsio ns,,, 
Th e churc h co nfe r e nc e begin s a nd e nds by at t e mpt -
ing t o ar ous e a n emo t ion of t he ideal, usua lly in 
t e rm s o f pe rs onal loyalty t o th e pe rs on of J e sus , 
but ve ry little is d one t o attach th e emo t io n t o 
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s pecifi c t a sks a nd pro j ec ts . I s th e i n d u ~trial 
life o f o ur day un e thical? Ar e n a t io ns imperial-
istic? I s th e f ami l y disinteg r a ting? Ar e yo un g 
people losing th ei r s e ns e o f values? I f s o, we 
a r e t old o v e r a nd ove r agai n th a t no thing will 
help b ut ' a ne w bapti s m o f th e s pirit' , a 'n e w 
revival o f r eligion' ~ a ' g r ea t a wak eni n g o f th e 
r eligio us co ns cio us nes s. ' 
But why no t be s pecific? Wh y doesn 't th e Chur c h 
o ff e r sp e cific sug ge st io ns for th e applicatio n o f 
a Christi a n e thic t o the diffic ultie s o f o ur day? 
I f th a t sugg e st io n is made~ th e an sw e r is th a t 
su ch a policy would b r ee d ronte nti o n . It cert ai nly 
wo uld . No mo r al pro j ect can be pr e s e nt ed a n d n o 
advent ur e made with o ut r e si s t a nce fr om th e tradit -
i o nalis t a nd debate amo n g e xp e ri me ntalists. I f 
th e ch ur c h co uld achieve s c his ms o n e th ical issues ! 
Th e y would r ep r e s e nt life a nd r eaiity . ''( 71) 
Th e ma ture Niebu hr o f la t e r year s may h ave come t o s ee th a t lo v e 
is n o t th e s imple a nsw e r t o eve ry mo r al proble~ 9 and that i t mus t 
be tra nslat ed i n t o justice i f it is t o be a t all r ele v a nt t o th e 
pe rpl e xin g problem s o f co nt e mp o r a ry s ocie ty . But ma tur i ty did no t 
diminish his co nvictio n th a t r eligio n sh o uld n o t be e th ically 
impotent . Th e " h a nd les t o history" wh ich h e wielded, h e wielded 
f o r this pu rp o s e . 
(i) REVELATORY EVENTS. 
Whi l st hist o r y may b e mo r ally ambig uo us t o th e e nd~ f o r th e 
re a s o n th a t hist o ry can no t be its o wn s avi o ur~ th e r e a r e eve nts 
in hist o ry which h ave revel a t ory s ignifi ca nce . 
Ni e buhr 's basic pr e su ppo s itio n about h i st o ry . 
e ve nt 9 a s we have s ee n~ is the Christ -e v e nt . 
This i s pe rh aps 
The r e vela t o ry 
But oth e r e v e nt s i n 
his t o r y h ave r e vela t or y significanc e al s o . I f this we r e no t s o; 
if hist o ry we r e d e v oid o f illumin a t o ry mome nts ; if all we co uld 
s ay ab o ut hi s t o ry wa s th a t it is '' fu ll o f s o und a nd fury, signif y -
i n g n o thin g" - th e n h o w co uld we di s ce rn th e s ig ns o f th e time s? 
" Th e r e a r e mome nts in hist o ry whi ch a r e more than 
me r e hist oric mo me nts ; f or in th em a whole co urs e 
o f his t o r y is fulfill ed . I n th e m th e s eemi n g 
c hao s o f th e past ac hieves its mea n i n g; a nd th e 
pa rti al a nd partic ula r a s pec ts o f lif e a r e ill um-
i n e d t o b e c ome parts o f a co mpl e t e wh ole . '' (72) 
Su c h a vi e w o f hist o r y is 9 h oweve r 9 impo ssible with o ut th e pr io r 
ass umpti o n th a t histo ry is t h e a r e n a in whi ch mea ning i s disc losed . 
Th e r e vela t o ry signi~icanc e o f eve nts i s h owever, po s s ible o n l y 
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f o r " th o s e wh o hav e eye s t o see": ttC hrist does n o t come t o th o se 
wh o do n o t e xp ec t Him. 11 ( 73) 
Ni eb uhr's Leaves From The Notebook Of A Tamed Cynic, th e 
j o urnal h e wr o t e whilst a pas t o r in De troit, is full o f example s 
of th e significance h e was able t o draw fr om occ urr e nces th e r e. 
We have referred t o one su c h occasion already: th e implicatio ns 
he dr a ws about e thical imp o t e nc e from his attendance a t a c hurch 
con f e r e nce. 
His ability t o see re v ela t ory signific a nce in historical 
e v e nts is well illustrated in an article e ntitl e d "His t ory (God) 
Has Ov e rtak e n Us " writt e n in 1941. (7 4 ) He writ e s 
"For y ears we hav e a rgued wh e th e r o r not we should 
go to wa r. Th e . implicit assumption of all th e s e 
arg ume nt s was th a t we had th e complete power t o 
ma k e this decision. Th e n hist ory d e s ce nd ed up o n 
us and t oo k th e decision o ut of o ur h a nds. · We 
might ha ve known th a t it wo uld be lik e this. His -
t or y i s no t complet e ly und e r th e co ntr ol o f human 
d ec isions as either th e interventionists or 
pacifists a ssumed. " 
Nie buhr s ees th e "g r ace" o f God in his natio n's participat-
ion in th e war. He argues t h a t ideally th e America n n a tion kn e w 
that it o u ght to r e s ist injustice done t o o th e r s a s it d oe s wh e n 
injustic e is d o n e t o it . Bu t it t oo k th e Japan ese attack t o pre-
cipitate such r e sistanc e . That this sh o uld be s o is a fact hea vy 
with path o s. "We could no t agree up on th e p e ril in whic h we st oo d 
as a n a tio nal community until th e peril was upon us ; that is th e 
stupidity of collective man. And we co uld no t agree up on o ur r e-
sp o nsibilitie s t o th e victims o f aggression until we had been 
j oined to th e m, no t by moral act but by historical fat e ." Th e 
pathos of this e v e nt ca n only be pro p e rly und e rst oo d in th e ligh t 
o f th e "g rac e" o f God 
" Fo r th e grace o f God is o n th e o n e hand th e provi -
d e ntial wo rking in h i story by which God make s th e 
wrath o f man t o pr ai s e him p a nd tr a nsmut e s good 
o ut o f e vi l . In th e immedi a t e situ a tio np that 
mea ns th a t h e persuades sinful men to consid~r th e 
mis e ri e s a nd necessit i es of their f ell ow men by 
throwing th em int o l i ke miserie s and necessities ... 
Th e o th e r eleme nt in divine "g r ace" is th e eleme nt 
o f f o rgiv e n e ss ... " 
This mea ns that we (America) must believe that God has th e re-
s o urc e s t o wipe o ut th e corruption which all o ur ac ti o ns betray . 
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With o ut this America could come to believe that it was " justified" 
in d eclaring a "holy war " wh e n , as th e ten o r o f th e argum e nt 
s eems t o imply , it was moral inertia which kept Ame rica o ut o f 
the war in th e first place . 
And wh a t wh e n th e wa r is ove r? Niebuhr co nclud e s his 
article by asse rtin g that t here ca n be n o acceptance o f grace 
with o ut r e pentance. In th i s specific situation r epen t ance must 
mean th a t "t h e ca tast rophe s o f th ese days will not o nly make us 
more r esol ut e in achieving such justice and international commun-
ity a s sinful men may e st ablis h by th e grace o f God, but more 
humble and, the r e f ore , more merci ful in judging both our allie s 
and o ur f oe s. " 
Th e Unit ed States' int e rventi o n in th e s econd World Wa r 
precipita t e d a s it wa s by th e J apa n e s e a ttack on Pearl ·Harbour is 
a historical e ve nt which, f o r Niebuhr, wa s rich in revelatory 
significa nce . Standing in th e tradi tion o f a J e r e miah in th e 
impending disaster f rom th e neo-Eabyl o ni a ns, and o f a De utro-
Isaiah wh o saw God's action in th e emergence o f the Pe rsi a n Cyrus , 
Ni eb uhr sees in America' s i nt e r ve ntion that "His t ory (God) Has 
Ove rtak e n Us ." Hist o rians wh o wor k with o ut his fra me o f reference 
may interpret th e sa me historical eve nts differently. Niebuhr 
would ha ve n o quarrel with this e xc ep t t o assert that th e politi -
cal life o f man can ultimat e ly onl y be interpreted with any sor t 
o f ad e qua c y fr om a " pro f o undly r eligio us standpoi nt~-Fdr o nly 
fr om such a standp o int do th e e v e nts which hav e "o v e rtaken us " 
pro vide th e impet us f o r a more r e s olut e striving f o r just ice and 
international comm unity, and a more merciful judg e me nt o f both 
ally and f oe . 
(ii) MYTH AND SYMBOL. 
I f hist o ry is r evela t ory of meaning, a s Nieb uhr arg u e s it is, 
th e n it f ollows that an import a nt aspect o f his methodology will 
VIHHC..L.ES • ,E:~_Pf!-E.~.f 1 0 be devoted t o th e f o rmulatio n o f adeq uat e es§i~sr·es t o . -= coc 
th a t mea ning. I t is o ur view that " myth " a nd " symb ol" are th o s e 
ve hi cle s. I n his e xp o sition o f Niebuhr's "philosophy o f hist o ry " 
Rober t Fitch describes his us e o f " symb olic e v e nts " as one o f his 
" h a ndles t o hist o ry "; one which has been "a permanent part o f his 
t ool kit " . (7S) We wo uld argue , however , that whilst symbolic 
e v e nts a r e i nd eed a permanent par t o f Niebuhr's " t ool Kit", t hey 
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are in f ac t a fundam e ntal vehicle of his method . As we sha ll 
show, myth and symbol are basic to th e int e rpre tatio n o f history 
in Nie buhr's method, as a c lose study o f th e e volutio n o f his 
tho ught sh ows. Such a study warrants a furth e r c riticism o f 
Fit c h's e xp osition in th a t he ma ke s little of th e place o f myth 
in Ni eb uhr 's th o ught. Tru e , it is no t always clea r wh e th e r Ni e-
buhr us e s myth arrd symb ol interchangeably o r wh e th e r th e r e are 
sh ade s of diffe r e nce in th e us e o f th ose t erms . I t is not clea r 
wh e th e r th e s e t e rms de no t e a way o f s eei ng hist ory, or wh e th e r 
th e y a r e us ed t o e xpr e ss th e mea ning o f hist ory. I n his a nalysis 
of myth and symb ol in Niebuhr 's christology , Le hmann argue s that 
" th e prevailing t e nd e nc y ... • s ee ms t o be t o de no t e by 
th e t e rm 'myth' a me th od of thi~king e specially 
suited t o und e rst and and interp r e t th e nece ssary 
co nn ec ti o n be twee n hist orical e xp e ri e nc e and th e 
ultimat e myst e rie s of th e Biblical and Christi an 
faith . 1 Symbols' a r e verbal (though not e xclus -
ivel y s o ) and chief l y: Biblical and c r eedal 
f o rmulat£ons o f mythi~al apprehe nsion . "( 76) 
What is clear , howeve r, is that fr om his ea rlies t writing 
thr o ugh to his lates t , th e proliferation of myth and symbol is , as 
Fitch s ays, "i nc r e dible both f o r s cope a nd f or variety . " (77) Fo r 
th is r ea s o n, and because we belie ve that th e s e are fundamental t o 
Ni e buhr's me thod , it is imp ortant not t o misr ep r e s e nt his th o ught 
at this point . 
Myth and Symbol in th e e volutio n of Niebuhr' s ... thought .. 
As f a r as we can disc o v-e r, Ni e buhr 1 s first explo r ation·· of th e 
dimensi o ns o f myth appeared on print in his Reflections on the End 
of an Era publish e d in 1934 , some - fi-ve yea rs after he we nt to 
Union . This volume which consists o f what he 'calls " tracts f or 
I 
th e times " wa s writt e n becau s e he believed that 
" . . . th e liberal c ulture of modernity is quit e un -
able to giv e guid a nce and dir e ctio n t o a confu s e d 
gene r ation which fa c e s th e disint eg rat ion o f a social 
syst e m a nd th e task o f building a new o ne . I n my 
op inion ad eq ua t e s ~irit ua l guidance ca n come . o nly 
thro ugh a more radical political ori e ntation and a 
more con s e rvative r el igio us con viction than are com-
prehended in th e c ult ure of our e r a . Th e e ff ort t o 
combine political radical ism with a more classical 
and hist orical interpretation of r eligion will strik e 
th e moder n mind a s bi z a rr e and capricious . " (7 8 ) 
Tw o chapte rs in this book a r e r e l e va nt t o our und e rstanding of th e 
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evolution of myth in Niebu hr's thought: nMythalogy and History" 
in which he argues that an adequate description of the nature of 
history must be mythologic a l. In »The Assurance of Grace" he 
argues that the idea of grace, fundamental to the Christian faith, 
can only be stated adequately in mythological terms. We will re-
turn to the content of these chapters. 
fallowing his Reflectians, . Niebuhr published the substance of 
his Rausehenbus~h Memorial LectUt~s given at Colgate-Rochester 
Divinity School in a valume . entitl~d An Interpretation of Christian 
Ethics in .l936 . . In this book .he . argues, as a foundation for the · 
exposition of what he calls . an· independent :Christian ethic;. that 
Christianity stands in . a mythical and not . a mystical t:tadi tian, __ 
and . expounds the ttgreat relig~ous .myths (which) daal with creation 
and redemption.n(79) 
What might be described as his formal theory of · myth is given 
in two publicatiohs: an article entitled nThe Truth in Myths" 
published i~ a Fe$tschift t o · his Yale professor D.C.Macintosh, ( 80) 
and a book · of sermonic essays entitled Beyond Tragedy. Both pub-
lications appeared in 1937, and set out what Niebuhr: describes as 
"the necessary. and perenially valid: contribution of myth to the 
biblical world view.n _(81) 
We believe it is highly significant that the evolution : of · 
Niebuhr's understanding of t h e place : and validity ·af myth contained 
in the works we have cited t oo k place during what we have described · 
as his 1tformative Years" at Union Theological Semin~ry, before he 
wrote his Gifford Lettures ~ Signific~nt, because it was during 
the~e years that his search f or adequate criteria for social 
choice took pl~ce. Historically, .these were tumultous years; be-
ginning with a period of unprecedented prosperity in the United · 
States and ending with the o utbreak of the Second World War . As 
we saw in Chapter Two, it wa s during this period . that Niebuhr moved 
beyond :pacificism; beyond socialism to a position which he describ-
es as Christian Realism. : What · Niebuhr calls the "necessary and 
perennially . valid contribution of ~ythn to the Biblical world view, 
therefore forms an integral part of the Christian Realism· which 
provides him with the foundations for his work as a social ethicist 
during what we have .called his . "Mature Years". 
With the publication in 1 941 of .the Gifford Lectures: The ' 
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Nature and Destiny of Man, and Faith and History in 1949, Niebuhr 
elaborates and expounds th e symbols 'the image of God in man 1 .. and 
!man as sinner' in order t o pursue his thesis that the Biblical 
view of man is superior to .both classical and modern views . The 
groundwork for this elabor a tion was, we believe, laid during his 
formative years. 
Two further comments . sh ould be made concerning -the evolution 
of Niebuhr's thought on myth and symbol. In the Living Library 
Volume on Niebuhr, published in 1956, he disavows the use of the 
term "myth" in reply to a criticism from Lehmann: 
"Lehmann makes one explicit criticism . He thinks my 
approach does not d o justice to the divine initiat-
ive and to 'God's mighty acts' . I wonder whether 
this criticism may not be due to my use of 'myth' in 
describing the transcendent significance of Jesus. 
The word has subjec t ive and skeptical connotations . 
I - am sorry I ever .used it, particularly since the 
project for 'demythologizing' the Bible has been 
undertaken and bids fair to reduce the Bibl~cal rev-
elation to eternally valid truths without any ex-
istential encounter between God and Man."(B2) 
. In similar vein, Niebuhr speaks of his "unpardonable pedagogical 
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error in'"'rhe Nature and Destiny of Man..,_ which he seeks to correct 
in his latest book Man's Nature and His Communitie s , published in 
1965 .. He writes 
"My t heolo gic a], preoc c u.pation prompted me to define 
the persistence and universality of man's self-
regard as 'original sin '. This was historically 
symbolically correct . But my pedagogical error 
consisted in seeking to challenge modern optimism 
with the .theological doctrine which was anathema 
to moder~ culture. I was in fact proud and heed-
less because I had taken pains to deny the 
historicity of the primitive myth of the fall of 
Adam in the garden; .. 
But these labours of modern interpretation of 
traditional religious symbol proved vain . . . The 
remnants of social optimism pictured me as a re-
gressive religious authoritarian, caught in the 
toils of an ancient legend. But it was even more 
important that . . . political philosophers who were 
in substantial agreeme nt with positions taken in 
my Gifford ·Lectures, were careful to state that 
their agreement did not extend to my 'theological 
presuppositions'."(B3) 
In this, his latest book, Niebuhr therefore uses what he calls 
"more sober symbols» for describing the ''well-known facts" which 
occupied him in his Gifford Lectures.(B4) One may discern, there-
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fore, from .a study of the e volution of his thought on . myth .. and 
symbol, .that before his Gifford Lectures he concentrated on the 
nature and validity of myt h . His later writings , from these 
Lectures contain little re f erence to myth (the word does not 
appear in the index of either volume); he now shows a preference 
for the term 'symbol' . 
The second point to note concerning the e volution of Niebuhr's 
thought is that there is perhaps some justification for Ronald 
Stone's suggestion that the publication of Man's Nature and His 
Communities marks what may be described as the "liberal-pragmatic" 
stage of Niebuhr's thought. (BS) As we have noted, the primary 
difference between his Gifford Lectures and this latest book is 
the disappearance of the th eo logical vocabulary in this later work. 
In this work he is concerned to translate his theologically in-
formed view of man into non t heological terms . The differences 
between the Gifford Lecture s and his latest book reflect not only 
a change in style, but also the process of intellectual evolution 
which has always been a hallmark of Niebuhr's life. It is true that 
Niebuhr could write in secular or theological style, depending on 
the circumstances of his writing, throughout his career. As Stone 
says, "the pieces in •christianity and Society • or ' Christianity 
and Crisis • are characterized by a much more frequen t usage of 
theological terms than articles he wrote concurrently for 'The 
Nation' and 'The New Leader' " .(B6) Essentially, however, the 
changes discernable in his l atest book reflect his conviction that 
Biblical myth and symbol need to be translated into terms relevant 
to the contemporary situation. This is borne out in Niebuhr's 
reply to Paul Tillich at a colloquium given in his honour in 1961, 
and recorded by Stone: 
" ... I ... made a mistak e in hurling the traditional 
symbols of Christian realism - the fall and origi-
nal sin - in the teeth of modern culture when I 
sought to criticize the undue optimism of the 
culture. Both these symbols ~ though historically 
significant, are subject to misunderstanding in a 
secular culture ... I still think that Paul Til-
lich's translation of these symbols into ontolog-
ical terms ... is too Plotinian in that it implies, 
if not asserts, that the whole temporal process 
is a corruption of th e eternal. Thereby one 
precious Biblical concept, embodied in _the idea 
of the goodness of creation, may be obscured. I 
would now rather translate these historic symbols 
into descriptive, rather than ontological, terms."(87) 
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Four years after this statement, Niebuhr published Man's .Nature . 
and His Communities in whi c h he seeks to translate the basic sym-
bols of his Christian real i sm into descrip~ive terms . Thus it 
might be said that, in evolutionary terms, Niebuhr moved from . a 
position 1n which he sough t to explore and expound .· Biblical myth 
and symbol, to a position i n which he sought to tra~slate myth and 
symbol into descriptive terms relevant to the contemporary 
situation. 
The Truth In Myth. 
"In the lexicon of the average modern, particularly in 
America, a myth is a piece of fiction, usually inherited from the 
childhood of the race." This is so, writes Niebuhr, because the 
"scientific outlook of our mature culture has supposedly invalid-
ated the truth value of the s e primitive stories:(BB) He is well 
aware that under the impact of modern science, mythological 
thought has lost credence: we live in what has been described as a 
post-mythical age. Niebuhr , however, could never accept the claim 
that our's is a post-mythic a l age. In fact, he spent a lifetime 
~ arguing against the dangers inherent in the secularised myths of 
liberal utopianism and Marxism: sociopolitical myths have shown 
themselves to be potent forces in our so-called post-mythical age . 
In theological terms, Niebuhr believed that it is impossible to 
speak of God's activity in history except in mythical terms. 
Writing in 1937, Niebuhr condemns what he calls "the fashion of 
modern religion to defend itself against the · criticisms of science 
by laborious reinterpretatio ns of its central affirmations with 
the purpose of sloughing off the mythical elements, apologizing 
for them as inevitable conce pts of infantile cultures 11 (89), and 
proceeds to argue that there are aspects of reality which neither 
science nor philosophy can a dequately describe, and which can be 
stated only in mythical terms . 
Niebuhr's preoccupation with the problems of mythical and 
symbolic language demonstrat e s his grasp of the issu~which have 
dominated twentieth century thought to such a large extent. For 
there is much evidence to sh ow that the problems constituted by 
myth and symbol including language, form the major pre-occupation 
of contemporary philosophy. John Hutchinson lists some of the 
inquiries which, "independent of each other, seem to be converging 
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upon the idea o f language (and symbolism) : logic, physical science, 
logical posi~ivism and linguistic philo s o phy, social science, lit-
erary an d artistic criticism, and inquiry into th e na ture of theo-
logical language.( 9D) _Su z an n e Langer's book Philo s op h y i n a New 
~ develops the thesis th a t symb olism and language constitute th e 
new key in which philosoph y will be composed in th e p e riod ahead . 
. She writes: 
"Every age in th e hi stor y o f philosophy h a s its o wn 
preoccupation. It s problems a r e pec uliar t o it, no t 
for obvio us practical r ea s o ns - political o r social -
but for deeper r ea s o ns of int e llec tual growth . . . 
(It has become app a r e nt, sh e continues) that th e ag e 
o f scienc e ha s begotten a ne w philosophical issue, 
i n e stimably more profound than its o riginal e mpiric -
ism . .. th e edific e o f human kn owled ge stand s before 
us, not a s a vast collection o f s e ns e r eports, but . 
as a structure o f fact s that are symb ol s and laws 
that are th ei r meanings. A new philosophical th eme 
has been set f o rth t o a coming age: an e pist emolog-
ical th eme , th e comprehension of sci e nc e . Th e 
power o f symbolism i s its cue, as th e finality of 
sense-data wa s the c ue to a f orme r e poc h. "(91 ) 
Whereas Langer a rgu e s th at modern e mpirical scie nc e has gi ve n 
rise to new epistemo l o gical proble ms wh ich will have t o b e dealt 
with by r e s e arch into th e natur e and function o f symb ol , Ni e buhr 
finds it n ece ss a ry to e xplore th e nature and functi o n o f myth and 
symbol beca us e he believes t hat "it is quite impo ssible to e stab-
lish a sense o f meaning in hist o ry in scientific t e rms. 11 ( 9Z) Fo r 
Niebuhr, th e r e f ore , th e primary functi o n o f myth is t o pr o vide 
the ve hicle by which it is po ssible to picture th e t otality o f 
historical e xp e rienc e. Writing in 1934 , Nieb uh r argu e s th us: 
"A philosophy o f history adequate t o bring all of 
the variou s perspecti ve s, from those o f eco nomists 
a nd political stra t egists to the insights o f 
artists a nd moralists, into a t o tal unity must be 
e nd owe d with th e highe st imaginatio n. I t must 
combine th e e xact d a t a o f th e sci e ntist with th e 
visio n o f the a rtist and must add religi ou s d e pth 
to philosophical generalization. An adequa t e 
phi losoph y o f hist or y must, in short, be a myth -
olog y r a th e r than a p hilosophy . .. mo d e rn c ulture 
is too empiricall y r a tio nalistic that it cannot 
do justic e to th e ve r y history o f which it is a 
contemporary spec tat or. It lacks a visio n o f th e 
wh ole which would gi v e meaning t o th e sp ecific 
eve nts i t s eeks t o c ompr e he nd. A visio n o f th e 
wh ole is possible o n l y if it is ass u med that 
human hist ory has me an ing . .. Meaning can be 
at tribut e d t o history only by a myth olo gy~"(93) 
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While it is easy for myth to be wrongly understood as scien-
tific statement about reality as is the case, for example, where 
the story of creation is treated as hi s torically or scientifically 
true, it is equally true t hat a scientific description of historic 
sequences will not suffice to convey the nature of total reality . 
It is for this reason that the functions of science and myth must 
be clearly defined. The function of myth is defined by Niebuhr 
in the following quotation : 
"It is the genius of true myth to suggest the dim-
ension of depth in reality and to point to a realm 
of essence which transcends the surface of history, 
on which cause-effect sequences, discovered and 
analysed by science, occur. In its (science's) 
effort to bring coherence into its world it can 
escape the error of a too mechanistic view of 
reality only with the greatest difficulty and at 
the price of philosophical corrections to philo-
sophical assumptions unconsciously implied in its 
method. It is bound to treat each new emergent in 
history as having its adequate cause in an ante-
cendent event in history, thus committing the 
logical fallacy, post hoc, ergo propter hoc. 
The religious myth, on the other hand, points to 
the ultimate ground of existence and its ultimate 
fulfillment ... But since myth cannot speak of the 
trans-historical wi t hout using symbols and events 
in history as its f o rms of expression, it invariably 
falsifies the facts of history, as seen by science, 
.to state its truth. Religion must therefore make 
the confession of St. Paul its own: 'As deceivers 
and yet true 1 ( 2 Cor 6:8) . If in addition religion 
should insist that its mythical devices have a 
sacred authority which may de f y th e conclusions at 
which science arrives through its observations, re-
ligion is betrayed into deception without truth."{94) 
The important point to note is his claim that it is the 
function of religion to grasp mythically life in its unity and 
wholeness, and that of science to describe the relation of its 
parts. 
An important aspect of Niebuhr's thought is the distinction 
he makes between ''prescienti f ic myths" and "myths of permanent 
validity". He is critical o f Bultmann in that he believes that 
Bultmann does not make sufficient distinction between these two 
forms of mythological thought. (gS) Niebuhr elaborates the distinc-
tion in his article "The Truth In Myths"; and argues that theolog-
ians retreated too far too quickly in the face of a scientific 
culture because they did not make this distinction sufficiently: 
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"Their error was to disavow permanent myth with 
primitive myth. Religion had no right to insist 
on the scientific a ccuracy of its mythical heritage . 
From this point a r etreat was necessary. That part 
of mythology which is derived from pre-scientific 
thought, which does not understand the causal re-
lations in the natural and historical world, must 
naturally be sacri f iced in a scientific age . But 
there is a permanent as well as a primitive myth in 
every great mythical heritage . This deals with as-
pects of reality which a r e s upra-scientific r~ther 
than pre-scientific. Modernist ic religion has been 
so thin on the whole because it did not understand 
this distinction a nd thus sacrificed what is 
abiding with what is primitive in religious myth . "(96) 
Niebuhr goes on to describe those aspects of reality which can 
only be stated adequately in mythical terms. In this article he 
deals with four such aspects: value (by which he means religion's 
attempt to grasp the organic unity of reality); the idea of 
creation (which relates the source of life to observable life); 
the myth of the fall (which comprehends the paradoxical nature of 
man's sin in terms of freedom and responsibility); and the relig-
ious myths of salvation (emb racing the ideas of incarnation and 
atonement). ( 97 ) In his Beyond Tragedy he includes the parousia 
and the idea of the resurrection of the body as aspects of reality 
which can only be stated in mythol~gical terms.1 9 B) The themes of 
The Nature and Destiny of Man (the image of God in man, man as 
sinner, original sin, justitia originalis, the doctrine of gr ace, 
the atonement , the kingdom o f God, the parousia, the last j udgement, 
and the resurrection) may b e regarded a s his fullest exposition of 
those aspects of reality which can only be stated in mythological 
terms: though, as we have s ee n, he does not use the word myth at 
this point. 
The Characteristics of Permanent Myth 
I 
The symbol of transcendence is integral with Biblical myth. 
For this reason Niebuhr would be in substantial agreement with 
Thielicke's criticisms of Bultmann in which he asserts that it is 
impossible to interpret a mythology in which there is a place for 
transcendence in terms of one in which there is no such place, and 
that the real issue today focuses on transcendence rather than 
mythology. ( 99 ) It is its transcendent referent that prevents re-
ligion from capitulation to the culture of any age, including the 
present one. For this reaso n , Niebuhr speaks of the quality of 
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transcendence in myth as its ''most ·essential genius": 
"· .. it is the virtue of mythical religions that they 
discover symboli of the transcendent in the actual 
without either separating the one from, or identify-
ing it with, the other. This is perhaps the most 
essential genius of myth, that it points to the 
timeless in time, to the ideal in the actual,but 
does not lLft the temporal to the category of the 
eternal (as pantheism does), nor deny the signifi-
cant glimpses of the eternal and the ideal in the 
temporal (as dualism does). (100) 
Attempts to express the truth of ''myths of permanent validity" 
in rational terms leads to absurdity. This for example, is the 
lesson Niebuhr draws from what he describes as the absurdity of 
theologies which "try to d e fine the two natures of Christ and to 
distinguish between the temporal and the eternal in the mythical 
God-man."(lOl) A completely rationalized myth is itself an absurd-
ity because it loses one o f its essential characteristics: its 
capacity to point to the transcendent. Or, pointing to the trans-
cendent, it loses its capacity to express the "organic and paradox-
ical relationship between the conditioned and the unconditioned". 
That is why, Niebuhr continues 
"as Clutton-Brock observed, religion is forced to 
tell many little lies in the interest of a great 
truth, while science inclines to tell many little 
truths in the interest of a great lie. The great 
truth in the interest of which many little lies 
are told is that life and history have meaning and 
that the source and the fulfilment of that meaning 
lie beyond history. The great lie in the interest 
of which science tells many little truths is that 
spatia-temporal realities are self-contained and 
self-explanatory an d that a scientific description 
of sequences is an adequate analysis of causes . "(l02) 
Niebuhr believes that religion has a greater affinity with 
the arts than it does with the sciences, and that great art is 
bound to be religious in th e sense in which Goethe defines art -
as the symbolization of the universal in the particular. The 
artist's portrayal of particular situations or emotions is always 
more than a mere portrayal of the particular . The great artist 
will, in his portrayal of the particular, convey suggestions of a 
universal or transcendent quality. Niebuhr developes this thesis 
in one of his favourite ana l ogies in which he describes the 
differences between portrai t ure and photography. 
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"A portrait is myt hical as compared with the scient-
ific exactitude of a photograph. Though a wise 
photographer will try to catch the permanent and 
significant rather than the passing mood of his 
subject he is always limited by the physical facts. 
The artist, on the other hand, falsifies some of 
the physical details in order to arrive at a sym-
bolic expression of the total character of his 
subject, this total character being a transcendent 
fact which is never completely embodied in any 
given moment of th e subject's existence. A really 
great portrait will go beyond this and symbolize 
not only the transce ndent personality of the subject, 
but will contain s u ggestions of a universal human 
mood."(l03) 
There are dangers in the a r t of portraiture . A portrait can so 
misrepresent its subject matter as to become a caricature of the 
subject. Since mythical thinking is analogous to the art of 
portraiture, the artistic l icence of the artist is analogous to 
the artistic licence of religion, and the same dangers are inherent 
in myth. For myth may so falsify the facts of experience and 
history as to provide a caricature of reality . But at their best, 
says Niebuhr, "both artist and prophet reveal the heights and 
depths of human experience by picturing the surface with something 
more and less than scientific exactness . 11 (104) And, by so doing, 
provide us with a truer picture of reality than is possible in 
purely scientific terms. 
Reference to the comparison between the artist and the prophet, 
leads us to examine a further assertion that Niebuhr makes for 
mythical thinking. For he argues that myth is an essential charac-
teristic of the Hebrew prophetic tradition. Using Nathan Soder-
blom's distinction between religions of culture and religions of 
revelation (~ncluding Judai s m and Christianity , and possibly 
Zoroastrianism) Niebuhr agrees that the distinguishing mark of the 
so-called cultural religion s is that they "seek some rational or 
mystical discipline to penetrate to the eternal forms which trans-
cend temporal reality."(lOS) These religions he defines as 
"mystical''· On the other hand, the distinctive feature of re~ig­
ions of revelation (or prophetic religions) is the idea of the 
transcendent "involved in, but not identified with, the process 
of history."(lD 6 ) These re l igions he defines as "mythical". 
Whilst Christianity has traces of a mystical tradition, it stands 
in a mythical tradition. Ni ebuhr developes this thesis in the 
following way: 
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"(Christianity) owes its primary basis to a mythical 
rather than a mystical religious heritage - that of 
the Hebrew prophet i c movement. Myths are not pec-
uliar to Hebrew re l igion. They are to be found in 
the childhood of e very culture... (and as such) 
mythical thinking i s simply pre-scientific thinking 
... it is (however ) also supra-scienti fie.. . (in the 
sense that) classic al myth refers to the transcend-
ent source and end of existence without abstracting 
it from existence. 
In this sense the myth alone is capable of picturing 
the world as a realm of coherence and meaning with-
out defying the facts of incoherence . Its world is 
coherent because all facts in it are related to some 
central source of meaning . .. The God of mythical 
religion is, significantly, the Creator and not the 
First Cause ... (a rational conception) . .. To believe 
that God created the world is to feel that the world 
is a realm of meaning and coherence without insist-
ing that the world is totally good or that the 
totality of things must be identified with the 
Sacred. The myth of the creator God is basic to 
Hebrew religion. 11 (1 0 7) 
The important conclusion wh i ch Niebuhr arrives at on the basis of 
this thesis is that the proc ess by which the Hebrew tradition 
arrived at its radical mono t heism was motivated by ethical rather 
than rational consideration s . Evil is a fact of life, but it is 
not attributed to God or to nature. The myth of the fall does not 
identify sin with the genes i s of life or with creation. Redemption, 
for prophetic religion, is a possib{lity because the God who tran~ 
cends the created world, pro mises ultimate redemption . However, 
the "realm of redemption is ne ver, as in rational and mystical 
religion, above the realm of living history, but within and at the 
end of it. The insistence of the Hebrew upon the sacred meaning 
of this life ... . is the root of all modern naturalisms, liberal and 
radical; though in the original Hebraic mythical view the process-
es of nature and history are never self-sufficient, . self-explanat-
ory, and self-redeeming. Go d will redeem history (that is the 
mythical emphasis in contrast to naturalism) but it · is the living 
world in its history that wi l l be redeemed (that is the mythical 
emphasis in contrast to the o ther-worldliness of rational-mystical 
1
. . } 11 (108} re ~g~on . . , 
Considering Niebuhr's e t hico-political critique of the "soft 
utopianism" of secular and r e ligious liberalism in America, and 
the "hard utopianism" of Marxism and Nazism, it may be said that 
the ethical consequences he d raws from the Hebrew prophetic 
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emphasis on transcendence is a basic criterion for his social 
ethics. This may be seen in his An Interpretation of Christian 
Ethics where he writes: 
. "The prophetic movement in Hebraic religion offers an 
interesting confirmation of the thesis that a gen-
uine faith in transcendence is the power that lifts 
religion above its culture and emancipates it from 
sharing the fate o f dying cultures . .The prophets 
saved Hebraic religion from extinction when the 
Babylonian exile ended the Hebraic culture-religion 
with its centre in the worship of the Temple . They 
not only saved the life of religion, but raised it 
to a new purity by their interpretation of the 
meaning ·of catastroph e, the redempti v e power of 
vicarious suffering, and the possibility of a re-
demption which would include more than the fortunes 
of Israel. In somewhat the same fashion Augustine's 
faith disassociated Christianity from a dying Roman 
world ..• , 11 (109) 
The relationship between ethics and religion forms the subject of 
a chapter entitled "Mythology and History" in his earlier 
Reflections, in which Niebuhr explores the similarities and dif-
ferences between classical Church,Christian sects, and Marxism in 
their responses to periods o f crisis in history . He argues that 
"an adquate mythology of history must be able to do justice to the 
t . f . . t h " { llO) S . t A · sugges ~ons o mean~ng ~n momen ary c aos . a~n ugust~ne 
(who may be taken to represent classical theology was able to 
regard the collapse of the Roman Empire with some equanimity 
because, in Niebuhr's view, Augustine had a mythology which enabled 
him to see the "rise of the Catholic Church as more than adequate 
compensation for the disintegration of the empire."(lll) This 
same quality is found in both Catholic and Protestant orthodoxy. 
Niebuhr describes it as an '' individualistic mythology" by means of 
which the vicissitudes of a particular period can be transcended 
and peace found "either in an institution of grace (the Catholic 
doctrine) or in a personal experience of grace (the Protestaot 
version) in which a realm of meaning above history was discovered." 
(ll2 ) Another answer to crisis in history is that of the apocal-
yptic Christian sects, whose members compromise the disinherited, 
and who look for redemption through divine intervention in the 
course of history instituting the millenium. 
Marxi-st mythology, Nieb uhr contends, has much to teach the 
Church in these critical time s. Its mythology of history emphas-
izes, on the one hand, the c onviction that · man is responsible 
199 
for moral action in history (unlike the sects), and on the other 
hand it recognizes (with the sects) that historical patterns are 
developed not merely by tho se who try to weave them. "Events in 
history are (therefore) read from a perspective achieved by an 
th . 1 d 1. . . " ( 113) T e ~ca an even a re ~g~ous pass~on . he Marxist mythology 
is a secularized version o f the Hebraic prophetic movement; as 
such it sees meaning in th e historical process, without denying 
moral responsiblity in that process. 
Just as there are Mar xists who, with undue determinism, be-
lieve in the inevitability of revolution and are therefore tempted 
to escape moral responsibility, Niebuhr believes that Christian 
faith in God's redemption of history can tempt Christians to 
escapism. This he believes is the critical issue facing the mod-
ern church. "Religious hope always tends to encourage moral energy 
by promising victory to a seemingly hopeless moral enterprise, but 
it also enervates moral energy by guaranteeing victory too unre-
servedly."(ll4) Writing at a time of social disintegration and 
re-building, Niebuhr believe d that Christianity must rediscover 
the moral imperative which b elongs to its heritage: an imperative 
which Marxism has retained, but which Christianity appears to have 
lost. But the issue was more critical still. Because Marxism is 
a secularized version of the Hebrew prophetic tradition, it betrays 
itself in illusion akin to l iberalism, and clothes itself in a 
"moral prestige ... without moral constraint". This inevitably 
happens when the transcendent quality of the heritage i s eradicated. 
We are men and not God. Wh e n we forget this we are tempted to a 
form of pride which produce s the worst form of fanaticism. This 
point Niebuhr emphasizes with far greater outspokenness in a later 
article entitled "Why Is Co mmunism So Evil?" In this article he 
argues that the basic cause of evil is the monopoly of power which 
communism creates. "Disproportions of power anywhere in the human 
community are fruitful of injustice, but a system which gives some 
men absolute power over other men results in evils which are worse 
h · · t· "(llS) Th b f . f th t t an ~nJus ~ce .. e a use o power ~s, ur ermore, suppor -
ed and aggravated by a whole set of presuppositions and moral 
pretensions derived from what Niebuhr calls "the secular religion 
which creates the ethos of t h e communist society", and leads to 
the "tendency of playing God to human history ... the cause for a 
d f . t 1. " ( 116) great eal o commun~s rna ~gnancy ~ 
200 
In summary, the symbol of transcendence in the Hebrew-
Christian heritage provides the imperative for responsible moral 
action in history. It can, however, enervate moral energ y . The 
secularized myth, be it Marxist or liberal, may retain th e moral 
imperative which belongs to its nature as myth, but removes th e 
constraints upon the abuse of power when the transcendent referent 
is eradicated. When this happens man tends to play God, and 
nothing in history is allowed to refute his presuppositions be-
cause nothing transcends him. This state of affairs is what 
Niebuhr calls ''ideological dogmatism" so inflexible that nothing 
is allowed to test or fals i fy it, and in which th e facts o f hist -
orical experience are re-written t o fit th e ideology rather than 
being allowed to test it. The capacit y for allowing such testing 
belongs only to mythical thinking in which the symbol of trans-
cendence is present. Th e necessity for such t e~ting now leads us 
to a discussion of verific a tion. 
Verification of the Tr u th i n Myth. 
~The ultimate problem of myth is always the problem of God'', 
writes Niebuhr. Primiti ve myth seeks to picture the ca us e behind 
every natural phenomenon: as such it is pre-scientific, and must 
give way to the process of scientific explana tion . On th e other 
hand, permanent myth seeks to approach the "transcendent source 
of meaning" of all e xistence . It is here that the problem of 
verificatio n is r aised . . 11 I f the meaningfulness of life points to 
a source beyond itself, h ow is it possible t o say anything about 
thattranscendence, and h ow c an anything that may be said be 
verified as true?",asks Nie b uhr.(ll7 ) 
Niebuhr's answer to this self-imposed question is con tain e d 
in a tight-knit argument wh i ~h concludes his article " Th e Truth 
I n Myths". We shall summar i ze this argument, because in it h e 
exhibits his belief that it is only in an inter-play between 
historical experience and my thical religion that an answer to the 
problem of verification can be found. 
Not unexpectedly, Niebuhr first considers three no n - mythical 
approaches(llB) to the problem of verificatio n. Basing his argu-
ment on a statement by Morris Co h e n that th e "visio n into th e 
Absolute is either into a f a thomless d ep th in which n o distinct-
tions are visible or into a fulness of being that e x ceeds ou r 
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human c o mpr e he nsio n ", Ni e b uhr a rgu e s that mys t ici s m can only 
e xpr e ss th e distinctio nl e ss a spec t o f tr a ns c end e nce . I t c an say 
no thing ab o ut Go d e xce pt th a t h e n e gat e s t e mp o r a l r e ality . 
P hilo s op hic a l i d e a l ism s ee ks t o d e fin e the transc e nd e nt in rational 
t e rms 9 th e r e by d e stro ying a n e ss e ntial quality o f tr a nsc e nd e nce; 
nam e ly its n o n-rationality in th e ultimat e s e ns e , Mo d e rn 
naturali sm, by c o ntrast , has usually s o ught t o und e rstand th e 
me aning o f e xist e nc e by d e nying the r ea lity o f transce nd o us , I n 
s o d o ing it has c l o th e d th e n a tural proce ss its e lf with a qu a lity 
o f transce nd e nc e: th e fru i ts o f which ar e "e ith e r d e spair in a 
me aningle ss world o r s e ntime ntality i n a world t oo simply meaning -
ful . " It is th e failur e o f ratio nal approach e s t o th e me a ning o f 
e xist e nc e th a t l e ads t o th e ad o ptio n o f a mythic a l appr o a c h in 
whi c h th e transce nd e nt is a ppre h e nd e d . It is h e r e that Ni e buhr 
po s e s a qu e stio n c o nc e rning th e d a ng e r o f " d o gmatism " in th eo l o gy ; 
a qu e stio n whi c h 9 as we h a v e s ee n 9 h e als o po s e s f o r s ec ular myth 
in his critiqu e o f Marxism. He writ e s : 
." .•. th e pr o ble m o f r e ligion is ho w it may d e fin e 
Go d with o ut r e sorting t o a d o gm a tic ac ce ptance o f what -
e v e r mythical d e finiti o n a particular hist oric tr a d-
itio n h a s e ntrust e d t o a ce rtain p ortio n o f th e r e~ 
ligio us co mmunity . Th e mod e rn r e actio n against 
naturalism and ratio nalism e xpr e ss e d in Ba rthianism 
fails 9 sig n ificantly , t o e scap e d o gmatism, I t is 
s u p e rior t o th e o ld e r d o gma t isms o f orth o d o x religio n 
in that it d oe s n o t insis t o n the sci e ntific and 
rati o nal validity o f th e mythical d e tails o f its 
tr a dition. Th e Fall and the Resurr ectio n ar e no t 
co nc e i ve d as hist oric a l in its th eo l o gy . But th e 
t o tal tr uth o f th e Biblical myth is ass e rt e d d o g -
ma t ically with n o e ff o rt t o validat e Christianity in 
e xp e ri e nc e against c o mp e tition with o th e r r e ligions , 
How is it po s sibl e t o e sc a p e this d o gmatism? I t is 
possibl e o nly if it b e r e alis e d th a t th o ugh human 
kn owl e dg e and e xp e ri e nc e a l ways p oint t o a s o urc e o f 
meaning in life whi c h transc e nds kn o wl e dg e and e xp e-
rie nc e , th e r e are n e v e rth e l e ss sugg e stions o f th e 
c haract e r o f this t r ansc e nd e nc e in e xp e ri e nc e . Gr e at 
myths hav e actua l ly b ee n b o rn o ut o f pro f o und e x-
peri e nc e a nd ar e c o nstantly subj ec t t o verificati o n 
by e xp e rie nc e . It may b e simple st t o illustrat e 
t his point in t e rms o f a sp e cific r e ligious d octrine: 
th e Christian d octrin e th a t Go d is l o v e and that 
l o ve is th e high e st moral id ea l . 
Th e id e al of lo v e is n o t a c aprice o f myth o l o gy . It 
is no t t ru e b e caus e t h e Cr oss has r e vea l e d it. Th e 
Cr o ss j ustifie s itse l f t o human faith b e caus e it 
s ymb oli z e s a n id e al which e stablish e s po ints o f 
r e l e 0ance with th e d e e pe st e xp e ri e nce s a~d insights 
o f h uman life .. . 
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: · ·The ~r a ns ce nd e nt s ource o f th e meaning of li f e 
~s thus ~n such a r elation t o all t empo r al process 
t~ a t a prof~ un d insight into any process or r eali ty 
y~ elds a gl~mpse o f th e r ealit y wh ich is beyond i t . 
This r eali ty can be r e v ea l e d a nd e xpr e s s e d o nly i n 
mythical t e rms. The s e mythic al terms are th e mos t 
adeq uat e symbols o f r eali ty beca us e th e reality 
wh ich we e xp e rience co nst a nt l y sugges ts a cen t e r 
a nd s o urce o f r eal i ty, wh ich no t o nly tr a ns ce nd s 
immediate e xp e r ie nc e , b ut also fi nally tra ns ce nds 
th e r a tio nal f o rms and ca t egorie s by which we seek 
t o ap pre he nd a nd describe it . "(ll9) 
To summariz e Nieb uhr's arg umen t, myth a nd symbol are th e only 
adeq u a t e v e hiclffifor e xpr e ss i n g th e quality o f tr an s ce nd e nc e . P ro~ 
f o und i ns ig ht int o any asp ec t o f human e xp e r ience r e veal s glimpse s 
o f tr a nsce nde nt r ea lity . It is in th e in t e r-play between mythical 
e xpr e ssio n o f tr a ns ce nd ence a nd th e r eali ti e s o f hu man e x pe r ie nce 
th at profo und myth i s bo r n , t es t e d , and r e fin ed . It is f o r this 
r ea s on , t o use Nieb uhr's c e l eb r a t e d e x pr e ssion , that myth and 
symb ol must b e t a ke n s e rio usly b ut no t li t e r ally . I f th e symb ol 
~s tak en lit e r ally th e di alec t ical co nc e ption o f time a nd e t e rni t y 
is f al s i fi e d a nd th e ultima t e vi ndication o f God o ve r history is 
r e du ced t o a po int in his t o ry .. . On th e o th e r ha nd if . th e symbol 
is dismiss e d •.. a s me r ely . . • pictur e sq u e or primiti v e ... th e r e -
latio n o f th e historical t o th e e t e rnal , th e Biblical dial ec tic 
is obse uve d in a no th e r d ir e c tio n . All th eologie s which do n o t 
t a k e th e s e symb ols s e rio us l y will b e d isco ve r e d up on close a na l ysis 
n o t t o t ake hi st o ry s e rio us l y e ith e r . 11 ( 1 2 0 ) On th e o ther h a nd, 
Biblical myth is n o t tru e beca u s e it is Biblical . I t mu s t b e 
t e sted in th e cr ucible o f e x pe rie nce . Thus, alth o ugh Ni eb uhr 
gr e atly modi fi es and c hang e s his approa c h in his la t e st boo k , and 
disavo ws th e u s e o f symb ols l ik e "original sin " , prefe rring "more 
s obe r symb o ls", the sa me cr i t e ri o n holds . Thu s he writ e s : "I 
stil l think th e Lo ndon Time s Li i erary S uppleme nt was substantially 
correc t wh e n it wr o t e some y ea r s a g o: 'Th e d oc tri ne o f origina l 
sin is th e o nl y e mpiri c ally v e r ifiable doc trin e of th e Christian 
fa i th . '" ( 121 ) 
Some Cr i t ici sms . 
As we h a v e n o t e d, Ni e b u hr mad e two spec ific c riticisms o f 
Bultmann . On e co nc e rns his f ailur e t o make a suff icient distinc-
tio n be twee n pre- s ci~n tific myth a nd myths o f pe rman e nt v a lidity. 
Th e o th e r do e s n o t me nti o n Bultmann specifi cally , but it le velle d 
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a t "t he pro j ec t f or 'd e myth ologi z ing ' th e Bible" which, Ni eb uhr 
arg ues, "bids f a ir t o red uc e th e Biblical r e velatio n t o e t e rnally 
l .d t th " {122 ) I · va ~ ru s .. , n th~s l a tt e r case , th e cri t ic o f Nieb uhr 
may well a sk wh e th e r he do e s no t lay hims el f ope n t o th e same 
cha r ge whi c h he le vels a t Bul t mann ? Furth e rm or e , cannot th e sam e 
strictur e s which Ni eb uhr in hi s f orma ti ve yea rs levels a t th os e 
wh o , i n th e f ace of moder n scie nce , r e tr ea t t oo f ar to o quickly 
in r e sp ec t o f th e ir us e o f myth, be levelled a t th e Ni eb uhr wh o 
wr ot e Man's Na ture a nd His Co mmunities? Th a t is t o say, Ni e buhr ' s 
c ritici sm ca n be us ed against hims elf . Ni eb uhr's di s a vowal o f th e 
us e o f mythol ogical lang ua ge ? and his a tt e mpt t o correc t th e 
" pe dag o gical err ors '' o f his Gi ff ord Lec tur e s in his lat e st boo k, 
r aise s ome imp ort a nt qu est io ns. I s th e iss ue simply a matt e r o f 
th e app r opriat e meth od of comm un ica tion? I f it is , th en Bultman n 
may well resp ond by a rguin g th a t his proj ec t of de myth olo gi z atio n 
wa s und e rtak e n with th e specific i nte ntio n of finding a more app-
ropriate wa y of communicating wi th mod e rn man. And Bultman n may 
well add that Ni e buhr ha s not und e rst ood his pro j ec t ve ry well 
when he s a ys th a t it " bids f ai r t o r e duce Biblical r e ve latio n t o 
e t e r nally valid truths without a ny e xi st e ntia l e ncount e r betw ee n 
God and ma n . 11 ( 123 ) 
To put th e i s su e in it s simples t f o rm , mu s t we disca r d my t h 
whe n s ee king t o co mmunic a t e with s o-called post - mythical , mod e rn 
man? If we must , th e n sur e l y bo th Bultmann a nd Ni eb uhr ar e o nly 
le ft wi th ' e t e r na lly valid t ruth s ' once co ntain e d in th e now-
dis ca r d e d myths . Niebuhr . f or o ne , is well a wa r e of th e d a ng e rs 
inhe r e nt in this appr oa c h: "W e say we t a ke hi s t oric al fa c ts 
s e rious ly but no t lit e r a lly ; but this may be on th e wa y of no t 
t aking th e m as historic al f acts at all . .. th e r e is peril in t his 
wa y of int e rpr e ting th e Gos pel truth . Th e peril li e s in th e t e nd -
e ncy t o r e duc e Christia nity t o y e t an oth e r phil o s o phy .. 11 ( 124 ) 
Th e issu e ma y be put a noth e r wa y . How import a nt is th e f or m 
whic h Biblical myth t a kes , a nd ca n you r e t ain th e co nt e nt if you 
~ e j ec t t he f orm? Ian He nd e r s on p~s e d th e pr obl e m in thi s way : 
"E ve n if we sta r t off by d e fini ng myth i n a nega tive 
ki nd of wa y a s wh a t is not hist oric all y true, those 
myths which ar e f ound in th e Bible might s t ill ~ pro v e 
t o ha ve an i ndisp e nsi ble place i n th e Chri s ti a h 
me ss a ge . Le t us t a ke f o r e xa mpl e , th e story of th e 
Fall as it is f o und in Ge n . 3. Wh a t th a t passag e 
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contains cannot be historic al truth for it is not 
based on co nt empo r ary r ecords . Yet it co nt ain s 
some kind of truth, for wh ate ver did or did no t 
happe n in th e Gard e n of Ede n, man as we know him i s 
fall e n. Th a t is why it has been said somewhere 
th a t if all th e copies o f Gen. 3 we r e lost, we 
should hav e t o set t o and write something similar . 
But would that some thing be a myth, or would it be 
a demythologized ve rsion of th e Gen. 3 story. Grant 
that i n such a cas e we would ha ve t o r eprod uc e th e 
content of th e Gen e sis story, would we produce it 
in th e same form? . . . For one of the iss ue s between 
Bultm a nn and his critics is wh e th e r we can dispense 
with th e f orm of th e ~yth as long a s we grasp the 
tr uth behind it."(l25) 
Nieb uhr's r e s ponse may well be t o r epea t his contentio n that we 
must take myth and s ymbol seriously ~ o t literally . By this 9 we 
take it 9 he means that it is th e truth co nt ai ne d in th e myth that 
i s important, not th e form. But if this is th e case, th e n why his 
ob j ec tions t o th e de myth ologization project? Further, it is a 
major· th e sis of Niebuhr' s, a s we und e rstand him, th a t myth is th e 
only adeq uat e ve hicl e f or a pprehending th e transcendent . I f he 
~~ts t o e xpr ess transc e nd ence he must, on his own admission, 
sp eak in mythical t e rms. I s no t Th ielicke right wh e n he argues 
th a t it is impossible t o in t erp r e t a myth olog y in which th e r e is · 
place for transc e nd e nc e int o· one in which th e r e is not.( 126 ) 
Another criticism may be e xpre ss e d i n th e s e t e rms : is ·moder n 
man in fa c t post-mythical? Or to put th e question another way, i s 
mythical thinking a charact eristic only of Biblical time s, or i s 
i t not a ba s ic f orm of human th o ugh t? Again, it is a b~sic th esis 
of Nieb uhr ' s that it is imp os sible to e xpr e ss th e transc e nd e nt in 
anythi ng oth er th a n symbolic a nd mythical t erms . This surely hold s 
tr ue f or modern man .as much as it does for Biblical times . . I f 
Suz a nn e Langer is right, th e n symb ol, myth, a nd ritual will play a 
signific a nt r ole in this e r a . 
We ag r ee wi th He nd e rs on wh en he writes: "is it not th e trans -
ce nd e nt rath e r th a n th e myth ological th a t man of t o-da y objects t o? 
His quarrel is not s o much with th os e who trea t th e oth er-worldly 
as this-w orldly", as myth doe s, "i t is r a th e r with a nybody wh o 
maintains that th e r e is an oth e r - worldly at all . 11 ( 127 ) I f you 
translat e Henderson's ''o th er-worldly " as tra nsc e nd ence, which is 
what we belie ve he means 9 th e n we a r e back with Niebuhr o nc e more. 
For he contends th a t Christian th eis m, with its co nception of a 
transc e nd e nt-imman e nt God, c a n only be e xpr es s ed in mythical terms . 
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Perhaps Niebuhr's rej oinder to this would be that the accept-
ance of his theological pre suppositions is nat as important as the 
acceptance, by realists and political philosophers, of his analysis 
of the human situation. Pe rhaps he would argue that the acceptance 
of the presuppositions on which his analysis was made ~s irrelevant 
as long as the truth of th e analysis is grasped. The error he has 
confessed to is a pedagogical one. 
We must now turn from an examination of Niebuhr's use of myth 
and symbol to another key for interpreting history which he may be 
discerned to use: namely his understanding of history as "drama". 
It should perhaps be stressed a t this point t hat we use the word 
'discerned' advisedly; for nowhere does h e present us with a sys-
tematic treatment of his modes of thought in this regard. Further-
mare, it should be noted that for the purposes of analysis it is 
necessary to distinguish different aspects of his th ought . But 
in so doing we do not want to create an impression of discontin-
uity. All these aspects belong ultimately to the rich whol e nes s 
of his tho~ght. 
• 
(iii) TRAGEDY AND IRONY IN THE DRAMA OF HISTORY 
The historical process has been likened by Niebuhr to the 
painter's flat canvass . Any attempt t o portray a f eeli ng of 
depth on canvass necessarily in volves the us e of "deceptive sym-
bols". Parallel lines, for e xample, are nat drawn as parallel 
lines. They are made to appear as if they co nv erge . For this is 
how they appear when en vis a ged from a t otal perspe~tive. " Th e 
necessity of picturing thin gs as they seem rather than as t he y are, 
in order to record on one dimension what th e y are in two dimens-
ions, is a striking analogy, in the fi eld of space , of the problem 
f 1 . . . t h h f t . •~ . t N . b h ( 12 8 ) T h · a re ~g~on ~n e sp ere o ~me , wr~ es ~e u r . ~s 
analogy between ar t and religion, to which we have re f erred in 
our discussion of myth and symbol, serves to indicate what might 
be termed the .artist -observer role whi c h Niebuhr adopts in his 
interpretation of th e drama of history . It is this role rath er 
than that of a philosopher or a critical historian which most 
accurately describes Niebuhr's stance before history . 
As we have indicated, · Niebuhr believed history to be revelat-
ory of meaning. It contains 'symbols of transc e nd ence' which 
point to the ultimate source of mea ning, a nd which can · most 
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adequately be expre ssed i n mythological terms. Such a view of 
history is, he believes, integral to the Hebrew-Christian heritage. 
it is not surprising, therefore, that he should describe history 
as "drama". I t is in The Self In the Dram~of History, written 
during what he describes as ''two years of enforced leisure" after 
a serious operation in 1952, that he gives most explicit express-
ion to the dramatic element in history. The book is :primarily 
designed to explore the dime nsi o ns of human selfhood and acknow-
ledges its indebtedness to ·Martin Suber's I and Thou. He 
summarizes the contents of Part On e of th e bpok so as to delineate 
his understanding of drama : 
"The dialogues of the self with itself, with others , 
and with God . 
The freedom of th e self which makes these dialog ues 
possible. Drama a s th e . historical deposit of the 
dialogues. 11 (129) 
The self, by virtu e of its fre e dom o ve r th e natural process(which 
determinism denies), is en a bled to be a "creator " in history . But 
the self is no t o nly a creator. It is also a "creat ure " of the 
web of historical e ven ts in whi c h it participates (something 
which voluntarism tends t o overlook). Any vie~ of history which 
blurs th e double role of the s elf, as creator .and creature leads 
t o err or . freedom and neces sity are integral aspects of th e self. 
If justice· is to be done t o both th e s e aspects of .the s elf, a 
dramatic .view of history is th e only adequate one to hold . 
Niebuhr argues for this vi e w in th e following .way: 
"The dialogues p in which th e self is involved, are 
transmuted into dra mas wh e n e ver th e y precipitate 
action. These actio ns are formed into dramatic 
patterns which cons t itute a web of destiny for th e 
individual ... Th ese dramatic patterns may exte~d 
to various communit i e s 9 family, local, or nation~l. 
The dramatic patterns are historic r ealities in 
which freedom and n e cessity a r e variously compounded ... 
The dramatic · patterns contain causal sequences which 
may be analysed with some degree of .acc ur ax:.y . .. 
(but these) analys e s of historical patterns must 
lack the scientific precision which characterize 
the conclusions of t he natural sciences .. . they 
must fail in th e t e s t of .predictability which is 
th e hallmark of any e xac t science. 
Historical patterns are in a ca t egory of reality 
which canna~ be ide ntifi ed with th e s tructures of 
nature . They are t o be sharply distinguished from 
natural structure s b e caus e th e y r epre s en t a com-
pound of fr eedom a nd necessity. 11 (1 3 0) 
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It is because historical patterns are so complex that they 
defy attempts at generalization by either scientist or philoso-
pher. For where variables are multiple and cannot be dissociated 
verification, the vary basis of a scientific or philosophical 
handling of history, is a~ impossibility , History, therefore, 
could never be completely d escribed and de t ermined by cycles or 
patterns of development , That there are appearances of cycle and 
development within human history is beyond question , However, i n 
Niebuhr's view "both describe, not patterns, ' but conditions for 
the historical drama , ''~lJl ) The fact that the patterns which 
appear cannot be rigorously verified is in keeping with the ex-
perience of human freedom. The historical drama is ju s t this 
paradoxical struggle betwe e n freedom and necessity. 
The unique contribution of the Biblical tradition to the 
understanding of history lies in its concepts of freedom and r e-
sponsibility, and in its view of history as drama. Niebuhr ac k-
nowledges that thia tradition has often been corrupted , He is 
under no illusiornin this regard, The Biblical tradition is, and 
· ~ has been, subject to error. At best , however, the Biblical tradi-
tiori has ''guarded the 'facts' of freedom and responsibility and 
acknowledged the selfconcern of the self .. , It also introduced a 
sense of the dramatic quality of history and the u nique~ess : of i ts 
. . "{132) var1ous occas1ons ,,, . 
Whilst The Self in the Dramas of History was written relativ-
ely late in Niebuhr's career , it does elaborate a theme which 1s 
subordinate in some of his earlier books, as he points out in it s 
Preface , Considering ~he e volution of his thought as a whole, i t 
can be argued that his understanding of history as "drama" is a 
theme which runs through mo st of his ~ark , In the evolution of 
his thought, however, the d ramatic interpretation of history has 
remained constant whereas the 'actors' and the 'action' have 
changed with his changing p e rspectives. 
His ~isillusionment, for example, with liberalism: poli t ical, 
theological, economic, and moral has been documented in Chapte r 
Two of his work. While his later polemics against liberalism 
teod to obscure his indebtedness ~o the liberal tradition, it ma y 
be argued that his disilluSionment stemmed from the belief -tha t 
this tradition did not do justice to the drama of history. 
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Liberalism, in the sense of a totally optimistic philosophy of 
life, was not warranted wh e n viewed in the cont~xt of the dramas 
of history. Thus, ~n 1936 , Niebuhr wrote: 
"Liberalism is in short a kind of blindness . . . It is 
~ blindness which does .not . see the perennial dif-
ference between human actions and aspirations, the 
perenni9l source o f conflict between life and life, 
... the torturous ch aracter of human ~istory."(l33) 
Niebuhr's move 11 beyon d. Socialism", partie ular ly in its Mar x ist 
form, is another example of a change in · perspective prompted by 
the fact that this altern~tive to liberalism was inadequate when 
viewed in the context of the dramas of history~ There is no doub t 
that he was attracted to Marxism partly because- of its realism, 
partly because of its social analysis and its vision of a more j ust 
socialized society. In an interview with Ronald Stan~, N~ebuhr 
described his Reflections o n the End of an Era, which document s 
his fascination with Marxis t mythology, as his "most ·Marxist 
work. 11 (lJ 4 ) However, his a tt~action to Marxism was never unqual-
ified, as _we showed in Chap t er Two and in this _present chapter. 
His rejection of Marxist and Socialist : altern~tives ~as based in 
part . upon a critique of the tenets of , these alternatives, and 
partly because they did not 'fit' the facts of historical ex-
perience . Stone sums up Ni e buhr's position in regard to liberal-
ism and Marxism, when he . writes:, 
."The criticism of Marxism was in essence the same as 
the critici~~ of li b ~ralism; both creeds weie 
blinded by utopian illusions to the need for re-
solute political action for achie~able moral e~ds . 
~arxist realism had exposed the illusions of · 
libei-alism, and Au gustiNkn realism exposed Marxist 
illusions. 11 (135) ~ 





It was .not an "Augustinian realism which enabled Niebuhr 
Marxist illusions . · I~ . ~as iather a · composite of a re-
discovery of the validity 6f the prophetic element in the Biblical 
tradition plus _an indebtedn-e s s to· Augus-tine, which Niebuhr called 
Christian Realism, that enabled him to do so . And -it was from 
this composite moral traditio n that there emerged the concepts of 
"tragedy" and 11 irony" that we r 'e · integral with Niebuhr's inter pre-
tation of history in his mature years . 
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Tragedy and Irony in History. 
Niebuhr's Beyond Tragedy is devoted to an exposition of the 
dialectical relationship between time and eternity, between God 
and the world, and between nature and grace, as these are con-
ceived within the Christian faith. An ancillary theme of the 
sermonic essays in this bo o k is, . as we have seen, the expositio n 
of the natur~ and function of myth and symbol. The th esis of th e 
book, based on the central ity ·of the Cross in the Christian world 
view, is elaborated in the following passage from the Preface: 
."It · is the th esis o f these essays that the Christian 
view of history passes through th e sense of th e 
tragic to a hope and an assurance which is 'beyond 
tragedy' ... Christianity's vi ew of history is tragic 
insofar as it recognizes e vil as an inevitable 
concomitant of e ve n the highest spiritual enterprises . 
. It is beyond tragedy ina~far as it does not regard 
evil as inherent in existence itself but as finally 
under the dominion of a good God."(l36) 
This book, published in 1937, is perhaps the most important 
one to come out of his formative years when he was searching for 
an alternative to the liberal and socialist views of history with 
which he had become disillusioned . . It is significant, we believe, 
that it was writt en during the period wh en his search for an 
alternative led him to a rediscovery of the significance of th e 
prophetic interpretation of hist~ry in the Biblical tradition and 
the Augustinian interpretation ~n classical theology. 
The roots of Niebuhr's notion of 'tragedy and beyond trag edy' 
are many. Richard Kroner in tracing the historical roots of 
Niebuhr's thought believes that Dostoe vsky and Unamuno exerted an 
influence on his thought. (l J 7 ) His realism arises from th e fact 
that Niebuhr is neither an o pti~ist nor a pessimist in any 
ultimat e sense, though his be lief that there is a position 'beyond 
tragedy' places him closer t o optimism. His r eali sm is d e rived 
in part also, from the lesso ns he learned from the liberal and 
socialist traditions . . To d e ny this would be to misrepresent the 
development of his thought . . For it is the same man thinking 
about history who arrives a t a belief in a - position 'beyond tragedy'. 
Hbwever, the roots of his thought are earl y embedded in the Bib-
lical and classical traditio ns. Proof of this fact is a passage 
in his Reflections(l934): 
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"The genius of classical r eligio n is t h a t i t f i nd s 
a basis for optimism a ft e r i t has en t ertai ned the 
most thoroughgoing pessimi sm .. . I n t he class i c al 
religious worldvie w man himself is co nceived a s a 
source of chaos .. . no complete ema ncipa t ion fr om 
the conf usio n and s elf-de s t r uc t io n of co nflicti n g 
egoisms is e x pected in mu nda ne h i story . Su c h 
emancipa t io n is expected only above his t o ry ( i n 
the Greek view) or at t he e nd o f his t o ry (acco rd -
ing to Heb r e w myt holog y ) . " ( 1 3 8) 
In a much la t er work The Irony of Americ a n Hist o r y (19 52 ) 
Niebuhr defined tragedy in t erms whic h reveal h ow d eeply e mbe dd ed 
• are these root s . It al s o reveals how hi s u nd e rstand i ng o f th e 
tragic element in history remai ned a co nst an t mo t i f : " Th e tragic 
element in a human situ a t ion is con s ti tut ed o f con s cio us c hoice s 
of evil for the sa ke of good . I f me n or n a t io ns d o evil i n a 
good cause; if t hey cover the ms el ves wi t h guil t i n o rd e r t o fu l-
fil some high responsibility; or if th ey s ac r i f ice s ome h i gh 
value for the sake o f a hig h e r o r eq ual o ne, th e y ma k e a tr a gic 
choice .. . Tragedy elicits a dm i r a t io n a s well a s pity beca u se i t 
combines nobility wit h g uilt. "(l J 9 ) I n t h e dr a ma o f c o nt e mpo r a ry 
history an outstandi n g e x am ple o f tr a g ed y i n Nieb uhr ' s v ie w i s 
the necessity for us ing nu clear d e t e rr an t s f o r 'th e pre s e rv a t io n 
o f peace . 
A provi s io nall y t r agic view o f h i st o ry r emai n e d a n es s e nt i a l 
part of Nieb uh r's th o u gh~. Crucial t o th is vi e w i s Nieb uhr's 
assertion tha t men are i nvo l ved i n th e co ns cio us c h oice o f e vil 
i n their s earch for j us t ice in histo ry . Th e fig ~r e o f Da v i d is 
perhaps the mos t o ut standi n g symbol of this tragic elemen t in 
history~ 140 ) Fo r , a s Nieb u h r s ay s, "David wa s a ma n o f wa r a nd 
~ . .. 
also a man o f God.'' As k i n g a n d st a t e s man David wa s r e s po ns i b le 
for the uniting in t o one ki n gdom o f t he t ribe s o f I srael , a n d a s 
such was involved in conflict an d wa r. Bu t because h e had s he d 
blood in carrying o ut hi s r e s po nsibilit ies, he wa s co ns ide r ed n o t 
worthy enough to b uild th e Temple . How ca n a ma n i nvolved in wa r 
b uild a t emple to a God who tra ns ce nd s co n flic t a nd st a nd s i n 
j udgement o f the sin s i nvolved i n t he p urs ui t o f t he h ig h e st 
values. The historical a n s we r t o th i s dilemma wa s th a t Solomo n 
built the temple, a nd not Da v id. Bu t t he Temple wa s no t b uilt, 
a r gues Niebuhr on th e vi rtu e s o f Solomo n ' s r eig n , b ut o n th e 
stability achieved t hrough David' s r eign o f unea sy co ns cie nce . 
David is the symbol o f the tragic eleme nt i n h isto ry , f o r i t i s 
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because of the ambiguities of human enterprise that th e pursuit 
of a good cause should involve men in compromise. Yet it is also 
the source of all genuine cre ativity in history. "Whatever th e 
prophets may say therefore", concludes Niebuhr, "there will always 
be King Davids. Nor could history exist without them. They are 
actually the authors of all human enterprise. Many of them do not 
have . David 1 s uneasy conscience. 11 (l 4l) For those who are involved 
in compromise, and who do have an uneasy conscience, the ch urch 
must be that place in society where men are not only disturbed by 
the word of judgement but where the word of God's mercy, consola-
tion, and reconciliation is heard. 
It is perhaps this view of the tragic whi ch led Niebuhr t o 
speak a belated word in mitig a tion of his disapproval of Henry 
Ford, with whom he had fought so bitterly in his Detroi t days. As 
he told an interviewer from the Oral History Research Sec tion o f 
Columbia University: 
"Perhaps I ought to confess •.. that I'm not as sur e 
as I was in my Detroi t days that Henry Ford was 
quite as bad as I thought him t o be ... (Nonetheless) 
contrasting Ford's idealism without self-knowledge 
and Fred Butzell's id e alism and shrewed self-knowledge 
awakened me from my moralistic slumber." (142) 
It remains, however, one of th e enigmatic f eatures of Niebuhr's 
thought that in spite of this co nfession he was never able to 
credit Henry Ford with the undoubted contribution he made to th e 
progress of industrialization in th e United States. This is all 
the more puzzling when we consider his understanding of trag edy. 
It appears that Niebuhr was able to tr ea t David more sympathetic-
ally than he was able to tr eat Henry Ford. Yet it is a real 
question as to whether Ford is not a modern counterpar t o f David 
in the sense in which history has shown Ford to be an "author of 
... . human enterprise" even if he did not, in Niebuhr's view, have 
an "uneasy conscience". 
Whereas tragedy involves a conscious choice of evil f or th e 
sake of good, the ironic element in history is related to an un-
conscious weakness in th e human situation. Whil e the concep t of 
tragedy remained an integral part of Niebuhr's interpretation of 
history, he himself moved beyond tragedy with th e publication in 
1952 of The Irony of American History. The shift from a tragic 
to an ironic interpretation of history is, as we have come to 
expect of Niebuhr, concomitant with oth er changes in his thought. 
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In the post World War Two era he became increasingly involved 
with the problems of international politics. It was also the 
period during which he b~came e ngrossed in a vindication of dem-
ocracy. Before the war had ended, he published The Children of 
Light and the Childre n of Da rkness: a book which has as its sub-
title "A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Tradition -
al Defence." In her biography Bingham calls the chapter which 
deals with this period of Niebuhr's life: "Selling Democracy". In 
it she describ e s the situation out of which this book was born in 
these terms : 
"Already, during th e war, as Niebuhr flew the Atlantic 
in his bucket seat, he had conjectured that the self-
corrective syst e m of democracy was the primary aim 
for which the Allied forces were fighting. Through 
their heroic efforts, backed by the industrial might 
of the home front, this system was being saved from 
it enemies. But how was it to be saved from its 
friends. 11 (143) 
His d e fence of democracy, and his involvement in international 
politics were partly responsible for the shift from a tragic to an 
ironic view of history. Eq ually important is the shift which may 
be discerned in the Niebuhr of the late forties when he turned 
from probing the causes of evil in history to which he had devoted 
so much of his life, to give attention to possible solutions. It 
is a period marked by a n e w openness to the possibilities of human 
accomplishments. Niebuhr's openness to these possibilities is 
qualified however, by his understanding of irony. 
Once more it is the interplay between the contemporary sit-
uation and the Biblical tradition which produce the mode of inter-
preting history for Niebuhr . That mode is irony. He uses it 
because it is more adequate than tragedy for the elucidation of 
the possibilities and dangers inherent in contemporary history. 
And it is these possibiliti e s and dangers which force him back to 
the Biblical tradition where he finds support for an ironic mode 
of interpretation. 
Niebuhr defines irony in the following manner: 
"Irony consists of apparently fortuitous incongruit-
ies in life which are discovered, upon closer ex-
amination, to be not merely fortuitous. ·Incongruity 
as such is merely comic. It elicits laughter. This 
element of comedy is never completely eliminated 
from irony. Eut irony is something more than comedy. 
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A comic situation is pr o v e d t o be an ironic one if 
a hidden relation is discovered in th e incongruity. 
If virtue becomes vic e thro ugh some hidd e n d e f ec t 
in the virtu e; if strength becomes we akn e ss because 
o f th e v a nity to wh ic h stre ngth may prompt th e 
mighty man or n a ti o n ; if s ec urity is transmut e d 
into insecurity be c ause t oo much r eliance is placed 
up on it; if wi sd om becomes f o lly b eca us e it d oe s 
no t know its o wn limits - in all such cases th e 
situation is ironi c . 11 (144) 
Irony must be distinguish ed fr o m pathos and trag e dy. I n a pathet-
ic situation, a per s o n is c a ught up in a fortuit o us c ircumstanc e 
over whic h he h a s no co ntrol, a s f o r e x a mpl e , in a natural 
disaster. As we ha ve seen , · a tragic situation is o n e in wh ich a 
consciou s c hoice is involv e d, and th e r e for e a degree o f r e sp o ns -
ibility also. ·furth e rmor e , " whil e a pathetic or a tragic situatio n 
is not dissolved wh en a person becomes conscious of his involvement 
~n it, an ironic situatio n must dissol ve, if me n or n a t ions are 
made aware o f their complicity in it. 11 ( 14 5 } Men or nati o ns may 
respond t o a disclo sur e o f th e irony o f th e ir situation in o ne of 
tw o ways, says Niebuhr. I t may lead to "a n abatement of th e pre-
t ensio n " which gives ris e t o th e irony; this h e t e rms "co ntriti o n". 
On the ot her hand, awareness o f irony may l ea d t o a . " desp e rat e 
accentuation o f th e vanities t o th e point wh e r e irony turns i nt o 
'1 .. (146} pure e v ~ . 
By pointing t o th e iro n ic eleme nt ~n co nt e mporary hist ory, 
Niebuhr believed he co uld ex p o s e th e unc o nsci ou s wea kn e ss e s h e 
d i s cerned in th e stre ngths o f his o wn co untry. As Ce rvantes had 
laughed at th e ideals o f c hivalry thro ugh Don Quixo t e, so Niebuhr 
s o u g ht to us e irony to e xp o s e th e hidd e n d a n gers lurki n g in post -
war America . I t is th e hidd e n, or unc o nscious quality of th e 
ironic in history which is s o well symboliz e d f o r Nieb uhr in 
Cervan t es' figure. "Don Qui xo t e' s ironic e spousal and r e futation 
o f the ideals of knight erra ntry may be detec t ed by th e r ea d e r 
wh ose imagination is guided by th e artist-observer, Ce rvantes . " 
But, Niebuhr adds, "Do n Quixot e is as unc o ns cio us of the absurdity 
o f his imitation o f th e ide a ls of chi valry as the knights are 
un co ns cio us o f the fraud ule nce o f th e ir ideals. 11 ( 14 7 ) 
To be able t o discern irony in hist ory it is n ece ssary to 
adopt th e role o f an "artist -ob s e rver" wh o is at o nc e both d e t ached 
from, and involved in that hist o ry. 
pretations of history are difficult. 
For this r ea son ironic inte r -
Ye t men d o hav e th e capacity 
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to transcend their situations and so are able to detect the irony 
~n them. However, this happens only rarely in history because as 
Niebuhr says, "the combination of critical, but not hostile, de-
tachment, which is requir e d .. . , is only infrequently attained." 
Whil e conceding that irony may be detected in history by men 
without the presuppositio n s of Christian faith, Niebuhr finds 
support for an ironic view of hist ory ~n that faith. I n fact h e 
argues that the Christian faith makes the ironic view of history 
"normative". On the one hand, the Biblical view of evil is ironic, 
and on the other hand, th e Biblical view of human freedom is 
ironic. 
II 
In Niebuhr's own words: 
the Christian faith tends t o make the ironic 
view of human e vi l in history the normative one. 
Its conception of r edemption from evil carries it 
beyond the limits of irony, but its interpretation 
of the nature of e vil in history is consistently 
ironic. This con s istency is achieved on the basis 
of the belief that the whol e drama of human history 
is under th e scrutiny of a di v ine judge wh o laughs 
at human pretensio ns without being hostile to 
human aspiration s ... 
The Biblical interpretation of the human situation 
is ironic, rather than tragic or pathetic, because 
of its unique formulation of the problem of human 
freedom ... man's fre e dom does not require his 
heroic and tragic d e fiance of the f orce s of Natu r e 
He is not necessarily involved in tragedy in 
his effort to be human .. .. His situat ion is not ... 
comprehend e d as a pathetic imprisonment in th e 
confusion of Nature . The e vil in human history i s 
regarded as the conse qu ence o f man's wr o ng us e o f 
his unique capacities ... Man is an i r o nic creature 
because he forgets that h e is no t simply a c r ea t o r 
but also a creature ."(l48) 
Niebuhr, thus, finds justification f o r his us e of irony a s a 
mode of interpreting histo r y in the Biblical conception of man. 
Man is both creator and cr e ature; both fr ee agent and r e sponsible. 
An ironic interpretation o f history is required if thes e two 
aspects of man 1 s nature are to be held in creative balance. An 
ironic interpretation becomes necessary when it is apparent that 
this creative balance is in danger of being lost. 
Niebuhr believed that the adve nt of th e nuclear age has 
given n e w plausibility to a tragic vi~~ of history . He also be -
lieved, however, th a t a pu r ely tragic view of life is not "finally 
viable". It is, at any rate, not the Chris tian view" according 
to which, he wrote, "destructivenes s is not an ine v itable 
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co ns e qu e nce o f h uma n c re a tivity. I t is no t in va ri a bly nece s sary 
t o do e vi l i n o rd e r th a t we ma y d o goo d. 11 ( 149 ) Th e r e wil l always 
b e tr a gic eleme nts in h i st ory . Goo d and evil will alway s b e 
c urio us l y a dmi xe d in hist o ry . Bu t , Ni e buh r arg ue d 
" .. . th e Christian f a ith is sur e ly right in n o t 
r ega rding th e t ragic a s t h e fi nal e l e ment in 
human e xist e nce . Th e tragic mo t if j s, at any 
r a t e , su bo rd i n a t ed t o t h e iro n ic o n e b e ca us e 
e vi l a nd d e st r ucti v e n e s s a r e n o t t o b e r e-
gard e d as th e in e vitabl e c o ns e q u e nc e o f t h e 
e xe rcis e o f h uman cr e ati vity . Th e r e is alwa ys 
th e id ea l p ossibi l ity t hat ma n will b r e ak and 
trans ce nd th e s i mpl e h a r mo n i e s a nd n e c e ss i t i e s 
o f h i s t o r y , a n d y e t n o t b e d e stru c ti v e . Fo r 
th e d e stru c ti v e ne s s i n hu ma n l i f e i s primarily 
th e co ns e qu e nce o f e xc eeding , n o t th e b o und s o f 
Na t ur e , but much mor e u l t ima t e limits . Th e Go d 
o f th e Bible i s , ' j e al o us ' . Bu t Hi s 
j e al o u sy i s n o t aro us e d by the a c hi e v e me nt s o f 
c u l tur e and c i v ili z atio n . Ma n ' s d o mi n i o n ove r 
Nature i s d ec l a r e d t o b e a r igh t f u l o n e . 
Div~ n e j ea l o usy is a r o us e d b y ma n ' s r e f us a l t o 
ob s e r ve th e limi t s o f h i s f r ee d o m. "( l 50 ) 
Wh e n ma n r e fus e s t o o b s e r v e ' th e limi t s o f his f r ee d o m' i n t hi s 
u l tim a t e s e nse, th e n ' virt u e bec omes v ic e ' and mu s t b e e x p o s e d 
f o r what i t i s . 
Ha v ing come t o t his u nd e r s t a nding o f ir o n y , h e d e v o t e d muc h 
o f his wri t i n g b e ginni n g wi th Th e I r o ny o f Ame r ic an Hist o r y t o 
t h e ta sk o f r eve aling t h e i r o ni e s o f c o nt e mp o r a ry h i s t ory. Ro nald 
St o n e has sh own that b e tw e e n 19 52 a nd 1969 Ni e b uhr wr o t e o r 
j o int l y - auth ored f o ur ma j o r b oo k s wi t h t h i s s pec i f ic f unct io n . (l Sl) 
Ni e b u hr belie v e d t hat Ame ric an h i st o r y was pa r tic ula r ly op e n 
t o iro ni c i nt e rpr e tatio n . Co mm un i s m, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , r eve al e d 
no t onl y the h e i g hts o f irony, but a lso th e d ang e rs t ha t a b o un d 
wh e n iron y is n o t hee d e d . "O ur mo d e rn lib e r a l culture" , h e wr o t e, 
"o f whi c h Ame rica n c i vilizatio n is s uc h a n u nall o yed e x e mpla r , i s 
in vo lv e d in ma n y i r o nic r e f utatio n s o f it s o rigi n a l p r e t e ns i o ns 
o f virt ue , wisd o m, a nd powe r . " Howeve r, h e co ntinu e d, " Co mmu n i s m 
ha s al r e ady ela b o ra t e d s ome o f t h e s e p r e t e n s i o n s in t o n o x i o us 
f o rm s o f tyranny " and we a r e th e r e f o r e in v o lv e d " in t h e d o ubl e 
iro ny o f co nfro nting evils which we r e d istill e d fr om i l lu s i o n s 
n o t g e n e r i cal ly diffe r e nt f r o m o ur ow n . " (l S2 ) 
A p a rticular l y goo d e x a mpl e o f hi s appli c a t i o n o f a n iro nic 
int e rpr e t a t io n o f co n t e mp o r a r y hi st o ry i s an articl e he wr o t e f o r 
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the Journal of Internatio nal Affair s in 1967, which he called 
"The Social Myths~ the 'Cold War'" · ( 153 ) We choose this article 
because it not only reveals the way Niebuhr applied irony to 
history, but also indicates his us e o f myth in contemporary history. 
In the abdve article Niebuhr e xplores th e ironic element in 
the 'Cold War' by comparing the myths and realities e vid ent in the 
contest between the Soviet Union and the Un i t ed States. Both these 
"super-powers", he argues, reveal imperialistic dimensions and 
have foreign policies which are support ed by s ocial myths. 
He defines a social myth as a "collectiv e s el f -image" , and 
argues that every "class and nation defends its elf and justifies 
its interests by a social myth''· Such a myth is "constructed by 
imaginative elaborations of act ual history" but hardly ever "made 
out of the wh ole cloth" of that history. This is because n o 
nation has a purely rational und erstanding of its history : r ea son 
is "always part master and part servant" o f the " s ocial s elf". 
Communism, writes Niebuhr, has achieved its political and 
economic status on the basis of "a most comprehensive myth, rooted 
in an apocalyptic, semi-religious, and pseudo-scientific program 
of revolutionary social redemption from all social injustice . " 
(154) 
Itssocial presuppos t ions have a more vi v id mythical basis 
than those of Western democracies. But this ~s not to say that 
Western democracies ha ve no mythical basis . As h e has stat e d 
elsewhere, "democrac y ~s a 1 bourgeois ideology' in so far as it 
expre ss es the typical viewpoints of th e middl e classes who ha v e 
risen to power in European civilization", and most of th e d emoc-
ractic ideals, 
(155) classes . " 
as we know them, were weap on s of th e commercial 
There is, however, a precaution which Niebuhr 
contends must be born in mind wh e n discussing th e characteristics 
of social myth. While it is generally suppos ed that d emoc racy 
has its basis in what he stigmatizes as th e " mythically pure 
individualism" of bourgeois society, the history of so-call e d 
"free societies" suggests that th e y, t o some degree, es tablish ed 
themselves for other reasons than thos e contained in their 
official myths. Their development d oes not always correspond to 
the s ocial myth by which they justify th em s el ves . Niebuhr argues, 
for e x ample, that in the democratic nation- stat e th e s o v e r eig n 
power was usually secure enoug h to allow th e development o f trad e-
uni onism to take place. By this process of pressure and 
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co unter- pressu r e, a " t ole r a bl e e quilibrium o f pow e r " wa s e stab -
l ish e d , a s a r e s ul t o f wh ic h a fr ee s oci e ty was pro d uce d. (lS 6 ) 
Ni eb uhr d e vo t e s a c ha pt e r o f Th e I r o n y o f A m e r ic a ~ rlis t o ry 
ent i tl e d " Th e Triumph o f Exp e ri e nc e Ov e r Do gma " t o a f ull e r 
e l abo r a tio n o f wh a t h e ca l l s th e '' iro nic f o rm of suc ce ss " in th e 
e xp e ri e nce o f Ame ric a ; (lS 7 )wh e r e pr a gmatism ha s dicta t e d t he 
c ou rs e o f e vents t o a fa r gr e at e r e xt e nt than Ame rican s t h e ms e lv e s 
a r e pr e par e d to admit . 
Th e th e sis whi c h Niebuhr s e ts ou t t o d e mo ns tra t e in r e la t i on 
t o th e 'Co ld War ' is th a t t h e r e i s iro ny to b e d i s ce rn e d in th e 
f ac t that b oth th e So vie t Un ion and t he Un i t e d St a t e s promo t e t h e 
myth o f a nti - imp e rial ism whil e at th e s am e time pra c t isi n g a f o r m 
o f it. "I t is o n e o f th e mo s t v i vid iro n i e s o f mod e rn hist o ry " , 
h e wr it e s , " that b o th th e s e s~ p e r p o w e r s e x pr e s s id e al s o f a n t i -
i mp e rial ism, "( lSB ) wh e r ea s b o t h " al s o wi e ld imp e ri a l p owe r . " 
Th e a nti - im perialist myt h o f t h e U.S.S. R . i s d e riv e d la r ge ly 
fr om two s o urc e s. On t h e o n e h a nd, b o th Mar x a nd Le nin d e v e l o p e d 
th e d o gma th a t imp e ria l ism i s th e f ruit o f capit ali s m wh ich 
thr ive s o n th e ac qu i sitive imp u l s e , a nd will t he r e f o r e e x plo i t 
f o r e ign mark e t s in p urs u a nce o f tha t impuls e . Sin ce Co mmu n i s m is 
t he ne gatio n o f eve rything th at c a pi t ali s m st a nd s f or , it c a n n o t 
b e imp e riali s tic. Th e "curio us ph e nom~n o n o f a n an t i- i mp e r ialis t 
Co mmunist imp e r ialism " may b e a c cou nt e d f or , o n t h e o th e r hand, 
by th e myth o f s oc ial r e d e mptio n i n t h e Co mmu n i st c r ee d . Communi s m 
i s u ni v e rs a listic by natur e , writ esNie b u hr, b e ca us e o f its 
'missio n a ry u rg e' t o build a su pra n a t io nal e mpi r e ba s e d o n th e 
s oc ializat io n o f pr o p e rty. " Th e Co mm u ni st s a w th i s su p r a n a t i o nal 
int e gra tio n as n o thing b ut a ' fr a t e r nal ' r e la t io ns hip b e tw ee n th e 
h o ly l a nd o f th e n e w r e ligion a nd all th e small e r , o f t e n no n -
t ec hni ca l n a tions. Ac c o rding t o th e Co mmu n i s t myt h, th e r e a r e n o 
powe r r ivalrie s in th e 's oc i a list camp'. Th e y wer e all el imi nat e d 
by. th e e limin a ti o n o f th e sourc e o f a ll e vil : pro p e r t y . Wi t h th e 
s oc i a liz a tio n o f pro p e rt y, t he wo r ld o b vi ou sl y mus t e x p e ri e nc e a 
ne w r eal ity i n whi c h p owe r ri valri e s would no l o ng e r figur e in 
t he r e l a ~i o nshi p o f s tro ng a nd we ak n a t i o ns . " (lSg) Th e r a t i o nal -
izatio n o f th e i mp e riali s m o f th e So v i e t Uni o n i n t e rm s o f i t s 
myth olo gy i s iro ni c . For, in t e rm s o f i ts o wn myt hology, imp e rial-
ist e xpansio ni s m is tran s mu t e d i nto a dri ve t o rid t h e wo r ld o f 
th e e vils inh e r e nt in capit al i s m, a nd s o pa ve th e wa y f o r a n e w day . 
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The rationalization o f imperiali sm is, however, a f eat ur e 
common to both th e So viet Union and the United States. "Each 
nation tends t o unive r sal i ze i ts ow n d ome stic ac hieveme nt. De-
moc r acy, f or e xample , is r egard e d by . ma ny as unive rs all y d e sirable 
and applicable. Bu t, ... it may be a political myth to r ega rd th e 
demo c ratic ac hi evement as a possibility f or all c ul tur e s and 
economies . 11 (l 6D) The t en d ency t o univ e rs alize d e~ocrac y is th e 
basic reason for imperialist pretensions o f th e United Stat e s, i n 
sp i t e of its avowed an ti-impe rialism. Th e a nti-imp e rialist myth 
o f th e United St a t e s is derived, o n th e o n e hand, fr o m th e fa c t 
th at this n a ti on is agains t th e imperial designs o f its adv e rsary 
a nd th erefo r e believes itself t o be inn o c e nt o f th e c rim e co mmitt e d 
by it . Th is ''myth o f innocence" is supp ort e d, o n th e othe r hand, 
by th e liberal democratic univ e rsalism e x pounded by Loc k e, J e ff e r -
son, and Wood row Wil s o n. Niebuhr believes th a t " Th o mas J e ff e rs o n .. 
was probably the first o f a long line o f Ame rican libe r al d e mo-
cratic anti-impe rialist s t o eq u a t e d emoc r ac y with th e ideal o f 
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~ niversalism", a nd Wil s o n wa s in accord with th e Ame rican s e ns e 
o f messianic mission" wh en h e "p r o j ec t e d a moral goal" f or America's 
en try into th e First World Wa r by arguing that " it was a 'war t o 
(161) 
mak e the world safe for d emoc ra c y' " · Tw o chap t er s in th e 
n a tional hist o ry of America pro vide furth e r proof, in Niebuhr's 
v iew, of the n a t io n ' s capaci ty f o r s el f -decep tion in th e process · 
of its expa ns ioni sm. Unde r th e slogan o f 'Manifest De stiny', th e 
n a tio n was able to give cre d a nce t o its e xpansio nism in its 
"ac qu isition of Te xas fr om Me xic o" , f or e xampl e . This sloga n gave 
th e natio n the "co ver o f moral o r 'd emocratic' purp o s e" . Th e 
s econ d chapter relat e s to " o ur venture in o v e rt, rath e r th an cover t , 
imperialism" wh en America d ecla r ed war o n Spai n - "a war that ga v e 
us th e boot y of the entire Spa nish imperial d o mai n in th e Ca rib-
b d P " f" 11(1 62) ea n an ac1 1c. 
If the So vi e t Union 1 s guilty o f imperiali s m und e r th e guise 
of its utopian ill us io ns, the Unit e d States is n o le ss guilty o f 
imperialism un der the gui s e of democratic u n i v e rsality. The 
failure of Communis m t o t ake root in We st ern natio ns , wh ere a 
form o f political fr eedom had been e st ablished before th e d evelop-
ment of modern industrialization, is evid e nc e o f th e difficulty 
of universali z ing domestic achieve me nt. Niebuhr co nt end s that 
although Western democracies we r e s low t o corr ec t th e myth o f 
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bourgeois individu alism, the f ac t th a t th e wo rk e r was able t o 
organiz e collective bargaining po we r ha s made th e Comm unist myth 
irrelevant in th e s e n atio ns. Th e co nt e xt in wh ic h Comm un ism was 
born is t o a large e xt e nt r e sp o nsible f o r th e su cce ss it achieved 
th e r e. Where th e co nt e xt i s significan t ly diff e r e nt, th e Comm un -
ist alte rn a tive becomes less pla us a bl e . 
Likewise it would be wr o ng t o a s s um e th at th e succ e ss o f 
Ame rican d emocrac y is r epea t able el s e wh e r e. Nieb uhr points o ut 
th a t " d emoc r ac y is an ac hi e v eme nt th a t r e quir e s c ultural, t ech n ical, 
a nd o th e r capacities o n th e part o f a pop ulat ion" th a t mak e th e 
t ask a difficult o n e . It may, th ere f o r e , be a " political myth t o 
r ega rd th e democ r a tic ac hi e v eme nt a s a possibility f o r all cul ture 
and economies" . Hist orical e vid e nce s ee ms t o sh ow " t ha t only a 
f e w n a tions o f Wes t e rn Europe h ad th e nece s sa ry h omoge neity, 
e du catio nal level , a nd political sk ill t o make th e d e mocratic 
principle o f 'aut hority b y con s e nt of th e go v e rn e d' wo r kable . " ( l 6 J ) 
Th e r e is mo unting e vid e nc e Nie b u hr belie v e s, that th e Asian and 
Afr ican continents, with th ei r dive rsitie s of la n g uage , r eligio n , 
a nd cul ture do n o t pro vid e suitable soil f o r a d emoc r a tic f o rm 
o f gove rnm ent . 
(164) 
Niebuh r , co ncluding his a rt icle with th e wo rds o f U Thant 
th e th e n Secre t ary-General o f th e Unit e d Nation s , writ e s : "I s ee 
no thin g b ut d a ng e r in th e id ea , s o a ss id u o us ly c ul t iva t e d o utside 
Vie tn am , th a t this con f lic t is a kind o f hol y war b e tw ee n tw o 
po we rfu l political ideolo gie s. " (l 6 S) 
The e x po sure o f th e i ronic in a p a rt ic ul a r s i tu a tio n ma y lead 
t o th e abateme nt o f th e p r e t e nsio ns which ga v e r i s e t o th e iro ny. 
I t may also lead t o a height e n i n g o f th o s e pr e t e nsio ns . Si nce th e 
p ublication of Niebuhr's a rt icle, th e r e has been a n aba t eme nt o f 
t e nsio n between th e So vie t Uni o n a nd t he Un i t e d Sta t e s. Th is ~s at 
least partially due to th e r ecog nitio n of th e iro ny in th e Ame rican 
pre t e nsio n e speciall y by t he yo u ng o f America, in partic ular, and 
of th e Wes t in gene r al . I t may also b~ iro nically, that th e 
aba t eme nt owes a t least s o me thing t o th e struggl e f o r po we r wit h i n 
th e Comm un is t block; wh o s e pre t e ns io n i t i s th a t th e r e can be n o 
co nflic t between brothers . 
To conclude o ur disc ussio n o f iro ny we must turn t o Nieb uhr ' s 
val idat ion o f it as a mo d e o f in t e rpr e tat ion. 
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The Validatio n of Irony as a mo d e of Interpretation. 
Is th e discernment of an ironic element 2n American h is t o ry, 
. or in modern history, merely subjective? Is it merely superimposed 
upon the data of history? Niebuhr believed that questions of thi~ 
sort raise the important issue of the natur e of th e presupposi t ions 
whi ch guid e the observer o f history. History, he writ e s, "migh t 
be likened to the confusion of spots on the card s us ed by psychiat-
ris ts in a Rorschach test. The patient is asked t o r eport what he 
s ees in these s pots; and he may claim to find the o utlin e s o f an 
elephant, butterfly or frog. ·Th e psychiatrist draws conclu s ions 
fr om these judgements about th e state o f th e patient's imagination 
r ath e r than about the actual config uration o f sp o ts on th e card." 
(l 66 ) Must we conclude th~t '' hist orical patt e rns are equally 
subj e ctive", asks Nieb uhr. 
Patterns o f meaning, be th e y ironic o r of some other s ort, 
are arbitary if th ey "do violence t o the facts, o r singl e o ut 
correlations or sequences of e v e nts, which are s o fortuitou s that 
only some special interest or passion could persuade th e ob s e rver 
of the significance of th e co rrelatio n ... " ( 16 7 ) An e xampl e o f this 
criterion enunciated by Niebuhr would be th e Marxist indictment of 
capitalism which argues that capitalist e xp an sio nism is moti vated 
by an e xploitiv e impulse. This is a mythical distortio n of th e 
facts . . While it 2s true that modern European nations us ed their 
sup erio r t ech nical, comme r cial , and political knowledge in the 
proc e ss of e xp ansion, it is a gros s o versimplification o f th e 
facts to single out exploi t a tion as th e primary motive for that 
. (168) 
expans2on. 
The problem of subjectivity is complex. Niebuhr concedes 
that there is an element o f subjectivity in all hist orical inter-
pretation. However, ther e is need to distinguish between purely 
arbitary judg emen ts which ei th er have no basis 2n historical fact , 
or which deliberately distort the facts to fit th e judgement, and 
those judgements which give real illumination to th e kaleidescopic 
even ts of history. The r e al issue, for Niebuhr, is not that 
history is interpreted on the basi s o f a particular s e t of pre-
suppositions . He would concede that th ere is rarely an interpret-
ation of history which is not based o n s ome presuppositions. 
Rather, the issue is wh ether the interpretation of hist o ry, 
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made on t he basis of pres upposition 1 is credible as i t st a nds. 
He puts the issue ~n this way: 
" the question is wh e th e r th e interpretations 
have a ny legitimacy or credibility t o th e ·ob s e rver 
apar t fr om his ac c ep t a nce o f th e governing prin-
ciple of interpre t atio n which prompted th e general-
izations. To be s pecific, is an ironic interpret-
atio n of c urr en t h i st o ry generally plausible; or 
does its credibility depend on a Christ ian view 
of history in whi c h th e ironic vi e w s ee ms t o be 
particularly gro und ed ? " (l69) 
Th ere are s i tuatio ns in h i st o ry which lend th em s elve s to iro ni c 
interpretation because th e y ar e o b v i o usly ironic: but th e s e may 
be detected by a n obse rv e r with ou t r ecou rs e t o a Christian view 
o f history. "Ne v e rth eles s " , writ e s Niebuhr, . " th e consist e nc y 
with which the category o f th e ironic is applied t o hist o r ical 
eve nts doe s fin ally depen d up o n a governing fa i th o r world 
. 11(170) 
v~ ew . . 
As we have seen 1 Nie b uhr belie v e s th a t a n ironic interpret-
ation of history is th e no rmati ve one f o r th e Biblical faith. It 
i s also, he believes 9 th e o n e whi c h most adequately ill umina t e s 
th e contemporary his t orical situat io n. Niebuhr d oe s n o t t ell us 
that his e ff o rts t o u nd e r s tand t·h e ironic ele me nt in co nt empo rary 
eve nts led him t o c o nclud e that this vi e w was n o rm a ti ve f o r th e 
Biblical faith. Neither d oe s h e s a y th a t this view o f iro ny wa s 
achieved by independent Bi blical research which th e n pro vid e d him 
with the key he nee d e d f o r in t e rpre ting c o nt empo r ary hist o ry . 
What is clear is th e dynamic int e rp lay be tw ee n Bib lica l fa i t h and 
contemporary history in Nieb uhr 's th o ught. This, as we h a v e seen 
el s e wh ere in this c hapt e r , i s a n e ss e ntia l part o f his method . I t 
is as he allows th e Biblica l traditio n and the co nt e mp orary 
situation to interact, th a t his ironic mode o f interpr e ta tion 
eme rg es. Th e credibility o f this mode is th e n t e st e d in th e 
c rucible of con t empora ry e ve nts. An instance o f this t e sting pro-
''-~ 
cess is Niebuhr's article "The Social Myths ~ th e 'Col d Wa r '". 
Niebuhr's article o n th e 'Cold War' illustrates o n e o f his 
basic cri t eria of verification. That c rit e ri on i s that th e credi-
bility of a particular in t e rpr e tat io n o f hist ory must b e e v iden t 
quite apa rt from the pr e supp ositio n s which gave rise t o i t. I t 
is possible t o f ollow th e argument o f th a t article with ou t kn owing 
th at Niebuhr's understand i ng o f i r o ny has Biblical roots. Nowhere 
in the article does he suggest that th e truth o f his analysis 
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depends on the acceptance o f his pr e suppositions. Th e analysis 
i s allowed to stand on its o wn, wi th o ut Biblical a uth ority being 
called into bolster it. Th e r e is no mention o f a transc e nd en t 
God " wh o lau ghs at hum an pre t e nsi on s with o ut being h ostile t o 
human aspirations." Yet, as we have s ee n, al l th e s e are important 
features of Nieb uhr's und e rstanding o f irony. 
Niebuhr's analysis o f irony a pp ears t o hav e a n ap ologe t ic 
interest also in that he bel ieves th e ironic eleme nt in contem-
porary history validates t he Christia n v i e w o f man. He is no 
more concer ne d in a n artic le f o r a s ec ular j o urn al, ho we ve r, t o 
persuade me n t o accep t th e Christian v i e w o f man than to a ccep t 
his theological pr e suppositio ns. I t is possible, th e r e f o r e , to 
accep t Niebuh r ' s analysis o f th e ' Cold Wa r ' without accep ting 
his Chris t ian view o f man . 
St o n e has a rgued th a t Niebuhr's us e o f irony ~s n o t th eolog-
ical in any special sense . He writ e s 
"Even in Niebuhr's special us e of iro ny, it is n o t 
particularly a th eolo gical concept . Ni eb uhr 
relates it t o his th eolog y, ho weve r, and claims 
that it is th e n o rma tive way f o r th e Christian 
t o view history."(l71) 
I f by th e us e of the word " r elat e s " St o n e means that Ni e buhr 
allow s th e interplay betwee n contemporary eve nts a nd th e Biblical -
Christ ia n f ai th t o create his iro nic mode of int e rpr e tation, we 
wo uld be in substantial a gr ee me nt with him. We a r e no t sure, 
however, th at this is wh a t St o n e means. For it is n o t e vid e nt 
f rom his book, perhaps beca us e this is no t its purpose, that h e 
gives much a tt e ntion t o Ni eb uhr's th eological method . I t is 
d iffic ult to uphold St o n e ' s claim that Ni e buhr's us e o f iro ny is 
not "particularly a th eological co nc ep t " wh e n viewed against th e 
final chap t er of N~eguhr' s 1The I r ony of American His t ory . I t is 
in this cha pt er that Niebuhr t ackles th e problem o f va lidatio n o f 
irony as a th eological co ncept. Tru e, Niebuhr d oe s n o t make ex-
el us i ve claims f or iron y a s a theological mode of interpreting 
hist ory . But h e does argue that th e th eological pre supposi tion s 
upon wh ich his und ersta nd i ng o f irony is bas e d lead him t o belie v e 
that th is mode of interpre ting hist o ry is finally viable. 
As h e says: 
"Elements of iro ny , tragedy o r pathos may , of course 
be detected in li f e a nd hist o ry with o ut a ny · 
guiding principle o f i nt e rpr e tatio n .•. 
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But a b a sic f a ith o r u l tim a t e pr e supp o s i tio n o f 
me aning wi l l d e t e rm i ne whi c h o f th e s e thr ee 
ca t e gori e s is r e g a rd e d a s th e mo st signific a nt 
fr ame o f me aning f o r th e inie rpre tati o n o f 
l i f e a s a wh ole ... " ( l 72) 
While no t a gr ee ing wi th Sto n e , it is n o t difficu l t t o und e r -
st a nd his judg eme nt a b o ut Nie buhr's us e o f iro ny. Fo r whil e 
Ni e buhr's th eo l o gi ca l meth o d s ee ms t o allow th e int e rplay b e twee n 
th eolo gy a nd hist o ry t o shap e his crit e ria f o r s ocial ch o i ce , 
th i s ~s h a rdly e v e r mad e e xpli c it . We will ha ve occa s i o n t o r e-
turn t o this f e ature o f h i s me th o d in th e n e xt chap t e r. At this 
stag e o ur sympathy with St o n e ' s judg e ment aris e s from th e fact 
that it is po ssibl e t o agree with Ni e buhr's analysis o f a partic -
ular situat i on with o ut a cce pting his th eo l o gical pre supp o s i t io ns. 
I t is po ssibl e , furth e rmor e, t o agree with him with o ut kn o wing 
what th e s e pr e supp ositio ns a r e 7 o r that h e i n fact had any. His 
a nalysis o f th e 'C o ld Wa r' situ a ti o n , in o ur vi e w, is a cas e ~n 
point. 
This f e atur e o f Ni e b uhr's me th od c an l e ad t o misund e rst a nding . 
I t a ls o ra i s e s r ea l pro ble ms. As Ni e buhr hims el f p o int e d o ut , 
po l i ticians agr ee d with his an a lysis o f th e human situatio n in his 
Giffo rd Le cture s whilst b e ing car e ful t o add th e qualificati o n 
that this d i d no t n e c e ssarily includ e th e ir acc e ptanc e o f his 
th eological pre suppositio n s . ( 1 7 3 ) Niebuhr b e li e ve d that th e 
crisis in c o nt e mp orary hi s t ory wa s s o gr e at that b e ing th eo l o gi c-
al l y acc e ptabl e was l e ss imp o rtant tha n making a c o ntributi o n t o 
th e al l e viatio n o f th e crisis. Bi ngham quot e s Ni e buhr as s aying : 
" Th e c risis qf th e tim e i s t oo grea t f o r me t o b e a th eo l o gian. " 
(l74 ) He wo uld th e r e f o r e pr e sumably n o t quibbl e ab o ut wh e th e r 
his us e o f iro ny was th eo l o gic al o r n o t. But t o anyon e s ee king 
t o und e rstand th e man and his me th o d th e issue is important. 
I t may well b e po ssi b l e t o mak e an iro n i c ahalysis o f a 
s i tu a tio n with o ut e xplici t r e f e r e nce t o th eo l o gic al pr e supp o sit -
i o ns. Th e qu e stio n, h owe ve r, is n o t o n e o f r e f e r e nc e but o f 
pr e s e nce . I s it p o ssibl e t o mak e suc h an ana l ysis with o ut 
th e o l o gic al pre supp ositio ns? If s o , wh a t is th e e ss e nti a l functi o n 
o f th e th eo l o gical pre suppositio ns? To put th e issu e anoth e r way, 
Ni e buhr's d e finiti o n o f i r o ny is c o nstru c t e d in such a way a s to 
l e ad th e r ea d e r t o b e li e ve th a t a trans ce nd e nt Go d is int e gral 
t o an iro ni c int e rpr e t a tio n o f hist o ry. His vi e w o f irony is 
th eolo gic a l i n this s e ns e . Pol itic ians and hist orians may agr ee 
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with his ironic interpretation and yet part company with him on 
his views about the transcendent. That Niebuhr is open to this 
kind of interpretation is, on his own mission~ clear. His answer 
is that in the final analysis meaningful existence is possible, 
on the Christian interpretation, only where there is faith in a 
transcendent source of life. To give rational expression to that 
faith, in any ultimate sense, is impossible. 
If, as Niebuhr argued, the ultimate problem for myth is the 
problem of God, the .ultimate problem for an ironic view is also 
the problem of God. Niebuhr's answer in relation to irony is not 
unlike the one he gave in relation to myth. He argued that myth 
is a way of expressing the transcendent source and centre of the 
. meaning of 1 Myth expresses the conviction that existence is 
meaningful~ and occurs wherever that conviction is held. In re-
ga to irony. he argues that an ironic view is normative because 
it expresses the scope and limits of human freedom (in much the 
same way as myth does) as understood in Christian 
irony is normative for other reasons too: 
ith. 
"The Christian preference for an ironic inter-
pretation is derived not merely from its con-
ception of the nature of human freedom, 
according to which man's transcendence over 
Nature endows him with creative possibilities 
which are, however, not safe against abuse and 
corru ion. It is also derived from its faith 
that life has a centre and source of meaning 
beyond the natural and social sequences which 
may be rationally discerned. This divine 
source and centre must be discerned by faith 
because it is enveloped in mysterys though 
being the basis of meaning. So discerned, 
yields a frame of meaning in which human free-




The em.ergence of an ironic view of history, as a mode of 
interpretation, signalled a more positive estimate of man than 
can be discerned in his earlier writings. This is due partly to 
th~ historical context in which he wrote The Irony of American 
History, and partly to the content which Niebuhr gave to the 
concept of irony. Niebuhr's colleague at Union~ John Bennett, 
believes that by 1946 the changes in Niebuhr's thought were 
clarified, and singles out "openness" as the most significant 
feature of this change. Bennett writes: 11 1 think that openness 
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to the possible uniqueness of each historical situation is the new 
element in his thought which is most importanto 11 ( 176 ) The success 
of the New Deal and the Fair Deal policies in the United States in 
bringing about creative change through piecemeal and experimental 
means impressed Niebuhr greatly, according to Bennetto In justif-
ication of this view, he draws attention to an editorial Niebuhr 
wrote in 1951 in which he acclaims evidence which had just been 
published indicating that greater equality had been achieved 1n 
the distribution of incomes in the States during the period 
1929 - 19460 Niebuhr concludes the editorial by saying: "Surely 
this is a very considerable revolutiono It may be more drastic 1n 
its consequences than some more advertised revolutions in 
Europeo 11 (177) 
Ronald Stone also believes that Niebuhr's concept of irony 
inclines him to a more positive estimate of mano 
the development of Niebuhr's thought in this way: 
He summarizes 
"The Christian view of history is not tragic because 
it is not necessary that man do evilo He can 
choose the good, but in his pride he does nato The 
development of the concept of irony inclined 
Niebuhr away from the more pessimistic notes of 
his Marxist or Christian realist writingsoo .''(178) 
Further evidence for Niebuhr's view that man "can choose the 
good" is given in his The Self and the Dramas of History, in 
which he develops the view that man is both "creature" and 
"creator" o He argues that a synthesis between the Hellenic view 
of man and the Biblical view is necessary for an adequate under-
standing of man~s nature and his community: 
"Modern historyooo has, in short, been a dramatic 
encounter between the Biblical-Hebraic and the 
Hellenic components of our culture in which the 
emergence of dynamic factors of a technical 
civilization gave a new dimension to the ancient 
encountero 
The dialectical tension between the two CGmpon-
ents in our culture was rooted in the fact that 
each was capable of realizing some facts of human 
existence and tended to be blind to otherso The 
Hebraic saw history as a drama and the Hellenic 
lobked for the structures which unde~lie the flow 
of history. The Hebraic was conscious of the 
organic aspects of human community while the 
Hellenic discerned the elements of artifact which 
had been introduced into the community by human 
contrivanceo The Hebraic had a sense of divine 
providence as ruling over history because it was 
conscious of the creatureliness of man in the 
-
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Process. Modernized Hellenism was so conscious 
of the role of man as creator that it became 
defective in the sense. of providence And alter-
nated between an excessive determinism and an 
excessive voluntarism. 11 (179) 
Granted that with the development of an ironic mode of 
interpreting history Niebuhr was able to give greater emphasis to 
man as creator, our problem with this mode is that it is by its 
very nature designed to underline man 1 s creatureliness. Irony, in 
the hands of Niebuhr, is the tool shaped by the artist-observer 
to enable him to root out man's pretensions. Irony is the mode 
which enables Niebuhr to elucidate those situations ~n history 
where man has exceeded the bounds of his creatureliness; for this 
is what he means by 'pretensions'. Niebuhr is still closer to 
pessimism than he is to optimism. His use of irony, ~s Stone says, 
inclines him to a less pessimistic view of man. He is less pessi-
mistic rather than more optimistic~ This is due partly to the 
nature of irony, and .partly to Niebuhr's conviction that history 
remains fragmentary to the end. As he says, "the chief issue 
between the two components (Biblical-Hebraic and Hellenic) de-
velops on the issue of the realization of the potentialities of 
history. The Biblical faith accepts the fact that historical 
meanings and fulfillments remain fragmentary to the end of history." 
We must, he continues, 11 rely upon Biblical ith to encourage the 
modesty and patience which will prevent present tensions from 
becoming catastrophic (because there are those who) are trying to 
bring history to a premature conclusion."(lBD) 
The disclosure of an ironic situati0n in history can lead to 
"contrition". By contrition Niebuhr means the "abatement" of the 
pretensions which gave rise to the ironic situation. How~ver, the 
disclosure of irony may also le to the heightening of the pre-
tensions which gave rise to it. In either case, iro~y is concerned 
to disclose pretensions, and is therefore a negative instrument 
designed to point up excesses. One cannot help the feeling that 
in the face of an ironic view all one can do is have a 'sober 
estimate of oneself'. It is, we believe, one of Niebuhr's 
greatest achievements that he elaborated the dimensions of such 
a sober estimate, and drew the boundaries of man's freedom in 
terms relevant to the contemporary situation. 
A rejoinder to the above comment could be that it was pre-
cisely Niebuhr's concern for relevance in the contemporary 
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situation that forced him to take an ironic view. Irony, it may 
be argued, is the tool of a realist to be wielded against the 
strong in their strength, As we have seen, in his analysis of 
the 'Cold War' situation,Niebuhr was concerned that the 'super-
powers' should be responsible, for the fate of the world depended 
on this. Irony, it may further be argued~ is the tool of a 
realist to be used in relatirrg to men and nations in positions 
of responsibility. For it is the means by which responsibility 
can be clearly defined, as well as the means by which sanctions 
can be brought to bear on the pretens ns of the strong. Irony 
is strong food meted out to the strong. The·post World War Two 
situation, and Niebuhr's deep involvement in it, would seem to 
corroborate this view. In an age of unprecedented danger, 
symbolized· by nuclear weapons, Niebuhr stressed the need for re-
sponsible action on a person and on a collective level. Bingham 
quotes Niebuhr as saying: 11 We are never theprisoners of histor-
ical destiny even though all pretensions of being its master have 
crumbled. 11 (lBl) Irony is the tool designed to help the crumbling 
of pretensions. 
Irony may help keep the picture of man's. creatureliriess in 
focus. One may ask, however, whether is of help to those who 
are tempted to despair rather than pretension. One may ask, for 
example, whether an irtinic vie~ would have helped those involved 
in the founding of the tr e union movement in the United States? 
The struggle of the worker to achieve a more equitable balance of 
power in industrial relations in the United States is, Niebuhr 
acknowledges, one of the basic achievements of democracy - perhaps 
even one of the factors which produced the democratic nation-
state.(lB2) In the struggle for a tolerable equilib um of power 
on the part of the workers, it is doubtful whether an ironic view 
would have been of much help. Their's were not problems of 
'pretension' and of exceeding the limits of their creatureliness. 
On the contrary, they needed to affirm their dignity as men and 
their solidarity ~s workers in the process of achieving a more 
equal distribution of power. A strong, mature trades unio·n 
movement may legitimately become the focus of an ironic interpre-
tationi But when Niebuhr himself was involved in the struggle of . 
the workers in Detroit, however, it was not with ony that he 
worked. Not long after he left Detroit he described his position. 
as an "effort'' to "combine political radic~lism with a more 
c ssical and historical iriterpretation 6f religibn. 11 (lBJ) 
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We now know th the synthesis between 11 a more radical 
political orientation 11 and 11 more conservative religious conv t-
ions'' wh h he was feeling after in his fo~mative years, finally 
took the form of a Christian realism which combined the insights 
of the Bib al and ciassical traditions with a liberal praJmat 
political approach. The insights of the Biblical and classical 
Christian traditions led Niebuhr, in his later years, to believe 
that "it is necessary to draw constantly on the ins hts of 
blical faith, part ularly in an age in which human achieve-
ments are great; and illusions threaten to be as great as the 
achievements. 11 (lB 4 } His realism, and his liberal pragmatic 
approach, were the result of the insights he gained from the 
Biblical and classical Ch stian tradition, but they were also 
the result of his capacity to read off from history lessons which 
changed his perspective. The mature role into which the United 
States had been forced, during the course of his own lifetime, in 
international politics, to a large extent caused his change in 
rs pecti ve. "We shivered on t h,e brink of war ld res pan sibili ty 11 , 
said Niebuhr, in 1960, "until history pushed us in."(lBS) To help 
the nation bear this responsibility, Niebuhr, it may be argued, 
us irony as a means of allowing the insights of Biblical faith 
to expose dangers inherent in responsibility. 
If irony was the weapon he used in a democratic society 
which had achieved a high level of technological advance, a toler-
able balance of power, and a more equal distribUtion of wealth, 
Niebuhr never lost his sympathy for those who were in the process 
of achieving these ends. Americans, Niebuhr argued, must never 
lose sight of the process by which their society had evolvedi nor 
must they thihk t it can be packed and exported to undeveloped 
countries. The political utopianism and political radicalism of 
undeveloped nations needs understanding, urged Niebuhr, because 
"Utopia seems a plausible goal to the peoples who have never ex-
perienced the torturous processes of history except in terms of 
expectation." While it is true, he argued, that "the independence 
of a natidn is no guarantee of justice within the nation", 
Americans should understand .the factors which motivate the demand 
for independence in developing nations. Furthermore, Bingh.am 
draws our attention to something Niebuhr wrote after the Second 
World War: "We defined democracy in such a way as to make it 
suitable for our luxurious circumstances'' and so forgot that 
"a minimum of soc health is a presupposition of democratic 
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life" and "assumed that if only (people) guard freedom, community 
will take care of itself.". Democracy. so defined, says Bingham in 
summarizing Niebuhr's argument) was not suitable ''for the poverty 
of either war-torn Europe or the new nations emerging from the 
crumbling of the erstwhile European empires. 11 ( 186 ) 
It is our contention that irony, as defined by Niebuhr, is 
not suitable in those situations which do not enjoy a ''minimum of 
social health'' and where there are those who are ln the midst of 
the torturous struggle to achieve social health. One can under-
stand the impatience of those who are involved in the struggle 
for social justice, and wield the weapon of irony against either 
the United States or the Soviet Union when they try to foist their 
brand of political domestic product onto emerging nations or com-
munities. It is doubtful, however, whether an ironic view of 
history can provide strength to the weak who are struggling to 
achieve social justice. 
There are those who have criticized the Niebuhr of the 
fifties as conservative. One critic is quite outspoken in this 
view: "-Niebuhr is again reflecting the mood of his times. In the 
effervescent twenties, he was an optimist, in the marxist 
thirties he was a radical, and now in the fat fifties he's just 
another middle of the roader. 11 ( 187 ) · Niebuhr's ironic view of 
history, and his pragmatic approach, are the main reasons why he 
has been labelled 'conservative'. But it is a label which does 
not fit Niebuhr well. Those who level this criticism at Niebuhr 
do not understand that he used irony, and adopted a pragmatic 
approach to political problems ~n the fifties, because of his 
Christian realism. It was this realism which led him to believe 
that, whilst pragmatism is a limit~instrument, it is a necessary 
one because "the human situation is partly subject to remedy and 
(188) partly not." It was this same realism which led him to 
believe that irony is necessary because men will not recognize 
this essential feature of the human situation. Those who criti-
cize niebuhr for being conservative do not understand the 
dialectic tension between history and faith in his life. It is 
just not true that Niebuhr ever simply reflected the mood of his 
times. His Christian realism, of which irony was a tool, led him 
to believe that democracy was a "method of finding proximate 
solutions for insoluble problems. 11 (l 89 ) If this makes him 
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conservative, then Niebuhr is happy to accept this label. In 
reply to Bennett's raising of the issue of conservatism Niebuhr 
says: "My conservatism relates to an increasing appreciation of 
the organic factors in social life'', but, he adds, it is ~ot a 
"conservatism which is merely interested in the preservation of 
some status .9..!:!.Q." for this 11 would be anathema for anyone who had 
drawn inspiration from the Old Testament prophets.''(lgO) Our 
criticism of Niebu~r's use of irony is not that it is conserv-
ative but that it illustrates Niebuhr's basic pessimism about 
man's nature and prevents him from being able to delineate the 
dimensions of man's creativity with the same depth that he was 
able to delineate the dimensions of man's creatureliness. His 
inability to do this is, we believe, a problem wh h relates 
directly to his theological method. 
Chapter Five 
'ADEQUACY' AND BEYOND 
'Adequacy' as a principle of verification in 
NiebuhrJs theological method. Niebuhr's paradoxical 
relationship to our age: the aspects of science and 
technology absent from that contemporary history with 
which his tr ition interacts. 
The theological groundwork for the apologetic 
and ethic task. N buhr's theological presupposi-
tions examined by means of a paradigmatic treatment of 
his theology: 'God as the symbol of Mystery and 
Meaning' - 'Human history contains Encounters. between 
God and ~an'. These presuppositions considered in 
relation to h 'adequacy' principle of verification. 
The promise of Niebuhr's theological method. A 
discussion of his work as ethicist and as an apologist. 
Same questions about Niebuhr's notion of ' ith' 
cans~dered. A critique of some aspects of Niebuhr's 
estimate of contemporary experience, and of the 
biblical-Christian tradition, including some proposals 
towards fuller.adequatio~. 
C H A P T E R F I V E 
"ADEQUACY" AND BEYOND: THE PROMISE AND 
THE LIMITS OF NIEBUHR'S THEOLOGICAL METHOD 
The editors of the Living Library Volume on Niebuhr began 
the Preface by saying: "The dominant motif of our age, as 
Alfred North Whitehead has pointed out, is science, and two 
characteristics associated with the scientific mentality are 
change and specialization, Such an age demands, of anyone who 
would interpret a cr icize its methods and goals, discernment 
and comprehensiveness. Reinhold Niebuhr, writing and speaking 
om the religous point of view and as an American, has exhibited 
these qualities and has performed this service for almost half 
a century," (l) 
(l) NIEBUHR'S PARADOXICAL 
RELATIONSHIP TO OUR AGE 
Few would disagree with the sentiments expressed by Kegley 
and Bretall in their assessment of Niebuhr. Yet there is some-
thing strangely paradoxical about Niebuhr's relationship to this 
so-called 'scientific age'. The :d~amat changes brought about 
by this process of industrialization in the United 5tates 9 the 
crises precipitated by the two World Wars, the emergence of Ameri-
ca as a 'super-powet~ the rise of Communism as a world force, 
and the struggle for independence on the part of developing 
nations in the Third World are among some of the changes which 
are reflect in Niebuhr's own development. His changing 
perspectives ~oth in theology and in ethics, are largely the result 
of his efforts to wrestle with the issues of contemporary history, 
It is one of Niebuhr's outstanding characteristics that he had 
the 'courage to change'. For this reason alone he demands to 
be interpreted and his work evaluated. 
What is strangely par oxical about Niebuhr, however, is 
that for all his discernment and comprehensiveness in dealing 
with the enormous social and political issues of our age, he 
seems to give little weight to the issues raised by science and 
technology. He seemed not to be able to credit these instruments 
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of man's dealings with the natural order with the same signific 
-ance that he saw in political and soci problems. For 
example 9 his latest book, Faith and Politics. (
2 ) is a collect 
of essays covering a period from 1930 to 1968. It bears the 
n 
subtitle: "A Commentary on Religious, Social, and Political 
Thought in a Technological Age." The reference to "a Technolo-
gical Age" in the sub-title somewhat misleadingo The book 
about contemporary religious. social, and political issues. 
The issues raised specifically by modern technology are not the 
subject of the book. The only sign ant reference to the 
problems of technology occurs in an essay in which Niebuhr is 
concerned to make the point that we have failed to achieve a 
just society in the situation which a "technical civilization 
has created." (
3
) It may be argued that since Niebuhr has 
described himself as a "po tical and social phibsopher teaching 
Christian ethics" (
4
) it is unfair to expect him to deal with 
the ethical issue raised specif ally by modern technology. Our 
response is that the problems arising from speci fields of 
scientific discovery have political and social impl ations which 
no Christian ethic can ignore. The ethics of genet control. 
the ethics of ecology, and the issues raised by modern cybernetics. 
are among the fundamental issues of our technological age. As 
such they have political and social implications. This failure 
is strange in one who began his life under the shadow of the 
assembly line. 
The roots of this par oxical feature of N buhr 1 s thought 
lie in his theological method. He is open to the criticism 
which Ian Barbour has levelled at much contempo theology: 
"Most contemporary theological works say very little 
about nature. Discussions of providence, for example, 
refer extensively to Godcs activity in history but 
are silent about his activity in nature. Is a 
sharp distinction between history and nature ten le, 
if nature itself has a history and if man is rooted 
in nature? In nee-orthodoxy, nature is the 
unredeemed setting for manus redemption; but has 
God as Creator done so little to anticipate his 
work as Redeemer that the realm of nature is com ete-
ly separate from the realm of grace? 
••. from the scienti side, a new view of nature 
forces us· to re-examine our ideas of God 1 s relation 
to the wo d. Tradition pictured a static world, 
creat initially in its present form ...• Today, 
the dynamic and temporal character of a growing 
evolving universe (of which biological evolution 
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is only one facet} must be taken seriously in 
theology." {5) 
The discernment and comprehensiveness with which the editors of 
the Living Library Volume have credited Niebuhr are not in 
question. However, one of the enigm ic features of Niebuhr's 
thought is his failure to discern the aspects of the scientific 
age to which Barbour refers. A dynamic view of nature is 
one such aspect. In this regard Niebuhr reflects his kinship 
with neo-orthodoxy; a kinship which he has in fact acknowledged. ( 6 ) 
Niebuhr gives us a clue as to why neo-orthodoxy was unable 
to evolve a 'theology of nature' when discussing the response of 
re gion to nineteenth-century evolutionary science. He makes 
the point that the resolution of the controversy led to a 
clarification of roles on the part of science and religion, 
and establishing of a 'necessary partnership' between them. 
II ... the nineteenth-century Darwinian controversy 
established the necessary partnership between 
religious-mythical pointers to the mystery of 
creation and an empirical account of the evolution-
ary stream in the realm of natural causation." (7} 
While recognizing that generalizations about neo-orthodoxy can 
easily become caricature, it can be argued that the response of 
neo-orthodoxy to the challenge from twentieth-century science 
was to further clarify the role of theology and leave the realm 
of nature to the scientists. Langdon Gilkey, who acknowledges 
his indebtedness to neo-orthodoxy, gives a critical appraisal 
of this position. He writes: 
11 ••• the neo-orthodox were conspicuously indifferent 
to scientific theories and hostile to any of their 
theological implications ..• To be sure, none of 
them ever doubted evolution as a biological theory 
.•• nor did they dream of questioning the legi-
timacy, say, of archaeological or historical 
studies of the Biblical periods. On the other 
hand, none of them considered using the biolo-
gical theory of evolution as the basis for a 
theological concept of creation or providence ••• 
On the whole, the neo-orthodox pictured themselves 
as writing theology from the ithful study of 
scripture and of church tr ition in correlation 
with their own personal, existential, and ethical 
experience ••. 11 (8) 
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Gilkey's characterization of nee-orthodoxy as a com~~a~e 
separation between science and religion, however true may be 
in general, ncl altogether fair as a description of Niebuhr's 
position. Here we face another enigmat feature of his thought, ,, 
His explicit statements of position (as for example in his 
essay "Coherence, Incoherenc and~ Christian Faith") do lend 
credence to Gilkey's charact zation. He does argue for a 
radical dichotomy between the world of nature and the world of 
human history. He does not use the biological theory of 
evolut n as a basis for a theological concept of creation. 
His theology was not, however, written from the ''faithful study 
of scripture and church tradition 11 • He stood in a tr ition 
nurtured by the insights of the Eiblic and classical C istian 
heritage. But he also sought to take history seriously. He 1 
perhaps more than, say, B h or B tmann 1 sought to allow the 
interplay between the trad ion ln which he stood and contemporary 
history and the social sciences to shape his theology~ The enigma 
here is that whereas h 
allow the trad n in 
life bears testimony to his capacity to 
which he stood to be tested and modified by 
contemporary history, h explicit statements allow for no such 
interplay and therefore lend credence to criticisms of the ki 
Gilkey makes. And further, the aspects of science a techno-
logy seem to be sadly absent from that contemporary history with 
which his trad ion interacts. 
N buhr's passion for soci justice, and his whole approach 
to apologetics are perhaps the most important reasons why the 
nee-orthodox label does not .fit him well. In spite of his 
acceptance of this label 1 it i not merely a "correlation" 
between insights from "scripture and church tradition" and 
11 personaly existential. and ethical experience" wh h shape his 
theology" He stands in the tradition of the Hebrew prophets 
because his is an ethical and religious passion 9 rather than a 
concern for rational consistency. The process through which 
his thinking passed is in some sense analagous to his descrip-
tion of 1 Hebraic religion 1 • He says, the npuri ng process in 
the Hebraic religion through which it arrived at a pure mono-
theism was dominated by an ethico-religious passion rather than 
a rational urge for consistencyc 11 ( 9 ) The data of contemporary 
history provided the abrasive for the process of purification 
during his 'torturous p grimage' towards the position he des-
cribes as Christian Realism. For reasons which we must explore 
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more fully later, data from contemporary science and technology 
contribut~d\very little. 
His ethical and apologetic pursuits are dominated by a concern 
to penetrate wh he saw to be the chief mal ies of our time: 
the •soft utopianism' of a liberal culture, and the 1 hard 
utopianism• of the Communi~t creed. Both these mal ies, he 
bel ved, h religious overtones. In his Intellectural Auto-
biography he describes the eth al and apologetic task in these 
words~ "Any encounter h the essential religion of a secular 
age must penetrate through the confusions which have been created 
by equating history with nature and meaning with rational intelli-
gibility, and implic though highly questionable dogmas with 
the prestige of science. The fact that the Communists should 
adorn their more explic dogma with the prestige of science 
provides modern liberal culture with a caricature of its own 
beliefs." {lO) By refuting the error contained in these modern 
estimates of man, N buhr bel ved th men may be led to affirm 
the Christian faith which provides a radical alternative. In 
other words, the apologetic task as he saw it was to take contem-
porary h ory seriously, and to provide an analysis of the 
errors contained in the modern estimates of man, before it can 
proclaim the estimate of man contained in the Christian faith. 
He is well aware that the refutation of one set of presuppositions 
about man does not compel acceptance of the Christian alternative. 
But neither does he bel ve that men will be led to accept the 
Christian alternat 
are exposed. 
unless the errors in modern v ws of man 
It is our purpose in this chapter to explore the promise 
and the limits of Niebuhr's theological method. It is our 
view that the religious perspective from which he sought to 
interpret and criticize our 'scientific age was itself the pro-
duct of a long and 'tor~urousu inter-action with some of the 
dominant features of the age. In that process his religious 
perspective was both clarified and mod ed. Clarified, in 
the sense that he remain convinced that a religious motif is 
indispensible. Modified, the sense that he acknowledged 
the impact of a scientific and secular culture, and recognized 
that a religious perspective would have to be validated if its 
resources were to be relevant in that culture. In what was 
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probably the last Preface he wrote, for Faith and Politics
9 
Niebuhr summarizes the twin concerns which pre-occupied him 
throughout his life: 
'' ... {these essays) reveal a unity in that they 
attempt to establish the relevance of the Christian 
ith to the contemporary political and ethical 
issues.· ·· 
My •• ~ purpose (in the Pre e) is to explaint 
or perhaps justify~ the contrasting method in two 
of the major themes of these essays. The one 
theme to validate the ~esources of the 
biblical faith by applying its moral imperatives 
and its law of love, enjoining responsibility 
for the neighbour's welfare in a technical age. 
Today, soci responsibilities must be guided by 
norms derived from all moral and empirical 
disciplines. A sa~red text or a religiously 
sanctified trad ion of past ages are in equate 
guides to the ever-changing human relations of a 
secular culture. 
The second theme is an explanation of the vitality 
of religious life in an age which expected the 
death of religion •.• The reason for this vitality 
is that religious faith is an expression of 
trust in the meaning of human existence despite 
all the cross-purposes, incongruities, and ills 
in nature and history." (11) 
A careful re ing of this statement reveals his strangely 
paradoxical relationship to our age. We have already pointed 
to the lack of any comprehensive treatment of the ethical issues 
arising specifically out of modern technology, and have made 
some preliminary suggestions as to why this is so. On the 
other hand, he is remarkably in tune with our age in his pre-
occupation with the problems of verification - problems that 
are characteristic of the scientific age. One of the main 
concerns throughout his life was to find ways of validating the 
insights of the Christian faith. He does this by srowing that 
the insights of the faith are relevant to contemporary issues. 
We will elaborate this aspect of NiebuhrYs thought later. 
Niebuhr argued that the resources of the Christian faith, 
in their moral applicat n, are more adequate than those derived 
from other sources in encountering the problems of our time. 
The criterion by which the resources of the faith are validated 
is their equacy to deal with these problems. The truth of 
the Christian faith derives its authority, contrary to Gilkey's 
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assertion, not from its sources in a Hsacred text" (scripture, 
in Gilkey's argument) or in a "religiously sanctified tradition" 
(church tradition, according to Gilkey). However important 
these sources may be to those who stand in the same tradition 
as Niebuhr does, the authority of that tradition in encounter 
with modern culture does not lie in its religious character. 
According to Niebuhr, it validated by its relevance and 
'adequacy, not by rel ious sanction. It is true because it 
offers an'•adequate alternative to the dilemmas facing modern 
man. Its truth lies in its relevance to contemporary issues. 
The truth of the Christian ith, according to Niebuhr, derives 
its authority from the fact that an anal is of the contemporary 
situation proves that its resources are more adequate to deal 
with these issues than are modern alternatives. 
What we have said out the adequacy of the Christian 
faith does not mean that for Niebuhr modern resources are e-
levant. On the contrary, he argues that the resources of the 
Faith are in themselves inadequate - "social responsibilit s 
must be guided by norms derived from all moral and empirical 
disciplines." 
The picture that emerges from Niebuhr's statement of posi~ 
tion would seem to indicate that the resources of the Faith and 
the best insights from all "moral and empirical disciplines" 
together form the norms from which men may find guidance in their 
social responsibilities. There is in this position evidence 
of what Bingham has described AS a 'nonchalance of faith 1 on 
Niebuhr's part, and also a humility in the face of the massive 
responsibilities which must be shouldered in our contemporary 
world. 
Niebuhr's capacity to allow the data of experience to inter-
act with the tradition in which he stood, and his willingness 
to work with the best insights in moral and empirical disciplines 
- whet~er they matched his presuppositions or not, is we believe 
what makes his theological method so full of promise. This 
capacity is what we described in Chapter Three as his 'adequacy 
principle'. It is th principle by which he sought to vali-
date the truth of the Christian faith. His employment of it 
is what makes his method worthy of careful evaluation. 
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What we have described as his 'adequacy principle' makes 
the neo-orthodox label fit Niebuhr none-too-easily. His 
primary concern was to offer men norms by which they may be 
guided in their social responsibilities. A theology which 
fails this test becomes the object of criticism. In 1960 
he in fact criticized neo-orthodoxy on this ground. In an 
article for the Christian Century series "How My Mind Has 
Changed In the Last Ten Years", Neibuhr wrote: "When I find 
neo-orthodoxy turning into sterile orthodoxy or a new 
Scholasticism, I find that I am a liberal at heart, and that 
many of my broadsides at liberalism were indiscriminate." (12) 
Students of Niebuhr will be forgiven if they are 
bewildered by his capacity to change his mind. But, as the 
above 'confession' indicates, he found any position intole-
rable which was morally irrelevant. About the same time 
that he made this statement about neo-orthodoxy, he specifi-
cally attacked Karl Barth for being morally irrelevant. 
In the context of his controversy with Barth over the Hunga-
rian rebellioh in 1956, he writes: 
"Barth ••. is certainly not a 'primitive anti-
communist' nor a 'secret pro-communist 1 • 
He is merely a very eminent theologian, 
trying desperately to be impartial in his 
judgements. The price of this desperation 
is of course moral irrelevance." (13) 
The promise of Niebuhr's theological method is that he 
sought to expound the Christian faith in terms that were morally 
relevant to contemporary life. A major factor in his partial 
failure to fulfil this promise arises from the exclusion of 
science and technology. It is this failure, rather than 
any vestiges of neo-orthodoxy, which lays him open to the 
charge of moral irrelevance in his time. His 'uneasy dualism' 
between the world of nature and the world of human history 
gives rise to a reservation about his theology, when judged 
by his own criterion of moral relevance. We refer, here, to 
his inability to deal sympathetically with the ethical·issues 
of a technological society. 
We must turn now to a detailed analysis of Niebuhr's 
theological method. We will construct a paradigm of his 
method, drawn from his explicit statements of position, and 
240 
concentrating our attention on his method of verification 
which we have previously called the 'principle of adequacy'. 
This pardigm will then be subjected to a critical analysis. 
In our final section we will seek to move beyond equacy 
towards adequation, building on the foundations laid by Niebuhr 
and attempting to incorporate our correctives to deficiencies 
evident in his method. 
A preliminanystatement of what we understand by "Adequa-
tion" seems necessary at this point. When the reality I 
experience is resonant with the truth of my tradition, that 
is adequation. Adequation cannot occur when an essential 
part of the reality I experience finds no corresponding cord 
in my biblical-Christian tradition. Neither is there adequa-
tion when essential parts of my biblical-Christian tradition 
fail to resonate with my contemporary exper nee. Adequation 1 
then, is a two-way process. Where there is a failure of 
adequation we are left on the one hand without criteria for 
social chciice, and on the ~ther with a dogmatism which does 
not enjoy verification in experience. Tha~ is to say, where 
there is no adequation between faith and experience, aspects 
of either that faith or that experience are muted. There 
are in Niebuhr's theology jarring notes which make it difficult 
for a child of the twentieth century to accept that theology 
because it fails to relate in important aspects to his total 
experience. The atrophying of the biblical doctrines of 
ation and Resurrection under Niebuhr's hand surely result 
from his ilure to take nature seriously, and this leaves 
him without criteria in dealing with science and technology. 
(2}. "ADEQUACY" AS A PRINCIPLE OF 
VERIFICATION IN NIEBUHR'S METHOD 
Any attempt at a systematic treatment of Niebuhr's theology 
is hazardous. He has repeatedly expressed his hesitation 
about being called a theologian. He has repeatedly stated 
that his prime pur~ose is to apply insights gained from the 
Biblical and Christian heritage to the issues facing contempo-
rary man. Apart from the dialectical nature of his thought, 
which itself makes any systematic treatment of Niebuhr 
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difficult, he seldom ventures into an explicit statement of 
his theological presuppositions. One of the difficulties 
confronting anyone who would understand Niebuhr's thought is 
due to the hiddenness of his presuppositions. This diffi-
culty has been noted by his brother, Richard, who says: 
"Reinie's thought appears to me to be like a great iceberg of 
which three-fourths or more is beneath the surface and in 
which what's expressly said depends on something that is not 
made explicit." (l 4 ) While no exposition of Niebuhr's 
thought can avoid the hazards inherent in systematic treatment 9 
no exposition of his thought can be adequate which does not 
attempt to get at the three-fourths of the iceberg. 
We will now proceed to construct th~ paradigm of. Nieb~ht~s 
theology and examine how he sought to validate it. It must 
be admitted that 'the eye of the beholder' will play a larger 
part in this const~uct because,of the unsystematic nature of 
his writings. Yet the task must be undertaken, and we will 
strive to be faithful as may be to the explicit in our search 
for the implicit. 
Our paradigmatic treatment of Niebuhr's theology will be 
based, in part, on the following works: two sermonic essays 
on "Mystery and Meaning", one published in 1946 and the other 
~n 1958; essays on "Optimism, Pessimism and Religious Faith" 
(1953), "Coherence, Incoherence, and Christian Faith" (1953), 
"Freedom" (1958), and "Faith as the Sense of Meaning in 
Human Existence" {1966). It is in these works that Niebuhr's 
theological position becomes explicit. 
There are, we believe, two major presuppositions in 
Niebuhr's theology. One is his view that God is the ultimate 
symbol of mystery and mean~ng. The other ~s his view that 
human history contains encounters between God and man. These 
presuppositions are themselves the product of Niebuhr's 
'torturous pilgrimage'. 
(a) God Is The Symbol 
Of Mystery And Meaning 
Whilst Niebuhr concedes that there is ultimately no way 
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in which belief in a transcendent God can be validated ration-
ally, he would argue that human existence is incomprehensible 
without such a belief. Such belief endows human existence 
with meaning, and defines the limits of any attempt to make 
reason the principle of coherence and meaning. In his reply 
to the 'death of God' theologians Altizer and Hamilton, Niebuhr 
indicates his understanding of the concepts "mystery" and 
"meaning", and the nature of religious language: 
"The younger theologians who cheerfully, even 
blatantly, announced their discovery that .1 God 
is dead' do not seem to realize that all 
religious affirmations are an expression of 
a sense of meaning and that a penumbra of 
mystery surrounds every realm of meaning. 
Religious affirmations avail themselves of 
symbols and myths, which express both trust 
in the meaning of life and an awareness of 
the mystery of the unknowable that surrounds 
every realm of meaning." (15) 
It is never easy to think and write clearly about God. 
"Now we see through a glass darkly; but then face to face 11 
(1 Co nthians 13:12), is the Pauline text upon which Niebuhr 
bases his two sermonic essays on "Mystery and Meaning". A 
genuine Christian ith, for Niebuhr, "must move between those 
who claim to know so much about the n ural world that it 
ceases to point to any mystery beyond itself and those who 
claim to know so much about the 'unseen' world that all reverence 
for its secret and hidden character is dissipated." (l 6 ) 
"Those who claim to know sa much about the natural world," are 
the various philosophers - ancient end modern, who acknowledge 
mystery provisionally but who expect to reduce to rational 
coherence, or regard mystery as residual ignorance which the 
progress of modern science will eliminate. "Those who claim 
to know so much out the 'unseen' world", are the theologians 
in both the Catholic and Protestant traditions who seek to create 
elaborate rational theologic systems in which the mystery of 
God and man dissolved too simply. 
For Niebuhr, God is the symbol of mystery and meaning. 
This does nat mean that we must not use our reason to the full in 
comprehending that mystery and that meaning. Mystery is not 
equ to ignorance. But neither must we think that reason 
resolves the mystery of life or fully comprehends its meaning. 
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"A genuine faith", argues Niebuhr, "resolves the mystery of 
life by the mystery of God ... Faith in God is faith in some 
ultimate unity of life, in some final comprehensive purpose 
which holds all the various, and frequently contradictory 9 
( 1 7) 
realms of coherence and meaning together." This does not 
mean, however 9 that this source of mystery and meaning must be 
marked with a mysterious 11 x 11 about which little can be said 
or known. Niebuhr often quotes Whitehead in support of his 
argument about the limits of rationality, and refers to 
Whitehead.'s analysis of the relationship of the temporal 
process to ultimate reality, in which he posits a 'primordial 
God'. "It believes that God has made Himself known. It 
believ~s that He has spoken through the prophets and finally 
in His Son. It accepts the revelation in Christ as the 
ultimate clue to the mystery of God's nature and purpose ln 
the world, particularly the mystery of the relation of His 
justice to His mercy. But these clues to the mystery do not 
eliminate the periphery of mystery. God remains deus abscon-
d 't II (18) l us. 
Before the mystery of God humility is essential. The 
'clues' to that mystery can only be expressed in mythical and 
symbolic terms. Although these modes of expression may be 
regarded as 'primitive' by modern culture, Niebuhr believes 
that we must "be reconciled to the fact that all religions 9 
particularly historically oriented faiths, must avail themselves 
of symbols, metaphors, and myths to point to the trasncendent 
sources of meaning in the flux of the temporal and phenomenal 
reality." He continues: 
"The custodians of the ark of faith must not be 
too ashamed of these metaphors; but they must 
not be too lit.erciilistic in defending their faith 
against all the empirical disciplines fortunately 
available in our pluralistic culture. 
Ideally, a partnership between the guardians of 
faith and the secular disciplines will prevent 
extravagant errors of both partners. The 
guardians of the faith will be saved from liter-
alistic and obscurantist fallacies, which are 
the vices of all moribund religious traditions. 
But expressions of basic trust, though their 
symbols may be regarded as 1 primitive' ... will 
prevent the elimination of all interest in 
ultimate meaAings and purposes. This empirical 
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purg~ of culture usually results in barrenness 
or moral sentimentality in even the most 
impressive forms of humanism." (19) 
These words, written by Niebuhr in response to the 'death 
as of God 1 theologians, may be taken 
to the problem of transcendence. 
his approach ~n another sense also. 
typical of h approach 
They a~e characteristic of 
The issue of transcendence, 
for Niebuhr, was never,merely a philosophical one. What might 
be called the 'ethics of transcendence' was his primary concern. 
He argued that the notion of God's tra9Qcendence in Hebrew 
thought was arrived at through eth al insight. "Faith in a 
completely trasncendent God was ••• their victory over poly-
theism and tribalism." ( 20) The ethical consequences of this 
faith Niebuhr summarizes in the following way: 
"It provided ••• for both the universalism and 
the perfectionism which are implied in every 
vital ethics . 
••• faith in·a transcendent God made it possible 
to affirm confidence in a meaningful e~istence 
even though the world was full of sorrow and 
evil .•• 
The prophetic religion from which Christianity 
took its rise is therefore not an other-worldy 
igion. It is thoroughly this-wor[dy." (21) 
In eth al terms, faith in a transcendent God has both a 
negative and a positive function. The negative function 9 
Niebuhr expresses in this way: "Only in a religion in which 
there is a true sense of transcendence can we find~the resource 
to convict every historic achievement of incompleteness 9 and 
to prevent the sanctification of the relative values of any 
age or era." ( 22 ) In fact he argues that "the most grievous 
and the most perennial sin of religion (is) the n of using 
the transcendent reference to absolutize rather than to crit 
( 2 3) 
cize the partial achievements of history," and cites as 
an example the religious sanction given by medieval Catholicism 
to the feudal structure of society. 
The positive function of faith in a transcendent God is, 
in Niebuhr's words, that "it will nerve men to exhaust all their 
resources in building a better war , in overcoming human 
strife, in mitigating the fury of man's injustice to man, and in 
est lishing a society in which some minimal security for all 
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can be ach ved." (24) The struggle to do this will involve 
men in compromise in the nicely calculated less or more which 
is the way we achieve justice in history. Whereas faith in 
a transcendent God can 11 nerve 11 men to work for such justice as 
is possible to achieve, it can deteriorate into a moral 
idealism unrelated to the flux of history, leaving us with 
only pragmat crite for social choice. This is his major 
criticism of Barthianism. Mar idealism is dangerous because 
it draws the teeth from any cons tent and historic ly related 
effort to work for justice. This happens, Niebuhr contends 9 
when "the sense of the absolute and the transcendent becomes 
so complete an obsession as it is in Barthian theology" and 
then "all mor striving on the level of history is reduced to 
• • • 11 (25) J.nsJ.gn J.Cance. 
If God is the symbol of mystery and meaning, how does He 
act in the world? In what sense is the transcendent God also 
the immanent God? How does Niebuhr avoid the dangers of a 
thorough-going ~ualism in which transcendance is absolutized, 
and religion becomes other-wordly and morally irrelevant? 
How on the other hand, does he avoid the dangers of monism in 
which an im~anent God. is identified with the temporal process? 
These problems occupied Niebuhr greatly, because he believed that 
the paradoxic nature of the transcendent-immanent God must be 
preserved. He believed that reason has always h difficulty 
with this paradox, and in attempting to resolve it has tended to 
the errors of either dualism or monism. N buhr's answer is to 
propose a radical dichotomy between the world of nature and the 
wo of human history, and to assert that human history is 
the drama in which God encounters man. He believed that theology 
should be open to correction by every field of human knowledge, 
Yet the only correction that he would allow from the insights of 
science was a rejection of the pre-scientific understanding of 
nature in the Biblical world view. The radical dichotomy between 
nature and history, Niebuhr's 'correction' to theology was promp-
ted therefore by his "scientific" or clos view of nature. 
(1) RADICAL DICHOTOMY .BETWEEN NATURE AND HISTORY 
"If we take the disciplines of the various sciences 
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seriously, as we do, we must depart at one important point from 
the Biblical picture of life and history. The accumulated 
evidence o~ the natur sciences convinces us that the realm 
of natural causation is more closed, and less subject to 
divine intervention, than the biblical world view assumes.'' ( 26 ) 
Niebuhr therefore proposes that a "radical distinction between 
the natural world and the world of human history must be made, 
however much h tory may have a natural base." ( 27 ) 
As far as we can see, thera are three factors wh h 
influence Niebuhr's proposal. The first is Biblical in 
origin and relates to the process by which Hebraic religion 
arrived at its radical monotheism. The second is his under-
standing of science and its influence upon theology. Th 
is his view of the radic freedom of man, and his negative 
view of natural morality stemming therefrom. 
(i) Radical Monotheism: 
Niebuhr's roots we~e deeply imbBdded in the Hebrew prophe-
tic movement. He does not explicitly·state that h distinction 
between natDre and history is bas on his understanding of the 
process by which He ew religion arrived at its radical monothe-
ism. One may legitimately infer this, however, for two reasons. 
One is the weight he gives·to that process, and its implications 9 
in much of his writing. 
the myth of creation. 
The other is the way he understood 
Niebuhr's book Christianity and Power Politics is devot 
to the thesis that modern Christ n and secular perfectionism, 
which places a "premium upon non-participation in conflict", 
.is bad religion and bad politics. His theological essay in 
this book, entitled "Optimism, Pessimism, and Religious Faith" 
borates his understanding of the process by which Hebraic 
1 . · · d t d' 1 monothe.;sm. (
2 B) H' 1 · f re ~g~on arr~ve a ra ~ca • ~s ana ys~s o 
that process, which we will examine below, leads him to the 
conclusion that a genuine faith can be neither pessimistic nor 
optimist A genuine ith, rooted in Hebraic soil, will 
lead to a "provisional pessimism'' about the possibilities of 
achieving justice in society, and a "qualified optimism'' which 
provides the impetus for social action whilst recognizing that 
every struggle towards justice runs the risk, at least, of 
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involving men in conflict. 
Niebuhr's argument takes the following form. Human 
vitality has two primary sources: animal impulse and confidence 
in the meaningfulness of human existence. This confidence is 
"primary religion''i··and it is the basis of optimism. For 
primitive man meaningful e~istence was to be found in his 
relation to his group. This relationship usually resulted in 
some form of totemistic religion. This is not merely a primi-
tive phenomenon, however. When national loyalty is reconstructed 
into a comprehensive religion, we witness the recrudescence· cilf 
totemistic religion. (Niebuhr believes that both Marixism and 
Nazism are modern forms of totemism.) The "little cosmos" of 
the group, while it is satisfying, is not sufficient in itself. 
Men must relate ·their group to a larger group, just as they 
must relate themselves to the grou~. For this reason "animism 
is as primordial as totemism in the history of religion.'' ( 29 ) 
For men tried to bring the natural world into their universe of 
meaning from the very beginning and sought to "relate their 
little cosmos to a la~ger cosmos''· However, life is not only 
cosmos it is also chaos and all profound religion is an attempt 
to embrace both these aspects of life: 
"The world is not only·a cosmos but a chaos. 
Every universe of meaning is constantly 
threatened by meaninglessness •. Its harmo-
nies are disturbed by discords. Its self-
~ufficiency is challenged by larger and more 
inclusive worlds. The more men think the 
more they are tempted to pessimism because 
their thought surveys the worlds which lie 
beyond their little cosmos,. and analyzes the 
chaos, death, destruction and misery which 
seem to deny their faith in the harmony and 
meaningfulness of their existence in it. All 
profound religion is an attempt to answer the 
challenge of pessimism. It seeks a centre 
of meaning which is able to include the 
totality of e~istence, and which is able to 
interpret the chaos as something which only 
provisionally threatens its cosmos and can 
ultimately be brought under its dominion." (30) 
The distinctive feature of the Hebrew-Christian tradition, 
according to Niebuhr, is its faith in a transcendent God who 
is both the centre of meaning and the goal of perfection. By 
this faith it is able to include the totality of existence in 
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its world view, without ignoring the chaos which is part of 
that totality or allowing it to become overwhelming. By this 
faith pantheism is avoided, and so :is ~otemism. 
monotheism Niebuhr describes in· this way: 
This radical 
"In th~ Jewish-Christian tradition this problem 
of p~ssimism and optimism is solved by faith 
1n a transcendent God who is at once the creator 
of the world (source of s ~eahing) and judge 
of the world .(i~e. goal of its perfection). 
It wa~ this faith in a transcendent God which 
made it possible for Hebraic religion to 
escape both the parochial identification of 
God and the nation and the pantheistic iden-
tification of God and the imperfections of 
historical existence." {31) 
The radical monotheism of Hebraic religion is as much the 
product of insight as it of experience. The process by 
which God was divorced from the vicissitudes of a particular 
nation is a compound of spiritual insight and h torical 
experience .which Niebuhr describes in these words: "the 
process of divorcing God from the nation was a matter of 
both sp~ritual insight ~nd actual experience. If the early 
prophets had not said, as Amos,, 'Are ye. not as the children 
of the Ethiopians unto m~, saith the Lord, 1 faith in the God 
of Israel might have perished with the captivity of Judah. 
But it was the exile which brought this process to a triumphant 
conclusion. A second Isaiah could build on the spiritual 
insights of an Amos, and could declare .a God who gave meaning 
to existence quite independent of the vicissitudes of a nation, 
which had been the chief source of all meaning to the pious 
J 
II (32) ew. 
We may conclude, then, that God 
with nature. or history, although h 
is not to be identified 
N . 
trascendence is not so 
A 
absolute as to divorce him completely from either. Clearly, 
Niebuhr's" radical distinctiori between nature and history may 
be attributed, in part at least, to h understanding of 
transcendence. 
(ii) Creation And Science: 
In view of Niebuhr's understanding of transcendence, what 
is to be said of the physical order? ~iebuhr is clear that 
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there is no Greek-type notion of the separation of body and 
soul, mind and matter, 1n the Hebraic world view. He insists 
that prophetic Judaism is thoroughly 'this-worldly'. By this 
he means that existence in this world i~ meaningful. Further-
more, it 11 rejoices in the physical creation. 'Lord, how rna ni-
fold are thy works. In wisdom hast thou made them all. 111 ( 33 ) 
But he then (in his essay) goes on to a discussion of death, 
an existential problem, and one looks in vain for any attempt 
to expound this joy in the physical creation. 
The reason for what amounts to a passing reference to the 
physical order in his essay, may. be found in his highly symbolic 
treatment of the myth of creation. One cannot avoid the feeling 
that whereas someone steeped in prophetic Judaism may well 
applaud Niebuhr's interpretation of radical monotheism, he 
would find Niebuhr's treatment of the physical creation some-
what puzzling. His symbolic treatment of the myth of 
creation is the result of his attempt to reconcile the Biblical 
with the scientific world view. The myth of creation preserves 
the mystery inherent in the natural order; a mystery which 
Whitehead's 'primordial God' points to. But the natural order 
is not the realm of divine intervention which the Hebrew 
assumed it to be: it is a nexus of causal relations for which 
no divine explanation is needed, except in an ultimate sense. 
"The situation for faith is only slightly altered by the new 
(scientific) picture of a quasi-autonomous nature, created by 
God, not maintained by His fiat from moment to moment." 
( 3 4) 
The myth of creation is a statement about the value of 
the world, an affirmation of the meaningfulness of the world. 
It affirms the goodness of the ~reated order, while preserving 
the mystery of that order. To say that God created the world, 
is to say something about value, about meaning, and about 
mystery. The myth of creation is a permanently valid myth 
because it points to the mystery and the meaning of the natural 
order. We may summarize Niebuhr's argument in his own words: 
"We have all accepted the scientific maxim 'Ex 
nihilo nihil sit' and are sceptical of every 
religious notion which regards the idea of 
creation as a substitute for the scientific 
analysis of causes. But there is one chink 
in the realm of meaning and rational 
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intelligibility. That chink is the fact 
that no previous cause is a sufficient explana-
tion of a subsequent event. Nothing explains 
the irrationality of the giveness of things ..• 
All mystic philosophies of the Orient and in 
the Occident •.. have partly ration ed and 
partly acknowledged the limits of rationality 
by the doctrine of 'emanation', which assumes 
that the temporal world is a corruption or 
emanation of the more meval oneness of all 
things in God ... The proposition which lies 
at the foundation of Western life-affirmation, 
the doctrine of the gqodness of creation, is 
inextricably united with the doctrine of the 
mystery of creation. With th mystery thought 
begins and ends •.. 
••• The absurdities of the primitive myths of 
creation must not obscure the profundity of 
the permanent myth which guards the mystery 
of creation and sets the limits for all 
rational pursuits wh h are always in danger 
of finding the world self-explanatory and 
self-fulfilling. 11 ( 3 5.) 
Science, then, must use every method at its disposal to 
analyse the. "quasi-autonomous" n ural order. In doing so it 
will make "obscurantist views of special acts in creation 
im ausible 11 even as it will refute "orthodox conceptions of 
'speci providence'" to account for specific events in history.(J 6 ) 
The mystery to which the philosopher of science, Whitehead, points 
with his 'principal of concretion', and wh h philosophers s ce 
Aristotle have sought to comprehend with their notions of a 
'first cause' or 'prime mover', is preserved in the myth of 
creation. Religion, especially the historical religions which 
do not want to identify temporality and finiteness with evil, 
must use mythical language to express that mystery. Th~ myth 
of creation is permanently valid in that it points to the mystery 
in the temporal and phenomenal world, and points to the transcen-
dent source of mea~ing in that world. for Niebuhr, therefore, 
no conflict between science and religion exists. Both are 
legitimate in their respective functions. In fact, "partnership" 
between science and relig n is necessary, because in that 
partnership an adequate view of the world emerges. Such a view 
is not pass le where one or other of the 'partners' is excluded. 
Thus Niebuhr's distinction between nature and history is. 
in part, the re ult of his endeavour to take science seriously 
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while at the same time holding to what is permanently valid in 
the pre-sc ntif myth of creation. It is due in part also 
to his understanding of man's radical freedom. 
(iii) Freedom And Natural Morality: 
"The mystery of creation", writes Niebuhr, "does not impinge 
immediately upon our experience, and its relation to meaning 9 
ther ore, exerc es (only) the minds of the most reflective 
persons in their most reflective moments. It becomes directly 
relevant to our experience only as it represents an ultimate 
mystery of freedom 9 which related to the mystery of our 
freedom, 11 {37) It is not ent ely clear what Niebuhr means 
here. It would seem that the. "mystery of creation" represents 
the fact that the ultimate mystery is freedom. The myth of 
creation, for Niebuhr, seems to be exhausted by the understanding 
that the created order is free ('quasi-autonomous') and that 
man is free also L'quasi~autonomous 1 ) vis a vis the Creator. 
It would seem then that both the natural world' and man enjoy a 
provisional edam from God, while at the same time being bound 
.to Him in some ultimate sense as Creator. 
For N buhr~ the mystery of our freedom as men takes two 
forms. They are "the mystery of our responsible freedom 9 despite 
the determining factors upon our life by reason of our creaturely 
finiteness,. and the greater mystery of the corruption of that 
freedom and resulting sin and guilt." ( 3 B) We will elaborate 
later the nature of man's radical freedom, as understood by 
Niebuhr. For the moment we must concentrate on his argument 
that because man free a distinction between nature and history 
is necessary. He says: "The justification for this distinction 
lies in the unique character of human freedom. Almost all the 
misinterpretations of human selfhood and the drama of history 
are derived from the effort to reduce human existence to the 
coherence of nature." (Jg) 
As we have come to expect of Niebuhr, his justification of 
the view that man is radically free, which entails the distinction 
between nature and history, is based on the diff ulties he 
discerns in efforts to create an ethical system based on natural 
morality. Any such system tends to obscure the rad al freedom 
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of man and the dramatic character of human history. An ethic 
based on naturalism results in the sort of pure· opti~ism which 
Huxley and Russell reacted to. An ethic based on natural law, 
whether Catholic or Protestant, obscures man's freedom, becomes 
too inflexible to meet modern ethical issues, and easily becomes 
the servant of reaction. As such it destroys the dialectic of 
prophetic religion 11 in which the movements of history are in. 
one moment the .instruments of God and in the next come under His 
. (40) 
condemnation.u 
With one important exception, Niebuhr finds ·himself in acccird 
with the reaction against naturalism of Hux y and Bertrand 
Russell. He is in accord with their distinction between the 
natural and human worlds. His exception is that belief in a 
transcendent God qu ifies the pessimism which results from 
their distinction. 
"The simple identification of human ideals with 
the forces of nature inevitably gave way to a 
humanistic du ism in which a sharp distinction 
was drawn between the human and the natural 
world. No better definition of this dualism is 
given than that found in Huxley's famous Romanes 
lecture on Evolution and Ethics, in which he 
declared: 'The cosmic process has no sort of 
relation to moral ends; the imitation of it is 
inconsistent with the first principles of ethics 
The ethical progress of society depends not on 
imitating the cosmic process, still less in 
running away from it, but· in combating it.' 
This kind of dualism is more realistic than the 
old type of naturalism, and it frees human moral 
life from slavish dependence upon the 'laws of 
nature'. Its general effect is to express 
optimism in terms of a human world of meaning 
and to relegate the world of nature to a realm 
of meaninglessness. 
Thus the optimism of pure naturalism degenerates 
into a fairly cons tent pessimism, slightly 
relieved by a confidence in the meaningfulness 
of human life, even when its values must be 
maintained in defiance of nature's caprices. 
Bertrand Russell's now justly famous "Free Man's 
Worship is a perfect and moving expression of 
this pessimism. 'Brief and powerless is man's 
life. On him and all his race the slow sure 
doom sinks pitiless and dark. Blind to good 
and evil, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless 
way. For man, condemned today to lose his. dearest 9 
tomorrow himself to pass through the gates of 
darkness, it remains only to cherish ~re yet the 
blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his 
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little day, proudly defiant of the irresistible 
forces which tolerate for a moment his knowledge 
and his condemnation, to sustain alone a weary 
and unyielding atlas, the world that his own 
ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march 
of unconscious power. 1 It must be said in favour 
of this view that if human li and human ideals 
are the only source of meaning in existence, it 
is more realistic to regard the world of nature 
as a 'trampling march of unconscious power' than 
to imagine that it exists only to support human 
purposes ... 
Yet this pessimism is not completely realistic. 
The world of nature is after all not as inimical 
to the human enterprise as this view assumes. 
'Nature, the homely nurse, does all she can to 
make her foster child, her inmate man, forget 
the glories he has known and that imperial palace 
whence he came.' The paradoxes of c ssical 
religion, in which God is known to be revealed 
in the benefices of nature even though it is 
recognized that the processes of nature do not 
exhaust the final meaning of existence, are more 
realistic than this dualism ••• 11 (41) 
This passage, cited from his essay "Optimism, Pessimism, 
and Religious Faith", is part of his analysis of how extravagant 
ideas of optimism have themselves been countered by the more 
realistic views of humanists Huxley and Russell. He immediately 
proceeds to argue that the tragic events of modern history "have 
negated practically every presupposition upon wh h modern 
culture is based." We will argue, at a later point, that the 
dualism inherent in Niebuhr cah be attributed in large measure 
to the 'tragic events of modern history 1 to which Niebuhr refers, 
rather than to the rational arguments which he uses to support 
this dualism. But to continue Niebuhr's argument, the events 
of modern history have challenged every modern presupposition~ and 
shown that 11 history does not move forward without catastrophe, 
happiness is not guaranteed by the multiplication of physical 
comforts, social harmony is not easily created by more intelli-
gence, and human nature is not as good or as harmless as had 
been supposed. We are thus living in a period in which 
optimism ••. has given way to despair, or in which some less 
sophisticated moderns try desperately to avoid the abyss of 
despair by holding to credos which all of the facts have 
. (42) 
d1sproved." 
We have quoted Niebuhr extensively at this point because 
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he, here, gives perhaps the clearest example of what prompts his 
own form of dualism. It is prompted partly by the difficulties 
which he believes are inherent in any ethic based in the natural 
order, and partly because of his ''provisional pessimism", as he 
calls it. If Huxley's pessimism is "slightly relieved" by a 
sense of the meaningfulness of life, Niebuhr's is qualified by 
this and by his faith in a transcendent source of meaning. 
What might be termed the 'natural law controversy' in Protes-
tant and Catholic thought occupied a great deal of space in Niebuhr's 
writing, much of wh h is beyond the scope of this essay. Paul 
Ramsey's essay on "Love and Law" in the Living Library Volume is 
an attempt to expo~nd Niebuhr's thought in this regard. ( 43 ) 
Perhaps the clearest exposition of Niebuhr's own position is given 
in his essay ''Love and Law in Protestantism and Catholicism." ( 44 ) 
Niebuhr's strictures against the theory of natural law in 
Roman Catholic moral theology are based on two main difficulties 
which he discerns in such theory. In his reply to Ramsey's 
article, Niebuhr summarizes his criticism of ~atural law and 
indicates his criter~a for doing so in a manner which shows that 
such a theory cannot do justice to man's unique freedom. He 
writes: 
11 ••• I may have been too critical of natural law 
concepts, but •.. the two main points of my 
criticisms ... (are) ..• that these concepts do 
not allow for the torical character of human 
existence. They are rooted in a classic ration-
alism wh h did not understand history. They 
therefore do not understand the uniqueness of 
historical occasion or the biases which creep into 
the definitions of natural law ••. Haw, for 
instance, can one declare property to be a right 
according to natural law when the institution of 
property represents such various types of power and 
responsibility in various historical settings? •.. 
The other point of my crit ism of natural law 
concepts is the tendency to make the law of love 
an addendum to the natural law, so that one 
defin~s the determinate possibilities and the 
other the indeterminate possibilities of good." (45) 
More recently, Niebuhr gave further corroboration to his criticisms 
of natural law moral theories. The inflexibility to which he 
refers in his f st criticism is cited as the reason why 
Catholocism has difficulty in dealing with the population 
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explosion. "I have not revised my ctiticism that natural-law 
moral theories, drawn from a metaphysical base, are too inflex 
ble. They cannot, for instance, adjust the prohibition of 
contraception to the moral necessities of a population explosion 
in a rapidly spreading technical culture." ( 46 ) The tendency 
to asceticism in Catholicism Niebuhr attributes to its proneness 
to make the law of love an "addendum" to natural law. "Christian 
faith has alwys held that love is the final norm of man as free 
spirit, able to realize himself only in indeterminate self-giving • 
••• Catholicism derived all proximate norms from the 'natural 
law', wh h was drawn from an analysis of the structure of human 
existence and from a rational calculation of competing rights. 
Then it consigned the law of love, particularly in its ultimate 
reaches, to a specific category of 'counsels of perfection'. 
The result was the division of the Christian community into two 
grades of Christians, the ordinary Christians and the ascetics 
and monastics, who were 'able' to realize the 'counsels of 
perfection' • 11 
( 4 7) 
In spite of the difficulties he discerns in Catholic natural-
law theory, Niebuhr has placed on record in his 1 est book ( 4 B) 
his 11 increa ng admiration for the Catholic ith". In discuss-
ing his "changing perspectives" over the years, he records that 
this admiration was prompted by "soc lly pragmatic" fac;:tors. 
"Catholics", he writes, 11 unlike many Protestants, never had any 
doubt out the social substance of human existence. The 
Roman Catholic faith derived much of its 'natural law' tradition 
from classical sources. Since the natural law was intended to 
give moral norms for a community, it naturally emphasized justice 
as the relevant norm •.. 11 Niebuhr at no point retracts his 
criticisms of natural law, yet he appreciates that Catholic m, 
by means of natural law, has been le to deal creatively with 
the problems of industrialization. 
"But I have a new appreciation of the fact that 
a great relig us tradition, emancipated from 
the organic collectivism of the Middle Ages, 
has been able creatively to help modern techni-
cal cultures of the West to solve the moral 
problems of industrialization. As a result, 
the Roman Catholic Church never lost the loyalty 
of its industrial workers. These workers in 
Protestant cultures often became infected with 
the virus of the Marxist rebellion." (49) 
256 
Anyone familiar with the details of Niebuhr's own 'torturous 
pilgrimage' cannot fail to miss the autobiographical ·note in this 
appreciation of Catholicism. In many ways it expresses the 
concerns which prompted his own search for adequate criteria 
for social ethics. It also accounts for his admission that his 
appreciation is derived from pragmatic considerations. If 
Catholic emphasis on norms for community is one source of his 
admiration~ its universalism is another. As he says 
11 ••• in these days in which an entire nation is 
attempting, in the civil-rights struggle, to 
come to terms with the 'American Dilemma' (that 
is~ the contradiction between our professed 
religious, moral, and political ideals and the 
sorry deprivation of rights for our Negro mino-
rity) the Catholic Church has another claim to 
our admiration. It has been mare consistently 
universalist, and has championed the 'human 
rights' of all our citizens." (50) 
Niebuhr's problems with natural-law theory in Catholicism 
relate, in the main, to his contention that they do not take 
adequate account of the unique character of human freedom, and 
the dramatic character of human history. His intellectual 
problems are, however, qualified by pragmatic considerations. 
,Judged by their fruits, in Niebuhr's view, Catholics are more 
to be admired than 11 many Protestants 11 • 
If Catholic natural-law theory ha,s provided more substantial 
guides to social justice than most Protestants will admit, its 
b as i c d e f e c t for N i e b u h r is it s as sump t ion " t.h at his tar y is , 
like nature, founded in eternal forms or 'essences' which 
provide the norms." This is a defective view of hist6ry, conti-
nues Niebuhr, because "all history is a bewildering mixture of 
human freedom and natural necessity. Therefore the historical 
dramas and configurations are more varied and more replete with 
historical contingency than either Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas 
assumed. 11 { Sl) 
The difficulties inherent in Catholic natural-law are nat 
unlike the difficulties in the new approach to natural morality 
which Niebuhr discerns in Protestant thealo~, particularly in 
its Barthian form. One of Niebuhr's sharpest differences with 
Barthian theology was that its new emphasis upon natural law made 
it a servant of reaction and the status quo, whatever its intentions 
might have been, 
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In an article on "Barthianism and Political Reaction" 
Niebuhr argues that both Barth and Brunner began as "frustrated 
socialists" (S 2 ) who became convinced after the events of the 
First World War that the ideal of a partnership between Christian-
ity and socialism was doomed, and that the establi~hment of the 
Kingdom of God on earth was an "idle d:rrecam'. They returned there-
fore to an orthodoxy which emphasized the transcendence of God, 
the perennial sinfulness of the world, and the need for a salvation 
which transcended the world. At this point the student of Niebuhr 
will understand Charles West's contention that Niebuhr is a 
Barthian. ( 53 ) There is no doubt that much common ground existed 
between Niebuhr and Barth. However, as we have seen in this work~ 
there was much that underscores, in Robertson's phrase, "the 
Barthian that Niebuhr was not." ( 54 ) 
Niebuhr's differences with Barth, not unexpeetedly, lie in 
the field of ethics. He argues that~there ar~ aspects of Barthia~ 
theology whci.ch can be exploited by·political rea~tionaries. One 
is Barth's revival of the Lutheran doctrine of the Schoepfungs-
ordnung -:- the 'orders of creation'. By this, writes Niebuhr 11 the 
natural relations of life, family, st~te, vocation, and race are 
designated" and ordained by God. ( 55 ) The problem, for Niebuhr, 
in this doctrine is that "there is only one step from the religious 
sanctification of the order of creation to the religious support 
of particular types of social organizat~on which the theologian 
. . (56) 
regards as 1 god-g1ven. 111 There are echoes here of Niebuhr's · 
criticism of Medieval Catholicism's sanctification of the feudal 
structure of society. The pressing mor~l problem of Barthian 
theology was, in Niebuhr's view, that it lent itself to exploita-
tion by those who tried to find religious sanction for events 
in Germany prior to World War Two: anti-Semitism and the absolu-
tization of the state, being cases in point. 
There may be gains in the Barthian position, Niebuhr,conceded, 
especially over against the modern liberal position which imagined 
that the law of love could be made authoritative in the worlds of 
politics and economics. "Perhaps there is nothing more important 
in the ethical reorientation of modern Christianity than a new 
study of the doctrine of natural law", wrote Niebuhr, because 
"love perfectionism is clearly no specific guide for the detailed 
problems which arise in human society." (S 7 ) Whatever the gains 
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of a revival of natural theology may be, in Niebuhr's view 1 they 
are hedged about with difficulty. Barth's revival of the 'orders 
of creation' lends itself to exploitat n by political and relig-
ious reactionaries who seek re gious sanction for the social 
structures in which they have a vested interest. 
Summary 
At this point we may summarize our exposition of Niebuhr's 
theological presuppositions. If a relevant social ethic is to 
be found which preserves Niebuhr's first theological presupposition 
that God is the symbol of mystery and meaning, while taking 
history seriously, a radical distinct n between nature and history 
1s necessary. The roots of this distinction, we have argued, are 
to be found in Niebuhr's understanding of (a) radical monotheism, 
(b) creation and science, and (c) freedom and natur moral y. 
Thrdughout ourAexposition of Niebuhr's theology to this 
point we have discerned a tension b~twea~ ~xpl it statements in 
which he seeks to give rational warrant to his views, and the 
discernible pragmatism in which the events of hi ory influence 
on his thought. He is searching for an adequate way of dealing 
with the issues of contemporary history in the light of his Hebrew-
Christian heritage. Out of the inter-play between th history 
and that heritage comes a theology, however obscure the method. 
Niebuhr has argued that Catholic natural-law and Protestant 
neo-orthodoxy, exemplified in Barth n theology, are inadequate 
as they stand in providing the resources for a Christian social 
eth What then is Niebuhr's answer? How can we find a 'law' 
or a norm for the establishment of tolerable harmony among men? 
Niebuhr's answer is that love must be translated into justice in 
the "nicely calculated less ondmoren of historical reality 1 and 
that the pragmat m and relativity inherent in such an ~swer are 
unavoidable. In 1959 he indicated the resou~ces necessary for 
a Christian social ethic, in an article called "The Problem of 
a Protestant Social Ethic". .Under the heading "Toward a Christian 
Ethic for Our Time" he outlines these resources, which we quote~ 
"The Biblical sources of a Christian social ethic 
are obvious. Among the resources of a Biblical 
faith are: 1) A sense of divine providence, which 
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leads to the recognition that the meaning and 
mystery of the whole drama of history is greater 
than all the schemes of meaning in wh h we try 
to comprehend it; •.• 2) The double emphasis on 
the 'dignity'of man as a !child of God' and on his 
'misery' as a sinner. In Christian thought the 
two are always related because it is recognized 
that they both have the same source in the radic 
fre om of the human spirit. The sin of man is 
the corruption of that freedom. The first part 
of the double emphasis leads to an insistence 
upon social and pol ical freedom consonant with 
man's essential freedom. It must be noted, how-
ever, that many forms of Christian thougbt, bath 
Catholic and Protestant, never champion indivi-
dual freedom, and that John Milton was really the 
first champion of freedom of conscience on 
Chr tian grounds. The second part of the empha-
sis prevents all utopian schemes, for it recognizes 
the possibility of evil in even the most ideal 
social situations ••.. 3} The passion for justice 
as an expression of the love commandment. This 
is vitally expressed in the Old Testament and 
particularly in the Prophets. The Old Testament 
witness is necessary because it deals with collec-
tLve relations more explicitly than the New 
Testament. 
Naturally an adequate Christian social ethic must 
avail itself of non-Biblical instruments of 
calculation, chiefly a rational calculation of 
competing rights and interests and an empirical 
analysis of the.structure of nature, the configura-
tions of history, and the complexities of a given 
situat n in which decisions must be made~" (58} 
What Niebuh~ here refers to as ''a sense of divine providence" 
is what we have called his first major theological presupposition; 
namely, that God is the symbol of mystery and meaning. What 
Niebuhr re s to as ''the double empha s" on the dignity and 
misery of man is what we believe to be his second major theologi-
cal presupposition; namely, that human history contains encounters 
between G and man. 
(b} Human History Contains 
Encounters Between God And Man 
In what sense can we speak of the 'mighty acts of God' ln 
the world? Ni uhr 1 s answer would be that we can speak of divine 
providence in relation to the natural world only in the sense ln 
which the mystery and the meaning of the natural world are 
preserved by the symbol of the Creator God in Biblical mythology. 
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The natural world is "quasi-autonomous", created by God but not 
maintained by Him from moment to moment. The natural world is 
neither divine nor demonic. Nature viewed as a totality is a 
lawful and quasi-autonomous order. Ey employing 'quasi-' 
Niebuhr limits autonomy in that God remains the symbol of mystery 
and meaning, analagous to Whitehead's 'primordial God', without 
which we fall into the error of resolving the mystery of creation 
too easily or believing that it is self-explanatory. Ey 'auto-
nomous' - Niebuhr emphasizes that divine providence cannot be 
called in to "explain" natural events. This is the specific 
task of the scientist. Should the scientist or the philosopher 
regard his explanations as ultimate, they overstep the limits 
inherent in the scientific method or in rational explanation. 
Mystery is not equal to ignorance, in Niebuhr's view. It ~s 
an essential characteristic of the natural order which no 
amount of rational or scientific research can ultimately resolve. 
The ultimate mystery of the natural order must be preserved if 
the meaningfulness of existence is to be affirmed, God is the 
symbol of that mystery and that meaning. Faith, then, is seen 
by Niebuhr as "the sense of meaning in human existence". A 
"sense" which the myth of creation most adequately expresses, 
when,~in story form, it tells this truth abciut this mystery and 
this meaning. In his article "The Truth in Myths 11 1 he writes~ 
"The myth of creation, in which God is neither· 
identified with the historical world nor separated 
from it, offers the basis upon which all theolo-
gies are built in which God is conceived as both 
the ground and the ultimate fulfillment of a 
meaningful world, as both creator and judge of 
historical existence. This paradox is really 
the only ground of an effective ethic because 
it alone harmonizes ethical and metaphysical 
interests, and gives us a picture of a world 
which is really a universe, but not so unoualified-
ly a meaningful world as to obscure the fact of 
evil and the possibility of a dynamic ethics." (59) 
For Niebuhr, the realm of human history is the realm in 
which we can speak of the 'mighty acts of God', because human 
history contains "encounters" between God and man. If God 
does not intervene in the natural order, because of its "quasi-
autonomous" character, he does intervene in human history. 
This is not to say that God can be called in to explain events 
in human history, If science has made the notion of God's 
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intervention in the natural order obscurantist, it has also 
refuted orthodox conceptions of Hspecial providence", . God is 
not to be conceiv as one cause in the link of causation nor 
even as the· 'F t Cause'. Neither He to be conceived as an 
11 arbitary monarch whose caprice accbunts for specific events in 
the whole variegat drama of history." ( 6D) 
His clearest expression of his view that human history must 
be seen as containing encounters between God and man is found in 
his article "Coherence, Incoherence, and~ Christian Faith". 
Human history, he writes, "must be understood as containing 
within it the encounters between man and God". These encounters 
are those ''in which God intervenes to reconstruct the rational 
concepts of meaning which men and cultures construct under the 
false assumption that they have a mind which completely transcends 
the flux of history, when actually it can only construct a realm 
of meaning from a particular standpoint within the flux." (61) 
Here we have a similar argument to the one which Niebuhr uses in 
his attempt to validate his first presupposition. God is 
encountered, so the argument went, at those places where men 
reach the limits of reason because mystery cannot be resolved 
by reason. Though reason must be used 9 a penumbra of mystery 
remained when reason had done its job. The argument for God 1 s 
intervention in human history 1s of a similar type. God is 
encountered at thffie places where men have over-reached themselves 
and sought to find a centre of meaning from within the flux of 
history itself. H tory, according to Niebuhr, cannot be its 
own saviour any more than reason can. Edward Carnell calls this 
form of argument Niebuhr's "negative pre-soteric proof" of the 
val ity of the faith. In his article on "Niebuhr's Criteria 
of Verification", Carnell writes: 
"Negative pre-soteric proof turns on this: that 
every effort to define the end of history from 
some perspective within history ends in a threat 
to both life and history. 11 ( 62) 
That ''history contains encounters between God and man" is a 
presupposition and as such cannot in any ultimate sense be ration-
ally val at However, N buhr believes that when in commerce 
with all forms of human knowledge a self-justif ation lies in 
the power of his presuppositions to illuminate meaning, yet to 
stand as a bastion against false centres of meaning which emerge 
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within the flux of history. Much of Niebuhr's work may
9 
in 
fact, be understood as an tempt to prove his thesis that "a human 
righteousness, which is not subjected to a purer righteousness 
than anything to be found in nature or in history, must inevitably 
degenerate into a fanatic self-righteousness." ( 6 J) Carnell sums 
up Niebuhr's argument in this regard~ 
"In the stead of God who judges and forgives sinners 
from a perspective beyond history, some absolutized 
aspect of either farm or vitality serves as a 
rallying point for the faithful on the one side, 
and a guide in eliminating nonconformists on the 
other. Th results in either a premature 
flight from history or a Pracrusteanizing of 
creativity to fit some individual or tribal 
virtue." (64) 
The Nature of the Encounter 
How is Gad encountered ~n 
answer gives us a clue bath to 
how He acts in history. When 
human history, we may ask? Niebuhr's 
his understanding of Gad and of 
Niebuhr gives a name to the trans-
cendent symbol of myste;y and meaning, he speaks of God as 
Creator, as Judge, and as Redeemer. 
He is encountered. 
And it is as these that 
(a) As Creator. God is encou.-:tered in 11 creativities 
which :introduce elements into the historic situ ion 
which could not have been anticipated, 11 ( 6 S) Gad's 
covenant with Israel is a Biblical example of His 
creativity. A modern example may be Americavs assump-
tion of responsibility as a Ysuper-power 1 • In his essay 
"History (God} Has Overtaken Us", to which we referred 
in Chapter Four, Niebuhr argued that historical events, 
such as America 1 s participation in the Second World 
War, have a providential quality about them. Neither 
America's participation in the War nor her subsequent 
role in world affairs were anticipated. Niebuhr 
~ 
has in fact defined providence in a way which suggests 
that this chapter of modern history is an example of 
God's 11 creativities 11 • In a letter to a student Niebuhr 
defines what he understa s by Providence~ 
"I would say anything is Providential which is not 
by human contrivance. Butterfield speaks of 
'secular providence 1 • This , those events 
263 
in history which are beyond human contrivance 
and which people must believe in even if they 
do not believe that all the effects are under a 
Divine rule. They are patterns of history 
above and beyond what people intend " 
(May, 1955) (66) 
(b) As Judge: God is also encountered 1n "judgement 
whenever human ideals, values, and historical ach ve-
ments are discovered to be in contradiction to the divine 
rather than in simple harmony with the ultimate coherence 
of things," ( 6 7) The role of the prophets 1n pointing 
to such contradiction is a Biblical example of what 
Niebuhr means by judgement, What we have called his 
'handles to history' - tragedy and irony, for example -
may in fact be described as prophet tools shaped to 
point to such contradiction 1n modern history. Our 
d cussion in the last chapter of the irony of the 'Cold 
War' is a case in point. 
(c) As Redeemer: finally, according to Niebuhr, God is 
encountered in events 11 in which the divine judgements 
may lead to a reconstitution of life. These are reve-
lations of redeeming grace in which the old self, 
including the collective self of false cultures. is 
destroyed, but the destruction leads to newness of 
life." ( 6 B) The Christ-event as the final point of 
the Heilgeschichte is the ultimate example of what 
Niebuhr means by "reconstitution". Bingham draws 
attention to a modern example of reconstitution in 
political life. She writes: 
"One of the old structures that has been renewed 
rather than destroyed by history has been Western 
capitalism. As Niebuhr said in James Chapel, 
1959, 
'We all have mixed economies today. 
History's inadvertence - or Providence -
dissolved '!the conflicting dogmas of the 
right and the left into a creative 
s y n t'h e sis ' . 11 ( 6 9 ) 
If human history can be seen as containing encounters of 
the sort we have examined above, then it is as a corollary to 
the unique character of human freedom. The 11 encounters". 
as we have seen, lie in the drama in which divine providence 
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confronts human effort. They are not to be understood~ there-
fore, apart from human freedom. 
(1) THE RADICAL FREEDOM OF MAN 
The roots of Niebuhr's thought can be traced from Augustine, 
the Reformers, Pascal, Kierkegaard, through to Barth. He has 
acknowledged that the 'existentialism' of Kierkegaard and Barth 
had a formative influence on his thought. He differs, however, 
in important respects from both Kierkegaard and Barth. He 
wants to take history more seriously than he believed Kierkegaard 
did, and he wants to take philosophy and the sciences more 
seriously than he believed Barth did. These important differ-
ences granted, Niebuhr's Christian Realism ~s broadly existen-
tialist as it is neo-orthodox. 
(70) 
His understanding of man's radical freedom is testimony 
t6 his form df. existentialism. He argues that the ultimate 
my~tery df freedo~ ~s expressed mythically in the creation. 
As such it does not imping~ direc~ly on our exper{ence but is 
something we know only in our moments of deepest reflection. 
It becomes directly relevant to us "only as it represents an 
ultimate mystery of freedom, which is related to the mystery of 
our freedom." ( 7 l) In his Gifford Lectures Niebuhr describes 
the two aspects of the mystery of man's freedom in this way: 
11 Botn the majesty and the tragedy of human life 
exceed the dimension within which modern culture 
seeks to comprehend human existence. The 
human spirit cannot be held within the bounds 
of either natural necessity or rational prudence. 
In its yearning towa the infin~te lies the 
source of both human creativity and human 
sin •.• 
The fa~t that man can transcend himself in 
infinite regression and cannot find the end 
of life except in God is the mark of h 
creativity and uniqueness; closely related 
to this capacity is his inclination to trans~ 
mute his partial and finite self and his 
partial and finite values into the infinite 
good. Therein lies his sin. 11 ( 72) 
In other words, man is unique in his "responsible freedom"; 
this is one aspect of the mystery of his freedom. And man is 
unique in the "corruption of that freedom 11 ; this is the other 
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aspect of the mystery of man's freedom. ( 7 3-) The mystery of 
man's freedom becomes apparent not only when we reflect on the 
meaning of existence as such. It can be known introspectively, 
and is directly experienced by us~ It remains an unresolved 
mystery because it cannot be fitted into a rational or natural 
system of co renee. 
(i) The Mystery Of Man's "Responsible Freedoinll, 
What N buhr means by man's capacity to transcend himself 
"in infinite regression" becomes clearer. when he expounds the 
nature of man's freedom. Our 11 re::>ponsible freedom" can be 
established introspecti~ely. Niebuhr's argument is t~at we 
know that although there are previous causes to explain our 
action~, we know also that we stand abov~ the flow of causes 
and are ourselves the cause of our actions. In his article 
''Freedom" Niebuhr lists some of its facets. (74) Man's .con-
ceptual capacity is one:.· Man is "able to apprehend not only 
single events and objects but to comprehend the flux of events 
in s 1geneilal patterns and essential character." Another ·facet 
of m~n!s freedom is his capacity to retain events in his memory 
and is able "by remembering history, to affect history." Man 
is a creature of nature and necessity, and insofar as this is 
true his actions 11 are determined by previous events" and "subject 
to scientif analysis." But insofar as man is ee, events 
1n history cannot be predicted with the same accuracy as is 
possible in the natural sciences. The difference between the 
historical and natural sciences may be attributed to the unique 
character of man's freedom. 
"The historical sciences are in a different cate-
gory from the natural sciences •... The good 
historian is therefore half artist and half 
scientist. He is a scientist in that he may 
analyse causes and historical trends. He is 
an artist in that he must interpret the 
meaning of an historical structure according 
to a g~neral system of meaning, which his 
imagination partly imposes upon them and 
partly elicits from them. 
Since the ultimate freedom of the person 
beyond all psychological, economic, political, 
geographic and other determining factors is 
always hidden and can be known only intro-
spectively. there is a natural temptation 
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for all students of historic~l events to be 
more determinist than the facts warrant. 
The freedom of persons •.. remains a threat 
to every scienti account of historical 
events." (75) 
Among the important conclusions which Niebuhr draws from 
his understanding of man's freedom is that the social and polit 
cal freedoms "which modern democratic communities accord persons 
express the belated convictions of modern communit s, gained 
after desperate ~truggles, that the community must give the 
persons a social fre om ~hich corresponds to the essent 1 
freedom of his nature." (7 6) 
For Niebuhr, the "unique and radical freedom of man" and 
its consequence -for our understanding of history,. "gives val i ty 
to the bibl al account of history." He continues, 
"The Biblic~l account assumes a di0ine providenc~ 
over individual and collective destinies, which 
esta shes meaning on the vast panoramQ of 
history, without annulling human freedom ,,, 
alternative methods of est lishing meaning by 
co-ordinating historical ~vents into systems 
of natural or rational coherinces, tend to create 
excessively deterministic or eq~ally exce~sive 
voluntaristic interpretations ,,, in which 
either the freedom or· the finiteness of men is 
obscured. 11 ( 77) 
Niebuhr's argument here is characteristic of his thought general-
ly. He argues that if we look at ourselves we discern a mystery 
of freedom which neither natural causality nor rational coherence 
can fully explain. If man is free in this sense, history cannot 
be subjected to rational analysis because such analysis cannot 
do justice to the freedom which we know introspectively. This 
view of freedom and this view of h tory gives credance to the 
biblical view. For the biblical view assumes a divine providence 
over individual and collective (historical) destiny wit ut 
annulling man's freedom. The biblical v w is, therefore, 
adequate because it is not deterministic as rational and natural 
attempts to establish meaning in history tend to be. It allows 
man's unique freedom. The biblical view is adequate, ln addition, 
because it is not voluntaristic. It understands man to be 
finite. Th is symbolized by its assumption of divine provid-
ence. Man is therefore free but finite. This, it would seem 
to us 1 is tantamount to saying we are men and not God. And this, 
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it seems, is what N buhr is saying by his exposition of freedom. 
Man is free, and man is man. 
are inherent in his nature. 
Man's eedom and his 'finiteness' 
But this, as we shall later argue, 
lS to say that man derives his freedom from his essential nature 
as man, and tends to separate man from God, It is only in an 
ultimate sense that man's freedom or his essential nature 
derives from God, it would seem. 
sense which the mystery of creat 
The ultimate sense is the 
n preserves. If nature is 
'quasi-autonomous' in that it is created by God, but not maintain-
ed by Him from moment to moment, so it would seem is man 'quasi-
autonomous'. Man is created by God, and in this sense derives 
his essential nature (and therefore his freedom) from God. 
But man is free, in the same way that nature is free. This, 
it would seem to us, is to obscure aspects of the Biblical view 
of man and history. 
Because of his understanding of man's eedom, Niebuhr is 
critical of rational and natural attempts to encompass it. He 
is critical also of theological attempts to do this. If ration-
and natural attempts to make sense of the mystery of man's 
freedom tend to obscure that mystery, any attempts to substitute 
God for either nature or reason tend to do the same. 
" .•. it must be mitted that versions of the 
Christian faith frequently interpret the idea of 
providence so th the freedom of man is annulled 
or imperiled and God appears to be an arbitary 
despot of the historical drama who creates 
meanings by special providence, that is, by 
interference with the natural causalities and 
coherences which always furnish the foundation 
upon which human freedom erects the various 
pinnacles of history. Calvinism has been parti-
cularly guilty of the primitive interpretation of 
the legitimate biblical idea of the sovereignty 
of a myste ous divine power who is both the creator 
and providential preserver of the human and 
historical enterprise. 11 ( 78) 
It seems that here we have another instance of the enigmatic 
character of Niebuhr's thought. On the one hand, he defines 
providence in a manner which tends to make it remote and ultimate 
in order to preserve man's freedom. On the other hand, his 
attempts to interpret God's action in history appear to operate 
out of a different understanding of providence. An example is 
his article ~History (God) Has Overtaken Us" which, it will be 
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remembered, identifies God with the dramatic events which led 
to America's participation in the Second World War. Because he 
believes history to be revelatory of God, he can speak of 
America's participation in the War in providential terms. The 
point that Niebuhr is making in his criticism of theological 
views which tend to make God the champion of particular events 
in history - thus giving them religious sanction - must in some 
measure be granted. The dangers of such a view Niebuhr has 
strenuously voiced throughout his life. This does not mean, 
however, that God does not act in history: On the one hand, 
Niebuhr is affirming that God 'precipitates' particular events 
in history, and, on the other hand, he refuses to allow religious 
sanction to be given to particular events in history. 
Niebuhr has spoken of the mystery of man's responsible 
freedom. If we ask, in what sense responsible, Niebuhr's 
answer would be th man is accountable for his actions, both 
good and bad. This leads us to the other aspect of man's 
·freedom which is prominent in Niebuhr's thought. 
(ii} The Mystery Of The "Corruption" Of Man's Freedom. 
If responsible freedom is one mysterious aspect of man's 
freedom, then "the gre er mystery" is the "corruption of that 
freedom and the resulting sin and guilt." ( 7 g) If the mystery 
of man's freedom cannot be encompassed by rational means, and 
is validated in experience, so too is "the mystery of the inevi-
tability of man's misuse of his freedom for his own ends. The 
persistence on universality of man's undue self-regard is so 
well established that every valid political science must take 
it for granted .••. his 'misery' and his 'dignity' have the 
same root, namely, his freedom. 11 (BD) 
Niebuhr relates the mystery of corruption of freedom to man's 
finiteness. Man does not sin because he is finite (for this 
would mean that the Creator God is responsible for sin), neither 
does he sin because he is ignorant (for this would mean that sin 
could eventually be er icated by more education - the liberal 
illusion). Man sins precisely because he wants to be God and 
not man; his sin arises out of his efforts to obscure his 
finiteness. 
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"The mystery of man's sin is strangely related to 
his finiteness in the sense that it is not derived 
from finiteness or ignorance but is rather the 
consequence of man 1 s futile effort to escape or 
to obscure the fact of his finiteness ..•• If 
one appreciates the symbolic n ure of the 
observation~ one can agree with Augustine's state-
ment that 'Men fall into sin~ which they could 
avoid~ in trying to avoid death which they cannot 
avoid. 1 The mystery of the evil in man does 
not easily yield to rational explanations because 
evil is the corruption of a good, namely; man's 
freedom. 11 ( 81) 
If the corruption of freedom can be established introspectively 9 
so can responsibility for that corruption. Under the heading: 
11 Responsibili ty Despite l111le.Ji tabili ty" in his Gifford Lectures 1 
Niebuhr puts the matter th way. 11 The fact of responsibility 
is attested by the feeling of remorse or repentance which follows 
the sinful action. (The self's) contemplation of its act in 
valves both the discovery and the reassertion of its freedom. 
It discovers that some degree of conscious dishonesty accompa-
nied the act, which means that' the self was not deterministically 
and blindly involved in it. Its dis..co'l.ery of that fact in 
contemplation is a further degree of the assertion of freedom than 
possible in the moment of the action. 11 ( 82 ) 
Niebuhr finds justification in the myth of the Fall for his 
understanding of evil as the corruption of good. If faith 1n a 
transcendent God made it possible for Hebraic religion to avoid 
the identification of God with the nation (totemism), it also 
made it possible to avoid the identification of God with the 
imperfections of historical existence (pantheism). 
Niebuhr continues 
This faith, 
11 ••• made it possible to affirm confidence in a 
meaningful existence even though the world was 
full of sorrow and evil. Some of the sorrow 
and misery was attributed to human sin. It was 
because man sinned that thorns and thistles grew 
in his field and he was forced to earn his bread 
by the sweat of his brow. The myth of the fall 
may solve the problem of evil too easily by 
attributing all inadequacies of nature to the 
imper ctions of man, but it cant ns one element 
of truth found in all profound religions, and 
that is that it reduces man's pride and presumption 
in judging the justice of the universe by making 
him conscious of his own sin and imper ction 
and suggesting that at least some of the evil 
from which he suffers is a price of the freedom 
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which makes it possible for him to sin." (83) 
Pride, or man's misuse of his freedom for his own ends 9 is .. 
rebellion against God. As such it is the basic form of sin, 
and it:issues in ~injustice toward others and in injury to the 
self in sensuality. It is that rebellion against God which 
·the devil in religious mythology symbolizes. 11 there is 
always a devil in classical religious mythology, and the devil 
is a symbol of the belief that e0il is regarded as an actual· 
rebelli~n against d. Of course, this realism is alw~ys 
balanced by an ultimate optimism, because it is never believed 
that the devil can seriously threaten the rule of God.'' {B 4 ) 
Pride issues in injustice toward others. Niebuhr's defence of 
democra~y.is precisely that it is the form of government which 
controls man's capacity for injustice while according man the 
freedom which is his essent l nature.' "Man's capacity for 
justice makes democracy pos ble, but m~n's inclination to in-
justice makes democracy necess 11 (BS) Pride involves injury 
to self in sensuality. William Wolf summarizes Niebuhr's 
thought on sensu ity: 11 the self in its freedom gives undue 
( 8 6) 
devotion to some element of vitality within the self." 
Two points should be noted here; both of which will be 
amplified later in this chapter. First, Niebuhr resolves the 
problem of theodicy by ascribing responsibility for evil to 
man's sinful nature. That is to say, man's freedom is what 
gives him his capacity for good and bad, and he is responsible 
for both. His distinction between historical evil and natural 
evil is evidence of how theodicy is resolved by reference to 
man. Bingham summarizes Niebuhr's thought in this way, 
tl 
11 When N buhr calls anger the proper attitude 
toward evil, he is referring more to historical 
evil than natural evil. Historical evil is 
defined as the 'bloodshed, slavery and social 
misery ••• of the world' brought about by the 
sinful misuse of human freedom. Natural evil, 
on the other hand, is typified by a child's 
death from disease." (87) 
It is instructive to note Niebuhr's view of natural evil because 
it indicates his int~rpretation of the biblical view of evil. 
He writes, in Faith .And ttistor~, 
11 Th~ obscurities and incoherences of life are, 
according to Biblical faith, primarily the 
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consequence of human actions. The incoherences 
and confusions, usually defined as 'natural' 
evil, are not the chief concern the Christian 
ith. Natu evil represents the failure of 
nature's processes to conform per ctly to 
human ends. It is the consequence of man's 
ambiguous position in nature. As a creature of 
nature he is subject to accidents and contingen-
cies which may be completely irrelevant to the 
wider purposes, interests, and ambitions which 
he conceives and elaborates as creative sp it. 
The most vivid symbol of natural evil is de h. 
Death is a simple fact in the dimension of 
nature; but it is an irrelevance and a threat 
of meaninglessness in the realm of history. 
Biblical faith is, however, only obliquely 
interested in the problem of n ural evil. It 
does not rega death, as such, as an evil. 
'The sting of death', declares St. Paul, 'is 
n'.".(88) 
It is not our purpose here to discuss the truth or other-
wise of the content of Niebuhr's statement about 'natural evil'. 
The significant point to note is that Niebuhr resolves the 
problem of eVil in history by ascribing it to man's sin, and 
the problem of natural evil by ascribing it to nature's ''failure" 
to conform to human needs and go s. Natural evil, ~n Niebuhr's 
view, is therefore only of "obliq8eh 'interest to the Christian 
faith. This is because, for Niebuhr, the Christian faith, and 
indeed the biblical ith, is primarily concerned with the 
problem of evil in human history. The reference to death in 
his st ement is reminiscent of his argument about death being 
related to man's finiteness, as we saw earlier. In his treat-
ment of theodicy Niebuh~ it seems, stands in the Augustinian 
tradition. Evil is ascribed to man's sin and is seen as rebel-
lion against God. His treatment of natural evil is superficial 
(he devotes one paragraph of his Faith And History to the problem) 
and as such he does not reflect the Augustinian tr ition well. 
According to John Hick, Augustine's controversy with Mani-
chaeism and his adaptation of Plotinian theodicy leads him to 
affirm the natural order. He does this by rejecting "the 
ancient Platonic, Neo-Platonic, Gnostic, and Manichaean preju-
dice against matter and lays the foundation for a Christian 
naturalism that rejoices in this world, and instead of fleeing 
from it~as a snare to the soul, seeks to use it and share it in 
gratitude to God for His bountiful goodness." (B 9 ) While Niebuhr 
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does affirm the goodness of the created order~ he does not 
work toward a 'Christian naturalism' g in fact as we have seen~ 
he proposes a radical distinction between nature and history. 
His superficial treatment of natural evil can be seen as yet 
another unfortunate consequence of this distinction which is 
inherent in his theology. This in turn arises from the radical 
distinction between God and His creation in Augustine. Niebuhr's 
Augustinian emphasis on the radical distinction between God and 
His creation is contained in his handling of the Christian doc-
trine of creatio ~ nihilo. 
Evil, according to Augustine is "privation of good". 
There "can be no evil where there is no good" because "nothing 
evil exists in itself~ but only as an evil aspect of some actual 
entity. Evils, therefore, have their source in the good, 
and unless they are parasitic on something good, they are not 
anything at all." ( 9D) As we have seen, for Niebuhr evil in 
human history is attributable to man's sin, and manvs sin is a 
corruption of his essential freedom, which is good. 
We must now comment on one other aspect of Niebuhr's thought 
before concluding this discussion of the mystery of the corruption 
of man's freedom. 
For Niebuhr, pride 1s the quintessence of sin. As such it 
alienates men from God, 1s the source of injustice 1n society, 
and does injury to the self. A large part of the first volume 
of his Gifford Lectures is devoted not only to an analysis of 
this understanding of pride, but also to an. analysis of 
three forms of pride which he distinguishes. They are 




question we raise is whether this identification of pride with 
sin does not derive from his pessimism about man 1 s nature. 
Niebuhr has surely experienced a form of pride which was 
good and healthy. How would the workers in Detroit have fared 
in their struggle for a more equal distribution of power if 
they had not taken a legitimate 'pride' in their identity as 
workers? Can you love your neighbour without a legitimate form 
of self-love, or pride in yourself? Is 'worker-consciousness', 
which it seems is a social and psychological pre-requisite if 
labour is to organize itself, possible without a legitimate 
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form of pride. Is pride the quintessence of sin? Is there 
not a legitimate pride of power, of knowledge, and of virtue? 
Must sensuality be attributed to sin? 
It seems that Niebuhr's pessimism about man's nature and 
his achievements enables him to devote far more space in his 
Gifford Lectures to an analysis of the~abuse ,of power, 
knowledge, virtue, and sensuality than he does to the right use 
of these aspects of man's. nature and his achievements. Is 
there not some substance in the suggestions of present day 
writers that it is not superbia (pride) but acedia (sloth or 
apathy) that lS the debilitating sin of our times? These 
writers, from widely differing viewpoints, seem to agree that of 
the seven deadly sins acedia - which for Catholic theologian 
Joseph Pieper means that man "renounces the claim implicit ln 
his human dignity" - is the root cause of man's incapacity to 
care. For it means taking a view of oneself and of others 
which does nOt do justice to what is implied in the theological 
notion of imago d ei and the res pan sib·ili ty which that entails, 
the gubernatio mundi - the exercise of the care of the world. 
Is the care of the world possible wh,ere there is not a healthy 
( 9 2) 
self-regard, a healthy pride in achievement, a greater affirma-
tion of the truth encompassed by the notion of imago dei? 
It .must be granted that emphasis upon pride has given Niebuhr 
a lever with which to prise open the unquestioned abuse of power 
and privelege which lead to injustice and to injury to self in 
contemporary society. We do not question Niebuhr's understand-
ing of sin as man's capacity to make of ·himself and of his 
collectivruties idolatrous centres of meaning. We do question 
whether his emphasis on sin as pride helps man to shoulder his 
responsibility for the care of the world? 
(2) THE MYSTERY OF GOD AND MAN ILLUMINED BY THE CHRIST-
EVE NT. 
We have already examined Niebuhr's understanding of the 
Christ-event in some detail in Chapter Fouro But it is impor-
tant here to see how Niebuhr interprets the Christ-event as 
illuminating the my~t~ry of God and the mystery of man. 
"All religions," writes Niebuhr, "try to assert some 
274 
meaning ~n the realm of mystery or they stand in awe before 
mystery and let it discount all particular finite and limited 
meanings by which men seek to make sense out of their life." ( 9J) 
He believes that the classical mystical faiths tend to solve 
the mystery of man's freedom and the mystery of man's sin by 
affirming the divine mystery. Biblical faith~ on the other 
hand, engages "in the hazardous enterprise of discerning in some 
events in history a revelatory depth or height, 'a light that 
shineth in darkness'~ which are clues to the meaning of history. 
Christianity goes further and asserts ••. that all previous 
revelatory moments are summarized and climaxed in the drama of 
the suffering Messiah~ in the 'Christ-event.'" ( 94 ) 
For Niebuhr, Christianity stands or falls by what it affirms 
about the Christ-event. What it affirms about that event cannot 
be expressed in ontological terms because··such terms lead to 
apparent illogicality, as is evidenced by early attempts at 
dogmatic formulation of the 'the two natures of Christ'~ for 
example. But this is not to say that affirmations ·about the 
Christ-event are not meaningful. They are meaningful for the 
light they throw upon the human situation and the divine mystery . 
II ... the Christian faith makes sense in affirming 
an historic person and event, in the context of 
the history of Messianic expectations~ were a 
revelatioh of the divine mercy and justice~ and 
that the crucifixion was the final revelation 
and symbol of the universality of human sin and 
the incapacity of men to solve the moral problem 
of human existence by the strenuousness of their 
moral striving." (95) 
that 
The revelatory Christ-event~ then, makes sense when men recdgnize 
the "fragmentariness of all human virtue". If men recognize 
this, Christ can become for them the symbol of ultimate mercy 
and the hiatus between human and divine righteousness can be 
overcome. 
The Christian faith makes some ultimate claims for Christ~ 
and upon these claims it rests. For Niebuhr~ these may be summed 
up in this way: "It asserts that we have~ in the Christ revela-
tion, the sum and climax of all previous clues to the mystery of 
both human existence and the relation of the divine creativity 
( 9 6) to the purposes of history." This does not mean that 
the Christ revelation is the only revelation~ but that it is the 
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most definitive for the Christian. 
The Christ-event is interpreted by Niebuhr as offering a 
basic "clue" to our understanding of God, and to the meaning of 
our existence. In his essay, "Mystery and Meaning" (1958) 9 he 
explains: 
"It gives a clue by faith to the mystery of 
creation for it substitutes for the unknown 
X of the primordial god, the conception of a 
divine source and end of all historical meanings 
and purposes." {97) 
It gives this clue "by faith": to say that man 1 s historical exis-
tence lS meaningful is, for Niebuhr, to make a statement of faith 
about that existence. Ii is a faith statement because rational 
or natural systems of coherence are limited in that they cannot, 
ln themselves, lead one ultimately to an affirmation of the 
meaningfulness of existence, If we assert that existence is 
meaningful, we do so by faith and not by reason. It is import-
tant to note that Niebuhr means by existence 'historical existence', 
and that any statement about its meaningfulness, whether Christian 
or not, is based on a presupposition of faith, In his Gifford 
Lect~res, he speaks of the impossibility of an interpretation of 
history which is not based on some such presupposition of faith: 
"It is, in fact, impossible to interpret history 
at all without a principle of interpretation which 
history as such does not yield. The various 
principles of interpretation current in modern 
culture, such as the idea of progress or the 
Marxist concept of an historical dialectic, 
are all principles of interpretation introduced 
by faith. They claim to be conclusions about the 
nature of history at which men arrive after a 
'scientific' analysis of the course of events; 
but there can be no such analysis of the course 
of events which does not make use of some pre-
supposition of faith, as the principle of analysis 
and interpretation. 11 ( 98) 
For Niebuhr, then, an affirmation about the meaningfulness 
of history is impossible without a presupposition of faith. 
For the Christian, that presupposition (or "clue") is the Christ-
event. The test of the validity of the Christ-event is that 
it makes sense of the realities we experience. One reality we 
experience is the mystery of our existence as such, another 
mystery which we experience is the mystery of our freedom and 
its sinful corruption, Without a ''clue" to these mysteries 
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which we experience it is not possible to make sense of them. 
This is because"nothing in reason or in nature can lead us to an 
understanding of their meaning. An analysis of the structures 
of the natural order, and of the laws of logic can lead us to 
certain conclusions about the structure of that order and about 
the nature of the mind. But it does not follow from these con-
elusions that existence 1s meaningful. 
Niebuhr, 1s an affirmation of faith. 
Such a conclusion, for 
The clue to that meaning 
is given 1n the Christ-event. Our experience as creatures of 
history is real and not epiphenomenal, and our experience of 
freedom and its sinful corruption is real and not illusory. 
These experienced realities have a "status in the total realm of 
reality". For the Christian, the Christ-event is the basic clue 
to the meaning of that totality. 
Niebuhr's argument is that if interpretations of history 
are based on presuppositions of faith, these presuppositions must 
in turn be tested by their adequacy in making sense of the 
"experienced realities". As such his argument is reminiscent 
of Pascal. He, in fact, acknowledged his indebtedness to Pascal 
in this context when he wro~e to a young man considering becoming 
a minister: 
" ,~. it became clear to me that by the nature of 
the human and the divine self there cannot be a 
'rational' validation of religious experience. 
Religious faith must remain to the end, on the· 
one hand, in Pascal's phrase, 1 a great gamble . 
while it is on the other hand a cRrtainty based 
on an accumulation of experience~. Pascal, 
living in a rationalistic century dominated by 
Descartes, was incidentally my best guide as he 
has been the guide for many.in our generation." 
(99) 
In what sense then is history given meaning by the Christ-
event? Niebuhr's answer is that because of man's unique and 
radical freedom, histor~cal experience requires meaning. History 
requires meaning by virtue of man's capacity to rise indetermi-
; nately above all rational or natural systems of coherence. The 
Christ-event gives meaning to history by its capacity to illu-
mine the mystery of human freedom 1n its sinful corruption. 
"It answers the human predicament of sin, of the inevitable 
inclination of man to use his freedom for his own ends, and of 
the infection of this self-regard in even the highest reaches of 
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moral endeavour." (100) The answer to the human predicament, 
Niebuhr argues i~ his Giffbrd Lectures 9 is the assertion of the 
Christian faith that the God whom we experience as Judge lS also 
the God of Mercy 9 and that the gap between divine and human 
goodness has been overcome by His initiativeo 
"All the difficult Christian theological dogmas of 
atonement and justification are efforts to expli~ 
cate the ultimate mystery of divine wrath and 
mercy in its relation to man. The good news of 
the gospel is that God takes the sinfulness of 
man into Himself, and overcomes in His own 
heart what cannot be overcome in human life 9 
since human life remains within the vicious 
circle of sinful self-glorification on every 
level of moral advanceo 
This is rightly regarded as the final revelation 
of the personality of God. It is final because 
it is the revelation of God's freedom in the 
highest reaches of its transcendenceo 
Christian faith regards the revelation in 
Christ as final because this ultimate problem 
(of how God's mercy triumphs over His wrath) 
is solved by the assurance that God takes man 1 s 
sin upon Himself and into Himself, and that 
without this divine initiative and this divine 
sacrifice there could be no reconciliation and 
no easing of man's uneasy conscienceo This 
revelation is final not only as a category of 
interpreting the total meaning of history but 
also as a solution for the problem of the 
uneasy conscience of each individualo o o o" (101) 
The Deus Absconditus is thus also the Deus Revelatus. 
But the manner in which God revealed Himself was not the manner 
which man expected. The Christ of the New Testament 9 according 
to Niebuhr 9 stood under a Messianic "aura" 9 and was therefore 
expected to clarify the ambiguities of man and history by the 
"clear victory of the righteous over the unrighteous as the cul-
mination of the meaning of historyo He (however) clarified 
history in another way than was intendedo Everything that is 
best in history is discovered under this light to be involved in 
the tragedy of innocent sufferingo" (l0 2 ) Evidence of this fact 9 
for Niebuhr, is that the highest achievements of human culture -
Hebraic religion and Roman law - were involved in the tragedy of 
that suffering. 
In what sense does the idea of a suffering and therefore 
merciful God offer a clue to the meaning of human existence? 
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Niebuhr's answer is that reflection on the mystery of human 
freedom and its sinful corruption - common to the experience of 
all men - may persuade us of the adequacy of this clue in clari-
fying the mystery of man's self-regard. 
"It clears up two problems about man's self-
regard. It does not regard this phenomenon as 
normative even though it be universal. That 
is to s a y , it in sis t s on t akin g ~s J. n s e rio u s 1 y 
and repudiates all theories which regard ego-
tism as harmless because it is natural; rrr 
which regard it as harmful but do not see that 
the universal ch~racteristic of human behaviour 
is not a normative experience of the human self. 
The other problem which is clarified is the 
problem of what to do about this persistent and 
universal human egotism. That is answered on 
an ultimate level by divine forgiveness. It 
must be answered on all proximate lev~ls of 
statecraft by providing all kinds of guards 
against the dangers of both collective a~d 
individual egotism.n (103) 
The clue offered by the idea of divine suffering love not 
only clarifies the mystery of man's persistent self-regard, it 
also clarifies the antecedent problem of man's freedom. It does 
so by suggesting that the perfect self-giving love of the cross 
~s the norm for human conduct. If man is free, what norm is 
he to use in his conduct of his life and of his relations with 
other men? The c~oss, which symboli~es the divine suffering 
love, suggests that that norm as agape. There are, however, two 
problems inherent in making agape the norm of human conduct-, says 
Niebuhr. 
"One is that insofar as the love of the neighbour 
is the obvious norm of human freedom and can be 
validated by any rigorous analysis of the human 
situation, it does not seem to require the 
acceptance by faiih of a particular revelation . 
•.• Why should we engage in hazardous acts of 
faith when the daylight of common experience can 
enlighten our darkness? 
The second difficulty is that sacrificial love, 
as exemplified by the love of ~hrist,. the agape 
of the New Testament, is too pure to be a guide 
for the ordering of the affairs of the community. 
These require the norms of justice and the mutual-
ities of philia rather than the pure transcendence 
over self of the New Testament agape. It is, in 
short, very difficult, if not impossible, to 
construct an adequate social ethic, requiring a 
careful calculation of' competing rights, from an 
agape ethic." (104) 
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Why, then, preserve the ideal of agape as the norm of h~man 
conduct? Niebuhr's reply is that it should be preserved~ not 
because it is a simple possibility (the liberal Christian illusion) 
or as a 'counsel of perfection' (as in the Roman Catholic view), 
It should be preserved as "a symbol of the indeterminate possibi-
lities of love in which human freedom stands; and as the transcen-
dent or 'eschatological' pinnacle of the ethical life of man." (lOS) 
Here Niebuhr's argument is that any attempts to construct an 
ethical syst~m without the symbol of suffering-love is bound to 
cut off this pinnacle "by some standard of prudence or some esti-
mate of human conduct"~l~~~ thereby to deny man's self~transcendent 
nature. Niebuhr seems here to be arguing that just as it is 
not possible to find a source of meaning in history from within 
history itself, so it is impossible to construct an adequate 
ethical system on the basis of man's capacity for ethical motiva-
tion and ethical action. History, according to Niebuhr, acquires 
meaning from a vantage point beyond history, and the construction 
of an ethical norm requires a transcendent norm if it is to do 
justice to man's capacity for self-transcendence. The universal 
reverence for "the heroic act and for the martyr's sacrifice ••o 
attest to the universal acceptance of the validity of the trans-
historical tangents of the meaning of our existence." (l0 7 ) What 
Niebuhr is saying is that the self-sacrifice exhibited in heroism 
and martyrdom and man's reverence of these attest his capacity to 
transcend himself. Agape, which is central to Christian faith, 
is thus part of our experience. As such it does not validate 
the Christian affirmations about God as suffering love. It does, 
however, strike a chord with something which is part of man~s 
experience. In this sense the adequacy though not the truth, of 
the Christian affirmation is attested. 
In the final analysis: 
"The only way of validating such a faith is to bear 
witness to it in life. R.B. Braithwaite, 
has come to the conclusion that the only way of 
validating the Christian faith is by the witness 
of 'living in an agapeistic wayv o ••• Professor 
Braithwaite is wrong only in one aspect of this 
affirmation. He has reduced the Christian faith 
to the simple moral proposition that 'God is love' 
and that we ought to love one another. The 
Christian faith is more profound than this kind 
of moral idealism. It declares that God is 
love and that his love is the final source of 
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harmony for men who know they ought to love one 
another but who really love themselves. The 
faith is an answer to their moral predicament 
and becomes meaningless if the predicament is 
not known • 11 {lOB) 
In his essay "Christians and Jews in Western Civilization", 
Niebuhr elaborates-his understanding of "witness" in this way: 
11 
••• the two faiths share not only a common mono-
theism but a common attitude toward history, 
toward historic responsibilities and toward our 
relation to the creator God as a'sovereign of 
history . 
..• both faiths derive not only their ethical 
creativity and their life-affirming impulse 
from the acceptance in faith of an historical 
revelation o • o. How is the claim to be validated, 
in the one case that I~rael is the chosen people 
of God, and in the other case that 'Gdd was in 
Christ reconciling the world unto himself?' 
Both covenants assume that an historic _ :"act is 
more than mere fact; it is but a disclosure of 
the mystery which bares history. In both cases 
a community of believers is organized on the 
basis of faith's apprehension of the revelatory 
depth of the fact. In both cases the burden of 
proof is on the covenant community that this 
exclusively apprehended revelation does not 
imply an exclusive God; o•• .In both cases the 
only proof of the affirmation of faith must be 
1 witness 1 , the witness of life, which is oriented 
not to some private and peculiar God, but to 
the divine sovereign whb is equally rigo~ous 
in his demands upon believers and upon unbelievers 
and offers no special subject to this God and 
responds to him in faithfulness and repentance, 
in gratitude and hope, can only be proved by the 
quality of a life. Both faiths must bear witness 
to thei:r ·revelation o Both faiths are in danger 
of neglecting the scientific and metaphysical 
tests for universal validity, which, inc~dentally~ 
may eliminate caprice but~~lways in danger nf 
annulling both the mystery of man, who transcends 
the coherences of nature and reason; and the 
mystery of history, which is the realm of both 
divine and human freedom.". (109) 
(3) THE PROMISE OF NIEBUHR'S 
THEOLOGICAL METHOD 
Our paradigm of Niebuhr's theology indicates his theological 
presuppositions. In the nature of the case, this paradigmatic 
treatment of Niebuhr's thought cannot do full justic~ to its rich 
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and variegated texture. This is due partly to the built-i~ 
limitations of such a treatment, but also to his dialectical style. 
It serves, however, to show the theological groundwork of his 
ethics and apologetics, and to indicate that it was within the 
framework of these theological presuppositions that he pursued his 
work as a social ethicist and Christian apologist. 
The enigmatic quality of his writing lies in the fact that 
his formal statements of theol~gical position, few as they are, 
raise as many questions as they seek to solve. In the final 
section of this chapter we will make some proposals concerning 
the problems raised by his theol~gy. Niebuhr, of course, was 
not a systematic theological ~ ~· He was a teacher of Chris-
tian social hies. As such, his main interest lay in establishing 
the foundations for social choice. To be sure, this involved him 
in theological reflection. But the main purpose of his reflection 
remained the solution of the moral problem. 
By his own admission, Niebuhr's love - apart from social 
ethics - was the apologetic task. Throu~hout his life he engaged 
in a runn{ng battle with what Schleiermacher described as 
Christianity's 'intellectual despisers'. Niebuhr's style is 
therefore polemic He cannot be understood apart from the 
intellectual issues which were his Sitz im Leben. If Barth may 
have dismissed the apologetic task by stating that the Gospel 
"cannot be recommended and defended; it has no advocates and no 
propagandists", (llO) Niebuhr held the contrary view. "My avoca-
tiona! interest as a kind of circuit rider in the colleges and 
universities has prompted an intere in the defence and just i-
cation of the Christian faith 1n a secular age •.. " (lll) 
It is as an ethicist and an apologist that Niebuhr exerts a 
far-reaching and important influence both in the United States 
and in Europe. Ronald Stone is on record as saying that contem-
porary debates in Protestant social ethics are dominated by 
former students of H. Richard or Reinhold Niebuhr. According to 
Stone students of American social thought cannot bypass Reinhold 
Niebuhr: 
"His critique of the Social Gospel, theological 
liberalism, pragmatism, Lutheranism, and American 
political structures and values, while incorpo-
rating asp~cts of all of them, make his work a 
watershed for social ethics in this country. 
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The problems of social ethics have been redefined 
by Reinhold Niebuhr, 11 (112) 
(a) Christian Social Ethics 
. 
Part of the redefinition of social ethics to which Stone 
refers lies in Niebuhr's justification of the phrase 'social 
ethics' itself. He argued that an ethic derived from the New 
Testament is founded on the whole oody of Christ's teaching, 
exemplified in the Sermon on the Mount. It is furthermore 
"derived historically and religiously from the sacrificial death 
of Christ and from the injunction, 'If any man would come after 
me let him deny himself, take up his cross and follow me'. Such 
an ethic needs a ~social' ethic in the sense that it must give 
guidance not only in terms of life, for which sacrificial and 
forgiving love is the norm, but must also come to terms with the 
problem of establishing tolerable harmonies of life on all levels 
of community under conditions set by the fact that men are sinners. 
Men do not, in fact, love their fellow men. They love themselves. 
A 'social ethic' must deal, in short, with the problem of 
'alter-egoism', i.e., with the fact that a community in which 
mutual love is the rule, rather than the exception, may, as a 
community become selfish, turning the love of the individual 
self into love of the collective self.'' (ll 3 } 
The process of finding 'proximate' rather than ultimate norms 
for man's collective life involves criteria other than those 
found in the New Testament. In fact, Niebuhr has argued that 
the distinctively Christian understanding of grace and red~tion 
~ 
"does not find place in a social ethic because it is a question 
whether nations, races and other groups have direct access to 
God, and can repent and have newness of life in the sense that 
individuals do." (ll4 ) Although Stone does not refer to this 
aspect of Niebuhr's thought, this must surely be credited as one 
of Niebuhr's distinctive contributions to the redefinition of 
the problem of Christian social ethics. He made this point 
cogently in his Moral Man and Immoral Society in 1934. He . 
continued to work on the basis of this presupposition. 
Christian social ethics, for Niebuhr, must include Biblical 
and non-Biblical sources if adequate criteria for social choice 
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are to be found. Herein lies one of the major sources of diffe~ 
renee between Barth and N buhr. While Niebuhr would agree with 
Barth that there can be no specifically 'Chr tian Marshall Plan'~ 
or specif ally Christian economic or polit al system either, 
Niebuhr parts company with Barth by insisting that criteria for 
Christian social ethics must be derived from Biblical as well as 
non-Biblical sources. In the process of finding 'proximate' 
norms for man's collective life the Christian cannot and aloof, 
and must be involved in all the haz s that such a process 
involves. In an essay "Barthianism and the Kingdom", Niebuhr 
makes clear his view that Christiansare involved in these hazards: 
"All history is compromise. But the 'nicely calcu-
ted less and more' with which we must deal when 
we deal with the ethical problems of history is 
really important. Any religious idealism which 
absolves us of responsibility for finding the 
best possible means to the highest possible social 
end dangerous to the moral struggle." (115} 
What then are the. sources .from ~hich::a Chtistian social ethic 
must be.derived? 
for social choice? 
How does Niebuhr, in fact, derive his criteria 
Perhaps the c arest summary of his own 
position is to be found in an essay: 11 Theology and Political 
Thought in the Western World 11 : 
"If we fully an e the complex relation which exists 
between religious and rational factors in the esta-
blishment of justice, we must come to the conclusion 
th two elements are equally necessary for the solu-
tion of the problems of the human community. One 
is a proper reverence for factors and forces which 
are truly absolute; and the other is a discriminate 
attitude toward relative and ambiguous factors and 
forces. As Christians we insist that there be a 
proper reverence for the absolute factors, which 
might be enumerated as: (l) The authority of God 
beyond human and historic authorities, enabling 
us to defy those authorities on occasion with a 
resolute 'We must obey God rather than men. 1 
(2) The authority of the moral law embodied in the 
revelation of Christ, which is to be distinguished 
from any particular version of that law which may 
have evolved h torically, including the different 
versions of 'natural law'. (3) The insistence upon 
the 'dignity' of the person which makes it illegi-
timate for any community to debase the individual 
into a mere instrument of social process and 
power and try to obscure the fact of his ultimate 
destiny, which transcends all historic realities, 
This acknowledgement of the 'dignity' of man must 
be accompanied in Christ n thought by a recognition 
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that this precious individual is also a sinner, 
that his lusts and ambitions are a danger to the 
community; (4) Reverence for the 'orders' 
of authority and social harmony which have actually 
been establish among us, beyond the wisdom of men 
and frequently by providential workihg in which 
'God hath made the wrath of man to pr~ise him!l 
Every one of these 'absolutes' is in danger of 
corruption; which is why we cannot speak so 
simply of Christian 'civic virtue'." (116) 
1n an article in honour of Rauschenbusch written about the 
same time as the essay from which we have just q~oted (1957), 
Niebuhr acknowledges that one of the genuine achievements of the 
·Social Gospel was the rediscovery of the Hebrew prophe as 
~teachers of social righteousness'. The Soci~l Gospel school 
recognized the ''importance of the prophetic insistence bn social 
righteousness and on collective morality, That ihsistence makes 
the O~d Testament a perpetual resource for a Chri~ti~n social 
ethic, .and raises the question,whether .in the history of Christian-
ity ethics as. distinguished from theology can ever develop an 
adequate .social ethic if it neglects the Old Testament prophetism. 
for without the Old Testament witness, the moral tension between 
Christ and the world, .as explicat.ed in the New Testament, is 
always in danger of creating or of providing an escape for the 
tension in either the asceticism of the medieval church or the 
piet tic individualism of Protestantism." {ll7) 
The question with which we began our study was whether it is 
,. 
possible to deduce coursesof social action from the ith. 
Niebuhr's response would be qualifiedly affirmative. The quali-
fication-would, in p .be his insistence that the Hebrew prophe-
tic witness recorded in the Old Testament must be an important 
resource for social ethics~ ~hat 'faith' must be understood as 
including the Hebraic faith exemplified in the prophetic traditiorfli. 
His qualification would also comprise his insistence that the 
biblical,...Chr ian tradition .cannot alone provi~e criteria for 
social choice. .The resources of philosophy and the human sciences 
are necessary. if a Christian· social ethic is.to be adequate. 
Realism, . he· would insist, ·"emphasizes justice through either 
conflict or equilibrium because of the perpetual character of 
human self-interest, particularly collective self-interest." (ll 8 ) 
for this reason Niebuhr would hold that a Christian social ethic 
must avail itself of non-Biblical instruments for the calculation 
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of competing rights and interests, and that the methods of the 
human sc nces must be used in datermining the nature and struc-
ture of the given situation in which decisions must be made . 
. In th and preceding chapters we have analyzed those aspects 
of Ni~buhr's theology which form the basis of h approach to 
social ethics. We have examined his understanding of God as 
the symbol of mystery amd meaning; .his view of man's 'dignity' 
and einfulness; his conception of the ChriSt-event as the reve-
lation of divine suffering love - the ultimate norm for human 
conduct; and his understanding of the Hebrew prophetic movement. 
These are his Biblical-Christian resources for social ethics. 
It is not necessary, therefore, to elaborate these resources 
here. Wh is important to note is that these aspects of his 
theology are constituent parts of Niebuhr's method 'of doing social 
ethics. 
Another constituent part of his method is his pragmatism. 
In fact, Ronald one considers Niebuhr's pragmatism to be so 
important that he devotes a whole chapter of his book on Niebuhr 
to what he calls,"A Pragmatic-Liberal Synthesis in Christian 
Polit al Philosophy." Stone adopts a develDpmental approach in 
analyzing Niebuhr's thought in a manner similar to the one we 
adopted in Chapter Two of this work. However, what we have 
called N buhr's 'Mature Years': the period during which he worked 
from·the ba s.of Christian Realism, Stone divides into two 
periods. The latter being the period during which,. according to 
Stone, ,Niebuhr develops a 11 pragmatic~liberal synthesis". Stone 
has good grounds for this approach because it was in the 1950's 
that Niebuhr returned to political liberalism: not the idealistic 
liberalism of Wilson which influenced him in his youth, but the 
pragmatic liberalism of the Roosevelt era in American politics. 
Though it was not always manife , Niebuhr's debt to pragma-
tism can be seen in all phases of his thought. As Stone says: 
"The philosphy of William James had been important 
to Niebuhr as a young student, and Niebuhr's 
methodological presuppositions continued to reveal 
the influence of James. In the 1930's Niebuhr 
co-operated with and argued against John Dewey. · 
In the 1940's he came to appreciate the pragmatic 
liberalism of President Roosevelt. In the 1950's 
he explicitly advocated Christian pragmatism." (119) 
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In the same essay where he enumerates the "absolutes" essentisl 
for Ch stian social ethics? rhebuhr defines "Christian Pragmatism 11 
thus: "'Pragmatism' has been a Schimpfwort in Christian circles 
for some time. How then do we arrive at a 'Christiani pragm ism? 
One can answer that question very simply by the assertion that 
Christian pragmatism is merely the application of Christian free-
dom and a sense of responsibility to the complex issues of econo-
mics and politics, with the firm resolve that inh ed dogmas 
and generalizations will not be accepted, no matter how revered 
or venerable, if they do not contribute to the establ hment of 
. t . . . . t t . II { 120 ) N . b h I t. JUS ~ce ~n a g~ven s~ ua ~on. ~e u r s pragma ·~sm, 
tempered as it is by his theological presuppositions, is character~ 
ized by a rejection of ideelogically conceived political systems" 
He insisted, therefore, in judging institutions of government on 
the basis of their usefulness for man's collective life. What 
might be termed 'utility in the service of justice' was the 
criterion by which he judged political institutions • 
. It is important to note that in order to find a basis for 
social ethics Niebuhr believed that theological ''absolutes" and 
non-theological principles should be held in balance with prag-
matic interests. This attempt to hold in balance theological 
and non-theological principles with pragmatic concerns in politi~ 
cal judgement marks another important difference between his 
method and that of Earth. The controversy which ensued between 
Earth and Niebuhr over the Hungarian crisis in 1956 exemplifies 
this. Niebuhr criticized Barth for his "extreme pragmatism? 
which disavows all moral principles. Without the guidance of 
principles and looking at every event afresh in the light of the 
Word of God~ Earth comes to the capricious conclusion that Commu-
n m is not as bad as Nazism because it is not anti-Semitic • 
••• A little concern for 'principles' would have instructed Barth 
that some of the Barbarism of Nazism was derived from the same 
monopoly of irresponsible power from which the barbar m of 
Commun m is derived. Looking at every event afresh means that 
one is ignorant about the instructive~ thoug~ inexact~ analogies 
of history which the 'godless 1 scientists po t out for our 
b f 't " (121} ene ~ • 
Niebuhrp .embracing the Chr tian tradition, being moved by 
his pragmatic concern for justice from idealism to realism, finding 
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'1 
in that tradition a strong stream of realism - running from the 
Hebrew prophets, the New Testament, through Augustine to the 
Reformers - was both confirmed in his realism and led to recover 
that element in the tradition from erroneous romantic, Enlighten-
ment, and nineteenth century views. 1 Christian Realism 1 , there-
fore, signifies both a method which brings the Ch tian tradition 
into interplay with the realitie~ ~f the time, and also the 
realism of the Ch tian tradition in which he stood. For 
example, his emphasis on the fallen state of man was his redisco-
very of the realistic nature of the ·Christian tradition. .The 
consequences which he drew for democracy from this emphasis are 
indicative of his method • 
. With some important reservations, Niebuhr's methodology is 
not unlike that of the Hebrew prophetic method which we examined 
in Chapter One. .There we noted that the prophets deduced 
courses of social action from history. They did so on the basis 
of their. understanding of history as the 'arena~ of God's action, 
~avelatory of his nature. They were able, therefore, to 'read-
off' from contemporary history what God was doing, and therefore 
what Israel ought to be doing •. The basic 'clue' with which they 
interpreted the events of their time was their understanding of 
God deriving ultimately from the Sinai-complex of events in their 
history. 
Niebuhr stands within a tradition which not only tells him 
that God is at work in history, but also deduces from that history 
the character of that God. Thus, for Niebuhr, justice is the 
social expression of ~gape_ because God reveals Himself as Judge. 
Contemporary history, which we understand to include the events, 
institutions, and intellectual achievements of a specific period, 
is allowed to interact with the Biblical-Christian tr ition. 
In that interaction the tradition is at times modified because 
it no longer 'fits' the facts of contemporary experience. .Niebuhr 1 s 
assertion that a radical distinction between natural and human 
history must be made, is an instance of such a modification of 
the tradition. On the other hand, there are times when the 
tradition provides him with the criteria for a radical criticism 
of the prevailing optimism which characterized the early part of 
this century. 
Niebuhr has been criticized for the scant attention he appears 
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to give to the church in his writings. It has been argued that 
the question of the,Church is an "undeveloped area of his thought" 
and a "critical omission in·Niebuhr's social picture of redemption." 
(122) It is significant, as D.E. Robertson points out, that the 
Living Library Volume on Niebuhr includes no chapter on his thought 
'about the Church. But as Robertson argues, Niebuhr has given 
a "rather large amount of attention to the church'' and shows that 
"he also values the institution more highly and positivelY: than 
h reputation would seem to allow." The greater part of what 
Niebuhr has written on the church is to be found in his "fugitive 
" tt d t h h d . d . 1 ( l2 3 ) essays , sea ere roug a ozen magaz~nes an Journa s. 
Robertson has in fact corrected the situation by collecting most 
of Niebuhr's essays on the church and publishing them in Essays 
In Applied Christianity. In that volume Niebuhr's writings are 
brought together and grouped into. five divisions: aspects of 
common worship in American churches; the ifh of the church 
and specific moral issues; Niebuhr's controversy with Barth~ 
an analysis and criticism of Catholic views of the churc~ ~nd 
of natural law theory; and finally a section on Niebuhr's writings 
on the ecumenical movement. 
It is beyond the scope of this work to enter into a dis-
cussion of Niebuhr's understanding of the Church, except insofar 
as thi~ affects his theological method. It is true that Niebuhr 
has written extensively on the church • He speaks appreciatively 
. of the church as "that place in human society where men are 
disturbed by the Word of God"; where "the word of mercy, recon-
cil~ation, and consolation heard"; where "the Kingdom cf God 
impinges upon all human enter ises 11 ; as a "community of hopeful 
. believers"; and as. "community of forgiven sinners". He is also 
critical of the church. He sees it as sharing the tendency.of 
all .institutions to choke creativity; to be tempted to self-
righteousness; and not to understand 11 as well as the prophets 
of Isr~el understood how severely the judgement of God falls 
upon the community which is the bearer of the judgement.'' ( 124 ) 
It is, we believe, true that Niebuhr has no explicit· parallel 
in his method to the role played by the covenant community in the 
Hebrew prophetic method. He does not see, as Lehmann does, the 
need for the role of a koinonia ~n his method. Lehmann speaks of 
a theonomous conscience operating within a three-fold context 
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comprising the Church (koinonia), the Faith (the Biblical-
Christian tr ition) 1 and the objective situation. Whereas 
Niebuhr's method involves an interaction between faith (including 
non-Biblical resources) and the objective situation for ethical 
decision-making 1 without any explicit role being given .to the 
Church. This is not to say th Niebuhr had no ap eciation 
of the Church, but rather that he gave no specific place to the 
role of the Church in his method. Whatever th~ difficulties 
. (125) 
~n Lehmann's approach, in methodology he does posit the 
need for koinonia both as a 1 conscientizing 1 ·community and as an 
enabling community in ~hich ethical decisions can be made. This 
koinonia we understand to be Lehmann's counterpart of the Hebrew 
covenant community out of wh h the. prophets operated. 
The fact that Niebuhr makes little. explicit provision for 
a farm o~ community of faith in his methodology for social ethics 
is a serious gap in his thought. Perhaps this omission accounts 
far the absence of any serious d;iscussian of conscience in 
Niebuhr's thought. If we accept fletcher's view that conscience 
is a function of the s~lf rather than a facultypf intuition 
within the self, (126 ) then the nacessity far some form of cammu-
nity. beca~es imperative. It .becomes necessary to ensure that a 
community exists in which a 'canscientizing' process is encouraged, 
.whereby the ~oral values and notions of reality are. shared and 
transmitted· from generation to generation. Understood sociolo-
gically1 this surely haw the Hebraic covenant community 
functioned. Should such a community cease to exist it is hard 
to seec how the prophet could be he The role of the koinonia 
in Lehmann's method recognizes this need. 
The need for some form of commun y as a constituent part 
of the ·process of ethical thought and eth al decision-making 
is necessary for another e~ually important reason. Mast of 
our social problems today are sa. complex~ that is is hard enough 
to locate the problem in the first place, let alone identify 
the causes. As sociologist Peter Berger puts it: 
"Our social problems today typically consist of the 
clash af highly organized interests, with well-
meaning individuals caught on bath sides i~ the 
logic and sometimes the ideology of their 
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respective positions. Also, these problems are 
chara~terized by a high degree of incommun ation 
between the groups and individuals participating 
in them. In many such instances, the classical 
approaches of 'social action' fail even to get 
off the ground. One may not even know where one's 
action could begin. Far example, mast situations 
of· industrial conflict in America today are far 
too complex for these old approaches. They 
involve highly complicated economic and politi-
cal relationships, which are very difficult to 
separate in terms of what is morally desirable 
or undesirable. In the early days of labor 
orga zation in America, when there were clear 
issues of economic exploitation and human indigni-
ty in almost every labor dispute~ involvement in. 
terms of 'social action' may have been relatively 
easy for Christians. Today, mare likely than 
not, these disputes do nat involve economic issues 
at all. It is very hard for a consistent moral-
ist to make decisions in disputes involving minutiae 
of work rules or job categories or in jurisdic-
tional quarrels between rival unions. The 
temptation is close then simply to abandon such 
problems to the forces of the social situation, 
giving up the attempt to engage the situation 
in~terms of Christian ethics at all. To yield 
to this temptation, however, is to say that the 
Christian faith is irrelevant to what are the 
crucial concerns of mast men in industrial society." 
{ 12 7) 
This description of the complexity of modern social problems could 
be reproduced many times. Any serious attempt, therefore, to 
contribute towards the problem-identifying and problem-solving 
process necessitates some form of community in which this can be 
done. The "Academy Movement" J..n Germany is an outstanding example 
of an attempt by the Church to create such a community in whi6h the 
complex problems wh h confront modern man can be discussed and 
proximate solutions found. The experience of the European 
"Academies" has been that it is possible for men of good-will, 
Christian and non-Christian, to establish a fellowship of agreed 
principles out of which p;:ro.xinate solutions to particular problems 
can emerge. In this process not only has the Church learned to 
listen sympathetically to the complex issues which confront men 
in society, but it has also discovered that the Biblical-Christian 
tradition recommends itself to those who feel 'the care of the 
world! "to be their care. 
Our criticism that Niebuhr makes no explicit provision in 
his methodology far a Lehmann-type koinonia should nat obscure the 
• • 
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fact that he appeared always to ape e out of same form of commu-
nity. Some form of 'fellowship of agreed principles' was always 
important to Niebuhr.- This can be demonstrated by reference to 
virtually every period of his life and thought. As we indicated 
in Chapter Twa, Niebuhr belonged to various 'fellowships', and 
operated at his best when in a stimulating group which shared 
similar aims to those he espoused. (l 2 B) Thus, whereas Niebuhr 
makes no provision for community in his explicitly methodological 
statements about social ethics, in point of fact he always operated 
aut of same form of community. 
method. 
Community is implicit in his 
All thought on social and political problems will remain 
indebted to Reinhold Niebuhr. His seminal contribution to social 
ethics has redefined the boundaries of Protestant ethical thought 
and given fresh impetus to social ethics. The problems which 
we have discerned in his approach are a challenge to improve an 
his method, and to engage in creative work at the frontiers which 
his contribution has enabled us to perceive mare clearly. 
Niebuhr himself was unsatisfied with aspects of his approach 
to the end of his life. In an interview, given in 1969, when in 
retirement and ill-health he speaks of his d satisfaction~ 
"We've had this long history of realism, Christian 
and non-Christian, and it's an interesting thing 
to me that many of my non-Christian real t friends 
like Hans Morgenthau were particularly anxious 
to say that they agreed with me, though they did 
not share my 'theological convictions'. 
The fact was - and this was my great offence -
my theological convictions to them were positive-
ly irrelevant. I used the doctrine of original 
sin as a symbol of the perpetu , universal 
charater of self-interest •••• I thought in my 
Gifford Lectures that I had made the doctrine of 
original sin acceptable both by disavowing the 
historicity of the Garden of Eden story and by 
disavowing Augustine's rather horrible doctrine 
of the transmission of original sin through 
sexual lust in the act of procreation. I 
thought this cleansed the doctrine for the 
modern mind, as well as making it relevant, but 
it didn 1 t. 
Intellectual life as well as political life uses 
all kinds of symbols and myths, and for good and 
bad reasons people accept or reject these symbols 
and myths. In other words, I think I was right 
in my realism, and in my theology, but wrong in 
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my pedagogy~" (129) 
This 'admission' illustrates both his unhappiness with 
aspects of his approach, and his characterist humility. The 
interview also serves to illustrate how important it was for him 
that the Christian faith should be made relevant. What Niebuhr 
identifies as his mistaken pedagogy was of concern to him because 
it constituted a failure in the apologetic task. If he was 
convinced that he was right in his realism and in his theology, 
was he right in assuming that the failure to make the Faith 
relevant was simply mistaken pedagogy? If he used pedagogy in 
the dictionary sense of the "science of teaching", then the 
question is surely not simply a matter of how he taught but also 
what he taught? Granted that the use of myth and symbol as such 
was-not in question, why was the symbol of 1 
relevant for non-Christians like Morgenthau? 
ginal sin' not 
We have noted that his latest book Man's Nature and His 
(130) 
Communities (1965) attempts to correct his "pedagogical error''· 
Niebuhr is prepared to exchange the symbol 'original sin 1 for 
self-interest. In this latter he might have had the agreement 
of secular realists, but it does not express an essential quality 
which the former does; namely, the view that sin is rebellion 
against God. The question remains whether the essential task 
is to arrive at consensus with secular realists, or whether it 
is to promote faith in God. These questions serve to introduce 
us to an analysis of Niebuhr 1 s method as a Christian apologist. 
(b) The Apologetic Task 
It is not possible to understand Niebuhr's thought without 
recognizing that an integral part of was his apologetic inte-
rest. Although critical of Niebuhr's approach, evangelical 
theologifan Donald Bloesch recognizes this when he writes~ 
"His basic concern has been to establish the eter-
nal relevance of the Chxistian faith to a secular-
ized and disillusion culture. At the same time 
he s sought to eschew the errors of the early 
apologists which resulted in a biblical-classical 
synthesis well as the arrors of Protestant 
liberalism which transmuted b~blical faith into 
either an idealistic or naturalistic philosophy 
of religion. Niebuhr has exerted a profound 
influence not only _upon' the xeligious thought 
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of our time but also upon modern secular and 
political thought. • •• 
(However) Niebuhr's method has convined many 
agnostics of the crejibility of the Christian 
vie~ of man, but they generally remain agnostic 
concerning the saving work of Christ, Many 
of his hearers will accept the Christian under-
standing of sin and even the possibility of the 
existence of God, but they will not commit 
themselves to the living Christ. Thus has 
been born the phrase 'the atheist followers 
of Niebuhr'." (131) 
Humility may have prevented Niebuhr from accepting 
Bloesch's evaluation of his 11 basic concern" because of the commen-
datory nature of the first paragraph, but he would have agreed 
with Bloesch's description of that concern. He would, no doubt, 
have been pleased with the phrase: "the atheist followers of 
Niebuhr." Pleased, ·in the sense that his basic concern was to 
establ h the relevance of the Christian faith. He therefore 
valued the company of those w.ho could not accept his theological 
convictions. He exhibited a certain 'nonchalance' about the 
outcome of his efforts to establish the relevance of the faith. 
His nonchalance, however, did not mean that where he felt the 
failure to do so was his, he did not try to correct his position. 
Nonetheless, he would insist that ultimately faith cannot be 
made rationally compelling, in the sense that men can be 1 argued 1 
into faith. He also insisted that the relevance of the Christian 
faith can be demonstrated to secular man. In this connection, 
Bingham draws attention to the fact that Niebuhr has expressed 
gratitude to analytic philosophy's contribution to the apologetic 
task. Writing in "The Christian Century", May 1960, he says: 
"I believe that the emergence of philosophical 
analysis •.• has made our apologetic task simpler 
by emphasizing that in the Christian drama we are 
dealing with a system of meaning for which no 
irrefutable rational proof can be given but to 
which we must bear witness by the quality of our 
lives." {132) 
In his understanding of the perennial problem for Christian 
faith of the relation between faith and reason Niebuhr is Augusti-
nian in his approach. faith is not reason; and precedes reason 
{fides praecedat .rationem.). But, in the sense that reason can 
help to persuade a man to faith, it is antecedent to faith. 
Niebuhr writes: 
294 
" .•... historic revelations can be related specula-
tively to the various aspects of human existence and 
can make ~ense out of themi Reason can thus follow 
after faith. It can also precede it, in the sense 
that a highly sophisticated reason can point to the 
limits of rational coherence in understanding contra-
dictory aspects of reality ..• 
•.• on. the positive side we are where we have always 
been. faith is not reason. It is the substance 
of things hoped for, the evidence of things not 
seen. 11 ,(133) · 
Two factors have emerged from our discussion of Niebuhr as 
apologist: his concern to establish the relevance of the Christian 
faith, and his belief that reason and revelation are not mutually 
irreconcilable. 
When we speak of Niebuhr as apologist it should be noted 1 
however, that he cannot be included in that category of apolog ts 
who attempt to build a theoldgical system on the foundations of 
the dominant motifs. of the age in whi~h they li~ed. That is t~ 
say, there are those who have understood the apologetic task to 
mean the defence 6f the Christ n faith by,means of a re-interpre-
tation of the faith in terms of the philosophical and cultu 
milieu of the·. time. Alan Richardson 1 s chapter on 11 Reinhold 
Niebuhr As Apologist" in the Living libxary Volu~e indicates the 
sense·in which Niebu~r cannot be called an apologist: 
"The title of this essay must in one sense be consi-
dered misleading. An apo~ogist in the strict 
sense of the word is one who seeks to make sympa-
thetic contact with the thought of his age with a 
view to commending Christian truth to his contempo-
raries and defending it against hostile criticism. 
It is clear that Reinhold Niebuhr does not set out 
in the deliberate fashion of other apologists to 
do this. He is far too ciitic~l of the presuppo-
sitions of our age to be a conventional apologist . 
•.. lf Niebuhr had been an apologist in the normal 
meaning of the word, he would have sought to build 
on the apparently solid foundation .•• provided by 
liberal thought for the super-structure of the 
Christian religion ••. One could illustrate the 
process from the work of all the great Christian 
apologists down the ages: .Aquinas 1 s building upon 
the new and .fashionable Aristotelian categories of 
the thirteenth century renaissance; Joseph Eutler.'s 
appeal to the deistical presuppositions of eighteenth 
century ratio~aliam~ ~-~·· 11 (134) 
If we accept, for the purposes of analysis 1 Richardson 1 s 
description of the apologetic task in the normal sense of the 
() 
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word, then it is clear that Niebuhr does not use what might be 
termed the "direct method" of an Aquinas, or a Butler. He has 
in fact indicated that he stands in a tradition which includes 
Augustine, the Reformers, Pascal, and Kierkegaard. He distingui-
shes another tradition which includes Origen~ Aquinas, and the 
R · H . t ( 
13 5 ) H. 1 t' h b ena~ssance uman~s s.. ~s apo age ~c approac can e 
described as employing the ''indirect method" which is discernible 
in the thinkers in whose tradition he stands. 
(1) THE INDIRECT METHOD 
In his apologetic method Niebuhr stands in the Kierkegaardian 
tradition, though he is not uncritical of Kierkegaard's method . . 
His criticism of Kierkegaard 9 as we have seen, related to his 
failure to take history seriously and his tendency to make faith 
and reason too radically contradictory. But Niebuhr is Kierke-
gaardian in the sense that his apologetic method consisted not in 
making Christianityplausible., but in demonstrating its relevance 
over against the illusions which tend to obscure the truth of 
Christian faith for his contemporaries. Kierkegaard was critical 
of the speculative idealism of Hegel, and of the mediating theolo-
gy which sought to combine the insights of Hegelianism with 
biblical insights. Bloesch has summarized Kierkegaard 1 s apologe-
tic as entailing the "removal of the illusions which keep men 
from treating Christianity seriously. Kierkegaard proceeded to 
puncture the idolatry in the theology and philosophy of his time; 
the principle illusion that must be shattered is the belief that 
we are already Christians ••.. (He further believed that) 'The 
communication of Christianity must ultimately end in 'bearing 
witness', the maietic form can never be final. for truth, from 
the Christian point of view, does not 1 in the subject • •o but 
in a revelation which must be proclaimed. 111 (l 36 ) H.R. Mackintosh 
summarizes Kierkegaard's approach in these words~ 
11 ••• Kierkegaard looked upon his own theology, he 
expressly tells us, as 1 a corrective to things as 
they are'. An age of flat and craven rationalism 
must be stung into wakefulness; in the circum-
stances of the hour no place was left for timid 
impartiality; the crisis called for didactic 
hyperbole which by its sharp edge pierced to the 
vitals." (137) 
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N buhr saw it as his task to puncture the illusions of a 
culture blinded by its mood of optimism. His apologetics consis-
ted first in a critical analysis of the culture of which he was 
part before pointing to the truth of Christian faith as he saw it. 
In this sense he saw his task as a "corrective to things as they 
are". The truth of Christian faith, on this view, can emerge 
only when the illusions under ~hich the culture labours have been 
exposed. This should. not obscure the fact that Niebuhr derived 
his criteria for refuting the illusions he discerned in modern 
culture from the perspective 8f the biblical-Christian tradition. 
But at this point we are concerned.to show one aspect of his 
approach to the apologetic task: a refutation of modern illusions 
in order that the adequacy of the biblical-Christisn tradition 
could be demonstrated to a secular culture, Adequacy, in the 
sense of providing an alternative interpretation of man's nature 
and destiny which 'fits' the reality men experience. 
This being the case, Niebuhr would have been 1n substantial 
agreement with Whiteheadts dictum: "When you are criticizing 
the philosophy of an epoch do not chiefly direct your attention 
to those intellectual positions which its exponents feel it 
necessary explicitly to defend. There will be some fundamental 
assumptions which adherents of all the variantsystems within the 
epoch unconsciously presuppose. Such assumptions appear so 
obvious that people do not know what they are assuming because 
no other way of putting things has ever occurred to them." (lJB) 
There were two 'unquestion assumptions' which Niebuhr found it 
necessary to expose. first, the assumption that because religion 
in general, and Christianity in particular, are based on ''unscien-
tific" presuppositions. they could offer no criticism of a secular 
culture which understood itself to be "scientific'' in nature. 
Second, modern culture assumed .the "inevitability of progress" 
and the ''perfectibility of man". When, from admittedly Christian 
presuppositions, Niebuhr embarked on a thoroughgoing criticism of 
the illusions of modern culture it came as a shock to those who 
held these unquestioned assumptions. Niebuhr records the response 
to his criticism in h Intellectual Autobiography: 
"The criticism of a liberal culture from distinc-
tively Christian presuppositions, and the defence 
of the faith trhough an analys of the inadequacy 
of the modern liberal and Marxist alternatives, 
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~ere subject to two contrasting criticisms fro~ 
secular opponents of Christianity and om the 
Protestant 9 chiefly Continental, theologians, 
The illusion that it is possible to have an 
empirical inquiry without a framework of guiding 
presuppositions is so widespread, particulArly 
in America , that it is regarded as outrageous 
to criticize a culture from the standpoint of 
1 dogmatic 1 p that is, Christian presuppositions 
Actually, no empirical observation is possible 
without a conceptual framework, And every 
rational framework points beyond itself to some 
framework of meaning which cannot be simply 
identified with rational coherence. In the 
natural sciences the analysis of efficient causes 
requires only one presupposition of faith: 
namely 9 that the operations of reason are rele-
vant to the processes of nature9 that consequently 9 
as the Renaissance was so proud to discover 9 
'mathematics unlocks the mysteries of nature.' 
The necessary presupposition 9 in other words 9 
that the universe ~s orderly, and the sense of 
order in reason is relevant to it." (139) 
Niebuhr found it necessary to attack what he discerned as the 
unquestioned positivist assumption in modern culture. It is the 
assumption, on the one hand, that the findings of the human sciences 
are true when they can imitate the methods of the natural sciences. 
It is the assumption 9 on the other hand, that specific inquiry 
ruled out "dogmatic" presuppositions; ·especially explicitly 
religious ones. 
Niebuhr called this unquestioned assumption one of the 
11 prejudices 11 of a 11 naive" culture. Throughout his life he found 
it necessary to expose and counter it, His first book~ 
Ci vilizatiQD Need Religion? ( 192 6) sketches his position over 
against the notion of presuppositionless science 9 and contends 
that Man's nature and the character of human history are such 
that no scientific description of the facts of that nature and 
that history can adequately 4 explain 1 them. In his much later 
"faith and the Empirical Method in Modern Realism" in Christiat:J 
Realism and Political Problems (1953) 9 Niebuhr agrees that the 
idea of a 11 presuppositionless science of human affairs is one of 
the points where the humanities have been unduly influenced by 
·the physical sciences 1 or have falsely attempted to transfer the 
methods of the latter to the former realm. 11 The study of man9 
he continued, must take ~nto account that he is both a creature 
and a creator "who does not fit easily into any system of 
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. ( 140} 
rational or natural coherence." · This is not to say hat 
the human sciences are of no Value. On the contrary, Niebuhr 
insisted that they are indispensible aids in helping us understand 
what things are and how they came to be what they are in history 
and in nature. But the scientific understanding of man's 
n ure and his history tends to obscure the fact that these are 
more complex than modern culture is willing to recognize. Realism 
will make use of the findings of the human sciences while at the 
same time recognizing that the whole truth cannot be contained in 
such findings. He summarizes his position in the following way: 
"Historically we live in a world in which evil and 
good are embattled in such a way as to illumine 
the terrible depths and the awful heights of the 
human enterprise. Because man in his grandeur 
and in his misery, in his high aspirations and 
in their egoistic corruption 9 is and always will 
be a more complex creature than modern culture 
has understood, his h tory more tragic and 
his redemption from self-seeking, whether ind~vi­
dual or collective,, more difficult and always 
less final than we have assumed. The dimension 
of this whole scene is so great than only the 
judgement and the grace of God can give it a 
frame of meaning." (141) 
The other unquestioned assumption of modern culture which 
he devoted a lifetime to exposing, Niebuhr summarized in his 
Intellectual Autobiographyg 
"The faith of modern man contains two related 
articles~ the idea of progress and the idea of 
the perfectibility of man. The latter is 
frequently the basis of the former article. 
Man is regarded as indeterminately perfectible 
because it is not understood that every growth 
of human freedom may have evil as well as virtuous 
consequences. The root of this error is that 
reason is identified with freedom, and it is not 
seen that reason may be the servant, rather than 
the master, of the self. This essential 
religion of modernity is no less 'dogmatic' for 
being implicit rather than explicit, and it is 
no more tr•Je for being arrayed in the panoply 
of science." (142) 
In this regard Niebuhr argued that it is incumbent upon modern 
culture to examine the Christian analysis of man 1 s nature and 
history because modern estimates are not only illusory themselves, 
.but more important, they are fraught with danger. Modern culture, 
writes Niebuhr, despite all of its "boasted empiricism" has been 
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caught in 11 some obvious miscalculations and even in some tragic 
erro~s." The world, he continues, is not "at all as the e ht-
eenth century hoped it would be if men would only disavow the 
irrelevant other-worldly hopes and expend all their energies on 
the perfecting of man and his society. The simplest way of 
defining this contradiction between past hopes and present reali-
ties is to call tention to the fact that the heaven on earth 
of modern man turned out to be more incredible than the old 
heaven; and much more.dangerous." (l43 ) 
We have argued that Niebuhr's apologetic method is Kierke-
gaardian in the sense that it compri~es an attempt to puncture 
the illusions of modern culture in o er to show that the moral 
tradition in which he stood - Christian Realism - offers a more 
adequate means of interpreting the human situation~ This method 
we have described as 'ind ct'. However,.this should not 
be understood to mean that, in the dictionary definition of the 
. word 'indirect', Niebuhr is circuitous or oblique in his apologetic 
method. We use the word to indicate the sense {n which Niebuhr 
builds his apologetic by exposing what he believes are the illu-
sory and dangerous fallacies inherent in the presuppositions of 
modern culture. 
A developmental analysis of Niebuhr's thought will indicate 
the manner in which he operated. During his formative years at 
Union he made extensive use of the symbol of 'original sin' to 
point to the pervasjve charac~er of human self-interest and part 
cularly of collective self-interest. Although he later expressed 
reservations about his use of this ~ymbol he nevertheless applied 
it with rigour in a situation predisposed to believe in man's 
perfectibility and in the inevitability of progress. It is now 
clear that he succeeded in making his point. The liberal camps 
in theology and in politics were forced to take him seriously. 
Events in history, including a World War and the rise of Communism, 
corroborated his view that a culture which succumbs to such 
illu~ions pays too high a price for its illusions, because it 
fails to make provisions for adequate safeguards against abuse of 
power, and does not take seriously enough the chaLacter of 
collective self...,.interest. 
Far from taking the,notions of man's perfectibility and the 
inevi tibili ty of progress as th·e bases from which to build a 
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theology, Niebuhr saw ~t as a necessary part of h apologetic 
task to expose these 11 naive 11 notions in the process of arguing 
that the tradition in which he stood offered more adequate alter-
natives. It is in this sense that we describe his methodological 
approach as an indirect one. He was of course aware that the 
defeat of one set of presuppositions about man 1 s nature and 
destiny will not necessarily effect an acceptance of another set 
of presuppositions~ Christian or otherwise. 
During the period when the New Deal and Fa Deal policies 
were being pursued with some success in Americap and a long 'cold 
war' ensued between his country and Russiap Niebuhr developed the 
tool of irony as an apologetic weapon. From our analysi~ of his 
use of irony it is clear that this was no mere literary device. 
H~ saw it as his apologetic task to point up the ironies in the 
struggle-between these two 'superpowers', and argued that an 
ironic v w of man's individual and collective self-intere ~s 
normative in the· Biblical-Christian tradition. As he saw it, 
the stakes were high and the illusions inherent in the strengths 
of both nations were of such an order that they need to be 
exposed if the world was to achieve an equilibrium of power in 
the "nicely calculated less and more" of that historical situation. 
His use of irony as an apologetic tool may be duced as further 
evidence of the indirect apologetic nethod which was characteris-
tic of his approach. 
Niebuhr's apologetic method is likened by Richardson to the 
role of the Hebrew prophet. Richardson argues that the prophet 
calls into question the assumptions of his day, and thereby 
draws attention to the truth of the tradition in which he as 
prophet stands. Describing Niebuhr 1 s thought in this regard, 
Rich son writes: 
"If we are. looking for an epithet by which to 
describe him the word that comes to mind is not 
'apologist' but 1 prophet 1 • In an important 
sense a prophet's function is exactly the opposite 
of an apologist's: instead of making sympathetic 
contact with the thought of his age the prophet 
is compelled by an inner necessity to criticize 
and reject it. A prophet will not compromise 
with the accepted thought forms and presuppositions 
of his day, since they appear to him to be idol-
atries; he exposes their inadequacy and hypocrisyp 
and he remorselessly drives those who will listen 
to his proclamation to seek for new and more 
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adequate forms of understanding. Niebuhr is 
cle a prophet in this sense~ in an age of 
the dominance of the categories of 'liberal' and 
'evolutionary'thinking he has compelled serious-
minded people to criticize their assumptions 
and to look for new and deeper ways of understand-
ing their experience. 
But there is a sense in which the prophet 
inevitably performs the work of an apologist 1 
whether he intends to do so or not. -The 
prophet by the startling and compelling quality 
of his utterance arrests men's attention and 
_ compels them to consider afresh the basic truths 
of the Biblical revelation and their implications 
for the life of man and of society •••. It may 
be true that the number of those who have been 
thus awakened by Niebuhr to a new and re~listic 
awareness of the nature of Christian truth is 
not very large; but in matters of this kind the 
size of the prophet's following is not important; 
in every age it is only a handful of thoughtful 
people who create the 'climate of opinion' and 
shape the outlook of the oncoming generation." (144) 
Now it may be more accurate to describe N buhr 1 s method 
as that of a prophet rather than that of an apologist in the sense 
in which the apologetic task is sometimes understood; namely 1 
the building of a theological framework on the dominant motifs 
of the age. But there is an important sense in which Richardson 
has oversimplified the prophet's mode of operation and so 
Niebuhr's method. It is true that the prophet will not compro-
mise with the accepted presuppositions of his age where he dis-
cerns these to be idolatrous in character. But it is surely 
not accur e to claim that the prophet stands over ag nst the 
thought-forms of a particular age. In principle such thought-
forms are not ruled out as being irrelevant in the prophetic 
method. The prophet does not come to contemporary history 
with a set of fixed presuppositions or 'absolutes' which he pro-
claims over against his age. It is true that the prophet is 
often seen to be against the mainstream of thought in his time. 
But this is because he discerns illusory and idolatrous trends 
in the contemporary situation which if left unchecked will lead 
a covenent-people into error and into a breach of covenant with 
God. But the prophetic view of history is a. dynamic one. The 
prophet allowed an interplay between the understanding of the 
covenant-God derived chiefly from the Exodus-Sinai complex of 
events in Israel's history,-and conte~porapy history. This 
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interplay determined the content of his message in a particular 
situation and dictated the course of action the covenant people 
should follmv o The Hebrew prophet did not superimpose a set 
of absolutes upon a particular historical situation, but brought 
to bear on contemporary history the basic 1 clues 1 about God and 
man derived from the tr ition in which he stood. His purpose 
in doing so was to ask what God was doing in the contemporary 
situation9 and to discern the course of action his people should 
take in obedient response to God. It is in this sense that we 
say the prophet took past and contemporary history seriously. 
It is true th the fixed point of reference for the prophet 
was the understanding of God and man usually derived from the 
Exodus-Sinai complex of events. This was more often than. not 
the basic 1 clue1 which he brought to the problem of discerning 
the will of God in his situation. If he discarded this clue 
he would step out of the tradition in which this 1 clue 1 was 
fundamental. But this is not to say that the prophet understood 
{he covenant as static and as containing all that was necessary 
·for s vation. Because the prophet allowed an interplay between 
the tradition and contemporary history 9 new insights into the 
nature of God and the destiny of men were possible. 
In his study on the message of the prophets von Rad makes 
the point that the prophet saw God 1 s action in contemporary 
history as analogous .with His a.ction in the saving history of 
Israel. .But the prophetsg understanding of history was such 
that they also allowed the possibility that God's action in 
contemporary history may give birth to new insights which may 
surpass or supercede the old. But the new is always analagous 
with the old. That is to say 9 the new thing God was doing was 
understood as being analogous with the way He had acted in the 
past. Von Rad writes~ 
"(the) correlation between the prophets and world-
history is the real key to understanding them 
correctly 9 for they placed the new historical 
acts of God which they saw around them in exactly 
the same category as the old basic events of 
the canonical history - indeed - they gradually 
came to realize that this new historical action 
was to surpass and thereforep to a certain 
extent, to supercede the old. They were in 
fact called forth by their conviction that 
Yahweh was bringi8g about a new era for his 
people. o. 
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' ••• Even so, the specific form of the new thing 
which they herald is not chosen at random; 
the new to be effected in a way which is 
more or less an gous to God's former saving 
work. Thus Hosea foretells a new entry into 
the land, I~ h a new David and a new Zion, 
Jeremiah a new covenant, and Deut~ro-Isaiah a 
new Exodus." (145) 
This discussion of the prophetic method provides us with a 
clue to understanding Niebuhr's approach as an apologist. It 
should be ·npted th it was during his formative years at Union 
that he came to appreciate the Hebrew prophetic tradit n. In 
Chapter FoLr we examined, in some detail, his analysis of myth and 
symbol and his appreciation of what he called the"mythical religi-
ous her age" of the Hebrew prophetic movement. This heritage, 
he argued, is the basis of Christianity. For Niebuhr the impor-
tant conclusions to be drawn from this myt~ical hetitage are 
twofold. On the one· hand, only a mythical approach is capable 
of picturing the world as a realm of coherence and meaning w hout 
defying the facts of incoherence. for this reason, the God Df 
the prophetic tradition is the Creator and not the first Cause·-
One who gives meaning to the world. On the other hand, the 
mythical religious heritage gives credence to Niebuhr's thesis 
that the process by which the Hebrew tradition was formed Was 
ethical rather than rational . By thi~ he means that the truth 
. contained in the "myths of permanent validity" are ethically 
motivated. The H~brew, argued Niebuhr, was less concerned to 
provide a rationally satisfying explanation of the world than he 
was to find a morally relevant way of acting.in the world. 
In his apologetic meth~ Niebuhr is not unlike the Hebrew 
prophet. He is critical, for example, of what he calls Barth;s 
"dogmatism" because he tends to bring to the contemporary situat-
ion a dogmatic formulation of the Faith which will not and cannot 
be corrected by that situation. Niebuhr believed that the alter-
native to the Barthian approach is a theology corrected by contem-
porary thought and experience, and therefore a theology which 
cannot altogether escape the problem of relativity. Writing in 
1928 in an essay entitled "Earth - Apostle of the Absolute'', 
published soon after Earth's Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie 
appeared in an English translation, Niebuhr critic es him and 
thereby gives an ind ation of his own position: 
II 
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in the sense that it (Barth's theology) is 
an effort to escape relativism through dogmatism 
it is a new kind of fundamentalism or an old kind 
of orthodoxy. It is, in fact» a revival of the 
theology of the Reformation, Calvinistic in its 
conception of God and Lutheran in its emphasis 
upon the experience of justification by faith • 
. • • In order to' escape the relativism of a -
theology which is based upon and corrected by 
biology, psychology, social science, philosophy, 
and every other field of knowledge, we accept a 
theology which has no way of authenticating itself 
except by the fact that it meets a human need ·-· 
.•• But ultimately there is no more peace in 
dogmatisfu than in magic~ We can escape relativi-
ty and uncertainty only by piling experience upon 
experience, checking hypothesis against hypothesis, 
correcting errors by cor.1sitl.e:ri.ng new perspecti_ves, 
and finally letting the experience of the race 
qualify the individual's experience of God •. " (146) 
By inference and by contrast it is clear that Niebuhr is 
willing to hold a position in which theology is corrected by the 
natural and human sciences. In this sense we believe Niebuhr 
is true to the Hebraic tradition~ exemplified in the prophets, 
1n which th~re is an interplay bet~een theology and contemporary 
experience. Relativity and uncertainty will always dog the path 
of such a theological position. But Niebuhr is akin to the 
prophet in that he avows it is by 11 piling experience upon experience, 
checking hypothesis against hypothesis, correcting errors by 
considering new perspectives'' thijt we arrive at a morally relevant 
and adequate understanding of man 1 s nature and destiny under God. 
Elsewhere in this chapter we have analyzed the theological 
consequences of an important correction which Niebuhr believed it 
was necessary to make to the Biblical world-view under the i~pact 
of modern science: namely, his radical distinction between 
natural ,and human history. In this regard we would argue that 
Niebuhr is in error. But his error does not consist of making 
the 'correction' as such. It consists rather in the fact that 
the understanding of science upon which he made the correction 
was inadequate. The model of science with which he operated was 
a too-static and too-mechanistic model. In this regard we 
believe that he was right in his method, but wrong"in the conclu-
sions which he arrived at. His wrong conclusions were the 
result of an understanding of science based on a nineteenth-century 
mechanistic model which is now superceded. .At this point he 
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reve s himself to be a child of his time. He should therefore 
not be toa harshly judged for using a closed madel of science 
which was then generally accepted. 
Ian Barbour describes"the rejectian of a Newtonian model for 
a model in which the key characteristics are dynamism, complexity, 
and unpredictability. He writes~ 
"In the Newtonian view ••• nature was essentially 
static, with all things presumed to have been 
created in their present forms. Nature was _,. 
simple - reducible, that is, to a few typ~s of 
entity governed by a few basic laws. Nature was 
deterministic, its future in principle predictable 
from knowledge of its present. The madel of 
clock and clockmaker seemed entirely appropriate ••• 
But today it appears that nature is neither static, 
simple, or determined. It is a dynamic process 
of becoming, .always changing and developing, 
radically tempor in character. This is an 
incomplete cosmos still coming into being. 
Again, it is not simple but highly complex. The 
world is many-levelled; it includes many types 
of entity and many types of law not reducible to 
each other ••.. Then again, nature is not deter-
mined but unpredictable. Many scientific laws 
are statistical and do not allow prediction of 
individual events." (147) 
We will return to this question of a theology corrected by a 
more contemporary scientific view of n ure later in the chapter. 
The point we wish to emphasize now is that contrary to Richardson's 
too-simple contention that Niebuhr refused to allow his theology 
to be corrected by contemporary thought forms, he did allow his 
theology to be carrected and informed by the natural and human 
sc nces. It is our contention that in so doing Niebuhr was 
operating in the prophetic tradition which~ again, Richardson 
expounds too-simplistically. It is true that Niebuhr's apologe-
tic method involved a critique of illusory and idolatrous aspects 
of contemporary culture. But it also true, although Richardson 
fails to show this, thatr in keeping with the prophetic tradition, 
Niebuhr did allow an interplay between faith and contemporary 
experience in his apologetic method. This interplay he called 
the "circular relation between faith and experience". This 
circular relation is irit~gral to his apolog~tic method, and its 
exposition forms the b~sis of his defence against criticism from 
Continental, and mainly Barthian, theologians in his Intellectual 
Autobiography. 
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(2) THE CIRCULAR RELATION BETWEEN FAITH AND EXPERIENCE 
Richardson devotes a considerable part of his essay on 
"Niebuhr As Apologist" to a criticism of his attitude to the 
miracle narratives in the Biblical record. He writes that Niebuhr 
is "vividly aware of the importance of history as the sphere of 
the saving encounter of man with God and as the locus of the 
Biblical revelation. At one crucial point in the discussion he 
becomes uncharacteristically reticent. Much of the Biblical 
narrative involves the miraculous, and it is not clear what is 
Niebuhr's final attitude toward miracle. On this matter his 
apologetic appears to falter." In fact Richardson continues by 
charging Niebuhr with "hesitation and (to speak plainly) equivo-
cation" in his view of the historicity of the Gospel, and argues 
that if the element of "factuality" ~s surrendered in our inter-
pretation of Creation, or the Fall, or Christ's physical resurrec-
tion, then we are left with a "new Gnosticism". He is aware that 
Niebuhr is himself conscious of the dangers of taking myth and · 
history "seriously but not literally", but questions whether he has 
succeeded in avoiding the dangers of making Christianity into 
a "theistic philosophy". (l4 B) 
Niebuhr's response to Richardson in the Living Library 
Volume reveals a great deal about his apologetic approach. In 
his reply he argues that the validity of the Creation, the Fall~ 
and redemption through Christ's Crucifixion and Resurrection are 
not dependent on the historicity of any of these 1 events 1 ; nor 
is their validity dependent on their miraculous charcter. He 
argues that the idea of creation is valid because it points to 
the mystery of divine freedom beyond natural or rational schemes 
of coherence. He argues that the idea of the Fall is valid~ 
not because its historicity can be demonstrated, but because it 
illumines the human situation. He argues, further, that "God 
was in Christ reconciling the world to himself", but that this 
does not gain its validity from the factuality, for example, of 
the virgin birth. The Resurrection. Niebuhr concedes, is a more 
serious problem, but argues that the validity of the Resurrection 
is not dependent on its miraculous character. Nor is its 
validity questioned if, as he argues, the story of the empty tomb 
is an "after-thought'' and the really attested historical fact is 
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the experience of the r en Christ among h disciples. {l49 } 
The issues raised in this debate between Richardson and 
Niebuhr are large and important ones. We have examined most of 
them at various paints in this essay. from a methodological 
point of view one fact emerges clearly. Niebuhr refuses to 
validate the truth gf the Christ n faith by reference to miracle, 
or historicity, or sacred canon. The doctrine of Creation, 
far example, is true - but not because it is contained in Holy 
Scripture. The idea of the fall is true - but not because it 
can be attested historically. The disciples experience of the 
risen Christ ~s histor:fca.lJy factual, but the truth af the 
Resurrection is not validated hy this means. 
'In what sense then does Niebuhr believe the essential 
features of the biblical drama of God's creation, judgement, 
and redemption can be validated? We have more than once noted 
his argument that the ultimate vindication of the truth of the 
biblical-Christ n view lies in the "witness" of those.who by 
faith accept this view. In this he reveals his kinship with 
Kierkegaard who argues that the maieutic approach must finally 
give way to the witness of those redeemed, and to the "proclamation" 
ef revealed truth. That is to say, Niebuhr saw it as .. his 
apologet task to act as a midwife by bringing into the light of 
day the illusory and erroneous nmtions hidden in the thought forms 
and presuppositions of his age. .He also saw it as his task to 
indicate~the way in which the biblical-Christian tradition in 
which he stood, modified in important aspects by the best insights 
of that age, offered a more adequate alternative. 
In the final analysis, for Niebuhr, the truth of the Faith 
must be apprehended by faith and not by reason. But he argued that 
this is so in an ultimate sense only, and was sharply critical of 
thase who beat a too-hasty retreat into dogmatism or.subjectivism 
in the face of the hard question of validating the Faith in a 
secular age. for he believed that it is possible anrl necessary 
to demonstrate the validity of the faith by showing its moral 
relevancy to contemporary issues, and by showing .the adequacy o'if 
its understanding of man-1 s nature and clestiny. 
The p~oces~ by which he himself'came to believe in the moral 
relevancy of the Biblical-Christian faith, he came to speak of as 
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the "circular relation between faith and experience." It is he:::e 
that we believe Niebuhr 1 s method holds great promise for the 
apologetic task, and for two reasons. 
In the first place 9 his notion of the relation between faith 
and exper nee makes it possible to take contemporary history 
seriously 1 and therefore to allow an interplay between faith and 
that history. Whilst it may be less hazardous to retreat into 
dogmatism 9 on the one hand 9 or subjectivism on the other 9 his 
method in principle allows the possibility of a creative synthesis 
between the truth of the biblical-Christian tradition and the 
realities of contemporary experience. In this way faith and 
experience can 1 resonate'. This 9 it will be recalled 1 comes 
close to what we have described as 1 Adequation 1 • 
In the second place 9 in his notion of the relation between 
f th and experience Niebuhr reveals an affinity with the scienti-
fic spirit which is predominant in our time. As such his 
theological method offers great promise to those who ~restle with 
the problem of how to communicate the Ch stian faith in a 
predominantly scientific culture. It should be noted here that 
there is little evidence in Niebuhr's writings that h concern 
with the question of validating the truth of Christian faith is 
motivated by philosophical concerns. He appears 9 rather 9 to be 
motivated by pragmatic considerations. His appreciation of the 
scientific milieu in which his contemporaries lived 9 character ed 
by its concern with the question of verification 9 influenced his 
search for adequate means of validating the truth of Christian 
faith for them. In this regard he appears to stand in the 
tr ition of a William James rather than a Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
It can be argued that there is a close affinity between the 
scientific and prophetic method. It is beyond our scope to 
enter into a discussion of the complex issues of the relationship 
between science and religion 9 in general. But it is necessary 
to justify the claim that there is an approximation between the 
Hebrew prophetic method and th of modern science. There is 
a close affinity between what Popper calls the "method of hypo-
thesis" in science 9 and the prophetic method as we have described 
it in this essay. for the prophet•s belief in Yahweh was tested 
and refined in the crucible of human experience in a manner similar 
to the process of empirically testing and refining an hypothesis 
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~n scientific practise. The promise of Niebuhr's methodological 
approach is that his notion of the circular relation between 
faith and experience allows experience to test and promote the 
refining of the faith. He writes of the relationship between. 
experience and the "spectacles'' of faith in the search for truth, 
as .follows: 
"Sincea guiding presupposition, held by faith, acts 
as a kind of filter for the evidence adduced by 
experience, it would seem that the theologians are 
right, and that the modern scientists are wrong 
in making 'experience' a final arbiter of truth. 
Eut the matter is more complex. Guiding pre-
suppositions do indeed color the evidence accumu-
lated by experience; b~p_t~ey do not fully control 
experience. Presuppositions are like spectacles 
worn by a nearsighted or myopic man. He cannot 
see without the spectaclesw But if evidence 
other than that gathered by his sight persuades 
him that his spectacles are inadequate to help him 
see what he ought to see, he will change his 
spectacles." {150) 
Niebuhr's notion of the relation between faith and experience 
is crucial to his method both as an ethical thinker and as an 
apologist. Re postulates it, as we have noted, as an answer 
to the critics of his Gifford Lectures. On the one hand there 
were those who argued that his critique of modern culture from 
explicitly religious presuppositions was inadmissable. He 
answered that presuppositionless science is impossible. His 
theological critics, on the other hand, argued that to make expe-
rience the arbite~ of truth was erroneous because Christian truth 
can @nly be apprehended by faith. They further argued that his 
method of refuting illusion in modern culture was an oblique and 
ineffective way of pointing to the truth of Christian faith. 
He answered that some presuppositions of modern culture can be 
shown to be inadequate, and that the Christian alternative can be 
shown to be better. 
This circular relation between faith and experience is also 
autobiogiap~ical. It was the process through which Niebuhr 
a process in which the presuppositions he held by faith, and 
realities of his Sitz im Leben, were in constant interplay. 




wh~ther the ctiticisms of both lib~ral and Marxist views of human 
nature and history was prompted by a profounder understanding of 
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Biblical faith; or whether this understanding was prompted by 
a refutation of the liberal and Marxist ith by the tragic facts 
f t h . t II { 151} I a can emporary ~s ory ••• t would seem, therefore, 
that his conception of the relation between.faith and experience 
is· d1tse.illf. th!3 1:produot .of that relation evidenced .in his awn life" 
It is characteiistic of Niebuhr that he changed, as it were, 
the prescription of the lenses in his spectacles many times. He 
never stepped aut of the theistic tradition. But within th 
tradition, in its Hebrew~Christian form, Niebuhr had occasion to 
change the prescription of his lenses, when these no longer gave 
him an adequate means of 'seeing.' But the analogy of the 
spectacles as descriptive of Niebuhr's methodology needs.to be 
amplified in twa important respects. If we describe his theistic 
presupposition as the tint which his spectacles bare; even in 
the period when he was rna influenced by Marxist philosophy, he 
never altered that tint. This remained the 'one thing constant' 
in his torturous pilgrimage. In addition, following the analogy, 
Niebuhr's changes of lienses always incarpor ed some facets of 
the prescr~ption he discarded. To overlook these is to make the 
spectacles analogy tao discontinuous. 
In the 1920's, for example, the inadequacy of much of the 
prevailing liberal view in politics and theology caused him to 
change his prescription. But this does not mean that he discarded 
what was, for him, permanently valid in this view. Kenneth 
Cauthen has identified some of the major themes of liberalism 
which dominated American Protestant theology in the first three 
decades of this century. These include: an emphasis upon the 
authority of experience; an emphasis on ethics; a recognition 
of the importance of man's social environment; a confidence in 
reason; the devalu~tion of the authority of the Bible;the accep-
tance of historical criticism; a dynamic view of history; an 
emphasis on the humanity of Jesus; and a recognition of the need 
fortoleration. (lS 2 ) As we have seen, Niebuhr's major critique 
of liberalism, religious and secular, was aimed at its assumptions 
about the inevitability of moral progress: the optimistic illusion 
which he called "soft utopianism 11 • But this should not obscure 
the fact that he remained a liberal in other important aspects; 
especially in his emphasis on the authority of experience and 
the importance of ethics. 
311 
Again, 1n the l930 1 s Niebuhr's lenses contained much that 
was prescribed by a Marxi~t view of history. The Augustinian-
inspired theological cr~tique which he brought to bear on the 
Marxist view does not mean that he discarded what he believed was 
a permanent value in this view. Ronald Stone has argued that 
there is ''not a single important idea in Niebuhr's political 
philosophy that depends upon Marxist philosophy. Some ideas 
from his Marxist philosophy remain, but they have found indepen-
dent justification in his thought.'' {lSJ) This comment by Stone 
reflects a disposition on the part of many American commentators 
on Niebuhr to clear him of all traces of Marxist influence in 
his mature years. 
It may be true that Niebuhr found independent justification 
for the lessons he learned during his 'Marxist phase 1 • But on 
Stone's own analysis of this phase, Niebuhr's appreciation of the 
problems of collective self-interest, and his break with paci sm 
occurred then. During the 1930's his critique of liberal 
illusions was made largely on the basis of a Marxist-influenced 
view of history. Amid a depression which highlighted the problem 
of the capitalist system, and in the face of a threatening inter-
national situation in which war seemed inevitable, Niebuhr argued 
that the only viable political alternative was a socialist one. 
On the other hand, the failure of socialism, highlighted in 
Germany in 1~33 and the Moscow trials in 1937, together with his 
growing appreciation that the Marxist view of history was really 
a secularized version of the B lical one, forced Niebuhr to a 
re-appraisal of his position. What was of permanent value to 
Niebuhr in this phase was that he was forced to a new appreciation 
of the Biblical view of history. By the time he had prepared 
his Gifford Lectures he was able to criticize both liberal opti-
mism (soft utopianism) and Marxist optimism (hard utopianism) 
from a newly-won perspective. That perspective incorporated a 
Biblical view of man's nature and history and an Augustian-
inspired theology. 
It is in Niebuhr's notion of the circular relation between 
faith and experience that he comes closest to using what we have 
termed 'Adequation' as the means of validating the truth of 
Christian faith. Truth, on this view, lies in the adequation 
between faith and the facts of experience. The verification 
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principle operative here is not that of the positivist who argues 
that what is true must be capable of empirical verification; 
though empirical datum is taken seriously. It is not that of 
the dogmatic theologian who argues that what ~s true is what is 
revealed by God; though revelation is taken seriously. It is 
not that of the existentialist who argues that what is true is 
what is experienced subjectively; though subjective truth is 
taken seriously. Niebuhr's life and thought portray a dynamic 
relation betweefi the truth revealed in the Hebrew-Christian 
tradition, the truth accumulated by empirical means in the natural 
and human sciences; and the truth as it is existentially perceived. 
Where the truth of the tradition and the facts of experience 
relate adequately, there is validation. Where the relation is 
inadequte, the presuppositions of the faith and the facts of 
experience ~~st ~e re-appraised. Precisely what constitutes 
an adequate relatimn between faith and experience is determined 
by the situation. It is doubtful, for example, whether Niebuhr 
could have developed his ironic view in his Detroit days. It 
is, by the same token, doubtful whether he. could. have developed 
such a notion at all were it not for his understanding of the 
biblical-Christian view of man's nature. Therefore, even his 
"handles'' by which he interpr~ted history gain their validity not 
just in contemporary experience, but also under the .influence of 
the tradition. That is to say, that even the validity of his 
tools is a matter of circularity. 
(3} THE· ROLE Of THE BIBLE IN NIEBUHR'S METHOD 
It appears that Niebuhr's method, exemplified in his 
conception of the relation between faith and experience, is akin 
to what recent Eiblical scholarship discerns as the method of 
the Biblical writers themselves. Hans-Ruedi Weber, for example, 
summarizes recent research regarding the nature of the inter-
pret•tive process recognizable in the Eible, and suggests that 
contemporary interpretation should be regarded as a prolongation 
of this process. He writes: 
WDuring the la~t decades biblical scholars have 
shown clearer than ever before the ad hoc character 
of.biblical texts. Most of these were written 
with concrete people, a specific time and function, 
in mind.. The .Bible therefore neve~ provid~s us 
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with the pure Torah (the pure will of God) or ihe 
pure Gospel, but with a plurality of Torahs and 
Gospels, each of them e y interpreted and 
written in and for a specific situation, More-
over, the questions, anxieties and hopes of the 
first addressees influenced not only the ways ir. 
which the Torah or the Gospel were communicated, 
but also the content of the message, namely the 
particular choice of material and the emphases 
made ••• The Bible cannot therefore be summed up 
in a clear statement of 1 the biblical Message', 
because it is already a manifold tradition of 
applied biblical faith, written in and for mani-
fold milieus ••• 
••• The manifold tradition of biblical faith must 
also today be restat ad hoc, reinterpreted for 
the here and now. If we do so 1 the questions 
of our time will enable us to discover new aspects, 
new emphases, new exigencies of biblical faith, 
just as long ago when the Dueteronomic renewal 
movement reinterpreted the Mosaic law for its 
awn situation, or when John restated the Gospel 
for his timrp. 11 (154) 
On the basis of Weber's exposition, there is a kinship between 
Niebuhr's method and that of the biblical writers. His concep-
tion of the relation between faith and expe+ience can be described 
as a prolongation of the interpretative process recognizable in 
the Bible. Niebuhr's method is ad hoc, in Weber's sense. At 
specific points in his life he found certain 1 centres 1 of biblical 
message to be more adequate than others as a means of interpreting 
the contemporary situation. The 1 centres 1 of the biblical message 
which he found to be relevant in the 1950's were not those of the 
1920's. 
While he does not himself describe his method in these terms, 
it is clear that he utilized what has recently been described as 
"relational centres" in the biblical text to interpret events 
in his situation. An ecumenical report on "The Authority of 
the Bible" has described 11 relational centres" in the following 
terms~ 
11 ••• biblical statements do have certain internal 
connections and many of these connections are 
directly related to central saving facts whereas 
others are derived from these primary statements, 
as conclusions from them or as fuller explanations 
of them .•• To denote these decisive centres (we) 
coined the term Eeziehungsmitte (relational centre). 
The love of God or the resurrection of Christ were 
(for example) regarded as relational centres from 
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which the statements about eternal life follow 
logically·-'! { 155·} 
The importance of the Bible in Niebuhr's methodology has .not 
been sufficiently stressed. Evidence of his extensive ~se and 
int.erpre±aifion of biblical texts may be adduced from the large 
Scripture indexes in his Gifford Lectures and in his Faith and 
History. His marry books of sermonic essays provide further 
proof of this fact. 
Niebuhr argued that there is no one'biblical message' or 
'biblical theology' as such. .In his Gifford Lectures he argues 
that' the· Reformation empha s upon the authority of Scripture, 
what he.calls "Bibli~ism", ~ears within it the dangers of idolatry. 
He argues that the authority of the .Scri¢ture must be _understood 
in the following.way: 
• 11 ·~ •• the Bible contains the history, .and .the 
·culmin ion ~n Christ, of that Heilgeschichte in 
which· the wholedauman ente.rprise becomes fully 
_conscious of its limits, of· i'ts transgressions 
of those limits, and of the divine: answer to 
its problems." When the Elible becomes an authora-
tative compendium·uf social, economic, politic 
and scientific knowledge it is used as a vehicle 
bf the sihful sanGtification of relative standards 
of knowledge and virtue which· happen· to be 
enshrined ~n a religious canon." (156} 
On the other hand, he is equally convinced that there is a unique 
quality about the biblical faith when considered in its wholeness • 
. In answer to a critic of this view, he writes: 11 I believe never-
theless that· there· is a 1 Biblical' ·faith· of great: con::;>istency and 
uniqueness which must be distinguished from both c s~ical 
rationalism and orientaL mysticism.-." (l 5 7) . In his Faith and 
History he gives an instance of what is unique in the biblical 
.record: 
" ~·· the Biblic concept of a divine sovereignty 
over individual and collective h tory has a 
.uniqu-e quality. Th·is ·quality is .given to 
Eliblical ;thought by the fact that the God who 
~s operative in historic~! destiny is not conceived 
as the projection or extension of the nation's 
or individual's ideals an·d purposes, nor as a 
power co-extensive with, or supplementary to, the 
nation 1 s power; nor as a force of reason identical 
·with the. Logos which the human mind incarn es .. " 
.{ 15 8} 
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With a little care it is possible to discern that at diffe-
rent periods of his life certain relational centres of the bibli-
cal record became his 'clue texts 1 for interpreting his situation • 
. During the early Twenties, when a pre-depression Detroit was in 
the process of phenomenal industrial expansion which highlighted 
the plight of the workers, Niebuhr regarded the ethical teaching 
of Jesus and of the prophets as his relational centres. He 
u these in conjunction with'hi1 liberal philosophy to establish 
criteria for social choice. 
In the Thirties, when the Great Depression was at its worst 
and a world conflagration seemed inevitable Niebuhr~ now at Union 9 
was in the process of re-examining h position. An important 
factor in th process was his companionship.with members of the 
Union culty who introduced him to the main outlines of biblical 
faith and to the classical texts of Christ n theology~ especially 
the thought of Augustine. During this period he moved to the 
left politically, and to the right theologically. His move to 
the left was due largely .to the influence of Marxist philosophy. 
His move to the right was due largely to the influence of Augustine, 
on the one hand 9 and to a different set of biblical relational 
ceotres, on the other. He came to apprec te the truth expressed 
in the biblical myths of Creation, the Fall~ and Redemption~ and 
to emphasize the transcendence of God, and the· character of Divine 
love symbolized in the Cross. It was in Augustine that he found 
a theologian who helped him answer his many unanswered que ions, 
and free him from the notion that Christian faith is bound up 
with the moral idealism of the ningteenth century. 
In the post-war Forties~ when the .effects of Roosevelt's 
policies were proving their worth on the domestic front, and the 
coloss task of rebuilding a shattered Europe was being assumed 
by America, Russ and Britain~ Niebuhr's Christian realist 
position Was established. Politically he had moved beyond 
socialism, partly as a result of his profounder understanding of 
biblical faithp and partly because the tragic events of the War 
had highlighted for him the tyranny of Nazism and of Communism. 
In 1944 when an Allied victory in Europe seemed certain he wrote 
his defence and critique of democratic political theory, published 
under the title The Children of Light and The Children of Darkness. 
He conceived this volume as a corrective to the illusions which 
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endanger a democratic form of government,, and argued in an uft-
q~oted aphorism that ''man's capacity for justice·makes democracy 
possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy 
necessary. 11 Neither idealism nor cynicism, .. he argued, would 
serve democracy well. By this stags he was using the two major 
biblical-Christian symbols of imago 'dei and 'man as sinner' as 
the relational centres for interp~eting events in the post-war 
period, and as a basis for a relevant ethi~ for the time. 
Summary: 
~e may summarize our d~scussion of Niebuhr's theological 
method thus far by saying that he was primarily concerned to 
e~plore ·the moral relevance and adequacy of the ~~blical-Christian 
tr ition in which he stood. Ethical and apologetic interests 
characte.rize his writing. Any discussion of his. theological 
method must therefore deal with both the content of his thought 
and the situation in which he worked. His ethical writings are 
not primarily concerned to ~uild a systematic Christian ethic, 
but to refute .error and illusions as he discerned them, and to 
offer another way. 
a similar concern. 
His apolo~etic writings are ehar~cterized by 
His refutation does not mean that he was 
unwilling to take seriously what he·. called "the wisdom of the 
worldtt; namely the best insights of philosophy, and of the 
·natural and: human sciences. 
His ethics and apologetics .are informed by a biblical-
Christ n tradition distilled from the nineteenth century roman-
ticism and idealism. In that process of distillation ~iebuhr 
wasp:ro.found.ly assisted 'by· the insights of Kierkegaard, Pascal, 
the Reformers, .and Augustine •. This m&ral tradition he described 
as Ehr istia'n Realism • But in·the process of working out a 
. relevant ethic for a particular situation, and working at an 
. adequate expression of Christian faith, he allowed t~at moral 
tradition itself to be modified and complemented by the best 
in ghts of ~the wisdom of the worl~". 
As an· ethicist,. his. method ·consisted· in. establishing criteria 
for social action on the basis of a confluence of a biblical-
Christian tradition which incorporated a sense of t~anscendent 
providence over history, an empha s on the di~nity of man as 
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imago dei and the misery of man a 11 sinner 11 , the Hebrew prophetic 
emphasis an justice as an expression of lave, agape expressed in 
the Crass; and extra-biblical and Christian resGurces of the 
natural and human sciences. 
As an apologist,. Niebuhr's method consisted in refuting the 
illusory assumptions of hia.culture and showing that the moral 
tr ition in which he stood prGvided more adequate alternatives. 
At different stages in his life he used different relational 
centres .in that traditiGJn in an attempt to establish a: point of 
contact with religion's intellectual despisers. In an ultimate 
sense he believed that .Christian truth must be apprehended by 
faith and not by reason. But operating at the pen-ultimate 
level, the validity of the Faith lay in its, adeguac y. 
{4) TOWARDS FULLER ADEQUATION 
The prSliminary description of 1 equation' with which we 
began this chapter su.ggested that when the truth Gf the biblical-
Christ n tradition in which we stand, and the facts of our 
experience 'resonate', there is adequation. Our description 
of Niebuhr's theological method shows that he sought to validate 
Christian ith by demonstrating its adequacy far contemporary 
man~ That is to say, there is in the interplay between faith 
and experience a validation of faith which is best described 
by the word 'adequacy'. What then is the difference between 
'resonance' and Niebuhr's notion df 'circularity'? Nothing, 
if it: were truly circular, but it fails to. be this for twa 
reasons. First .because Niebuhr seems unable to live with the 
relativity of such a position, and from time to time seems to 
introduce 'faith' as some sort of 'absolute'. Second, because 
he fails to include a major part of contemporary experience in 
that which he allows to test and refine the tradition; namely, 
the whole realm of nature and man's contemporary grappling with 
it. 
When we turn to a critique of Niebuhr's theology, and try 
to suggest reasGns for the limits which are to be discerned in 
it, we will argue that there are shortcomings in his estimate 
of bath .tradition and experience, and in the degree to which 
he is. prepared to rely on his own method. 
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Since an essential part of his method is to allow an ter-
play between faith and experience~ his method is dogged by the 
problem of relativity. He was not unaware of this problem. 
He recognized that a theology which is corrected by the insights 
of contemporary experience may avoid the pitfalls of dogmatism 
and subjectivism, but it cannot avoid the problem of relativity. 
The best that can be achieved is a progressive v idation by 
"testing hypothes against hypothesis,,by correcting errors 
by considering new perspectives, and finally by letting the 
experience of the race qualify the individual's expe ence of 
God •. 11 
Herein lies Niebuhr's promise. For in this approach truth 
lies in the dynamic interplay between faith and experience; it 
does not reside exclusively in Christian faith any more than 
it does in contemporary experience. Truth, on this view, 
is validated by its adequacy; by its 'fittingness' for a series 
of situations. It is a situat nal approach in that truth 
emerges from the situation; but the situation in and of itself 
not the final arbiter of truth, since it is almost certain 
to be a compound of both truth and error. It is an historical 
approach in that it takes seriously the truth in past experience 
and seeks to relate it to the present situation. But it does 
not argu~ that all that is necessary for our salvation is contained 
in past experience; since the past is also compounded of truth 
and error. It is a dynamic approach in that it recognizes, 
in principle, that new truth may be apprehended in the future 
which may correct error in present perspectives. 
The most important question that can be ask of Niebuhr's 
theological method, based as it is on his notion of the circular 
relation between ith and experience, is whether it is truly 
circu r. If it can be shown that there are elements of the 
tradition which he will not allow to be tested and refined by 
expe nee, or if it can be shown that there are aspects of 
experience which he excludes from that testing and refining 
process, then Niebuhr can be criticized for failing to be 
consistently circular. 
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(a) Some Questions About 
Niebuhr's Notion Of 'Faith' 
Niebuhr's mltion of "faith" as the ·"sense of mystery and 
meaning" for which God is the symbol~ has been criticized by 
philosophers William Dray and Hans Meyerhoff as resolving the 
historical paradoxes by an appeal to "faith which is the fruit 
of 'grace'"; by asserting that it is only from a transhistorical 
perspectiv~ that human life and history have m~aning. A criti-
cism of a different sort~ but also related to the notion of 
faith~ comes from Peter Berger who argues that neo-orthodoxy 
resolves the problem of relativity by positing 1 faith 1 as an 
'Archimedean point' in a sphere immune to relativization. We 
will examine these criticisms because if they are justified then 
it would seem that Niebuhr is unable to live with the rel~tivity 
inherent in his notion of circularity. 
(i) 'Faith' and History 
Niebuhr's Faith and History is the basi~ of William Dray's 
analysis of his approach. Dray's major difficulty with Niebuhr 
relates to the manner in which Niebuhr seeks to validate his 
position. However, . as we will show, his d iff ic ul ty re.late s in 
fact to the nature of religious language. We quote -Dray~ 
"Christianity ~ he (Niebuhr } says ~ ' knows by faith 
of some events in history in which the transcendent 
source and end of the whole panorama of history is 
disclosed 1 ••• they 'must be apprehended by faith~ 
and can orily be so apprehended in humility and 
r'pentanc~'. Reception of. the divine revelation 
is itself a !gift of grace' 
... we need to know~ not only that there are some 
events in history which~ by exemplifying Niebuhr's 
theological concepts~ give support to ris inter-
pretation as a whole~ but also what~ if it occurred, 
would count as evidence against that interpretation. 
As to (this) difficulty; a critic's suspicions 
may well be aroused on finding Niebuhr declaring 
flatly that~ for the Christian~ 1 nothing can happen 
in history to shake the confidence in the meaning· 
of existence'. .It might perhaps be thought that 
this is nothing more than an expression of conven-
tional piety on Niebuhr's part. Yet his treat-
ment of historical evidence often suggests that 
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it is a good deal more than this. We find him 
arguing, for example, of the rise and fall of 
cultures and civilizations .•. (that) if a 
historica institution flowers ... it is evidence 
of God's grace. If it withers, it is evidence 
of a divine judgement upon it~ This form of 
argument, however, makes it virtually impossible 
to challenge Niebuhr's providential claims; 
his theory appears to have defences against its 
overthrow built right into it. 11 (159) 
Dray concludes his study of Niebuhr's approach to history by 
saying: "The retort may perhaps be forgiven that, as Niebuhr 
expounds the Christian view of history, it is that view, rather 
than history, which is mysterious". 
(160) 
This play on the word 
'mysterious' is, on Dray's analysis, a criticism of Niebuhr's view 
that "the mystery of divine Providence gives meaning to history." 
) 
(161) 
The difficulties which Dray expresses with regard to Niebuhr's 
view of history, and specifically with his notion of 'faith', are 
of the same kind in Hans Meyerhoff's critique. Before we examine 
Dray's criticisms, thersfore, we will quote from Meyerhoff. He 
writes of Niebuhr's dialectical approach to history, based on 
The Nature and Destiny of Man, in the following terms~ 
"This dialectical approach (in which secular theo-
ries of human life and history are criticized) 
assumes a Christian character ... primarily-
I think, because, according to Professor Ni~buhr 
and other Christian thinkers, the historical 
process is not comprehensible in its own terms . 
. .. Dialectical theology, as it is called, solv~s 
the historical paradoxes only by an appeal to 
faith, which is 'the fruit of 'grace' 1 
... Now, 'from such a vantage point, history is 
meaningful even if it should be impossible to 
discern any unity in its processes'. It is 
clear that this is ~ vantage point beyond history. 
History as well as human life have a meaning 
only if they be viewed from a transhistorical 
perspective." (162) 
Meyerhoff concludes his introduction to a selection of readings 
from Niebuhr's Gifford Lectures on the meaning of history from a 
Christian standpoint by citing, with approval, the words of a 
critic of the Christian view of history. "Presented with such 
an ultimatum (that .the Chtistian view of history is based on pre-
suppositions held by faith), any conscientious historian"- and 
one might add, any conscientious philosopher - 'may perhaps be 
excused for protesting that this is having it both ways with a 
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vengeance; not everybody can bring himself to cry credo quia 
impossibile est'"· (l 63 ) 
At first reading it would appear that Dray and Meyerhoff 
criticize Niebuhr because his view of history is a Christian one -
in which a basic presupposition is faith in a transcendent source 
of mystery and meaning. Since it is clear that they have diffi-
culty with this presupposition, they are critical of the view of 
history expound by Niebuhr. But this surely not the problem, 
for both Dray and Meyerhoff would know that Niebuhr's Faith and 
History and his Gifford Lectures were written from an explicitly 
Christian standpoint, and for a Christian audience. In other 
words, they cannot be criticizing Niebuhr's interpretation of 
history because it is based on presuppositions held by faith; a 
speculative philosopher of history would rB ily concede that this 
is the case. 
A closer reading of the criticism made by Dray and Meyerhoff 
may le one to believe that the problem lies in Niebuhr's insis-
tence that history can only be given meaning from a "transh torical 
perspective" (Meyerhoff], and "really denies in the end that 
h tory itself is fully meaningful ••• in spite of its not appear-
ing so to us" (Dray). This insistence on Niebuhr 1 s part, which 
Dray and Meyerhoff correctly interpret, directly attributable 
to his view th human history is more complex than any scheme of 
rational coherence which we may invent in order to comprehend it, 
and that the sense of meaning which we give to history is based, 
therefore, on presuppositions held by faith. Niebuhr's presuppo-
sitions in this regard are explicitly stated. "Religious faith", 
he writes, "pos s not only a mysterious creator God but a myste-
rious divine providence, which somehow brings unity into the inco-
herences and incongruities of man's dividual and collective 
history .•. Faith looks to an ultimate order beyond the incoheren-
ces, incongruities and cross-purposes, and creates or accep~ the 
presupposition of a divine providence, related to the ultimate 
source of the temporal process." 
(164) 
It would seem that the differences between Niebuhr and the 
philosophers Dray and Meyerhoff relate direc~ly to Niebuhr's 
religious presupprisitions. 
response would be that there 
If this is.the case, then Niebuhr's 
is no way of fully validating the 
presuppositions of Christian faith except by showing their 
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adequacy to illumine the human situation. In the final analysis, 
he would argue, the Christian can only witness to the truth con-
tained in the presuppositions which he holds by faith. 
{ii} q:"aith' .and Relativity 
The real point of issue between Niebuhr and the philosophers 
is, on close analysis, not that his v ~ of history is based on 
presuppositions held by faith, but that Niebuhr's notion of 1 faith 1 
appears at times to take on the. character of inviolable truth, 
which the Christian possesses as the "fruit of 'grace'", but which 
the histo n .9.bl§. historian does not possess. Dray, for example, 
is critical of Niebuhr's notion of 1 faith' in the meaningfulness 
of existence because nothing allowed to "count as evidence 
against that interpretation", and because the form Niebuhr's 
argument takes "appears to have defences against its overthrow 
built right into it." Meyerhoff, in similar vein, quotes from a 
passage in Niebuhr's Gifford Lectures to show that faith which is 
"the fruit of 'grace'" takes on•the character of a final 
court of appeal for resolving the paradoxes of human history in 
dialect al theology. The passage from N buhr which Meyerhoff 
quotes reads as follows: 
"By its (Christian faith's) confidence in an eternal 
ground of existence which is, nevertheless, involved 
in man's historieS! striving to the very point of 
suff ng with and for him, this faith can prompt 
men to accept their historical responsibilities 
gladly. From this standpoint of such a faith 
history is not meaningless because it cannot 
complete itself; though it cannot be denied that 
it is tragic because men always seek prematurely 
to complete 
Thus wisdom about our destiny is dependent upon a 
humble recognition of the limits of our knowledge 
and our power. Our most reliable understanding 
is the fruit of 'grace~ in which faith completes 
our ignor~ce without pretending to possess its 
certainties as knowledge; and in which contrition 
mitigates our pride w hout destroying our 
hope." (165) 
Niebuhr appears here to be saying that the Christian view of 
history as meaningful is dependent on 'faith'. This is self-
evident, for it a Christian view of history th~t he is expoun-
ding. However, the difficulty arises when he says that "our most 
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reliable und~rstanding" is not dependent on _rational "knowledge", 
but on the recognition'of its limits. It is the "fruit of 1 grace 111 
which, although it cannot disguise itself as knowledge since it 
is held by faith, still appears to b~ a "kind of knowledge'' which 
the Christian possesses but the historian .s.!:!.2. historian does not. 
On this view Niebuhr appears to have created a vantage point which 
is closed to the. historian as such; namely, "faith which the 
fruit of 'grace'"· 
Within the ~anguage game of theology it may be accurate to 
describe 1 ith' as the "fruit of 1 grace 111 , but to those who do 
not share his presuppositions Niebuhr's exposition of f h can 
be misleading. 'Faith' becomes the mysterious possession of a 
few by "'grace''', and appears to have been elevated to a position 
which makes it immune to relativiz ion. 
Peter Berger has criticized nee-orthodoxy for creating a 
vantage point which is immune from the process of relativization. 
Since Niebuhr's notion of faith open to this interpretation, 
and since he has acknowledged his kinship with nee-orthodoxy, 
is important to examine Berger's critic m. If it can be shown 
that Niebuhr introduces 'faith' as some sort of 'absolute', then 
his method is not truly circu Berger writes: 
"The vertigo of relativity that historical scholar-
ship brought over theological thought may thus be 
said to deepen in the perspective of sociology. 
At this point one is not much helped by the metho-
dological assurance that theology, after all, 
takes place in a different frame of reference. 
That assurance comforts only if one is safely 
established in that frame of reference, if, so to 
speak, one already has a theology going. The 
essential question, however, is how one may 
begin to theologize in the first place. 
Orthodox theological positions typically ignore 
this question - 'innocently' or in mauvaise foi, 
as the case may be .•• Extreme theological 
liberalism of the variety that now calls itself 
'radical theology' may be said to have despaired 
of finding an answer to the question and to have 
abandoned the attempt ..• Between these two 
extremes there is the very interesting attempt, 
typical of nee-orthodoxy, to have one's cake and 
eat it too - that is, to absorb the full impact of 
the relativizing perspective, but nevertheless to 
posit an 'Archimedian point' in a sphere immune 
to relativization." . ( 166) 
His analysis of nee-orthodoxy leads Berger to the .conclusion 
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that the vantage point immune to relativization "is the sphere of 
'the Word', as proclaimed in the kerygma of the church and as 
grasped by faith." He finds corroboration for this view in neo-
art hGJdo xy 1.s 11 differentiation between 1 religion 1 afld 'Christianity 1 9 
or between '~eligion' and 'faith'. 'Christianity' and 'Christian 
faith' are interpreted as being.something quite different from 
'religion'. The latter can then be cheerfully thrown to the 
Cerberus of relativizing analysis (historical, sociGJlogical, 
psychologital, or what have you), while the theologian, whose 
concern, of course is with 'Christianity' - which-is-not~'religion', 
can proceed with his work in splendid 'objectivity"'· (l 67) 
\ 
The question to .which we must address ourselves is whether 
Niebuhr's notion of 'faith' is an "Archimedean point" of the sort 
Berger describes. It is true that Niebuhr makes a distinction 
between history and Heilqeschichte, for example, but he does so 
~n a manner which cannot be cans;_t;..vued to give tGJ 'salvation history' 
an 'absolute' quality. 11 .. while Heilgeschichte is not merely 
an aspect of general histGJry, nor its natural culmination, neither 
is it a completely separate history. Its revelations are what 
give history meaning. It is not true that life would be meaningless 
but for the revelations embodied in Heilgeschichte. Life and 
history are filled .with suggestions of meaning that point beyond 
themselv,s;and with corr~ptions of m~~ning due to premature 
• 11 (168) 
solut~ons. 
It is true thattNiebuhr speaks of the ."self-disclosure of God 
in Christ" as the "final 'wqrd' which GGJd has spoken to man", 
which must be grasped by faith. 
(169) But he does so in a manner 
which cannot be interpreted :asJdna):c:ii:lg iftk'.:ahsoll.Jte 1 • 
"The relation betvveen truth, apprehended in God's 
self-disclosure, and the truth about life which 
men deduce through a rational organization of their 
experience, might best be clarified through the 
analogy of our knowledge of other persons. We 
know what we know about other persons partly 
through an observation of their behaviour . 
..• (But) the other self cannot be understood until 
he speaks ~o us. Only the 'word' of the other 
self, coming out of the depth or height of his 
self-transcendence can finally disclose the other 
'I' as subject and not merely as object of our 
knowledge. · 
The word of self~disclosure is thus partly a 
completion of incomplete knowledge, partly a 
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c ification of obscurities and partly a correc-
tion of falsifications." (170) 
Niebuhr uses the analogy of the 1 word 9 to describe the manner in 
which God's self-disclosure in Christ completes our "incomplete 
knowledge 11 9 clarifies "obscurities 11 9 and corrects "falsifications". 
While Niebuhr's notion of ifaith' may appear to have the 
character of an 1 Archimedean point 1 9 his understanding of the 
relation between faith and exper nce 9 in principle 9 precludes this. 
As he says in h Gifford Lectures~ "the truth as apprehend by 
faith is not something wh h simple men b eve upon authority and 
wiser men deduce from experience. for there is an element in the 
truth of faith which defies the wisdom of both wise and foolish, 
more particularly of the wise. But on the other hand a truth of 
faith is not something which stands perpetually in contradiction 
to exper nee. On the contrary illumines exper nee and is 
in turn validated by exper nee." (l7l) 
If Niebuhr does not make of 1 faith' a vantage point immune 
from the relativizing process~ does he not make it immune from 
falsification? This is 9 in fact 9 the major criticism which Will m 
Dray makes of Niebuhr~ "we need to know •.• what 9 if it occurred 9 
would count as evidence against that (faith's} interpretation ••• 
(h form of argument 9 however 9 makes it virtually impossible to 
challenge N buhr's provident claims." We need to examine this 
critic m because 9 in principle. Niebuhr's notion of the c cular 
relation between faith and experience does allow for falsification. 
We will do this by making a distinction between 'intellectual 
o nness' and 'religious conviction' 1 in order to clarify Niebuhr's 
position as we understand it. 
{iii) Intellectual Openness and Religious Conviction 
Dray 9 will be remembered 9 stated his problem with reg 
to the fals ication of theological language by saying that 11 a 
crit 1 s suspicions may well be aroused an find g Niebuhr flatly 
decla ng that 9 far the Christian 9 'nothing can happen in history 
to shake the canf ence in the meaning of existence 111 • 
We have shown that Niebuhr is consistently circular in his 
method. That is to say 9 in principle he does nat preclude the 
possibility of falsification of presuppositions held by faith. 
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How then can we explain Niebuhr's assertion that nothing can shake 
the Christian's confidence in the meaningfulness of exist~nce? 
Is this assertion not an instance of making a presupposition held 
by faith immune to falsification? 
The problem lies in Niebuhr's failure ~o make explicit a 
distinction of the sort we made in Chapter.Three between 'truth 
within the tradition' and 'testing the tradition'. The necessity 
for such a distinction arises because of the difference between 
intellectual openness (contained in Niebuhr's notion of the circular 
relation between faith and experience}, and religious conviction 
(contained in the assertion that nothing can shake the Christian's 
confidence ~n the meaningfulness of existence). 
For Niebuhr the relation between presuppositions held by faith 
and experience is such that he cannot, in principle, be said to 
preclude the possibility that experience may cause him to alter 
his "spectacles". In this method there is intellectual openness. 
He would insist, however, that "it is in fact impossible to inter-
pret history at all without a principle of interpretation which 
history as such does not yield ... the idea of progress or the 
Marxist concept of an historical dialectic are all principles of 
historical interpretation introduced by faith." (l 72 ) While the 
-
course of historical events do-es not "inevitably yield the prophe-
tic interpretation of events'', nevertheless "history does justify 
such an interpretation, once faith in the God of the prophets is 
assumed." ( 173 ) 
Niebuhr's method is thus open to the possibility that events 
may falsify the presuppositions by which he interprets history, 
But he cannot predict in advance what "if it occurred, would count 
as ev~dence against (faith's) interpretation", as Dray asks him to 
do. The reason for this lies in what might be termed the 'exis-
tential commitment' to presuppositions held by .faith which is 
characteristic of both scientific and religious presuppositions. 
-It also lies in the character of religious language as such. 
Intellectual openness does not mean the absence of commitment 
to presuppositions held by 'faith'. Philosophers of science 
concede this. Ian Barbour, _for example, writes. 
11 ••• the relation between theoiy and observation 
. (in science) turns out to be problematic. 
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There are no bare uninterpreted data in sc nee ... 
The presuppositions which the scientist brings to 
h inquiry influence the way he formulates a 
problem, the kind of apparatus he builds, and the 
type of concept he considers promising. Theory 9 
in short, permeates observation. As N.R. Hanson 
puts it, 'all data are already theory-laden'. 
(There are) both subjective and objective 
features of science, All data are indeed theory-
laden. yet observations do exert a control on 
theor s. Paradigms are indeed resistant to 
falsification·, yet' they are not immune to cuma-
lative pressure from discordant d a and replace-
ment by ternative paradigms. 11 {174) 
The scientist has a commitment to what Barbour calls scientific 
"par igms 11 (such as Newton 1 s work in mechanics) because they 
"involve fundamental assumptions and ways of looking at the 
world. 11 (l 75 ) ;, On Barbour 1 s analysis. the scienti fie par igm 
takes on the character of a 'description of reality' which must be 
taken seriously but not literally. until it can be shown to be 
an in equate one~· . For this reason it doubtful if the scientist 
could tell in vance what, if it occurred, could act as evidence 
against it, althou~h his commitment to the paradigm does not 
preclude the possibility that it may be falsified on the basis of 
evidence not t to hand. 
Given Niebuhr's faith in a transcendent God who gives meaning 
to human history it is not difficult to understand his assertion. 
wh h Dray finds so problematic. that for the Christ n ''nothing 
can happen in history to shake the con dence in the meaning of 
existence." It may be that what Niebuhr is asserting is that the 
meaningfulness of existence 9 based on presuppositions held by 
ith,. is for him adequate to describe the facts of experience, 
thereby val ating those presupposit ns. In other words 9 Niebuhr's 
assertion is not unlike the sc ntific paradigm in that it in-
volves a fundamental assumption about the world 1 and describes a 
way of looking at the world which, for Niebuhr? has taken on the 
character of a 'truthful 1 description of reality. But the trl!th 
of this assertion is the 'conviction' which Niebuhr arrives at by 
means of the testing and refining process inherent in his notion 
of circularity. Furthermore, Niebuhr does not say that life and 
history would be meaningless without his presuppositions; 11 life 
and history are filled with suggestions of meaning that point beyond 
themselves'' and thereby attest the truth of the presuppositions 
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which he holds by faith. 
It is a characteristic of religious. lang~age that it is 
1 convictional 1 • .It may be that Drayrs problems.with regard to 
Niebuhr 1 s view of history can,- in the final analysis •. be ascribed 
. ' 
to this feature of theological language. The problem which Dray 
has with the form of Niebuhr)s argument in .Faith and History,is 
that it seems to' have defences against its overthrowbuilt into 
it. What Dray fails to see is that while Niebuhr is careful not 
to disguise -'faith' as a fo.rm of knowledge - · 11 faith completes our 
ignorance without pretendi~g to possess its .certainties as know-
ledgefl - he is nevertheless bearing witness to a 'certainty' or 
conviction; namely, faith in a transcendent God who gives meaning 
to human history. This faith h~s the quality of 'certainty' which, 
whilst it is borne out by the process of tssting and refiriing, 
.cannCJt be said to be "knowledge" .. In the final analysis, the 
maieut.:i.c form must give way to- 11 witness 11 • 
. William Hordeni ~riting on the nature and function of religious 
language, .analyzes the convictional nature of theological language, 
with reference to-the work of W{llem Zuurdeeg: 
_ 11 The key.to Zuurdeeg's position is his concept of 
'convictional language'. 'Conviction' is 
chosen for Zuurdeeg 1 s purpose because of its 
Latin root, convince which means 'to overcome, to 
CDnque'r,. to· refute • I .• •. Jt brings OUt the fact 
that. the man ~ho.speaks of his God, of right or 
wro·ng, or- of something beautiful, is not describing 
_how' he 5eels, he ·is pointing to that which has 
'convicted' him. ~hat the conviction is ca~not 
be, a. matter of pers.onal taste: it depends on the 
nature of the 'convictor' . 
... ConVictions are -'sufficient gro~nds fer action'. 
From convictions decisions are made and life is 
governed. Convictional attitude is sui generis , .. 
~·· Convictional language is as much concerned to 
point to reality as is empirical language. 
(It) aims to deal-with .'the whole of reality', 
.whereas science· cCJnfesses that it deals only with 
certain relations ~etween certain kinds of facts, 
that is,.~ith'a part of reality . 
. No language can be free from coQvictions. .In 
science we ~ust extol objectivity b~cause only by 
objectivity. ·can science ·achieve its goals. Eut 
this~does not mean that scienti~ts are without 
convictions." (176) 
Zuurdeeg 1 s . "convict ional language" is of .course an attempt to 
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overcome the problem of what .logical positivism c~lls 'emotive 
language', .with its connotations of unimportance and subjectivism. 
~ut it is not an attempt to find another word for emotive l~nguage. 
·He beli-eves that it .is· possible to use· analytic philosophy to point 
to the nature and function of religious language as such, and 
believes that the term 11 convictional 11 serves this purpose . 
. In Chapter Three we argued that Niebuhr's methodological 
. . 
·essay. 11 Coherence, Incoherence, and Christian faith" would have been 
stren9thened had he made explicit the distinction between 'truth 
within·the tradition' and 'testing· the tradition' which is implicit 
in his methodology. His failure to do this leads to the kind of 
criticism·which Dray makes of his Faith and History: it~ can appear 
as though it has. defences against its overthrow built into it. 
What we have said about the convictional nature of religious 
language, and the need to distinguish between iritellectu~l openness 
and religious. conviction may help to clarify. Niebuhr 1 s method. We 
suspect, however, .that this will not satisfy Dray. For, at a funda-
mental level,· Dray's criticism is that the form Niebuhr's argument 
takes "makes it virtually impossible to challenge (his) providential 
.claims"; that is to say, the debate is not about the nature of 
Nie~uhr's argument but about providence. If this is the case, 
Niebuhr's response to scientist Lawrence Kubie is apposite: 11 lt J.s 
quite clear that for Kubie the meaning of life consi~ts in the 
promise. of history that scientific intelligence will gradually master 
everything. I think that faith is naive and he thinks my faith is 
incredible. I think we have the debate between historic-faith and the 
. "(177) Enlightenment in a nutshell there. 1 
Our discussion .of Niebuhr's theological method thus far has 
. been concerned with those c:ti tics who have sought to show that 'faith' 
is some sort of 'absolute' which Niebuhr introduces to resolve the 
problem of relativity inherent in his method. We. have concluded that 
Niebuhr is truly circular in that .he does not, in principle, preclude 
4 faith' from the testing_ and refining process. We have also pointed 
to· the distinction between intellectual openness and religious 
conviction, believing that this may help to clarify his method. 
One of the problems which occupied Niebuhr during his formative 
years at Union was the relation between a theology of revelatiQn and 
historical and religious relativity. -The manner in Which he 
resolves the problem is contained in his notion of the circular 
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relation between faith and experience. H. Richard Niebuhr dealt 
with the· problem more explicitly, . and in a systematic way in his 
The Meaning of Revelation (1943), and Reinhold has acknowledged his 
indebtedness to his brother in this regard. H. Rich Niebuhr's 
book aims at combining the insights of Troeltsch and Barth: "~t 
appears to me that the critical work of (Trceltsch) and the con-
structive work of {Barth) belong together." (l 7B} He therefore 
analyzes the manner in which revelation is unde~stocd within the 
community of the church, and argues inter 
nRelativism does not imply subjectivism or scepticism. 
It is net evident that the man who is forced to 
confess that his view of things is conditioned by 
the standpoint he occupies must doubt the reality 
of .what he sees. It is not apparent •... that one 
who understands hew all his experience is histori-
cally mediated must believe that nothing is mediated 
·through hi cry ... 
... . If the historical limitations of all thought 
about God demand that theology begin consciously 
with and in an historical community,. its limita-
tions as an inquiry into the nature and ob ct of 
faith require it to begin in faith and therefore. 1n 
a particular faith,. since there is no ether kind 
of faith." (179) 
Differences intemperament and interest account, no doubt, for 
the fact that Reinhold does net give a systematic treatment of the 
meaning of revelation as does hi~ brother. .Much of what is contai~ed 
in H. Richard's bock is assumed by Reinhold whose ethical and apolo-
getic interests lead him to c~ncentrate on an analysis and critique 
of modern culture in order to demonstrate the·adequacy of the 
Christian alternative. For th reason we believe it is necessary 
to ~ake a distinction of the sort we suggested in Chapter Three 
between 'truth within the tradition' and 'testing the tradition' 
in order to clarify what is implicit in Niebuhr's method . 
. There are two levels, the level of 'testing the tradition' 
and 'testing the truth w hin the traditibn 1 which are analagous 
to the world-view of the scientist and the ordinary operation of 
the scientist within that world-view. .What Niebuhr's critics are 
asking him to do is to use criteria which are only appropriate to 
the second in 'order to test the first, which even t scientist 
cannot do. In the matter of '.testing the tradition 1 or. the world-
view of the sc ntist there remain two levels, the one an intell.ec-
tual acknowledgement that this way of saying things is not absolute 
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and might one day be falsified 9 thought it is not presently possi-
ble to say by what means. The other is the level of conviction 
which leads Niebuhr to function at the level of 'truth within the 
tradition' or the scientist to carry on with his scientific 
endeavour. 
Having argued that on close analysis Niebuhr's method is truly 
circular 9 and that he does not inprinciple introduce 'faith' as 
some sort of 'absolute' which is immune from the relativizing 
process 9 we must now turn to his estimate of both tradition and 
contemporary experience and examine the extent to which he is pre-
pared to rely on his own method. 
(b) Towards Fuller Adeguation 
There .are aspects of Niebuhr's estimate of both tradition and 
experience which neither do justice to the tradition nor 'resonate' 
with contemporary experience. If authority in doctrine and ethics 
lies in the adequation between the tradition and contemporary 
experience, Niebuhr's estimate of both issues ia a failure in impor-
tant respects to provide that adequation whereby the tradition is 
validated for contemporary man 9 and thus to provide a basis for a 
relevant ethic. 
Niebuhr fails to include a major part of contemporary expe-
rience in that which he allows to test and refine the tradition; 
namely, the whole realm of nature and man's contemporary grappling 
IJ'!ith it. Niebuhr's definition of man as "radically free 11 9 while 
it may accord with contemporary thought 9 • does not do justice to 
the biblical-Christian tradition's estimate of man. The overall 
sense of pessimism about man's nature and history which one gains 
from Niebuhr's theology can be attributed to the fact that his 
~s a theologia crucis which enabled him to grapple with the issues 
of his time. But his pervading pessimism mutes that element in 
the tradition which is expres~ed in the Pauline text about the 
glory of our destiny~ "creation still retains the hope of being 
freed 9 like us 9 ••• to enjoy .•.. glory as the children of God. 
From the beginning till now the entire creation, as we know 9 has 
been groaning in one great act of giving birthi 
creation 9 but all of us • • • " (Rom. 8:.21-2 3) 
and not only 
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To gaih fuller adequation these jarring nates in Niebuhr's 
theology will need to be corrected,. and we now make same proposals 
concerning the way in which this may be done. 
(l) Towards a theology of nature: 
Niebuhr's attempt to take the natural sciences seriously 
caused him to propose a radical distinction between nature and 
history;, to assert that human history contains encounters between 
God and man, nature being. "quasi-autonomous". It is paradoxical 
that in his attempt to take the natural sciences seriously he 
'blocked aut' the whole realm of nature from his the6lagy and left 
himself ~itha~criteria for .grappling. with the issues of science 
and technology. The paradox is compounded by the fact that although 
it is possible to identify some of the reasons for the dichotomy 
between nature and history in Niebuhr's theology, in principle 
there is nothing in his. method which prevents him from embracing 
the whal~ realm of nature in that theology. 
We have suggested, for example, that Niebuhr's view of science 
led him to conclude that nature is "less open" to "divine inter-
vention" than the Biblic~l world-view presupposed. The treatment 
of the doctrine of Creat~on becomes highly symbolic under Niebuhr's 
hand, and turns aut to be a statement abaut·.mystery and meaning 
to which natural.and rational coherences.may point, and wh h the 
transcendent God of radical monotheism symbolizes. "Blind to good 
and evil, omnipotent matter ralls on its relentless way" may be the 
wards of Bertrand Russell but they express the sentim~nts of 
Reinhold Niebuhr, qualified only by his belief that "the processes 
of nature do not exhaust the final meaning of existence", and that 
nature is not omnipotent in Russell's sense but ''quasi-autonomous". 
As we saw in Chapter Three Niebuhr's attenuated,, view of providence 
is thus open to the charge that it is a 'God-of-the-gaps'-type in 
the Bonhoefferian sense that "what we call 'Gad' is being mare 
and mare edged out of life, lasing mare and more ground." 
Sa far as we can discover, there is however nothing in 
principle in Niebuhr's method which prevents him from including the 
realm of nature in his theology. First because he asserts that 
a "scientific and philosophical analysis of (the rational caherences 
of the world) is nat incapable of revealing ••• a profounder mystery 
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. (180) 
and mea ng beyond them." Taken at face value? c.,•J :rerne;.-
te~ing Niebuhr 1 s stri~tures against using 1 coherence 1 as a tee~ o~ 
tr•Jth, this statement can only mean that nature is "not incapablen 
of revealing God. Taken from his most methodologically explici-
essay, this statement wou seem to contr ict the proposal he 
makes in that same essay that a rad al dic~otomy between nature 
and history is necessary if apologetics is to find a way forward. 
o~ the one ha the proposal lends itself to the charge of dualism 
and of a 'God of the gaps 1 while, on the other hand his statement 
allows the possibility that nature is revelatory of God. 
The second reason why we believe that there is nothing in 
Nieb~hr 1 s method which precludes the embracing of nature in his 
theology lies in his understanding of history. History contains 
"symbols of transcendence", according to N buhr, and these symbols 
are not confined to the Heilgeschichte. This is perhaps Niebuhr 1 s 
bas presupposition about history: the Christ-event is the primary 
revelatory event but "there are moments in history which are more 
than mer~ historic moments; 
is fulfilled. 11 
for in them a whole course of history 
It is true that when Niebuhr speaks of history he usually 
means human history. But it is not clear to us why history shouli 
be thus confined. If nature has a history it must surely te 
possible to speak of nature 1 s history as containing symbols of 
transcendence in the way Niebuhr does of human history. 
How then can we explain Niebuhr 1 s ilure to embrace nature 
in his theology? For one whose formative years were spent in 
the shadow of the assembly line, who enjoyed owning a Model T Ford, 
and whose experiences of the early days of a travel were a source 
of delight, this failure is range indeed. It is true that the 
shadow cast by the assembly line had its dark side. The birth 
pains of the motor industry included poverty~ unemployment~ and 
labour exploitation. It may be that Niebuhr's negative attitude 
toward technology results from his grappling with these problems. 
Perhaps his failure to appreciate nature stems from his 
polemic against qsoft-utopianismu in all its varieties~ including 
a 1 scientism 1 which dressed itself in the guise of a 9 saviour 1 of 
contemporary society~ and used the prestige of science to sanctif~ 
partial perspectives. These strictures grant ~ it is diffic 
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to understand how a contemporary of Alfred North Whitehead failed 
to appreciate the latters' contribution as a philosopher of science. 
For as Victor Lowe 1 :c:ari interp:1reter of Whitehead, has said~ "The 
mathematician who, with Bertrand Russell, ·wrote PrinciQia Mathema-
tica, created in the late 1920's a new world v~ew which, like the 
world itself, was too-big and many sided to be grasped at once." (181) 
It is to Niebuhr's credit that his earliest book Does Civiliza-
tion Need Religion? (1927) contains appreciative references to 
Whitehead's work. A footnote in that book says: "Professor 
Alfred Whitehead, in his Science and the Modern World and Religion 
in the Making indicates the inevitable anti-mechanistic trend of 
philosophical thought as it achieves mastery of the varied fields 
of modern science." ( 182 ) In his earliest l:ilook, Niebuhr draws the 
conclusion from his reading of Whitehead that "no total view of 
reality can ev~r be permanently mechanistic, for new types of real-
ity do emerge and- science is able to explain only the process and 
(183) not the cause of their emergence.'' · It is our view that 
while Niebuhr does not speak of God in such terms as First Cause or 
Prime Mover, his understanding of God as the ultimate symbol of 
mystery and meaning, for which he finds warrant in the biblical 
tradition's u~derstanding of radical monotheism, is his attempt to 
build a bridge between the biblical understanding of God and the 
metaphyscial thought of Whitehead. 
It appears, however, that Niebuhr failed to grasp the impli-
cations of the dynamic view of the world which Whitehead 1 s thought 
helped to create. As Victnr Lowe says: 
"(·In his) Science and the Modern World (1925) Whitehead 
showed why it was important for all of us that the 
criticism and replacement of the Newtonian concepts 
should be carried beyond the immediate concerns of 
physical science. Newton's success had established 
the reign of what Whitehead called 'scientific 
materialism' - the mechanistic view of nature which 
resulted from .the work 6f the great seventeenth-
century scientists. Dualism was its immediate 
result~ the material world fitted this scheme bf 
ideas, values were outside it. But as the appli-
cation of the scheme increased, scientific material-
ism became a dominant force affecting morals, poli-
tics, poetry, the entire civilization of the occident . 
•.. Idealistic philosophers did not dethrone it; 
like orthodox theologians, they assumed that this 
was the final scientific truth about nature, and then 
strove to mitigate it by arguing that nature 
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presupposed something beyond nature •••• In the 
twentieth century, however, scientific materialism 
broke up from the inside: 'What is the sense of 
talking about a mechanical explanation when you do 
not know what you mean by mechanics?' wrote 
Whitehead. 'The only way of mitigating mechanism 
is by the discovery that it is not mechanism.' 
Could not the dualism be overcome at last by some 
new conception of. the nature of. things, which would 
express the aesthetic and purposive character of 
immediate experience at the same time that it 
provided a more adequa~e frame of reference, 
basically neither mechanistic nor materialistic, 
for natural science?" (184) 
By the time Niebuhr wrote his Gifford Lectures his apprecia-
tion of Whitehead is severely qualified 9 and ref&emes to him appear 
1n the chapter "The IDptimism of Idealism'' wh~ch describe Whitehead 
as "a striking example 11 of "idealistic optimism". One can only 
conclude from this that Niebuhr identified Whitehead with the 
'soft-utopianism' which he sought to contest, and that he failed 
to appreciate that a dynamic view of the world does not necessarily 
carry this implication as we showed in relation to our discussion 
of Teilhard 1 s view of evil in Chapter Three. 
In the final analysis the reason for Niebuhr's failure to 
embrace a ~ynamic view of nature, and his reduction of nature to 
the amphi-theatre in which the drama of God 1 s encounters with man 
in human history is played out, must remain a mystery which'cannot 
be explained. It may be that Niebuhr's thorough-going pragma-
tism, and his concern for the moral issues of his time, enabled him 
to live with the uneasy dualism which is the consequence of his 
distinction between nature and human history and, as his earliest 
book suggests, to "accept at least a qualified dualism" because 
"it is morally more potent than traditional monism." 
In a paradoxical way Niebuhr's determination to take "the 
various sciences seriously" fails to reap the promise implicit in 
that determination; namely, a theology which embraces nature in 
its scope. It leads him instead to distinguish nature from 
history "however much history may have a natural base", and does 
not recognize ~hat nature itself has a history. 
To move beyond Niebuhr towards a theology which embraces 
nature it will be necessary to marry what has become divorced in 
his method. In theological terms this me.ans that we must bring 
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together the doctrines of Creation and Redemption and interpret 
them in a manner which includes both natural and human history seen 
1n dynamic perspective. 
In the matter of, how we understand 1 a theology of nature', 
Ian Barbour's description may p~ovide a starting point: it is 
"an attempt to view nature in a theological perspective derived 
from religious experience and historical events." Barbour 
suggests that the work of process philosophers Whitehead and 
Teilhard de Chardin can contribute to such a theology. "I submit 
that the idea of a God of persuasion is consistent not only with 
the contemporary understanding of nature but also with the God of 
love known in religious experience and in the worshipping commu-
nity." (lBS} Such a view would certainly mitigate the attenuated 
view of pxovidence which is the consequence of Niebuhr's notion of 
a "quasi-autonomous" nature, and, by implication the "quasi-
autonomous" character of history as 'drama'. 
We cannot here enter into the consequences of a theology of 
nature of the sort Barbour proposes. No doubt the questions for 
theology raised by such an attempt are large and important ones, 
not the least of~ which being whether such an attempt does not 
involve us in a new kind of monism which identifies God with the 
world and which obscures the tension between transcendence and 
immanence which Nieb4hr sought strenuously to hold. 
We have s that to move towards a theology of nature it 
will be necessary to bring together the doctrines of Creation and 
Redemption, and to re-interpret these in dynamic terms. We believe 
that the Resurrection is that symbol in Christian theology which 
will enable us to do this. It may well be that the difficulties 
we discerned in Niebuhr's handling of the Resurrection can be 
attributed to his distinction between nature and history. He 
sees the Resurrection as that symbol in Christian theology which 
enables faith to hope· "for an eternity which transfigures, but 
does not annul the temporal process." Since by history Niebuhr 
normally means human history we must understand the hope of a 
transfigured but not annulled "temporal process" expressed in the 
Resurrection symbol to apply only to human history. But this 
to atrophy the Resurrection as it is understood in the· N~w Testament 
where it has strong cosmic significance. 
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The significance for the whole created .order which the 
Resurrection signified for Paul - 11 that the universe, all in 
heaven and on earth, might be brought into a unity in Christ" 
(Eph. 1:10), is attributable to the Hebraic totality view of human 
nature according to John Cumpsty. He writes: 
"Paul as a Jew, .•. as M. E. Dahl has shown, held a 
totality view of human nature in spite of the 
dualist language he uses to his predominantly 
Gentile readers. If then Jesus lived after 
death, as for Paul he did, then Paul must have 
believed the tomb empty; sown a natural body 
and raised a spiritual body, but nevertheless 
raised. (It) is the only view consistent 
with a unitive concept of man; man formed of 
the dust of the ground and caused to live by the 
breath of God. Now if you believe that man is 
dust of the ground, matter caused to live and 
re-live though transformed, then you are led to 
recognize the possibility of cosmic redemption; 
new heavens and new earth yes, but in the sense 
of transformed not made afresh; all things summed 
up and given eternal significance. With cosmic 
redemption the radical discontinuity between this 
world and the next disappears. To retain 
a unitive viewr of: man and to press on to its 
further possibility in terms of cosmic redemption 
(was Paul's intention)". {186) 
As Cump y goes on to say, redemption has become too commonly 
~dentified with the survival of individuals and we too readily for-
get that most of the New Testament world believed in such survival, 
including some Jews, and to them Resurrection simply interpreted 
as a sign of survival would hardly have been 1 good news'. It is as 
the rembval of ·the last question mark set against the absolute 
Lordship of Yahweh - the question mark of death and decay ~that the 
Resurrection must be understood, and therefore John can say in the 
same breath 11 in Him is life and without Him was not anything made 
IS 
that was made". The dichotomy between salvation and creation~ 
overcome because it is now seen that the Ruler of history and nature 
can now reach into this flux of change and decay and preserve to 
Himself eternally that which He values. 
' 
The Creation therefore in 
the Resurrection ·has a new status; it is eternally significant. 
With this understanding of the Resurrection we can understand 
James Stewart's word: 11 In this cosmic event ... God was doing 
something comparable only with what He had done at the first crea-
tion. . .. Resurrection meant that the world had died in the night 
and had been reborn." {lB7) 
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There are problems relating to any attempt to give credsnce 
to Resurrection today, but it is not apparent that such a project 
is impossible. It is not inconceivable that the modern view of 
nature, ~hile it differs from the Hebraic, can en le us to find 
a way of interpreting the Resurrection which does justice to its 
New Testament significance as the rsign 1 of cosmic redemption, 
and correlates with a dynamic view of nature expressed in the 
process thought of Whitehead in such phrases as: 11 the things 
whi~h are temper arise by their participation in the things 
which are eternal'', and the view th the fundament characteris-
tic of nature is "passage" or "creative advance". (188) 
If the Resurrection enabled the New Testament writers to 
assert the Lordship of Ch st over matter, a re-interpretat n 
of the Resurrection today may help us to assert the Lordship of 
Chr t over an evolving, but not inevitably progressing process, 
The blems posed by such a project are no doubt tremendous and 
beyond our scope here. We nevertheless wish to indicate that 
if Creat n and Redemption are to be brought together, and if 
theology to find a way of viewing nature more adequately than 
Niebuhr's does, it must look to the Resurrection as that symbol 
in Christian ith w~ich may enable us to do th 
(ii} Man's Essence As 'Dionity 1 
It is d ficult to know whether Niebuhr's definition of man 
in terms of "radical freedom 11 a cause or a consequence of his 
distinction between nature and history. What is certain is that 
r Niebuhr 11 freedom distinguishes man from the realm of nature", 
as one of his interpreters puts it. (lB 9 ) N buhr makes this clear 
h h · 1 11 • f lf d t · t · 11 (lgO) wen e wrltes: man s essence lS ree se - e.ermlna lDn • 
Ultimately Niebuhr would have to disagree with Sartre 1 s dictum 
Opto ergo .§..!dL!l- "man is nothing else but what he makes himself"" 
But it is only in the ultimate sense that the ''mystery of man's 
freedom' is derived from God. that Niebuh:r 1 s notion of man 1 s ."unique 
and radical freedom" differs from S~rtrevs. As we have seen, 
the "mystery of creation" according to Niebuhr represents in some 
ultimate sense the mystery of freedom so that the created order 
is free ( 11 quasi-autonoFJlllous 11 ) and man is also free vis..§. vis the 
Creatdr. Both the natural world and man have a 1 provisional 
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freedom' from God while being bound to Him in some ultimawsense 
as Creator. Thus for all Niebuhr's statement that man is 
radically free, he comes nowhere near 5artre 1 s position that man 
creates his own good and his own bad, 
to obey or disobey. 
Man, for Niebuhr, is free 
According to Ronald Stone the roots of Niebuhr's doctrine of 
freedom can be traced to Heidegger and Kierkegaard, "Of particular 
importance to Niebuhr was Heidegger's view of man as the creature 
which reaches beyond itself, beyond its environment, beyond its 
time, and beyond its reason. Niebuhr's debt to Kierkegaard, 
particularly to Begriff der Angst, is obvious in·The Nature and 
Destiny of Man. The anxiety which Kierkegaard called 'the dizzi-
ness of freedom' contains the possibility of choosing false gods 
or the true God. Like Kierkegaard, Niebuhr argues that no 
explanation but the affirmation that sin posits itself is suffi-
cient to account for man's inevitable free choice of 
of his existence." (l 9l) 
lse centres 
The contemporary crisis may also help to explain the roots 
of Niebuhr's doctrine of freedom. Fot it ~nabled him to vindicate 
divine sovereigny and to locate evil in human history in the corrup-
tion of man's freedom. If man's freedom is derived from God, the 
corruption of that freedom - man's sin - cannot be attributed to 
God. On the contrary superbia, the quintessence of sin, is man's 
abandoment of God as his "true end" and the making of himself a 
"~ind of end". Believing that the contemporary crisis was of the 
same order as that which prompted Augustine's The City of God, 
Niebuhr's theodicy is Augustinian and his theology a theologia 
crucis which interprets the Incarnation in soteriological terms. 
He shares with Augustine the thought expressed in the ancient 
Easter liturgy: "0 Felix culpa quae talem ac tantum meriut habere 
redemptorem", which John Hick translates as "0 fortunate crime 
(or, 0 happy fault), which merited(to have) such and so great a 
redeemer." (lg 2 ) 
Despite his acknowledged indebtedness to Luther, Niebuhr's 
estimate- of ~an as radically free does not reflect well his 
Lutheran heritage. The classic debate between Luther and Erasmus 
concerning man's freedom and his dignity serves to illustrate 
this. For although Niebuhr saw his role in the debate between 
faith and reason - the essence of the Luther-Erasmus conflict -
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to be a defence of the faith against charges of incredulity and an 
attack on naiv~ assumptions about reason, in the ·matter of his 
estimate of man he fails to reflect Luther's emphasis on man's 
dignity as a child of God. Heinrich Bornkamm describes the issue 
between Erasmus and Luther' on the matter of freedom in the following 
way: 
"( asmus attacked) Luther at that point where 
C holic and humanistic lines. of thought met: 
~amely, in the problem of free will.· In his work 
De libero arbitrio (1524) the dogmatic solution of 
th~ problem was of no concern to him. • .. It was 
not the question as such that interested him, but 
rather the moral consequences of the denial of free 
will. . .. With his reply De servo arbitrio (1525) 
•.. Luther .•. was not only concerned with the 
moral consequences, but the question itself was of 
~ital importance to him: the question of human free-
dom, seen from the perspective of the reality of 
God. Only this kind of freedom was his concern, 
not the philosophical question of determinism 1 the 
possibility of making a free choice in matters of 
every day life. • .. " (193) 
The significance we draw from this discussion is that Erasmus, 
the humanist, with his relatively optimistic view of the human 
situation believes that man's dignity requires th he have such 
freedom as to enable him to obey or disobey the commands of God. 
For Luther, man's dignity does not lie in any immediate sense in 
his freedom; he is either in bondage to sin or bondage to Christ. 
The dignity of man lies.in God's purpose for him. So great is 
this purpose that by contrast man's present position might be 
likened to a drowning man in the midst of the sea who needs to 
be rescued not dignified with the belief that he can swim. 
We conclude that there were ways open to Niebuhr to interpret 
human dignity either than as "radically free" and as "sinner" which 
led to the theologia crucis and the divide between nature and 
history. The consequences of Niebuhr's estimate of man should 
not, however, minimize his achievement if we remember that it was 
in an age when "scientific materialism" still pr aminated, and 
in a world shaken by crisis, that he sought to interpret man's 
nature in term~ of freedom and sin. 
If we describe man's essence as 'dignity' rather than 'freedom' 
the consequences of Niebuhr's estimate can be overcome and we can 
reflect more accurately than he was able to the richer estimate 
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of man contained in the biblical-Christian tradition. In this 
regard, Herbert Richardson has given to the word 'dignity' a 
meaning which may prove helpful for our understanding of man. 
Richardson argues that we do not have a term which des-
cribes that elusive and yet fundamental property of a person 
which the Hebrew word kabod ('glory') denotes, and that the 
closest we can come to it is in the word 'dignity'. The follo-
wing passage indicates the tenor of Richardson's argument: 
"Let us attempt to understand the meaning of 'dignity' 
by considering a Hebrew concept which is similar to 
it, the concept of kabcid (usually tra~slated as 
'glory'). The kabod of God is not His nature 
Nor is God's kabod His very existence, for the 
word kabod cannot be used as a proper name. 
Rather, God's kabod is the weightiness, heaviness, 
degree, or dignity proper to being who He is . 
. .. Dignity is the basis of authority. It is what 
gives weight to words, i.e., turns them into 
commands. • .. Dignity is th~ basis of tragedy. 
It is what gives life importance and redeems it 
from ,triviality. • . • Dignity is the basis. of 
meaning •..• Even though life may have meaning, 
it may not have dighity • 
•.. Dignity is a formal notion, and its material 
content can vary from case to case. A learned 
judge has kabod; so does a monarch. A man 
receives kabod from a good wife, and children may 
bring honour and glory to their parents." {194) 
While it would take us beyond the scope of this essay to 
pursue Richardson's line of argument, it is illuminating to note 
its context. He argues that the theme of the glory of God is 
an emphasis in American theology which needs to be recovered today. 
It is intrinsic to that theological perspective which strives "to 
have God's purpose for creation actually be realized in the world 
- a desire to actualize eschatological holiness in space and time. 
Such a perspective implies that the fundamental theological 
question is cur creatio. n (l 9S) As such it is a theologia 
gloriae rather than a theologia crucis: a theology which can 
however do full justice to the person and work of Christ. 
Richardson's notion of 'dignity' may help us to move towards 
an estimate of man which does greater justice to the biblical-
Christian tradition than Niebuhr's seems to do. Whereas Niebuhr 
sought to i~terpret the imago dei in terms of man's freedom and 
the corrup~ion of that freedom of sin ('original sin'), we believe 
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that the imago .Q.ti can be understood in terms of 'dignity'. That 
· is to say, Gad gives man kabad when He creates and redeems him. 
And man's chief end is to bring glary and honour to Gad. Such 
a view would affirm man's dignity without denying his capacity to 
sin. Man is free to obey or disobey, to bring glary to Gad or 
nat to do so. Such an estimate of man would do justice to that 
vision of the dignity of man which Luther expressed. 
The notion of kabod enables us to speak of God as ascribing 
to man an essential "weightiness" and 11 dignity 11 in creation, and 
to speak of man's individual and collective destiny as bringing 
glory and honour to God. It can do so without denying what is 
signified in the 'original sin' symbol; namely that man fails 
•to do this and makes of himself a 11 kind of end" (Niebuhr). The 
imago dei signifies man's essence as dignity without denying his 
sin. The ct that God in Christ redeems man is further expression 
of the essential dignity which God ascribes to man. 
It . possible to speak of the "weightiness" and 11 digni ty 11 
which God as Creator gives to the whole realm of nature and man's 
place in it. This is what a theolagia gloriae seeks to do. 
But it is possible to do this without lasing what is expressed in 
a theologia crucis; namely that God in Christ is Redeemer. The 
difficulty we have with Richardson is that, in his argument, he 
seems to suggest that we much choose a theology of glory.~ a 
theology of the Cross. If theology is to bring together Creation 
and Redemption,-and to see these as embracing man and nature, it 
must look to the Resurrection - understood in its New Testament 
cosmic sense. For it is surely in the Resurrection that Creation 
is given an eternal significance which Redemption makes it possible 
to realize - "to have Gad's purpose far creation realized in the 
warld 11 (Richardson). A theology of Resurrection will help us to 
affirm the 'dignity' (kabad or glary) of the created order, without 
denying the reality of sin and the need far redemption. 
We summarize our discussion and its implications by asking 
whether Niebuhr's estimate of man's essence as "free self-determi-
nation" does justice to the imago dei symbol {11 It's freedom is 
a radical one. In the words of Pascal, the 'dignity of man 
and his misery 1 have the same source'!) Surely the imago dei 
symbol expresses man's essence as the dignity which God gives him 
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both in creation and redemption: a dignity which embraces not 
only his freedom but his destiny also. Dignity not only pre-
supposes freedom, it also describes that destiny which man's free-
dom enables him to choose. 
The significance for social ethics of a description of man's 
essence in terms of dignity is that it provides us with a 'model 
of man' which embraces destiny. As such it gives to man's 
contemporary grappling a purpose which .freedom itself does not 
give. 
To speak of man's essence as dignity is to .affirm that history 
has a destiny which man can realize, without denying the morally 
ambiguous character of history which Niebuhr asserted. For the 
conclusion which Niebuhr draws from the morally ambiguous character 
of history is that we achieve "a tolerable life in a kind of 
confusion of purposes, which is better than the organization of 
the whole resources of a community for the acheivement of false 
ends." This, writes Reubem Alves, 11 is to come to the. bitter 
conclusion that there is ho hope for hi~tory 11 , for there is (in 
Niebuhr) a "profound pessimism" which does not recognize "the 
possibility of tirganizing the whole resources of a community for 
the achievement of true ends." "Social creativity is dismissed 
as either a utopian dream or an idealogical demon, with its 
ultimate roots in man's selfishness and self-deception." (lg 6 ) 
While we would want to emphasize the 1 social creativity' of 
Niebuhr's stress on individual and collective self-interest at a 
time when notions of the 'inevitabi+ity of progress' were rife, 
there is substance in Alves' charge. We would, however, suggest 
that the reason for Niebuhr's pessimism is to be found in his 
stress on radical freedom, rather than in his stress on sin. For 
men do sin, and this is Niebuhr's outstanding contribution that 
he pointed to the dimensions of that sin for collective life. 
But to say that man is created free is not the same as saying man 
is created with dignity and a destiny which embraces freedom. To 
define man's essence as dignity, in the manner we have outlined, 
would enable us to identify the true ends which the whole resources 
of a community may achieve, without denying man's capacity for 
creating false ends, and without affirming the 'absurdity' of 
science and technology or the 'absurdity'of power as Alves seems 
to do. (197 } 
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CONCLUSION 
While there are aspects of Niebuhr's theology which neither 
do justice to the tradition, nor 'resonate' with contemporary 
experience - and therefore constitute a failure to fulfill the 
promise of his theological method - we have sought to shaw that 
this failure is one of 'estimate' rather than method. It is 
thus a failure in the degree to which he was able to rely an his 
awn method. In a paradoxical way his 'failures of estimate' 
vindicate his method. Far the 'circularity' intrinsic to his 
method prevents partial perspectives from becoming absalutized and 
provides the means of testing and refining them that the~ may be 
corrected; that we may move towards a fuller adequation between 
tradition and experience. 
If there is one lesson we do well to learn from Reinhold 
Niebuhr it is that we will nat validate Christian faith, or 
derive criteri'a for social choice, except in the interplay between 
tradition and experience. A theology which embraces nature within 
its scope, and which holds before man a vision of his dignity, may 
be better able to validate itself and to provide criteria far 
social choice in the face of the problems and possibilities of our 
time. 
In the theological method of Reinhold Niebuhr we learn that 
authority in doctrine and ethics lies in the adequation between 
the truth revealed in the tradition, and the realities of contem-
porary experience. Men may be grasped by the adequation between 
them, and directed in their 'care of the world' by the Gad who 
reveals Himself in bath tradition and experience. Authority lies 
in that adequation - 11 it is what gives weight to wards, that is, 
turns them into camma.nds 11 • It is the authority men felt in the 
presence of Jesus: 
11 The people were astounded at his teaching, far, 
unlike the doctors of law, he taught with a nate 
of authority." (Mark 1:22) 
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